WORKS IN PROGRESS: HISTORY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND TEXTUALITY IN THE FICTION OF JAMES JOYCE

By

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WORKS IN PROGRESS: HISTORY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND
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In this study I examine the ways in which the formal properties of Joyce's texts (as well as explicit statements in those texts) imply a de-centered conception of subjectivity as profoundly social and a critical view of history as endless flux without telos. Both of these characteristics of Joyce's fiction can be related to his fundamental conception of language as continuously generating meaning in social and historical context rather than as containing the fixed intentional meaning of its author as theological originator of discourse. In Hegel's teleological view, history is the process through which the mind discovers itself. But to Joyce there is no pre-existing self to be discovered. His texts undertake a radical critique of idealism in any form, undermining the notion of Hegelian teleological history or of a Kantian transcendental subject.

Employing a multi-disciplinary mode of inquiry, I establish an intertextual dialogue involving Joyce's major texts and a number of figures from diverse fields such as literature, philosophy, science, psychology, and critical theory. Particularly prominent among these figures are Friedrich Nietzsche and Mikhail Bakhtin as examples of the kind of thought embodied in Joyce's work, while Augustine, Kant, and Hegel stand as important

representatives of the kind of thought that Joyce's texts seek to undermine. Especially important literary intertexts range from Dante to Shakespeare to Thomas Pynchon. The overall result of my work is a reading of Joyce that shows his texts to support a program of radical political activism, historical engagement, and anti-elitism--a view almost diametrically opposed to most received ideas about modernist literature.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: HOW JOYCE CAME TO BE A POLITICAL WRITER

Literary reputations come and go, often evolving in strange and unpredictable ways, especially over long periods of time as tastes and perspectives change. In the late eighteenth century the redoubtable Dr. Samuel Johnson dismissed Laurence Sterne's most famous work by noting, "Nothing odd will do long. *Tristram Shandy* did not last" (*Hill and Powell* ii.449). However, Johnson's reports of the death of Sterne's novel were (like those of the death of Mark Twain in 1897) greatly exaggerated. In our own century, in fact, there seems to have been a growing trend toward the privileging of oddness in literature, and it comes as no surprise amidst this trend that *Tristram Shandy* has been restored to life. Twentieth-century readers, living in a world that is itself increasingly peculiar, seem to have developed a rapidly growing ability to absorb even the most startling of literary innovations with relative ease and comfort. Thus the shocking and subversive formal experiments of James Joyce--at least they were *meant* to be shocking and subversive--have been assimilated into the modern intellectual mainstream to such an extent that Joyce is now often considered *the* central figure in twentieth-century literary history. Joyce now probably gets more critical ink than anybody except Shakespeare, leading Edward Mendelson to refer to the activities of Joyce scholars as the "enormous multinational operations of the IG Joyce cartel" (171).

The appropriation of Joyce by the intellectual powers-that-be is highly understandable, since the best way to counter a voice as powerful and as radical as Joyce's is may be simply to claim that it isn't really all that radical after all. Brian Stonehill summarizes this development: "For his violations of literary propriety, society has taken its revenge upon James Joyce by making him respectable" (48). Indeed, after a few initial outcries of indignation, the history of Joyce criticism has largely consisted of a concerted attempt to tame his work and to make it fit within traditional frameworks. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer discuss the history of this critical strategy of assimilation, identifying Pound and Eliot in the vanguard of conservative appropriators of Joyce. They note, however, that *Finnegans Wake* still remains largely unrecuperated, despite Joyce's own efforts to stimulate commentary (such as the *Our Exagmination* studies) that would render it intelligible (4-6).

The comments of Attridge and Ferrer are important for two reasons. First they indicate the way in which *Finnegans Wake*, as the last fully undomesticated Joycean text, now plays a crucial role in any attempt to appreciate just how revolutionary Joyce's work really was.[1] But they also indicate the way in which poststructuralist critics have attempted to answer the establishment appropriation of Joyce by attempting their own counter-appropriation. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the history of critical assimilation of Joyce is the way in which that assimilation has been undertaken by so many disparate elements. Initially reviled by all but a small intellectual/artistic elite, Joyce is now the golden boy of everybody from vestigial New Critics to deconstructionist philosophers to French radical feminists.

Joyce Among the Marxists

The mechanics of this process are nowhere more fascinating than in the history of Joyce's relationship to Marxism and to politically-based criticism in general. One of the most often cited of Joyce's many notorious personal statements has been his own ostensibly curt dismissal of any concern with politics: "Don't talk to me about politics," he reportedly told his brother Stanislaus. "I'm only interested in style" (quoted in Ellmann, "Introduction" xix). For years critics seemed to take Joyce at his word, reading his work as being strictly apolitical. In the heyday of the New Criticism this assessment was high praise for many, but it certainly brought Joyce few fans among Marxist critics. Early on, especially after the publication of *Ulysses*, Joyce was singled out by many Marxists as a sterling example of everything that was wrong with modernist literature and even with capitalist society in general. Perhaps the most famous of these early Marxist attacks on Joyce was the polemic delivered by Karl Radek at the 1934 Congress of Soviet Writers. Radek reviles Joyce for concentrating on scatological trivialities while ignoring the issues that are truly important for worldwide revolution. He acknowledges Joyce's prominence calling him (along with Proust) a "hero of contemporary bourgeois literature" (152), but describes Joyce's work as "[a] heap of dung, crawling with worms, photographed by a cinema apparatus through a microscope" (153). To Radek, Joyce's view is so narrow that "for him the whole world lies between a cupboardful of medieval books, a brothel and a pothouse" (154).

Radek's declaration of Joyce as bourgeois hero correctly anticipates the role that Joyce would come to play for many in the Western literary establishment. And his analysis of *Ulysses* is also particularly illustrative of the kind of misinformation that seems to follow Joyce everywhere. For example, at one point he notes that the action of the book takes place in 1916, whereupon he complains that Joyce's "Blooms and Daedaluses" seem unaffected by events in the Irish insurrection during Easter of that year (153).[2]

Still, Radek's attack on Joyce, misinformed though it may be, is representative of a typical Marxist attitude toward Joyce that obtained for years to come.[3] While it is true that there was some defense of Joyce at the Writers' Congress (notably by Wieland Herzfelde), Radek's view reigned supreme to the point that it became politically impossible to praise Joyce in print in the Soviet Union for at least the next three decades.[4] The Marxist opposition to Joyce was based on two oddly contradictory objections to his work. On the one hand, some Marxists objected to the extreme realism of Joyce's work, seeing it as such a direct depiction of bourgeois society that it must somehow be implicated in the values of that society. Even V. Gertsfelde, who in 1934 was unusually sympathetic, suggested that Joyce's work is a "direct result of the capitalist system, the details of which Joyce presents so profusely without ever revealing the forces at work behind the scenes" (617).

On the other hand, other Marxists reviled Joyce for his solipsistic turning away from realism in the interest of emphasis on his own technique. This attitude, typical of that of important figures such as Lukács toward modernism in general, also took the form of an attack on

Joyce's fascination with interior states of the individual subject at the expense of any concept of communality. In particular, this emphasis was seen to contribute to the gap between subject and object that creates the profound alienation of the self in modern captialist society. Clearly Joyce, having been idenitified as a target, was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Such normative critics already had in mind a notion of what proletarian literature was supposed to be, and Joyce's fiercely non-didactic work just wasn't it.[5]

But while Stalinist Russia was thus attempting to protect itself from contamination through Joyce's evil influence, forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain were hard at work trying to effect that very contamination. Thus Huyssen notes the way in which modernism was "domesticated" for such purposes in the fifties and "turned into a propaganda weapon in the cultural-political arsenal of Cold War anti-communism" (190).[6] For example, rumor has it that the United States Central Intelligence Agency apparently accepted *in toto* the arguments of Radek, Lukács and others that works such as those of Joyce were counter-revolutionary, promptly producing its own Russian language edition of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* for seditious distribution within the Soviet Union.

Yet even in such early days there were indications that these early "vulgar" Marxist attitudes toward both Joyce and modernism were less than unanimous. Leon Trotsky argued early on that normative concepts such as "proletarian literature" were highly dangerous, representing a denial of history because they forced the culture of the future to conform to a static notion derived from the culture of the present. To be effective,

argued Trotsky, art must be allowed to pursue its own course apart from pre-conceived notions of acceptability, and as evidence for his case he cited the utter mediocrity of the literature produced under strict Stalinist control.[7]

Meanwhile, outside the Soviet Union, Marxist commentators such as Theodor Adorno began to argue that the difficult, obscure texts of modernism performed the salutary function of forcing readers out of the patterns of conditioned response into which modern capitalist society had driven them. Adorno particularly privileges technical innovations such as the twelve-tone system of Schoenberg for their ability to shock listeners out of the numbness brought about by modern popular culture. The music of Schoenberg forces a new level of participation on the listener, leading to what at first appears to be the kind of subjective internalization for which early Marxist critics attacked Joyce. But, as Fredric Jameson explains in his discussion of Adorno, Schoenberg drives the subjective so far that in the final analysis subjective and objective are reunited:

> Thus, in a situation where subjective and objective have begun to split apart, Schoenberg's originality was to have driven the subjective and expressionistic to its outer limit, to the point at which the nerve-pictures and traumata of the latter slowly veer, under the pressure of their own internal logic, into the new objectivity, the more total order, of the twelve-tone system. (*Marxism* 31)

These comments on Schoenberg clearly point the way to a possible absolution of Joyce from charges that his emphasis on subjectivity contributes to the phenomenon of alienation, and it is precisely Joyce whom Jameson produces as an example of the way in which the interaction

of multiple levels of meaning can provide a linguistic analogue to Schoenberg's twelve-tone system of music. Moreover, Jameson goes on to suggest that the progressive development of Joyce's writing practice "toward something which transcends both style and pastiche altogether and which, like the twelve-tone system in the musical realm, may stand as a distant representation of some future linguistic organization of a postindividualistic character" (*Marxism* 34).[8]

Jameson himself is representative of the sort of contemporary Marxist critics whose work has done so much to rehabilitate Joyce from the exile imposed upon him by Stalinism. As a counter to those who would criticize Joyce on the one hand for his bourgeois subject matter or on the other for an emphasis on form so intense that his subject matter is rendered irrelevent, Jameson would argue that content and form are simply not separable in this way. To Jameson form itself is intensely political, and "it is possible to grasp such formal processes as sedimented content in their own right, as carrying ideological messages of their own, distinct from the ostensible or manifest content of the works" (*Political* 99). To Jameson style *is* politics, so Joyce's claim to be interested only in style does not make him so apolitical as would first appear.

Indeed, Jameson's comments on form as content seem particularly applicable to the work of Joyce, about whom one of the most famous statements ever made was Samuel Beckett's claim that in *Finnegans Wake* "form *is* content, content *is* form. . . . His writing is not *about* something; *it is that something itself*" ("Dante" 14, Beckett's emphases).[9] This notion is also related to Pierre Macherey's argument

that critics should pay exclusive attention to neither style nor content of a work, but instead should study the conditions of the work's production. Such study involves careful consideration of form, but must also acknowledge contextual influences that contribute to the shaping of the work and determine its "conditions of possibility" (41).[10]

Macherey is particularly critical of normative critics who would come to a text with an idealized expectation of what it should be in order to measure the text against that expectation. Such approaches deprive the text of the dynamic power that derives from the interaction and clash of different discourses within the text. Macherey notes the way in which literary language is influenced by the other discourses (scientific, theoretical, everyday speech) that surround it in its historical moment. Indeed, much of the ideological power of literature comes from the way in which its language is able to mimic and parody these other discourses: "Mingling the real uses of language in an endless confrontation, it concludes by *revealing* their truth. Experimenting with language rather than inventing it, the literary work is both the analogy of a knowledge and a caricature of customary ideology" (59). Literary discourse is not about "reality," then, so much as it is about language itself; it is "a contestation of language rather than a representation of reality" (61).

All language to Macherey is ideological, because there is no possibility of a "pure" artistic language that is uncontaminated by the discourses that surround it: "there is no first, independent, innocent language" (45). Joyce, with his profound awareness of the inherited nature of all the language at his disposal and his texts that exist quite

explicitly as assembled extractions from a variety of discourses, would seem to provide the ideal demonstration of Macherey's contentions. Moreover, Macherey's emphasis on the mechanics of production would in general seem to privilege the kind of reflexive, self-conscious texts (like Joyce's) that show their own awareness of such mechanics, and it is no accident that one of Macherey's favorite examples is Borges.

The critical environment associated with Marxists such as Macherey and Jameson coincides with a general shift in the attitude toward Joyce among many Marxists. Spurred by the combination of Joyce's frequent references to contemporary political issues and of the radically experimental nature of his writing, politically-oriented critics have come more and more to see a subversive political potential in his work. Joyce's texts are powerfully antithetical to totalitarian ideologies of all kinds, expressing a direct contempt for authoritarianism both in their subject matter and in their refusal to succumb to univocal methods of interpretation. Critics of various vaguely avant-garde persuasions have thus often adopted Joyce as a generalized anti-reactionary figure, as illustrated by Philippe Sollers' assertion that *Finnegans Wake* is "the most formidably anti-fascist book produced between the two wars" (109).

Joyce's political rehabilitation, like his original condemnation, has been approached on the dual fronts of style and content. As early as 1936, James T. Farrell responded to attacks such as Radek's by asserting that one could not judge the political import of Joyce's work apart from a consideration of his intense antagonism toward the twin nemeses of Irish nationalism and the Irish Catholic Church. To Farrell, this opposition gives Joyce's work a definite political force which Radek

might appreciate had he not "so philistine a viewpoint" (102). Further, Farrell suggests that *Ulysses* broke so much new ground that any future novel that might satisfy Radek's criteria for political acceptability would almost surely turn out to have profited significantly from Joyce's example (102-6).

Yet the constant presence of such specifically Irish political issues in Joyce's work has received surprisingly little attention over the years. Joyce's opposition to the Church has been viewed as being either too narrow (as a purely personal issue) or too abstract (as a broadly philosophical one) to be genuinely political, and some have even taken the appropriation of Joyce to the extent of claiming that he was a pro-Catholic writer, despite the constant and furious assault on Catholicism carried out in his work. Robert Boyle, S. J., has produced a book-length study of the influence of Pauline philosophy on Joyce. Boyle makes a gesture at even-handedness by suggesting that Joyce was neither "wholeheartedly pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic" (78), but spends his entire book trying to demonstrate affinities between Joyce and Catholic thinking. There is no question that Joyce's mind was heavily influenced by his Jesuit upbringing, and there are features of Joyce's writing practice that indeed make it possible to find Catholic (or just about any other) affinities in his general attitude should one be sufficiently motivated to do so. But it will be my position throughout this study that Joyce (or at least Joyce's *work*, which is my real interest) is, in fact, wholeheartedly anti-Catholic, as well as anti-theological, and that both God and Church function consistently in Joyce as figures of tyranny and oppression.

Joyce's dialogue with Irish nationalism has similarly received surprisingly little attention as a political statement, with most observers focussing on Joyce's interest in Parnell as a case of individual hero-worship that had very little to do with politics. As late as 1972 Phillip Herring was claiming that Joyce's interest in Irish political issues was provincial and near-sighted, motivated strictly by personal interests. In fact, Herring claims that Joyce regarded attempts at Irish political reform to be not only hopeless, but undesirable as well:

> At this point one might well call Joyce's politics reactionary. Ireland's continued progress was a direct threat to him because it undercut the legitimacy of his prolonged exile, made it more difficult to defend, and, further, threatened to obscure his gallery of paralytic portraits, to date them as the product of a particular era of Ireland's past. ("Joyce's Politics" 5-6)

Herring then goes on to declare, however, that Joyce is worthwhile strictly on the basis of his artistic genius in spite of (or perhaps, one suspects, because of) his disinterest in politics. Apparently Herring (like Joyce's Gabriel Conroy) would like to think that literature is above politics.

Perhaps the best evidence of the potential political power of Joyce's work is that it has survived so many attempts to empty it of any subversive force. By 1987, G. J. Watson, in an essay that is at least partly a response to Herring, discusses Joyce's relationship to the Irish contemporary scene in highly political terms. Watson notes, for example, that the "politics of Joyce's *Ulysses* may be seen as a characteristically massive attempt to deconstruct the mythology of Romantic Ireland" (41). He concludes that Herring misses the point of Joyce's lack of enthusiasm

over the new Irish Free State, which was not an opposition to progress, but a serious doubt as to "whether it *is* 'progress' to found a state on a politics construed as a theology and a history construed as a drama" (56, his emphasis).

Recent Trends in Joyce Criticism

Watson's view is now much more in the mainstream of Joyce criticism than is Herring's, and in a recent book even Herring makes an attempt (albeit a half-hearted one) to see a political slant in *Dubliners* (*Uncertainty*). Indeed, for more than a decade now, the trend in Joyce criticism has strongly swung toward demonstrating just how political his project really was. One might identify Richard Ellmann's influential biography (first published in 1959), which depicts Joyce as being rather uninterested in politics, as one of the major forces behind the older perception that Joyce's work was apolitical. Yet, ironically, Ellmann's revelation in *The Consciousness of Joyce* (1977) of the highly political orientation of much of Joyce's reading material can be seen as a watershed in the turn toward politicizing Joyce.[11]

Ellmann spends most of the latter book exploring Joyce's intertextual dialogues with Homer and Ulysses, but after examining the contents of Joyce's Trieste library is forced to conclude that Joyce's work carries on an extensive dialogue with a number of explicitly political texts as well. Ellmann notes Joyce's extensive political reading and concludes that Joyce's "principal political authority" was the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (83). Further, observing Joyce's defiant attitude toward both Church and State, Ellmann announces that "Joyce's

politics and aesthetics were one. For him the act of writing was also, and indissolubly, an act of liberating" (90). However, for Ellmann this conclusion apparently means not so much that Joyce's aesthetics were political as that his politics were aesthetic.

Ellmann also identifies (but does not really discuss) sexuality as a central issue in Joyce's political vision, noting that "[t]he point at which religious and secular morality impinged directly upon him was its demand that he restrain his sexual impulses" (2). A year later, Colin MacCabe pursues this suggestion much further in his own discussion of Joyce's politics in *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word* (1978). However, as the title might indicate, MacCabe's interest is more in Joyce's formal innovations than in specific content, and his book, informed by both Derrida and Lacan, participates in the general poststructuralist apotheosis of Joyce as anti-authoritarian hero. MacCabe particularly emphasizes the way in which Joyce's subversion of traditional notions of subjectivity undermines corresponding notions of authority. This subversive project reaches its zenith in *Finnegans Wake*, but MacCabe suggests that Joyce's political statement in the *Wake* is emptied of force because Joyce fails to address a specific constituency, and because nobody can read the book except English professors:

> In order to place ourselves in the position from which the process of separation in *Finnegans Wake* can be experienced, it is necessary to have a commitment to Joyce. The only section of society that shares an imaginary identity with Joyce are the Joyce scholars and it is they who form his only audience. (157)[12]

In the years after MacCabe's book, Joyce continued to be a favorite subject of poststructuralist critics, and as late as 1988 books such as

Patrick McGee's *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's "Ulysses"* were appearing that could claim a clear line of descent from the kind of approach pioneered by MaCabe. Continental commentary on Joyce has also pursued this line in the work of Derrida, Cixous, Rabaté, Sollers, and others. But (no doubt largely because of broader trends in literary criticism in general during the last decade) the most active line of inquiry concerning the political import of Joyce's fiction follows Ellmann in concentrating on Joyce's own reading, while expanding that concern to include the larger question of Joyce's general interaction with his contemporary cultural context. For example, Ellmann's student, Dominic Manganiello, has expanded his mentor's study of Joyce's reading material, providing even stronger evidence of Joyce's lasting interest in politics. Manganiello concludes that Joyce was influenced more directly by the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker than by Bakunin, largely because of Tucker's more pacifistic attitude, though Tucker himself was influenced by Bakunin, whose *God and the State* he translated. Curiously, though, Manganiello is still reluctant to see Joyce's fiction itself as a political statement, instead concluding--apparently in opposition to Ellmann--that "Joyce's saving quality as an artist was that he distinguished, as Pound did not, between the aesthetic and the political" (233).

Richard Brown follows Manganiello's 1980 study with a 1985 book focussing in particular on Joyce's treatment of sexuality. Noting the curious traditional lack of commentary on the topic, Brown cites evidence of Joyce's reading and of his known interest in specific contemporary debates over issues pertaining to sexuality to demonstrate that the

emphasis on sexual matters in Joyce's fiction is more than Joyce's own prurient fascination with the subject, and in fact has highly political overtones. Brown suggests a particularly strong relationship between Joyce's interest in sexuality and his opposition to the Catholic Church, noting that "Joyce's abandonment of the Church consisted . . . in a shift of ideas that both he and his brother described as a shift from belief in a God to a belief in the sexual instincts that make up the human spirit" (126). Apparently, to Joyce, sex is what we have instead of God.

Brown's mode of inquiry is identifiably similar to that pursued by Cheryl Herr in a 1986 book that focusses on the impact of Joyce's cultural context on his writing, looking particularly at the press, the church, and the popular stage. Herr sees Joyce's works and his culture "as parallel texts, that is, as reflexively related versions of an unrecoverable historical experience, which nonetheless expose the process by which social reality takes conceptual form" (8). And finally R. B. Kershner extends this kind of study in 1989 to include the intertextual dialogue between Joyce's texts and various contemporary texts from popular literature, including boys' magazines, adventure stories, and pornography. Kershner's work also adds the additional critical force of a specific theoretical framework, reading Joyce's interaction with popular literature within the context of Mikhail Bakhtin's theories of dialogism.

The cumulative conclusion of these sorts of studies of Joyce and his cultural context is that Joyce's work participated extensively in its own social and historical moment. And, while neither of them is overtly Marxist, the studies of Herr and Kershner in particular begin to suggest

certain affinities between Joyce's awareness of social issues and the thinking of Marx. As early as 1965 Bernard Benstock suggested that "[t]he political climate of *Finnegans Wake* owes as much to fundamental Marxian dialectics as its psychological climate is dependent upon Freud and Jung and its evolutionary structure determined by Darwin" (*Joyce-Again's* (246). This statement does not necessarily indicate a sympathetic relationship between Joyce and Marx, since Joyce's work was often informed in important ways by viewpoints--such as those of Freud and Jung--to which it was opposed. But by 1984 Mary King was presenting at the Ninth International Joyce Conference a Marxist reading of *Ulysses*, noting the heavy emphasis on exchange of commodities in the book and concluding that "[t]here is a close and deeply historical affinity of imagination between Marx and Joyce" (341). Similarly, at the same conference Trevor Williams read *Portrait* within a Marxist context and concluded that it is the story of Stephen's production by a specific social context and of his struggle against the false consciousness created by the ideological climate of Ireland.

Apparently, not only is Joyce becoming more and more political and more and more Marxist, but the political relevance of his work is gradually spreading backward from the *Wake* to earlier and earlier points in his career. These changing perceptions of Joyce's writing are fascinating in themselves, all the more so because they provide such clear markers of the corresponding change in the general orientation of literary criticism. McGee notes the ability of Joyce's work to respond to various trends in criticism: "At every phase in the development of recent literary theory, Joyce appears as an example and an authentic

symptom of his and our historical moment" (2). Indeed, it is no accident that Joyce's works were autonomous, apolitical, aesthetic artifacts during the reign of the New Critics, but that they became radical illustrations of the unlimited proliferation of meaning during the heyday of Derrida and powerful political statements in the Age of Bakhtin.

There seem to be two strands in recent Joyce criticism. In one, exemplified by critics such as Brown, Herr, and Kershner, Joyce is an intensely social writer whose vision of his contemporary historical moment takes on a decidedly anti-bourgeois tone. In the other, exemplified by critics such as MacCabe, McGee, and Attridge, Joyce is a radically anti-authoritarian figure of iconoclastic opposition to oppressive structures of all kinds. These two strands might be identified with Joyce's own dual interest in socialism and anarchism. Both groups of critics would seem to be working in opposition to the historical tendency to domesticate Joyce, yet at the same time one might ask whether they are not simply repeating the move of the literary establishment and attempting to appropriate Joyce for their own ends.

In this study I will employ both approaches to read Joyce's four major works, gaining entry to the social Joyce by means of an intertextual dialogue between Joyce and Bakhtin,[13] and approaching the iconoclastic Joyce by means of a dialogue with Friedrich Nietzsche. I believe that Bakhtin and Nietzsche are exemplary of the two strains of thought that recent critics have found in Joyce, and these dialogues should help to illuminate the presence of and interaction between these two strains in Joyce's work.[14]

Joyce, Bakhtin, Nietzsche

Reading Joyce through Bakhtin is by now an obvious move. Bakhtin's work with dialogism, carnival, and Menippean satire seems ideally suited to treat Joyce, and in the crucial essay that did much to introduce Bakhtin to the west in the late seventies, Julia Kristeva cited Joyce as one of the leading modern practitioners (along with Kafka and Bataille) of "Menippean discourse" ("Word" 82). By 1983 David Lodge was claiming that the later work of Joyce is paradigmatic of the theories of the novel expounded by Bakhtin:

> the later episodes of *Ulysses*, and the whole enterprise of *Finnegans Wake*, appear not as eccentric digressions from the great tradition of the novel, sidestrains of a maindrain, but the most complete fulfillment of the expressive potential of the novel that has yet been achieved. ("Double" 1)

In 1984 Allon White cites both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* as central examples of polyphony and carnival, and Joseph Valente does the same in 1988, noting the way in which reading Joyce through Bakhtin shows that "Joyce's famous declaration that he cared nothing about politics, only about style, shimmers with the sort of irridescent irony we are accustomed to finding in his fiction" ("Politics" 68). Meanwhile, in 1986 Kershner uses Bakhtin to read *Portrait*, noting that "Joyce would seem to be the perfect illustration of nearly all of Bakhtin's major concepts" ("Artist" 893n). By the time of his 1989 book Kershner is reading *Dubliners* with Bakhtin as well, and the paradigmatic pattern of all recent trends in Joyce criticism--starting with the *Wake* and moving gradually backward to *Dubliners*--is complete.[15]

Nietzsche has been used less extensively than Bakhtin for the direct reading of Joyce, as might be expected since Nietzsche is not a literary theorist *per se*. However, certain affinities between Joyce and Nietzsche have long been noted. Ellmann's catalogue of Joyce's Trieste library includes three books of Nietzsche's work in English translation, and Joyce himself alludes to Nietzsche at several points in his work, so it is clear that he was familiar with Nietzsche's philosophy to some extent. Indeed, given Nietzsche's prominence in the intellectual climate of Joyce's young adulthood, it would have been most surprising for Joyce *not* to have had some exposure to Nietzschean ideas. John Burt Foster notes the eminence of Nietzsche during the first decades of the twentieth century: "Anyone who came to intellectual maturity in Europe and much of the Americas between the 1890s and the 1930s would have had trouble avoiding contact, either direct or indirect, with his work" (3). Patrick Bridgwater similarly notes the importance of Nietzsche during this period:

> Nietzsche was *the* formative influence on Eugene O'Neill, Herbert Read, and Edwin Muir; he was a major influence on John Davidson, W. B. Yeats, John Gould Fletcher, and Jack London, and an important influence on Wyndham Lewis, D. H. Lawrence, and J. C. Powys; he also left his mark on the work of a number of other important moderns, including Hart Crane and Wallace Stevens. (202, Bridgwater's emphasis)

The mention of Yeats here indicates the strength of Nietzsche's impact in certain Irish circles, and indeed David Thatcher suggests that Yeats "may be regarded as the chief beneficiary of the Nietzsche movement in England" (275).

Neither Bridgwater nor Foster mentions Joyce among the modernist artists strongly influenced by Nietzsche, and Foster even goes so far as to claim that Joyce, Eliot, and perhaps Proust can be regarded as genuinely anti-Nietzschean (416). Thatcher, meanwhile, acknowledges that Joyce's fiction shows a certain familiarity with Nietzsche's work, notably *Zarathustra*, but he concludes that Joyce "went through a period of temporary infatuation with Nietzsche which left no mark of any consequence on his creative work" (136). But the view that Joyce went through a period of youthful interest in Nietzsche which he quickly outgrew very closely parallels the traditional notion that Joyce's early interest in politics was a passing fancy that played no important role in his mature work. I would suggest, in fact, that the dismissal of Joyce's interest in Nietzsche partakes of many of the same misconceptions of Joyce's work as does the dismissal of his concern with politics.

There have long been hints that perhaps Nietzsche was more relevant to the reading of Joyce than generally recognized. As early as 1922, for example, Joyce's French connection Valery Larbaud said in a lecture that Joyce's work did for Ireland what Nietzsche's work had done for nineteenth-century Germany (quoted in Manganiello 168). And Walter Kaufmann writes in his introduction to the *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* (1968) that Joyce is among those writers on whom Nietzsche's influence "deserves more study than it has yet received" (x).

Kaufmann's call has been answered. Ellmann in his biography dismisses Joyce's interest in both politics and Nietzsche with a single sentence, noting that "[a]t heart Joyce can scarcely have been a Nietzschean any more than he was a socialist" (*James Joyce* 142). But the

recent growing recognition that Joyce's political concerns were more than a passing youthful fancy casts Ellmann's statement in a highly ironic light, and indeed Joyce scholars have also begun to suggest that there is much more of Nietzsche in Joyce's work than has often been realized. These twin discoveries are not entirely independent, of course. Given Nietzsche's prominence in the early decades of this century any claim that Joyce participated extensively in his contemporary cultural moment will of necessity imply a certain involvement with Nietzschean ideas. For example, both Brown and Kershner have argued the importance of Havelock Ellis' pioneering work on sexuality to Joyce, but Thatcher has shown that Ellis himself was heavily influenced by Nietzsche (93-120).

More direct confluences between the thought of Nietzsche and that of Joyce have also been noted. Lodge (a few years before declaring Joyce an exemplification of Bakhtin) noted in 1977 that the historical consciousness informing *Finnegans Wake* was "strikingly similar to Nietzsche's heretical philosophy of history" (*Modes* 135). A year later James Maddox suggested that Joyce sought to break free of any external definitions of himself, attempting to become "self-defined like the Nietzschean *Übermensch*" (3). Valente also argues the continuing importance of the concept of the *Übermensch* to Joyce's work, suggesting that Joyce did not lose interest in Nietzsche with age so much as gaining a more sophisticated understanding of him: "Whereas Joyce previously found in Zarathustra the personification of his own antinomian impulse, he now discovers in Nietzsche's Dionysus the theoretical basis for his increasingly syncretic vision" ("Beyond" 88).

Valente emphasizes Joyce's affinity with Nietzsche's perspectival views on interpretation, while Joseph Buttigieg has recently followed Lodge in suggesting strong parallels between Joyce and Nietzsche in terms of their attitude toward history. But Buttigieg points out that Nietzsche's radical vision of history is inseparable from his attacks on the tradition of Western metaphysics, a tradition that Joyce also seeks to undermine:

> The story of *Ulysses* is in large measure an account of the pitfalls awaiting the modern imagination after the death of metaphysics; it is an exploration into the persistence with which the ghost of a dead metaphysics haunts our age, preventing us from freely creating our own world. ("Struggle" 203)

Buttigieg suggests that the fundamentally unsettling nature of Joyce's attack on metaphysics at least partly explains the fervor with which so many have pursued the attempt to domesticate Joyce, noting that "it is easier to live with the ghosts of broken icons than to dwell with (not upon) the fragments" (204).

In the final analysis, it is not Joyce's personal familiarity with or fondness of Nietzsche's work that matters most for reading Joyce through Nietzsche. After all, Bakhtin is clearly useful for reading Joyce, but Joyce almost certainly never heard of Bakhtin. What matters in both cases are certain affinities between Joyce's texts and either Bakhtin or Nietzsche in terms of subject matter, writing practice, and general philosophical attitude. Reading Joyce in dialogue with both Bakhtin and Nietzsche allows these affinities to be explored. In addition, this approach sets up a dialogue between Bakhtin and Nietzsche

as well, which should shed important light on the implications of the dual strand in recent Joyce criticism.

At first glance, Bakhtin and Nietzsche do not seem to accommodate each other well. While language is central to the thought of both men, in Bakhtin language is ultimately tied strongly to a physical and social reality, while to Nietzsche there may be no reality other than that generated by language itself. Indeed, the trend toward increasingly historical and political approaches to literary criticism that has brought Bakhtin such prominence can be seen to have arisen largely as a reaction against what many saw as the abyss of Nietzschean/Derridean poststructuralism. Further, Bakhtin's vision of humanity is intensely social and communal, while Nietzsche generally appears to be an exponent of fierce individualism.

Yet in some ways Bakhtin and Nietzsche seem to be pursuing similar projects. Such was Nietzsche's prominence in the Europe of the early twentieth century that Bakhtin could no more have avoided a certain contact with Nietzschean thought than could Joyce. Clark and Holquist note that Bakhtin's brother Nikolai (one year older than Mikhail) was fascinated by Nietzsche at a young age and that "[r]eading Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* at the age of eleven was a turning point in his life" (24). The exact influence of Nikolai's Nietzscheanism on Bakhtin is unclear, but in his later work Bakhtin himself acknowledged a profound debt to the work of Vyacheslav Ivanov, himself a leading Russian Nietzschean.[16] Clark and Holquist summarize Nietzsche's influence on Bakhtin:

> Although Bakhtin later declared himself an opponent of Nietzsche, it is probable that he, like his brother, passed through an early Nietzschean phase. Indeed, despite Bakhtin's disavowal of the German philosopher, there are hints of Nietzsche in his work. (26)

This narrative, in which Bakhtin passes through a youthful interest in Nietzsche then moves on, is strikingly reminiscent of Ellmann's depiction of the transitoriness of Joyce's Nietzscheanism. Interestingly, Bakhtin's reported repudiation of Nietzsche also seems to participate in the larger trend in which most figures (especially artists) who have been influenced by Nietzsche seem to have felt it necessary to deny that influence. Thus Foster observes that writers influenced by Nietzsche (Lawrence is a good example) often tend to view him as someone who

> threatens their sense of artistic integrity and originality. The philosopher has become a rival, and they must struggle to disengage themselves from him in a process that involves both the psychological pressures emphasized by [Harold] Bloom and the intellectual quarrels analyzed by the Russian formalists. (34)

There are certainly a number of Nietzschean elements in Bakhtin's work. For example, Nietzsche's Dionysus is clearly a carnivalesque figure, leading Kristeva to note in her Bakhtin essay that "this carnival scene, which destroys a god in order to impose its own dialogical laws, calls to mind Nietzsche's Dionysianism" (78). Further, as I have noted elsewhere, both Bakhtin and Nietzsche stand as important forerunners of the kind of non-Aristotelian logic that pervades Joyce's work, most dramatically in *Finnegans Wake* ("Western").

This kind of alternative logic suggests Derrida's deconstruction, and Nietzsche is an obvious influence on Derrida.[17] But there are

interesting Bakhtinian echoes in Derrida's work as well. For example, Derrida has himself labelled his *Glas* as a work of Menippean satire, the genre that is so central to Bakhtin (in McDonald 140-1). White makes a connection between Menippean satire and Derrida, comparing Derrida and the deconstructionists to Bakhtin's clowns, parodying and carnivalizing Western philosophy (139). White here suggests Derrida's clownishness as a criticism, but his depiction of Derrida as Bakhtinian clown highlights the element of carnival in Nietzsche's own depiction of himself as a philosophical "buffoon" (*Ecce* 782, IV.1).[18]

Other affinities between Bakhtin and Nietzsche can be cited, but perhaps the most important parallel between the two thinkers is the centrality of language itself to all of their philosophical conceptions. In particular, literary language is of extreme importance to both Bakhtin and Nietzsche, so a literary venue such as the work of Joyce seems a natural place to explore their similarities, as well as their differences. Perhaps, then, my readings of Joyce will be fruitful in illuminating the relationship between the work of Bakhtin and that of Nietzsche as well as in shedding light on what I have called the Bakhtinian and Nietzschean strains in recent Joyce scholarship.

Certainly the polyphony of Joyce's work is such that it can easily accommodate both Bakhtinian and Nietzschean approaches. Indeed, it can accommodate a number of other voices as well, and, while using Bakhtin and Nietzsche as my principal resources, I will freely make use of a number of other texts from a variety of disciplines when such use seems helpful in my reading of Joyce. Thus at various points in this study, I will initiate dialogues between Joyce's texts and a variety of discourse

from such diverse fields as psychology and psychoanalysis, history, philosophy, science, and critical theory. I will also employ a number of literary texts, ranging from Dante to Shakespeare to Virginia Woolf to Thomas Pynchon and Salman Rushdie. In particular, I will keep in view the relationship between Joyce and general trends in both critical theory and literary history in an effort to explain how and why Joyce's work has been able to prove so attractive (and sometimes so unattractive) to so many diverse groups over the years. Moreover, since Joyce works so extensively in a parodic mode, I will also employ a number of texts that help to illustrate the kind of thinking that Joyce seeks to oppose. For example, I will examine the ways in which the formal properties of Joyce's texts (as well as explicit statements in those texts) imply a de-centered conception of subjectivity as profoundly social and a critical view of history as endless flux without telos--which might be taken as repudiations, in turn, of Kant and Hegel.[19] Most prominent among these latter texts will be the work of St. Augustine, whose work I will use to illustrate Joyce's antithetical relationship to Catholic thought, which figures as an instance of his opposition to authoritarian attitudes in general.

The various intertextual dialogues that I will establish in this study act to support the view that Joyce's work--in terms of both style and content--is profoundly embedded in its contemporary historical moment and that it is intensely concerned with various important social issues of its time. In addition to this concern with specific contemporary issues, Joyce's texts also support a general philosophical position that is powerfully opposed to dogmatic and authoritarian ideas of any kind.

These two conclusions roughly correspond to the Bakhtinian and Nietzschean views of Joyce, but these two aspects of Joyce's work cannot in fact be viewed entirely separately--one implies the other, even as the two sometimes clash. The overall result of my work is a reading of Joyce that shows his texts to support a program of radical political activism, historical engagement, and anti-elitism--a view almost diametrically opposed to most received ideas about modernist literature. I will thus end my study with a brief discussion of Joyce's place in the modernist canon and of the ways in which my reading of Joyce points toward revisions in our conceptions of twentieth-century literary history.

Notes

[1]Many attempts have been made to tame even the *Wake*. Most prominent among these are the various attempts to recuperate the *Wake* as a dream or dreams, thus explaining its strangeness as emanating from dream logic. And one can find numerous assertions such as Clive Hart's claim that the *Wake* is fundamentally lucid and almost conventional in style when compared to other radical experiments of its time (*Structure* 31). Fortunately, though, the *Wake* has remained stubbornly resistant to such attempts at domestication.

[2]Ironically, Radek begins his comments on Joyce by noting that "[o]ur writers are not sufficiently well acquainted with foreign literature" (150).

[3]This is not to say that Marxist critics were especially benighted in their readings of Joyce. Equally strident criticisms of Joyce were launched from the far right, as exemplified by Wyndham Lewis. Moreover, Joyce's work was banned for years in a variety of "democratic" countries, including the United States. And it should be noted that there were always supporters of Joyce in every part of the political spectrum as well.

[4]Gleb Struve notes that Radek "was speaking as an official representative of the party, and his verdict on Joyce, Proust, and Dos Passos bore the stamp of finality" (275). Such, however, were the exigencies of Stalinism that Radek himself was later branded an agent of Hitler and an enemy of Soviet Russia.

[5]See Hawthorn for a discussion (and rebuttal) of early Marxist attacks on Joyce, especially as concerns the issue of subjectivity. See also Segall for an interesting historical survey of left-wing attitudes toward Joyce in America, especially as they were influenced by Trotsky.

[6]Alternatively, William Cain notes certain suggestions of an ideological complicity between Cold War anti-Communism and the New Criticism (4). I will discuss the complex relationship between modernism and the New Criticism at several points in this study.

[7]On Trotsky and literature, see Siegel.

[8]Compare Jameson's statement elsewhere that *Ulysses* shows the opposition between subject and object to be "intolerable" ("*Ulysses*" 139).

[9]All ellipses in quoted passages are mine unless indicated otherwise.

[10]The mode of interpretation espoused by Macherey has much in common with Jameson's concept of "metacommentary," in which one not only performs an interpretation, but also must provide an explanation for the necessity and legitimacy of the interpretation as well. Among other things, the metacommentator must recognize that "a determinate literary form always reflects a certain possibility of experience in the moment of social development in question" ("Metacommentary" 12).

[11]An updated version of Ellmann's biography was issued in 1982, showing little influence from the later book in terms of politicizing Ellmann's reading of Joyce.

[12]MacCabe goes on to suggest that he does not mean to upbraid Joyce, and that it was the "failure of the Irish revolution" which deprived Joyce of a political audience (170).

[13]In this study I will make prominent use of *Freudianism* and *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. These works are sometimes considered the work of Bakhtin, sometimes of his colleague V. N. Voloshinov. I will follow the practice of the editors of the English editions of these works in referring to them as the work of Voloshinov, but I will treat Voloshinov as a member of the "Bakhtin circle" and consider that these works contribute to the dialogue between Joyce and Bakhtin.

[14]One is tempted to characterize the Bakhtinian and Nietzschean modes of Joyce criticism in terms of an emphasis on content and on style, respectively, but the work of both Bakhtin and Nietzsche acts to deconstruct any traditional distinction between style and content.

[15]Note also that Bakhtin's work anticipates that of both Jameson and Macherey in sometimes striking ways.

[16]Clark and Holquist note, however, that Ivanov placed an unusual stress on collectivity for a Nietzschean (26).

[17]Joyce is also an important influence on Derrida, as Derrida himself has admitted. For example, Derrida has stated that "every time I write, and even in the most academic pieces of work, Joyce's ghost is always coming on board" ("Two Words" 149).

[18]Due to the many available editions of Nietzsche's work, I will cite Nietzsche by both page number (which varies from edition to edition) and section number (which is the same in all editions) throughout this study.

[19]They can also, of course, be read as repudiations, in turn, of nineteenth-century Romantic poetry and the nineteenth-century realistic novel.

CHAPTER 2
WHY ALL OF JOYCE IS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF "THE SISTERS"

It would obviously be nonsense to claim that all of Joyce is contained in the first paragraph of "The Sisters," the story that initiates both the *Dubliners* collection and the entire body of Joyce's published fiction. Joyce's writing does, of course, change over the years. In fact, one of the favorite pastimes of Joyce scholars in recent decades has been the development of narrative/biographical models for the progress of Joyce's career from the relatively traditional naturalism/realism of the earlier stories in *Dubliners* to the stunningly non-traditional verbal magic (black or otherwise) of *Finnegans Wake*. *Something*, the argument goes, obviously changed somewhere along the way, and there is a temptation to relate this change to one or more rather Augustinian conversion experiences on the part of Joyce himself. This argument is not without a certain validity. The early *Dubliners* stories were begun in Ireland by a terribly young Irishman, filled with the excitement (both positive and negative) of the early years of a new century and empowered by a certain confidence in his own destiny to do great things. *Finnegans Wake* was completed by a man much older and wiser, a citizen of the world, blind and nearing death, resigned to the knowledge that the book on which he had spent the past seventeen years would never be widely understood or appreciated in his lifetime. It was completed on the Continent, with the specter of World War II looming over

a Europe that had still not regained the composure shattered by the first world war. Between the beginning of Joyce's work on *Dubliners* and the end of his work on the *Wake*, relativity and quantum mechanics smashed the complacent world of nineteenth century positivistic science into atoms, psychoanalysis began to take firm purchase in the popular imagination as the master narrative of the development of the human psyche, Marxism for the first time became a worldwide political force, and a variety of developments in modern thought appeared to shake the entire tradition of Western metaphysical philosophy to its very foundations.

The period of history spanned by Joyce's career was, in short, a time during which a lot of things *happened*. In the light of the changes in Joyce's life and in the world over the forty years or so of his literary career it would certainly be curious if his writing *didn't* change over that period. On the other hand, the exact nature of these changes is not simple to delineate. One of the things that makes this question interesting is that in many ways the evolution of Joyce seems to parallel the evolution of literature in general, as he grows from the nineteenth century realism/naturalism of *Dubliners* to the High Modernism of *Portrait* and *Ulysses* to the postmodernism of *Finnegans Wake*. But it turns out not to be so easy to identify break points in Joyce's career at the interstices between individual works. The later chapters of *Ulysses* seem to have more in common with the *Wake* than with *Portrait*, and in many ways "The Dead" has more in common with *Portrait* than with the rest of *Dubliners*. Further, the "naturalism" of *Dubliners* remains embedded as a part of *Ulysses*, and *Dubliners* itself appears less and less naturalistic as diligent critics continue to unearth increasingly symbolic

interpretations of Joyce's early stories. Much of this blurring effect occurs because the composition of the different works tended to overlap. For example, *Stephen Hero*, the first-draft version of *Portrait*, was written in the midst of the writing of *Dubliners*. Furthermore, Joyce had already begun working on *Ulysses* before finishing *Portrait*, and had started the formulation of *Finnegans Wake* before completing *Ulysses*.

These overlaps demonstrate that much of the difficulty in locating break points in Joyce's career comes about because such points simply do not exist. Joyce's development as a writer tends to be more of a continuous evolution than a series of discrete and stable "periods" separated by sudden changes in direction and emphasis. At each stage in his career, Joyce maintains a strong sense of communication with all the earlier stages in that career. All of Joyce is not contained in the first paragraph of "The Sisters," but all of it remains connected to that first paragraph in a profound way.

Strange Language in "The Sisters"

The young boy who narrates "The Sisters" begins with an inaugural paragraph that describes his vigil outside Father Flynn's window: "If he was dead, I thought, I would see the reflection of candles on the darkened blind for I knew that two candles must be set at the head of a corpse" (9). R. B. Kershner points out that the use of the word "reflection" here is a "very curious slip," noting that a reflection should originate outside the window where the boy stands, not inside with the candles. Kershner finds the slip significant: "This confusion of reflection and refraction, internal and external, is thematically

embodied in the remainder of the text as well, as the boy investigates the priest's identity and meaning both internally, through dream, and externally, through the overheard conversations" (*Joyce* 24).

One might argue that Kershner is being too picky here--after all, we know what the narrator "means." Hugh Kenner has singled out this sentence (as revised from the earlier version of the story published in the *Irish Homestead* in 1904) as an example of the way in which Joyce fine-tuned the story to remove "adult cadences" and to make it seem more the product of a child narrator (*Dublin's* 50).[1] And minor linguistic slips certainly seem appropriate in the innocent narration of a child. On the other hand, we have no idea of the age of the boy at the time of the narration, which may be occurring significantly later than the events narrated. And even if the boy is young, the language he uses is not. It has been used many times before, has participated in many previous narrations, and still bears the unavoidable traces of those previous uses. Regardless of how ostensibly innocent, all discourse to some extent or other participates in such intertextual dialogues:

> The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of *any* discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse. On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction. Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the subject. (Bakhtin, *Dialogic* 279)

Time and again we are given examples in "The Sisters" that illustrate the way in which the significance of a given utterance goes far beyond the specific intention of its speaker, or even beyond the

specific words contained in the utterance. What the narrator "means" and what a given utterance "says" may be different things entirely. What is being challenged here is a conception of language in which meaning is fully inherent within words so that words can provide a transparent reflection of some prior reality. In the light of this conception of language, the boy's "slip" in the use of the word "reflection" in the first paragraph takes on added significance. For, in viewing the blinds of Father Flynn's room, what the boy is doing is reading a sign, and his own innocent semiotic theory requires that signs work through a process of reflection. This theory of signification is not merely an indication of boyish naiveté. It is in fact the theory of signification that has reigned supreme throughout the history of Western philosophy, and especially in that portion of history following the introduction of the concept of the Cartesian transcendental self as originator of meaning.

Richard Rorty (among others) has particularly emphasized the centrality of metaphors of reflection in drawing a direct link between the Cartesian-Kantian model of the self and attitudes toward language and knowledge:

> The picture that holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations . . . Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself. (*Philosphy* 12)

Rorty goes on to outline ways in which modern philosophers such as Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger have called these traditional metaphors of reflection into question. Similarly, Rodolphe Gasché outlines the history of the concept of reflection in philosophy to note that this

concept has been radically challenged by the work of Jacques Derrida, work that among other things implies an increased role for literature as an "Other" of philosophy (176 and *passim*).

To see an indication toward the work of Derrida and others is to read a great deal into a mere "slip" on the part of Joyce's boy narrator. Such a reading is, however, at least partly justified by later developments in Joyce's career. Visual metaphors of light and reflection will always hold a central place in the thought of Stephen Dedalus, thought toward which Joyce is incessantly critical and antagonistic. Further, mirrors in *Ulysses*--where the "cracked lookingglass of a servant" is suggested by Stephen as "a symbol of Irish art" (1)--function as powerful structural images. Gose discusses Joyce's "use of mirror opposites both for thematic resonance and for structural articulation" in *Ulysses* (229). However, Gose presents an entirely recuperative reading of Joyce's juxtaposition of contraries in *Ulysses*, suggesting that it occurs "so all can be reduced to one source, the mind of their creator" (230). This reading seems to me precisely the opposite (the contrary) of the real significance of Joyce's simultaneous presentation of contraries through mirror imagery. After all, the recognition that a mirror reflection is both a reproduction of and, in another sense, the opposite of the original powerfully calls into question the sorts of polar models of difference upon which any such simple-minded models of meaning as direct reflection of the mind of the author must depend.

Further justification for seeing a link between Joyce's early use of the word "reflection" and the eventual ruminations of Derrida and others on the topic is provided by a recognition of the well-known influence of

Joyce's work (especially *Finnegans Wake*) on Derrida. For example, Gregory Ulmer presents the *Wake* as a paradigm of the kind of "homophonic" logic he sees as being central to the work of Derrida--logic based on "puncepts" rather than concepts--noting Derrida's fascination with the macaronic puns employed by Joyce in the *Wake* ("Puncept" 164-73). Meanwhile Ulmer emphasizes elsewhere the importance of Derrida's challenge to traditional philosophical metaphors involving light: "Keeping in mind that light is *the* philosophic metaphor, any change in our understanding of its nature should affect its analogical extensions in such concepts as form and theory" (*Applied* 26).

Obviously, Joyce's boy narrator did not consciously choose his words in order to enter into a dialogue with the history of Western philosophy. Moreover, despite the evidence that Joyce lavished particular care on the construction of this sentence, I am also not saying that Joyce "meant" to enter such a dialogue. What I am saying is that the *word* "reflection," because of its centrality to Joyce's entire body of work and to philosophical discourse, unavoidably triggers such a dialogue, especially when it is rendered conspicuous by being improperly used. Michael Riffaterre describes this sort of "triggering" effect:

> Intertextual connection takes place when the reader's attention is triggered by . . . obscure wordings, phrasings that the context alone will not suffice to explain--in short, ungrammaticalities in the idiolectic norm . . . which are traces left by the absent intertext, signs of an incompleteness to be completed elsewhere. ("Syllepsis" 627)

Intertextual connection is triggered during moments of linguistic strangeness (like the boy's curious use of the word "reflection") when the true dialogic and intertextual nature of language, normally submerged

and implicit, suddenly makes its presence felt. This dynamic has much in common with Julia Kristeva's model of language in which a pre-linguistic "semiotic" element exists beneath the surface of ordinary "symbolic" language, always carrying the potential of breaking through that surface at key moments with a disruptive force, especially in poetic texts (*Revolution* 79 and *passim*). Kristeva's model itself has much in common with Freud's model of the psyche, in which the subject speaks from the conscious mind, but in which unconscious elements can irrupt at unexpected moments, such as in "Freudian slips." Indeed, Riffaterre has elsewhere suggested that intertextuality consists precisely of "signs pointing to the unconscious" (*Intertextual* 372).

It is important to recognize that the train of intertextual connection set off in such moments of textual strangeness occurs quite apart from any question of authorial intention, and indeed such associations are by nature beyond authorial control. Words always bear traces of their former uses whether the author likes it or not, as Derrida has so emphatically demonstrated. However, it may be in the work of Bakhtin, in his appreciation of the social and ideological implications of such traces, that this phenomenon finds its fullest expression. Bakhtin and his circle repeatedly emphasize the social embeddedness of all discourse and the ideological content of all words. "Words," writes Voloshinov, "are always filled with content and meaning drawn from behavior or ideology" (*Marxism* 70). Further, this concept of language implies that meaning is dependent upon social context and thus beyond the control of individual intention:

> the utterance is defined by the constant and more general interrelationships of the speakers as representatives of definite social groups, social interests, and, in the final analysis, definite social classes. The deepest levels of these interrelationships can be outside the subjective consciousness of the speakers and, none the less, still define the deep structural aspects of their utterances. (*Formal* 153)

Thus, while meaning may exceed authorial intent and be disseminated through a variety of texts exterior to the one in which a given statement is made, this dissemination does not occur as the kind of "freeplay of the signifier" often evoked in American appropriations of Derrida. Rather, this meaning is still constrained to lie within the range laid out by the pre-existing discourses with which it comes into contact. As a result, meanings do not proliferate boundlessly. Rather, some meanings for the same words are available in certain social and historical contexts and not in others, though it is always possible that new and different meanings will be created through the interaction of discourses that had previously remained separate.

Language as Power, Language as Limitation

There is much, even as early as "The Sisters," to indicate that Joyce was already wrestling with conceptions of language as a phenomenon of discursive context rather than subjective intent. Immediately after his mention of the "reflection" of the candles, the boy narrator offers a recollection of the words said to him by the moribund priest: "He had often said to me: *I am not long for this world*, and I had thought his words idle" (*Dubliners* 9, Joyce's emphasis). Implicit in this statement is a typical Catholic distinction between the immanence of "this world" and that other transcendent one of the ideal realm, a hierarchy the

destruction of which will form a principal goal of all of Joyce's work. And, importantly, it is then immediately revealed that the priest's words were *not* idle. A central theme that will emanate from this opening paragraph to resound throughout Joyce's work is that words are in fact *never* idle. Words are, to Joyce, things of great power and consequence, a fact that both reiterates and calls into question the Catholic tradition of the power and mystery of the Word of God.

Joyce's youthful narrator emphasizes the theme of the power of words as he continues his meditation (still in the first paragraph) on the condition of the paralyzed priest:

> Every night as I gazed up at the window I said softly to myself the word *paralysis*. It had always sounded strangely in my ears, like the word *gnomon* in the Euclid and the word *simony* in the Catechism. But now it sounded to me like the name of some maleficent and sinful being. It filled me with fear, and yet I longed to be nearer to it and to look upon its deadly work. (9)

Clearly, the "it" of this last sentence refers not to the disease that has disabled Father Flynn but to the name of that disease, to the word "paralysis" itself. Given the motif of spiritual and political paralysis that runs throughout *Dubliners*, this initial emphasis on paralysis serves an obvious thematic function, especially after decades of critical elaboration.

But it is significant that the emphasis here is on the *word* "paralysis" rather than on Father Flynn's ailment itself. There is a level on which this opening paragraph signals us that paralysis will be an important item in the following pages of *Dubliners*, and indeed the links among sexuality, religion, and death evoked by the image of a failed priest paralyzed by what might be the effects of syphilis make

this level richer than it might first appear.[2] But an important message to be flagged in this meditation on language is that *words* will be important, not just in *Dubliners*, but in all of Joyce's work. This emphasis on language presages the fascination with words (and especially the sounds and material reality of words) to be shown by the young Stephen Dedalus in *Portrait*; the quick links that the narrator draws among disparate fields such as medicine, geometry, and religion (links that occur within and through the medium of language) foreshadow the stream-of-consciousness associations of the interior monologues of *Ulysses*; and the particularly phonetic nature of these links (the words are associated because they *sound* alike to the narrator) already shows an understanding of the importance of homophony that will eventually explode into the alternative logic of the "funantics" of *Finnegans Wake* (*Wake* 450.27).[3]

The anxiety that the boy feels in the presence of ominous words is clearly related to his sense throughout the story that language is somehow beyond his grasp. Much of the discomfort he suffers occurs as a result of his vague sense of being surrounded by powerful discourses, discourses that he cannot understand but that which act to shape and constrain his own speech nevertheless. In particular, his uneasiness with the words "paralysis," "gnomon," and "simony" goes beyond the strangeness of the words themselves (they're all Greek to him) and extends to a recognition that such words are connected to powerful discourses that are outside his current mastery. The boy, seeking to envision a suitable identity for himself, finds Uncle Jack, Old Cotter, and Father Flynn all lacking as models. More importantly, he is

gradually coming to realize the profoundly linguistic basis of subjectivity and the way in which any identity he forms will be a function of his discursive environment, an environment the foreignness of which will unavoidably lead his self to be other than himself.

Granted, the words "paralysis" and "simony" carry strong thematic resonances in the context of the story. Similarly, Gerhard Friedrich has suggested that the gnomon, as a figure of incompleteness (a "gnomon" in geometry is the figure that remains when a parallelogram has a smaller parallelogram removed from one corner) functions as a symbol of the general spiritual condition of the citizenry of Dublin ("Gnomonic").[4] Again, such thematic interpretations are clearly correct, but "gnomon" clearly resonates on other levels as well. The excision of the gnomon stands as a figure of castration, announcing Joyce's depiction of Dublin as a castrated city in which the stultifying effects of an excessive subservience to a traditional and institutional Name of the Father introduce a general paralysis in which real fathers are unable to function. This reading of the gnomon participates in a long literary tradition of linking sexual abnormality with simony that goes back at least as far as Chaucer's Pardoner, an avowed simoniac who is most decidedly "no man" and who stands as a clear predecessor to Joyce's gnomonic Father Flynn. Further, Carolyn Dinshaw has persuasively argued that the anatomical incompleteness of the Pardoner functions as a metaphor for the necessary incompleteness of the interpretation of any text: "The Pardoner enunciates the only possible strategy of using language in a postlapsarian world, cut off from primary wholeness and unity: he acts according to what I call the hermeneutics of the partial,

or, for short, eunuch hermeneutics" (28). Similarly, in "The Sisters" there is a level on which "gnomon" has special significance in terms of the incompleteness of Joyce's text, of the boy's growing recognition that language always implies more than is actually said, that each statement exists within the context of a larger discourse that exceeds the conscious intentions of the language user.[5]

The elusiveness of language continually sounds as a major theme of the entire story, and the narrator frequently makes statements that might mean more than he appears to realize. Interesting examples of (apparently) inadvertent wordplay are scattered throughout the story. For example, at one point the boy tells us that the priestly duties described by the dying priest appeared so "grave" that it was remarkable anyone would "undertake" them (13). At another, he punningly tells us: "In the evening my aunt took me with her to visit the house of mourning" (14). Such inappropriately humorous uses of language can be attributed to the boy's youthful innocence, but then language escapes the control of the adults in the story as well. The most obvious example of this effect occurs in Miss Eliza's reference to the *Freeman General*, rather than the *Freeman Journal* and to "rheumatic wheels" on the carriage she and her siblings were to rent (16, 17). Similarly, the malapropic Miss Eliza refers to the dead Father Flynn's old friends as the only ones "a body can trust" and notes that the priest's life was "crossed" (16, 17). Finally, both Miss Eliza and the boy's aunt refer (without irony on their own parts) to the failed priest as having been "quite resigned" (15).

The anti-clerical tone of the story is greatly enhanced by the various parodies of the Sacraments that the narrator mentions, though the

boy himself often seems unaware of these parodies. That the brand of snuff brought by the boy to Father Flynn is called "High Toast" (and that the priest fumbles the snuff much as he fumbled the fateful chalice, resulting in a symbolic staining of his priestly garments) represents a parody of the Eucharist that is obvious to the reader, but apparently not to the narrator. Similarly, the boy appears oblivious to the symbolic significance of the debased Communion implicit in the wine and crackers offered him by the Flynn sisters after the priest's death.[6] And finally, the boy (having yet to reach the recognition of sexuality that comes upon the later narrator of "Araby") seems totally innocent to the persistent tone of sexual innuendo that runs as an undercurrent through the entire story.

It is the pre-existing discourses of religion and of sexuality that allow the boy to convey the religious and sexual themes of the story without any understanding that he is doing so. That his narrative is introduced into the context of these other discourses has a powerfully determining factor on what his narrative says, just as the conversation of the women after viewing Father Flynn's body is thoroughly determined by the social clichés that one expects to hear in such situations. That conversation, banal though it may be in itself, would seem to be one of the key elements in Joyce's depiction of the dynamics of language in "The Sisters," and indeed elsewhere in *Dubliners* as well. Like Gabriel Conroy in his imaginary mourning over Aunt Julia, Father Flynn's survivors find that it is difficult to find anything new to be said in such situations. In fact, they make no attempt to find anything new to say, because by remaining strictly and uncritically inscribed within received convention

they can avoid any meaningful confrontation with the reality of the emotionally-charged situation in which they find themselves. As a result, Father Flynn's ghost and the past that it implies are kept at bay, just as the ghost of Parnell is defused of any real impact on the present by the conventional way in which the anniversary of his death is observed in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room."[7]

The discourse of the women in this funereal conversation is so conventional, in fact, that the adult speakers can omit key parts without interfering with the understanding of their adult addressees. Thus, the aunt, uncomfortable with speaking of the physical reality of death, asks: "Did he . . . peacefully," and Miss Eliza has no trouble interpreting and responding to the question (15). Such ellipses echo those earlier embedded in the discourse of Old Cotter, who attempts to express his suspicions concerning the oddities of the priest in such a way that the adults present will understand his meaning, while the innocent boy will be excluded: "I have my own theory about it, he said. I think it was one of those . . . peculiar cases. . . . But it's hard to say. . . ." (10). And later, concerning the relationship between the boy and the priest: "My idea is: let the young lad run about and play with young lads his own age and not be . . . Am I right, Jack?" (10).

Old Cotter is, apparently, successful in communicating his meaning to Uncle Jack without also communicating that meaning to the boy, who does not understand the conventions of the discourse being spoken sufficiently well to fill in the gaps. The boy does, however, understand that the ellipses contain significant information, and as a result he is greatly troubled by them: "I puzzled my head to extract meaning from his

unfinished sentences" (11).[8] As before, he adheres to a "container" theory of language, in which words transparently reflect meanings that adhere within them, so that to understand words one need merely extract those meanings. But he is unsuccessful in this extraction, because the meaning of Old Cotter's utterances is not in fact located in the sentences themselves, but elsewhere, in the conventions of the discourses of religion, sexuality, and gossip within which he speaks. The boy, meanwhile, is handicapped because he does not understand the convention being invoked, though he does seem to be gaining a vague (and discomfiting) knowledge that a convention is *being* invoked.

The frequent use of ellipses in "The Sisters" is the most obvious means by which Joyce conveys his view of language as gnomon, as statement in which something is always missing because located elsewhere, in the social context and conventions within which the statement is made. For one thing, these ellipses act quite literally to build spaces or gaps in the text of the type that Wolfgang Iser sees as being the true sources of communication between text and reader (*Act* 167). The implication is that there is more meaning here than can be put into the spoken words. One might compare here Julia Kristeva's discussion of the use of the "three dots" in Céline, where she notes the way in which ellipsis marks at the end of a clause "point to the *overflowing of the clause* into a higher unit of enunciation" (*Powers* 198, Kristeva's emphasis). In short, the ellipses allow meaning to overflow into the discourses in which the given clause exists, acting as pointers to other texts, signs of intertextual abundance, indications that there is always much more where this came from.

It should be pointed out that, with one exception, the ellipses in "The Sisters" are found exclusively in the speeches of the adult characters and never in the narration itself, a fact attributable at least in part to the fact that the boy narrator is not yet sophisticated enough to evoke convention in this way. As Kershner points out, these ellipses represent an attempt on the part of the speakers to appropriate power through the invocation of hegemonic discourse, a recognition that "the world must be filled with banalities lest something unspoken break to the surface" (*Joyce* 27). Indeed, the one case in which the boy himself uses ellipsis is in his narration of his dream about the priest, which breaks off as his memory fails (14)--here keeping something unconscious from breaking to the surface of the conscious mind.[9] However, just as the various speakers in the story do not have control over the implications of what they say, so too do they fail to maintain control of their silences. What is left unspoken does in fact break through time and again--if not to the boy at least to the reader.

The reader of "The Sisters," (and the other *Dubliners* stories as well), must constantly fill in ellipses, literal or otherwise. One might argue that such is the case with *all* works of literature--such a thesis forms a central part of the reception aesthetics of Iser, for example, as well as the studies of literary "production" of Pierre Macherey.[10] Riffaterre argues that this "iceberg" effect is a characteristic of literary language in general:

> In literary writing every lexical element is the tip of an iceberg, of a lexical complex whose whole semantic system is compressed within the one word that presupposes it. To put it otherwise: the literary text is a sequence of embeddings with each significant word summarizing the syntagm situated elsewhere. ("Syllepsis" 627)

It is clear that, once the production of meaning is removed from the confines of the story itself in this way, the result of that production moves well beyond authorial control. Once the presence of the author-God as creator and arbiter of meaning is removed, different readers are free to make different connections and to create different meanings. Like Dostoevsky's old Karamazov, Joyce tells us that "God is dead, everything is allowed." A recognition of this phenomenon is particularly critical in approaching the work of Joyce, who so often has himself been pictured as a God-like creator bringing forth a fictional cosmos of which he is in full control.[11] On the other hand, it is true that Joyce himself seems in control of the various slips made by his narrators and characters in "The Sisters" and elsewhere. The boy narrator may have chosen the word "reflection" innocently, but one can rest assured that Joyce chose it with great care. Like Father Flynn, Joyce was always if anything too scrupulous about such matters.

I will come back later in this study to the way in which Joyce's work preserves a strong notion of authorial agency even while undercutting any traditional notion of authorial intention. But for now note that *James* Flynn, as a figure of the artist (scrupulous or not), drops and breaks his chalice anyway, a failure that can comfortably be recuperated as a symbol of the failure of either God (Magalaner and Kain 71-3) or of the Irish Church (Corrington 21-2) in providing spiritual sustenance to the Irish people. Yet the failure of Father Flynn also figures as an allegory of the failure of mastery in general. The Church is founded on a myth of divine mastery (and authorship), and in a text

that radically calls into question any notions of theological origin the failure of God or of the Church appears inevitable. The fact that the chalice "contained nothing" (*Dubliners* 17) becomes a symbol of the absence at the heart of all such theories of origin.[12] Joyce, too, holds out no Holy Grail for the reader, and the quest for final meaning in negotiating his texts must necessarily go unfulfilled.

Again, however, this is not to say that the story is free to take on an unlimited range of meanings. The recognizable presence of conventional discursive frameworks assures a certain consistency in the construction of the story by various readers, who will themselves approach the text from within the constraints of specific contexts. A central message of "The Sisters" concerns the way in which private language use is so thoroughly informed by public discursive conventions, often associated with specific institutions such as the Church.[13] Bakhtin's concept of the "speech genre" does a great deal to illuminate this effect. Bakhtin identifies the "utterance" as the basic unit of actual speech practice. However, unlike the *parole* of Saussure to which it is often compared, every utterance belongs to a specific speech genre with certain generic conventions that constrain the form that the utterance might take--just as the existence of specific discourses limits the freeplay of the dissemination of meaning as I described above. Furthermore, these generic conventions imply specific world views and ideological investments. Thus, the utterance is inevitably implicated in the contemporary social and political moment in which it is produced. All utterances are thus profoundly historicized, and historical changes in language are closely linked to historical changes in the world at

large. As Bakhtin puts it: "Utterances and their types, that is, speech genres, are the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language" (*Speech* 65).[14]

Palinodic Narration: History and the Temporality of Language

Bakhtin's dynamic historical view of the utterance implies that all utterances within a specific genre are produced in a dialogue with previous utterances in that genre. Any speaker (or writer) is thus inevitably not only expressing his own ideas, but repeating and responding to the ideas of others as well:

> He is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe. And he presupposes not only the existence of the language system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances--his own and others'--with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation or another (builds on them, polemicizes them, or simply presumes that they are already known to the listener). Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances. (*Speech* 69)

This understanding of the profound historicity of all language use provides important support to the view of historical embeddedness and situatedness of all discourse. No text is produced in a vacuum, but instead each exists as part of an entire social, historical, and cultural moment. This being the case, it is clear that the romantic notion of the artist-creator does not provide an accurate description of the actual mechanics by which texts come to be. Further, if much of the meaning of "The Sisters" is unavoidably taken from discourse outside the story itself, it follows that the meaning of the story will change with time, as the discourses surrounding it change. As a result, the story is able to take on a profound historicity and to remain current, carrying on

dialogues with discourses (like that of poststructuralism) that only came into existence long after the initial publication of Joyce's story. Again, the same can be said of any work of literature, but I would argue that Joyce's work, which reflexively renews itself through continual self-dialogue and autocriticism, is particularly well designed to take advantage of this effect.

A recognition of the profound temporality and historicity of all language can be found at every level of Joyce's discourse, beginning with the individual word, as indicated by the highly charged interaction of the word "reflection" at the beginning of "The Sisters" with its past (and future) connotations. Hugh Kenner, remarking the frequent occurrence of idiosyncratic word order in Joyce's sentences, notes the way in which this practice "throws the words into isolation, exposing their unmortared surfaces" (*Stoic* 31). Kenner's lapidary metaphor is apt, because Joyce's sentences tend to have a highly *constructed* quality.[15] It is not apt, however, in the sense that Joyce's words are anything but engraved in stone, but clearly change in connotation with time.

Joyce is always aware that the order in which words are spoken or written greatly affects the meanings of those words. Thus, in "The Sisters," we have the uncle's explanation to Old Cotter about Father Flynn that "The youngster and he were great friends. The old chap taught him a great deal, mind you; and they say he had a great wish for him" (10). This (apparently inadvertent) *double entendre* is immediately followed by the aunt's pious (but polysemic) cliché: "God have mercy on his soul." The sequence of these statements casts a particularly dark

aura over the deictic uncertainty of the pronouns involved, leaving one to wonder whose soul it is that requires mercy, and why.[16] And again, this implication appears to exist completely outside the intention of the aunt.

This effect also occurs within individual sentences. Kenner notes the way in which Joyce would often first select the words to go into a sentence, then agonize at length over the exact order in which to put those words (*Stoic* 31). This practice leads to the unusual word order that Kenner notes, a phenomenon that lends an unusually temporal quality to Joyce's sentences. Some of the more interesting of these explicitly temporal constructions in "The Sisters" involve the presentation of sentences that appear to have one meaning (usually related to death and corruption) until the end, when they are revealed to refer to something entirely different (and relatively innocent). For example, we are told that Old Cotter was initially interesting because of his discussion of "faints and worms"--and allowed to make all sorts of conjectures concerning the nature of such discussions--until the sentence ends with a reference to his "endless stories about the distillery," signalling the fact that "faints and worms" are in fact terms from the discourse of brewing (10).[17] Likewise, when the boy later enters the room containing the body of the priest, we are informed that "There was a heavy odour in the room--the flowers" (14).

These sorts of sentence constructions are interesting for a number of reasons. For one thing, they demonstrate on a local level a characteristic that informs Joyce's writing throughout *Dubliners* and indeed throughout his career. These sentences uttered by Joyce's boy

narrator contain within them the principal structural feature of most of the individual *Dubliners* stories and of *Dubliners* as a whole. Kershner, for example, notes how each of the stories in *Dubliners* tends to create the expectation of a specific climax and then to avert that expected climax (*Joyce* 88). Moreover, any number of commentators have argued that "The Dead" has a markedly different quality than the other stories in the book, indicating that such reversals also inform the global structure of the book itself. The sort of building and subsequent destruction of reader expectations embodied in such sentences demonstrates what Hélène Cixous sees as a fundamental character of Joyce's writing--that it sends the reader on "wild-goose chases . . . which should shatter *any habits* of reading, which should be continually shaking the reader up, and thus committing this reader to . . . an incessant questioning of the codes which appear to function normally but which are sometimes suddenly rendered invalid" (19).

This shattering of received habits forces the reader actively to attend to the process of reading rather than relying upon predigested stereotypes. Cixous' invocation of the role of the reader in the process of decoding such sentences brings to mind the "affective stylistics" of the early Stanley Fish, an approach which was based in large part on precisely such effects. To Fish, it is not what a sentence means in retrospect when viewed from its end that counts. Rather, it is the experience of the reader in negotiating the sentence as it unfolds in time that constitutes the true significance of the sentence. Thus, a sentence "is no longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an *event*, something that *happens* to, and with the participation of, the reader"

(25). Moreover, it is significant that some of Fish's favorite illustrations of this thesis involve cases (especially in the work of Milton) in which a line of poetry contains the beginning of a sentence that builds certain expectations in the reader, only to find that, in the continuation of that sentence on the next line, "the expectation and anticipation are disappointed, and the realization of that disappointment will be inseparable from the making of a new (and less comforting) sense" (164).

Except for the fact that the new sense in the ending of the sentences I have cited from "The Sisters" is in fact *more* comforting than that indicated by the beginning of the sentence, this effect that Fish finds in Milton's poetry is precisely the same as that which occurs in Joyce's story. Important in both cases, however, is the inseparability of the anticipated meaning from the one that is finally produced--the boy's mention of the odour in the death chamber may turn out to refer to the flowers, but the suggestion of the corruption of the physical body after death produced by the beginning of the sentence continues to linger in the air nevertheless. A meaning is put in place, then immediately retracted, in a mode of narration that can be identified with the poetic tradition of the palinode. And it is a characteristic of all palinodes that the retracted meanings cannot be erased, though they may be placed under erasure.

This palinodic mode of narration will continue to be a feature of Joyce's writing throughout his career. Matei Calinescu, citing Samuel Beckett as his principal exemplar, suggests that a central feature of "a certain direction within postmodernism" is "the insistent use of a

rhetoric of palinode or retraction, a rhetoric that earlier modes of writing had used only marginally" (309). I think that Calinescu is correct in identifying palinodic rhetoric as an important feature of postmodernist narration. He is not, however, correct in suggesting that the extensive use of this rhetoric is a new development of postmodernism. For one thing, the palinode form owes much to the tradition of the spiritual autobiography. The *Confessions* of St. Augustine, for example, can be read as one extended palinode repudiating his earlier life. Moreover, it should be noted that the very concept of the palinode implies an appreciation of the temporality of language, in which later statements retract (or attempt to retract) earlier ones. In this regard, it is relevant to note that Augustine, in his famous rumination on the nature of time in Book XI of the *Confessions* employs the unfolding of language in time as one of his principal examples of temporality.[18]

After Augustine, the technique of the palinode was a common one in medieval literature, as Chaucer's famous retraction of the *Canterbury Tales* aptly illustrates. Jeremy Tambling, for example, discusses the frequent use of palinodes in Dante, noting precisely the effect I have described here in relation to Joyce and Beckett:

> These palinodes suggest re-writing, rather than development, discontinuity rather than consistency, and qualify unitary truths with the sense of lability, doubleness, and difference. (132)

One might argue that my associative flight from Joyce to Milton to Beckett to Dante has been set off by an over-interpretation of a couple of perfectly innocent comments on the part of the boy narrator of "The Sisters." After all, that boy clearly could not have been aware of all

of these possible connections to his relatively simple utterances. For that matter, neither could Joyce. The influence of Dante on the writing of *Dubliners* has become more and more apparent over the years, but neither Fish nor the foul Beckett were available to the author of "The Sisters."[19] I am, in short, reading something into the text that simply isn't there.

But that, I would suggest, is precisely the point. What Joyce does know (but what the boy narrator is only beginning to learn) is that there is in fact much more significance to any given utterance than what is contained in the words of the utterance itself. Further, he knows that this extra meaning exists in the flow of time, residing in texts that were produced both before and after the text in question. This dialogic effect allows Joyce's work to interact with "The Tradition" in a way that goes well beyond the smooth adaptation envisioned by Eliot. The most obvious evidence of Joyce's recognition of this phenomenon is his frequent use of allusion, explicitly triggering intertextual connections that would normally be implicit in the nature of language itself. Further, Joyce images his interaction with literary history through the ongoing interaction (an inner textuality) of his own work with itself. Within *Dubliners*, images and motifs that appear in one story frequently reappear in the changed context of later stories, not only allowing the earlier story to echo in the first, but also allowing the later story to retrospectively emend the meaning of the earlier one. For example, let me return to that early sentence in which the boy narrator of "The Sisters" looks for signs of death candles outside the window of Father Flynn. Candles, this sentence tells us, have great symbolic

significance, especially in Catholic Dublin. As a result, the reader of *Dubliners* is alerted to be on the lookout for candles as symbols, and indeed candles will appear at crucial points many times in the book, ranging from the almost preposterously Freudian scene in which Bob Doran uses his phallic candle to light the fire of loosely-clad Polly Mooney (67) to the rejection of ceremonial candles as Popish mumbo jumbo ("magic-lantern business") by ex-Protestant Tom Kernan (171) to Gabriel Conroy's rejection of the hotel candle so that he may seduce his wife in near-darkness--the lighting, apparently, in which she looks best now that her aging face is "no longer the face for which Michael Furey had braved death" (216, 222).[20] And these links are far from gratuitous. Each subsequent reactivation of the candle motif serves to build and reinforce the complex symbolic mutual involvement among sexuality, death, and religion that forms one of the central themes of both *Dubliners* and Joyce's entire project.

These sorts of intratextual links proliferate throughout *Dubliners*, just as they also appear in all of Joyce's later works, and a recognition of such links greatly contributes to an appreciation of the book's finer points. The narrator of "The Sisters" clearly lacks the meta-narrative perspective to be intentionally alluding in his reference to the candles to the situations of Bob Doran, Tom Kernan, and Gabriel Conroy. But the inevitable associations that occur between his narration and those later stories nicely illustrate the way in which "meaning" in "The Sisters" (and everywhere in Joyce) consistently eludes any traditional notion of intention on the part of the narrator as theological originator of his own discourse. In addition, the evolutionary way in which symbols and

statements acquire changing significance as the reader proceeds through the book indicates Joyce's recognition of the inescapable historicity of his own discourse.

This evolutionary character informs all of Joyce's entire career. Each work varies greatly from all the works before it, while at the same time building upon and recalling those previous works. David Hayman describes Joyce's consistent use of repetition:

> Details, characters, events, effects, and techniques from one work carry over into the next much as the image or event occurring in one chapter will turn up in later episodes as a symbol or an echo. Like a thrifty housewife, Joyce used the stock and ingredients from yesterday's soup to flavor today's casserole. (*Mechanics* 15)

This process of continual reactivation of motifs and images results in the complex framework of verbal and thematic interconnections for which Joyce's work is justifiably famous. Kenner notes the laborious cross-referencing required for any serious reading of *Ulysses*, and attributes this phenomenon to Joyce's profound appreciation of the properties of the book as a concrete medium in which all pages co-exist simultaneously so that one can turn back and forth from one mention of a given motif to another (*Stoic* 32-4). He is right, of course, but this emphasis on the simultaneity of the book as medium does not do justice to the fact that readers still traverse books (especially on the first reading) in a primarily linear fashion. Iser (who often invokes Joyce as exemplar) has emphasized the way in which this sort of cross-referencing does not imply a simultaneous view of the entire book as object, but rather proceeds in time:

> Thus, in the time-flow of the reading process, past and future continually converge in the present moment, and the synthetizing operations of the wandering viewpoint enable the text to pass through the reader's mind as an ever-expanding network of connections. (*Act* 116)

Similarly, at first glance the large number of repetitions in Joyce's work appears to be a direct enactment of Stephen Dedalus' privileging of rhythm in art, where he defines rhythm as "the first formal esthetic relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part or of any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part" (*Portrait* 206). In Stephen's system of aesthetics, this emphasis on rhythm appears to be directly related to his privileging of stasis in art, which in turn evokes the "spatialization" of form noted by Joseph Frank in his highly influential essay on modernist literature. This spatialization derives from the intricate webs of interconnections existing in such works, webs that (to Frank) allow all parts of the text to resonate with all other parts and force the reader to consider the *integritas* of the work in its entirety as an aesthetic whole rather than as a moving narrative. Frank cites *Ulysses* as a prime example of spatial form, noting that

> the reader is forced to read *Ulysses* in exactly the same manner as he reads modern poetry, that is, by continually fitting fragments together and keeping allusions in mind until, by reflexive reference, he can link them together to their complements. . . . Joyce cannot be read--he can only be reread. (18, 19)

It is true that Joyce's works require rereading. But what is also important to note is the way in which Joyce's works constantly interrogate and reread themselves. To an extent, the notion of spatial form is helpful in understanding the importance of the many repetitions

found throughout Joyce's work, repetitions that are often based on sound rather than sense, as one might find in poetry. However, Frank's notion of spatial form has no way of accounting for the fact that the actual experience of reading unfolds in time as a profoundly temporal experience and that each repetition of a motif in Joyce's work is re-energized and re-accentuated by its new context. The notion of a work as a static aesthetic artifact, revolving in crystal, shows a profound lack of appreciation for the dynamic, self-critical, and deeply historical nature of Joyce's entire project. To carry Hayman's culinary metaphor a step further, it is important to note that the same ingredients may acquire a very different flavor in the context of today's casserole than the one they had in yesterday's soup.

Joyce's repetitions always involve such changes in flavoring, always show "history repeating itself with a difference" (*Ulysses* 535). Indeed, he makes it clear in *Dubliners* that *pure* repetition, the passive serving of leftovers devoid of this kind of re-accentuation, is tantamount to death. For nothing characterizes the paralysis of his Dubliners more than their tendency to repeat themselves endlessly, like the absurd, never-to-be-forgotten Johnny circling the statue of King Billy. Santayana may be correct that those who fail to remember the past are doomed to repeat it, but Joyce makes it clear that this same fate awaits those who remember the past all too well and accept it uncritically. Joyce's continual technique of repetition with a difference demonstrates a belief that the past must neither be forgotten nor accepted as a preordained truth that might not have been otherwise. Thus, in both his thematic representation of the relationship of the people of Dublin to

their past and in his own writing practice, Joyce posits a clearly-defined theory of history, one that suggests a real possibility that human agents can affect the outcome of events.

Joyce and Nietzsche: History as Confrontation with the Past

Joyce's emphasis on history as repetition with a difference again suggests the work of Bakhtin, because to Bakhtin pure repetition without re-accentuation is possible only in monologic discourse. No utterance that dialogically interacts with its discursive environment "can ever be repeated; it is always a new utterance (even if it is a quotation)" (*Speech* 108). The repetitive paralysis of Dublin, then, can be imaged as a failure of dialogism, as a surfeit of monologic discourse. But such repetition most obviously invokes Nietzsche, and it may be the work of Nietzsche that provides the most direct insights into Joyce's treatment of history. Joseph Buttigieg has also perceptively linked Joyce's attitude toward history to Nietzsche's seminal essay on the topic, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History." In this essay, Nietzsche discusses three distinctly different modes of approaching the past, which he identifies as monumental, antiquarian, and critical history. Briefly, monumental history involves a view of the past as determined by the great deeds of mighty men. Antiquarian history involves a reverence for all things past, great or not, purely because of their pastness. And critical history involves an uncompromising, violent, and antagonistic confrontation of the past. To Nietzsche, each of these types of history has both uses and disadvantages in the proper context, but no one is healthy if pursued alone and apart from the others. While Nietzsche's

own project is largely critical, he emphasizes that a purely critical history is in danger of becoming blindly destructive, causing its practitioners to forget the lessons of history. Within the context of *Dubliners*, it is especially important to note the way in which both monumental and antiquarian history pose the threat of overwhelming the present with the past, causing the past to become the "gravedigger of the present" (Nietzsche 62, 1).

When Nietzsche suggests that the motto of monumental historians might be "let the dead bury the living" (72, 2) and that a purely antiquarian history "hinders any firm resolve to attempt something new, thus it paralyzes the man of action" (75, 3), it is clear that he is providing an apt description of Joyce's Dubliners, who compose "a veritable gallery of characters paralyzed by their uncritical allegiance to tradition" (Buttigieg 9).[21] The solution, according to Nietzsche, is not to turn away from the past, but to put it to use in the service of the present. He describes the ability to appropriate the past in this way as the "plastic power" of an individual or of a culture, where plastic power is defined as "the capacity to develop out of oneself in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign" (62, 1).

This concept provides an extremely useful way of looking at the work of Joyce, which subsumes and appropriates vast numbers of past texts, transforming them for its own purposes while at the same time continually transforming itself and "developing out of itself in its own way." Because of this phenomenal plasticity, there is, in fact, a way in which all of Joyce is contained in the first paragraph of "The Sisters"--and in

which the first paragraph of "The Sisters" is contained in all of Joyce. That first paragraph (like all of Joyce's paragraphs) proliferates through the entire remainder of his project, continually being recalled and questioned, never being forgotten, never being allowed to rest. This is not to say that all of Joyce's career is literally contained in this first paragraph or that Joyce somehow had in mind his entire project even at this early date, thereby specifically planning the beginning of "The Sisters" as a prelude to that project as a pre-conceived whole. Such a claim would be absurd, despite the occult powers often attributed to Joyce by over-enthusiastic critics. As I have shown, Joyce's work is characterized by a fundamental incompleteness--all of Joyce is not even contained in all of Joyce, much less in that first paragraph. Furthermore, Joyce's work is also characterized by a profound dynamism. It constantly changes and evolves. When I say that the first paragraph of "The Sisters" remains present in all the rest of Joyce's writing, I am not saying that Joyce's writing never changes, but rather that his writing at each moment in its evolution bears traces of and carries on dialogues with all of the earlier moments in that evolution.

As I explore the Nietzschean aspects of Joyce's notion of history in this study, it will be useful to keep in mind Paul de Man's suggestion that the attitude shown toward the past by Nietzsche is emblematic of modernity in general, making Nietzsche a central figure in attempts to write a history of modernist literature. De Man rather curiously ignores Nietzsche's repeated admonitions that we must actively engage the past, focusing instead on the phenomenon of Nietzschean forgetting, but his identification of Nietzsche as a key figure in modern literary history

seems apt.[22] It will also be useful to remember Buttigieg's suggestion that the models of history suggested by Nietzsche and Joyce can help us greatly in rewriting the history of modernism from a postmodern perspective.[23] Of course, the emphasis on continual revision of the past in both Joyce and Nietzsche argues a conception of history in which periodization has meaning only in the loosest and most heuristic sense. But an examination of the dynamics of Joyce's fiction can tell us a great deal about his view of the dynamics of literary history, just as it can tell us a great deal about his view of history in general.

Notes

[1]In the earlier published version to which Kenner refers, the phrase containing the candles appeared as "the ceremonious candles in the light of which the Christian must take his last sleep." In the earliest available manuscript version of the story this sentence appears as the relatively simple, "It was not the light of candles so far as I could see" (*Dubliners* 243). Clearly Joyce put a great deal of care into the precise formulation of this particular sentence. Magalaner notes how, in writing the *Dubliners* stories, Joyce seemed to be "trying almost desperately to achieve Flaubert's aim of the exact adjective or verb needed to present his point in precisely the correct perspective" (*Time* 89).

[2]Note that Joyce added the motif of paralysis only in the version of the story that was to be included with the other stories in *Dubliners*. There is no direct indication in "The Sisters" that this paralysis might be linked to syphilis, though certain characteristics included in the description of the priest are consistent with such an interpretation. See Waisbren and Walzl. Also see the contention by Garvin that the theme syphilis runs throughout Joyce's work. Garvin conjectures that this theme arises from the fact that Joyce's father suffered from advanced syphilis (42-6).

[3]References to *Finnegans Wake* conventionally include both page and line numbers, separated by a period. I will follow this convention throughout.

[4]Herring presents the latest discussion of this aspect of the significance of the word "gnomon," noting that it describes the "emptiness, incompletion, solitude, loneliness, shadow, darkness, and failure, which so affect the lives of Joyce's Dubliners." But Herring also notes the appropriateness of the term as a description of the

language in Joyce's book, "part of a political rhetoric of silence within a larger framework of language (*Uncertainty* 4).

[5]Todorov discusses Bakhtin's recognition of the incompleteness of the verbal content of any given utterance, citing an early article by Bakhtin/Voloshinov that compares an utterance to an "enthymeme" (41). An enthymeme is a syllogism in which one term is left unstated--quite analogous to a gnomon as a figure from which something is missing.

[6]Magalaner and Kain suggest that the boy's refusal of the crackers shows his "symbolic reluctance to accept the ceremonies of his former faith" (85). Obviously that symbolism is accessible to any reasonably sophisticated reader of the text but not, I would suggest, to the boy himself. My guess is that his own plea of self-consciousness in a tense situation--"I declined because I thought I would make too much noise eating them" (15)--is a perfectly good representation of his conscious motivation.

[7]By contrast, note the way in which Michael Furey's ghost does impact upon the life of Gabriel Conroy, because the existence of that ghost does not fit in with the conventions of the romantic narrative in which Gabriel envisions himself.

[8]Similarly, note the troubling air of the mysterious that continues to hover about the death of the priest, despite the resort to cliché as defense that I noted above. "The entire conversation of Eliza with the boy's aunt is the simultaneous assertion that everything went as it should with the priest's death and that something mysterious went very wrong" (Kershner 29).

[9]Kershner attributes the boy's use of ellipsis to the infectious effect of the ellipses in the speech of the story's adult characters (31).

[10]Macherey states it plainly: "What is important in the work is what it does not say" (87).

[11]For one of the more extensive treatments of Joyce in this mode, see Brivic.

[12]Compare Stephen's declaration in *Ulysses* that the church is founded "upon the void" (170).

[13]Joyce's challenge to the traditional distinction between the private and the public has powerful implications for Marxists, who often see the privatization of the subject as a central consequence of bourgeois society. This privatization estranges individuals from one another, thus preventing any effective mass action. In this vein, Wirth-Nesher notes that most of the scenes in *Dubliners* occur in public places, and that "the turning points in most of the stories occur as a result of interaction with strangers" (284).

[14]Compare Joyce's own remark in his essay "The Study of Languages" that "in the history of words there is much that indicates the history of men, and in comparing the speech of to-day with that of years ago, we have a useful illustration of the effect of external influences on the very words of the race" (*Critical* 28).

[15]In parts of *Ulysses*, and in all of *Finnegans Wake*, even Joyce's individual words are openly constructed in nature. This change extends his recognition of the temporality of language, as he rearranges usual spellings in order to allow the letters of words to unfold in new and surprising ways in the process of reading. This, incidentally, is a phenomenon that can effectively occur only in writing, not in speech, and Joyce's emphasis on individual letters relative to Bakhtin's emphasis on the word shows his relative emphasis on writing as opposed to the primacy of speech metaphors in Bakhtin.

[16]Compare here the boy's dream, in which he and the priest appear to change roles (13-4). This confusion between the boy and the priest foreshadows the unstable boundaries between characters that will inform Joyce's later work.

[17]Actually, most readers probably *still* don't know what faints and worms are without consulting an auxiliary source, like Gifford's *Annotations*. This experience is a common one for readers of Joyce and further illustrates the way in which meaning in Joyce is so often fully realizable by an appeal to information located outside of the text itself.

[18]Influenced by the quantitative verse of Latin poetry, Augustine cites poetry as a principal example of a temporal phenomenon, though perhaps his most memorable example involves the temporal process of reading a psalm (274, 278).

[19]On the presence of Dante in *Dubliners*, see Cope, who presents an interesting argument for Dante's *Commedia* as a structural and thematic model for all of *Dubliners*. Reynolds presents a detailed chart that attempts to show the way in which *Dubliners* is in fact laid out according to the cantos of *Inferno*, stating that "Joyce wrote the stories of *Dubliners* in the mood and manner of Dante's abrasive denunciation of faction-ridden Florence" (159, 156). She then goes on to argue that *Portrait* is modeled on Dante's *Vita Nuova* (178). In any case, note Ellmann's statement that "Dante was perhaps Joyce's favorite author" (4). Joyce himself told his brother Stanislaus that the story "Grace" was modeled on the *Commedia* (Ellmann, *James Joyce* 229), a relationship that Magalaner discusses (130-1).

[20]Candles do not figure directly in "A Little Cloud," but there is clearly an implied hint at phallic inadequacy in the designation of its protagonist as "Little Chandler," especially in light of the sexual significance of candles in the rest of *Dubliners* and in light of the "unmanly" characteristics displayed by Little Chandler himself.

[21]Indeed, Nietzsche's diagnosis of the ills of his contemporary Germany, in which his compatriots "serve history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate" (59) sounds some striking resonances with Joyce's analysis of Dublin.

[22]De Man suggests that, to Nietzsche, "[m]oments of genuine humanity thus are moments at which all anteriority vanishes, annihilated by the power of an absolute forgetting" (147). This forgetting then frees man from the encrustations of the past so that he is able to act in the present. But Nietzsche's "forgetting" is far more selective than de Man indicates, and Nietzsche himself acknowledges that we cannot escape the past in this way. Even in a critical history that rejects the chain of past events, "it is not possible to wholly free oneself from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in them" (Nietzsche, "Uses" 76, 3). A critical history must have something to be critical *of*. As Hayden White notes, Nietzsche recommends a "synthesis of all three ways of reading the past, not an escape from the past, for the past cannot be escaped" (351).

[23]Buttigieg (ignoring various political critiques that have already been launched against modernism) argues that histories of modernism up until now have been primarily monumental, and that what we need now is a critical history of modernism (11).

CHAPTER 3
SERENDIPITOUS INTERTEXTUALITY: JOYCE'S "THE DEAD" AND SHAKESPEARE'S *TWELFTH NIGHT*

Early in his *Confessions* St. Augustine describes the process through which he learned language as a child:

> I noticed that people would name some object and then turn towards whatever it was that they had named. I watched them and understood that the sound they made when they wanted to indicate that particular thing was the name which they gave to it, and their actions clearly showed what they meant, for there is a kind of universal language, consisting of expressions of the face and eyes, gestures of tone and voice, which can show whether a person means to ask for something and get it, or refuse it and have nothing to do with it. (29)

This seemingly innocent "common sense" passage provides a succinct summary of the metaphysical conception of language that has dominated Western civilization throughout its history. Augustine here posits language as a direct reflection of intentional desire on the part of the speaker, and the importance that he places on physical expressions and gestures shows precisely the sort of privileging of full presence that we have come, since Derrida, to associate with metaphysics. Further, this passage illustrates the Augustinian theory of language as naming, emanating from the original Adamic naming of the objects of the world and demonstrating a conception of language as a means of obtaining mastery over those objects.

To Augustine, the fact that we live in a postlapsarian, post-Babelian world was at least partially compensated for by the sacrifice of Christ, which restored to human language much of its original power:

> In the Christian dispensation, human modes of thought and expression, although still limited by the human condition, could now worthily take on the tasks assigned to them by God. Human language, reborn through the Incarnation, could now assist God in spreading the effects of the Incarnation to the world. (Colish 3)

A recognition of the central importance of the Incarnation to Augustine's conception of language helps to reveal the thoroughly theological orientation of that conception. And Augustine's view remained dominant throughout the Middle Ages, when he "became an authoritative source second only to the Bible" (Colish 7).

It is thus not surprising that Augustine should provide such a powerful gloss for so much of Joyce's work, given the extensive influence on Joyce of medieval thinking in general. But the dialogue between Joyce and Augustine is very often energized more by their differences than by their similarities. Joyce's view of language is thoroughly *non*-theological, and his work does a great deal to demonstrate what happens to language when God is removed as an ultimate source of authoritative meaning. The implications of this removal are in fact staggering, and much of what I am doing in this entire study involves an exploration of those implications. The most obvious implication, though, is the destruction of any notion of direct intentional mastery of language by speaker or writer. Language does not exist as a secondary expression of an idea that originates in the spirit. To Joyce, language always comes

first, and to him, as to Oscar Wilde, language "is the parent, and not the child, of thought" ("Critic" 75).

Moreover, it is particularly characteristic of Joyce's view of language to be intensely aware of its historicity, of the fact that it has been inherited from generations of previous users and that it bears the indelible marks of those users. Language, in fact, comes down to us already embedded in well-defined discourses that severely limit the flexibility with which language can be used. When, in "The Dead," Gabriel Conroy grumbles that "Irish is not my language" (189), he (like all speakers) is saying more than he thinks, expressing the lack of proprietorship that characterizes the relationships of all speakers to all languages.

However, the priority of language to authorial intention can be liberating as well as limiting. The discursive embeddedness of language implies that one can never fully say what one means, but it also implies that one might say much *more* than one means as well. This insight is, I believe, one of the fundamental keys to the workings of the Joycean text. In effect, centuries of previous use have resulted in a linguistic erosion that has worn certain semantic channels in language, and Joyce's words, like the words of everyone else, have a tendency to run in those pre-worn channels. But there are also cross-channels, into which our words sometimes unexpectedly swerve. Joyce's language arises from within the context of his stultifying Dublin heritage, and his words tend to run in the ruts of Dublin culture. He does, however, have two possible strategies at his disposal to combat this sort of linguistic paralysis and to facilitate "cross-channeling." First, embedded in the discourse

of Dublin, he can turn the energies of that discourse against itself through parody, creating a linguistic turbulence that erodes the banks of the conventional channels that surround his own language, perhaps to the point of connecting up with neighboring alternative channels. But since Joyce's language is a part of Dublin discourse, this strategy implies that he will be caught in the current and must also parody himself, resulting in the palinodic movement that I described in the last chapter. Second, he can reach out to other, different discourses through intertextual connections. These discourses will in turn run in their own channels, but at least they are different channels, broadening the scope of meaning. This irrigation work, however, must largely be done by the reader, since each reader will bring a slightly different discursive background to Joyce's work, thus expanding the range of possible meanings. In this chapter, I will discuss these two strategies of meaning generation in Joyce's short story "The Dead."

Intertextual Connections in "The Dead"

As I indicated in the last chapter, two principal ways through which texts can trigger intertextual dialogues are through direct allusion to a specific intertext and through "moments of strangeness"--oddities and peculiarities in tone or diction that indicate an absent intertext. Both of these techniques are used to good effect in "The Dead." For example, Gabriel Conroy's debate with himself over whether to include a somewhat obscure quotation from Browning in his postprandial salutation points directly to the work of Browning:

> He was undecided about the lines from Robert Browning for he feared they would be above the heads of his hearers. Some quotation that they could recognise from Shakespeare or from the Melodies would be better. The indelicate clacking of the men's heels and the scuffling of their soles reminded him that their grade of culture differed from his. He would only make himself ridiculous by quoting poetry to them which they could not understand. (179)

This passage is unusually rich, and for a number of reasons. As usual with Joyce the reference to Browning is not gratuitous. John Feeley argues that the "theme, tone, and diction" of Gabriel's speech indicates that the Browning poem he has in mind is the "Epilogue" which closes *Asolando*--a volume that was, appropriately enough, published on the day of Browning's death (89). Feeley notes a variety of parallels between Browning's poem and Joyce's story, including the structural fact that "The Dead" closes *Dubliners* as a sort of epilogue. And the parallels seem valid enough as far as they go, despite the fact that his argument is significantly hampered by his stated belief that everything in Joyce's writing is intended to "contribute to unity of effect" (87), a belief that prevents him from exploring ways in which Browning's poem contributes to Joyce's irony by the ways in which it *differs* from "The Dead." It is worth, for example, comparing Gabriel's glowing *Daily Express* review of Browning with Joyce's review of Frederick Langbridge's *Ballads and Legends*, in which he states that "Mr. Langbridge's worst manner is very bad indeed; here the worst vices of Browning are united with a disease of sentiment of which the 'Master' cannot justly be accused" (Joyce, *Critical* 124).[1] It is this disease of sentiment (always anathema to Joyce) which afflicts virtually all of the characters in "The Dead." Joyce's recognition of Browning's lack of sentiment (despite other vices) creates an ironic gap between the British poet and the

denizens of "The Dead" (most notably Gabriel himself) that adds substantially to the resonance of the story. One implication is that the sentimental Gabriel, in his admiration for the unsentimental Browning, thoroughly misunderstands either Browning, or himself, or both.

Gabriel is mulling over the propriety of his Browning quotation while still smarting from his rebuff at the hands of Lily, the caretaker's daughter, and he is invoking (à la Ortega y Gasset) his superior culture as a means of defending himself from the revolting masses that surround him. His association of the *Melodies* of Thomas Moore with mass taste is quite consistent with this reading, and indeed Moore functions as a representative of the degraded state of Irish culture throughout Joyce's work. He is mentioned, for example, among the lowbrow *littérateurs* championed by the old josser in "An Encounter," and his ballads may be alluded to in the titles of both "Araby" and "Eveline." Gifford sardonically summarizes Moore's literary status by noting that "[n]o properly sentimental Irish home was complete without its copy of Moore's *Irish Melodies*" (39).[2]

It is, then, entirely appropriate (at least from his own point of view) for Gabriel to cite Moore as a example of "low" culture. Shakespeare's works were no doubt better known than were Browning's, but it still seems curious that Shakespeare would be included in the same category as Moore. Again, Gabriel's position as an arbiter of cultural value seems to be undercut--if he regards Browning as "high" art and Shakespeare as "low," then his taste seems rather questionable. But what is really called into question here is the very notion of such high/low value distinctions in artistic matters. The extent to which Joyce

undercut such dichotomies through the free intermixture of materials from all cultural realms in his work is only now beginning to be appreciated. It may be true that Gabriel here echoes Joyce in his allusiveness, but the joke is that in the case of Joyce critics have readily identified allusions to Dante, Shakespeare, Homer, and others for many years, while the heavy presence of references to popular culture in his work has largely afforded the material "which they could not understand."[3]

The coupling of Shakespeare with Moore in opposition to Browning is conspicuous for its inappropriateness, and thus acts to call attention to the presence of the Bard in Joyce's story. Indeed, other than Browning, Shakespeare is the author to whom Joyce directly alludes most often in the story. Thus, when Gabriel browses in an idle moment he views over his aunts' piano a picture of the balcony scene from *Romeo and Juliet* and one of the "two murdered princes in the Tower" from *Richard III*. Both plays have important thematic resonances with the theme of death in the rest of the story, with *Romeo and Juliet* also connecting (among other things) to the theme of overly romanticized young love, and *Richard III* connecting to Gabriel's status as nephew and to famous stories about horses and British royalty. These sorts of connections are obvious, but once Shakespeare has been put in place as an important intertext, the dialogue can by no means be confined within predictable limits. For example, Gabriel also views a picture of his mother reading to his brother Constantine. He thus views three pictures, emphasizing the importance of this scene--in *Dubliners* important things very often happen in threes, a mannerism that Joyce perhaps garnered from Dante. And, speaking of threes, note that the one thing all of the pictures have in

common is that there are two people in each picture, while Gabriel looks on as a third.

This image of Gabriel as an outsider, as the third who makes a crowd, will later resonate with his position outside the remembered experience of Gretta with Michael Furey. For example, the picture of Romeo and Juliet brings to mind Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, who falls in love with the actress Sibyl Vane as she plays Juliet, then becomes jealous of Romeo and dead lovers everywhere: "I want to make Romeo jealous. I want the dead lovers of the world to hear our laughter" (200). But, since two of the three pictures involved in "The Dead" depict scenes from Shakespeare, it is natural to ask whether Gabriel's situation viewing the pictures connects to anything in Shakespeare as well. In fact, it does. There is one well-known moment in Shakespeare that is built precisely around the motif of a third party gazing upon a picture of two other parties. In the second act of *Twelfth Night*, Feste the Clown enters as a third to the carousing duo of Sir Toby Belch and Sir Andrew Aguecheek:

> SIR ANDREW: Here comes the fool, i' faith.
> CLOWN: How now, my hearts! Did you never see the picture of "we three"?
> SIR TOBY: Welcome, ass. Now let's have a catch.
> (II.iii.15-8)[4]

Shakespeare, like Joyce, builds his work through appropriation and transformation of whatever materials happen to be at hand. In fact, Shakespeare and Dante were probably the two authors from whom Joyce learned most in this regard. One must read Shakespeare as one reads Joyce, being ever alert for signs of intertextual intrusions. Here the

"picture of 'we three'" is in fact a real picture, a well-known piece of Renaissance visual wit showing two asses, with the title implying that the viewer makes a third. Shakespeare's audience would have recognized the allusion at once, and so does Sir Toby, as his jovial answer indicates. Elizabeth Freund presents an interesting discussion of the way in which this picture functions in *Twelfth Night* as a "model of the hermeneutic process" (475-6). In particular, she notes the double bind in which the picture places the interpreter: one cannot interpret the picture properly without placing oneself in the role of ass, but if one does not assume the role of ass, then one is still an ass for being too dull to interpret the picture properly.

Paradoxes of this sort can be read as allegories of the undecidability of interpretation in general, and such situations frequently occur in Joyce's work--as in *Portrait* when Stephen is made the butt of Wells' humor whether he kisses his mother or not. In terms of "The Dead" it is Gabriel (as usual) who is the dupe, and this scene identifies him as both a fool and an ass. And perhaps there is an indication that we, as Joyce's interpreters, cannot identify the all-too-human Gabriel as an ass without recognizing our own asshood--but that interpreters who cannot see that Gabriel is an ass are thereby making asses of themselves.

But this, one might say, is making much ado about nothing. The link between Gabriel's viewing of these three pictures and Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night* is tenuous indeed, despite the fact that the work of Shakespeare in general is overtly identified as an important intertext. But let me hold that question in abeyance for a moment and turn to the

other method of triggering intertextual associations that I would like to examine--moments of strangeness in the text, or "ungrammaticalities in the idiolectic norm," as Riffaterre would have it ("Syllepsis" 627).

In "The Dead" the one sentence that has seemed most often to strike commentators as peculiar is Gabriel's enigmatic note near the end: "The time had come for him to set out on his journey westward" (223). Certainly the west is here associated with Ireland itself, and in this sense the "journey westward" can be interpreted as a turn away from the anti-nationalist tendencies exhibited by Gabriel in his earlier encounter with Molly Ivors. His journey might then indicate his acceptance of the potential vitalizing effects of the folk culture of his own native land. In this light, it is important to note that images of the East function throughout *Dubliners* as symbols of exotic lands where one might escape the stifling atmosphere of Ireland. Gabriel's westward turn, then, functions as an acceptance of current reality as opposed to the dream of escape. There are also more symbolic interpretations of this westward turn. Brewster Ghiselin finds a unifying pattern in the religious connotations of the various eastward and westward movements in *Dubliners* as whole, noting (among other things) that Christians of the fourth century turned to the west to renounce Satan and that Joyce must have "shared that profound human feeling, older than Christianity, which has made the sunrise immemorially and all but universally an emblem of the return of life" (321). In contrast, the west is traditionally associated with sunset and with death--except that it is a death that is associated with rebirth, since we all know that the sun will rise again tomorrow. Thus, Gabriel's turn to the west can be interpreted either as a rebirth

and affirmative acceptance of his present life or as a surrender to death and despair.[5] Moreover, this duality in interpretation is inevitable, since rebirth and death are inseparably intertwined. As that later Gabriel, Salman Rushdie's Gibreel Farishta, tells us, "To be born again . . . first you have to die" (*Satanic* 3).

The sort of symbolism invoked by Ghiselin immediately suggests Dante as an intertext that might help to explicate possible meanings of Gabriel's westward journey. As Mazzotta points out, Dante (participating in a well-developed medieval *topos*) employs the notion of *translatio imperii*, of movement from east to west--related to the westward movement of Aeneas from Troy to Rome--as a fundamental metaphor for history itself. "Modeled on the movement of the sun from east to west, this doctrine is conventionally based on the analogy between the duration of the day and the totality of history" (Mazzotta 99). Thus, "[t]he sun is the foundation of history, its radical metaphor" (102). In this scheme, east is associated with the past and west with the future, so that Gabriel's turn to the west can be taken to represent his acceptance of the flow of history, as a rejection of the immersion in the past that characterizes the society around him and as a turn toward the future.[6]

Yet the sun is a deceptive metaphor for history. The Christian model of history, centered on the uniqueness of the Incarnation of Christ and featuring a relentless progression from the Fall of man (which initiated history) and the Final Judgement (which will end it), is a strictly linear one in which events occur once and for all and the past can never be repeated. But the rising and setting of the sun is in fact a cyclic process that is repeated continually. Thus the ineluctable

movement of the sun from east to west both is and is not a proper metaphor for Christian history. The paradoxical status inherent in all metaphors based on solar movement has been discussed by Derrida (*Margins* 250-1). Basically, Derrida's argument is that the sun as source of light is a perfect figure of illumination, but that since the sun repeatedly disappears and hides itself from view it is also an ideal figure of obscurity, of what can only be known indirectly. As a visible object it is a paradigm of the sensory (the proper) that is the core of metaphor, and as an invisible object it is a paradigm of the figurative. The sun thus becomes the metaphor for metaphor itself, and the *translatio* of the sun from east to west, from appearance to disappearance, stands as a figure for the *translatio verbi* from literal to figurative meaning in metaphor.

It is tempting to interpret Gabriel's move to the west as a sort of conversion experience in which he transcends the hold that the past has on the present by turning to the future. But, due to the paradoxical nature of all solar metaphors, this interpretation is radically undercut by its own implications--as are all moments of transcendence in Joyce. The self-referential metaphoricity of the sun leads to an infinite regress of meaning in which it is impossible to reach any final interpretation, and it thus comes as no surprise that critics have been unable to decide between diametrically opposed interpretations of the significance of Gabriel's westward journey. In any case, to Joyce the past is never strictly past, but must constantly be confronted in the present. Turning away from the past, ignoring it, is just as stultifying as monumentalizing and mythologizing it.

Derrida refers to metaphors of solar movement as "heliotropic" metaphors, after the heliotrope, the flower that turns to follow the sun in its movement across the sky. Interestingly, Dante, too, employs the heliotrope as a metaphor for metaphoricity itself. In the canto of the thieves (*Inferno* XXIV) much of the suffering of the sinners is due to the fact that they must go about "naked, terrified,/with no hope of hole or heliotrope" (l. 92-3). Admittedly, scholars have sometimes found the "heliotrope" reference here puzzling, but Mazzotta suggests (I think rightly) that the implication is that the sinners have no recourse to metaphor, that they are doomed to literalness, which (in Dante) is synonymous with death (104).[7]

Literal reading, in Dante, is specifically associated with petrification (read "paralysis") because of the way it paralyzes the potential for polysemic generation of meaning.[8] Interestingly, one of the symptoms of paralysis that Joyce attributes to his Dubliners is precisely this tendency to be locked into literality. We are told in the opening sentence of "The Dead" that "Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet" (175). As Hugh Kenner has pointed out, this construction seems odd because Lily is clearly not *literally*, but *figuratively* run off her feet. But the figure is a banal one, such as Lily herself might employ (*Voices* 15). To Kenner this is a mistake that any caretaker's daughter might make and is therefore entirely appropriate. However, it seems to me that Lily's confusion between the literal and the figurative is symptomatic of something much larger. In Dublin, metaphors have lost the spark of "semantic impertinence" (in Paul Ricoeur's felicitous phrase) that is generative of meaning and have thus

descended into the petrification of literalness. Joyce's appreciation of this phenomenon shows an understanding of the historicity of language that not only recalls Dante but is also reminiscent of Nietzsche, who argues that all literal uses of language are in fact simply dead metaphors that we have forgotten are metaphors:

> Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins that have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. ("On Truth" 84, 1)

This hardening of illusion into "truth" is always for Nietzsche insidious, and indicates the necessity for perpetual and continual recreation (coining?) of fresh metaphors. Man's fictions must be capable of being discarded when they outlive their usefulness. It is precisely this capability of renewal that Joyce's Dubliners have lost.

The parallels between Gabriel Conroy's westward journey and the ruminations of Dante and Derrida on metaphor thus not only reinforce the thematic impact of "The Dead," but also point to a reading of Joyce's story (and perhaps the rest of *Dubliners* as well) as a reflexive meditation on language in general and on its own composition in particular. *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* have been read this way for years, but an understanding of the intensely reflexive nature even of these early stories adds to an appreciation of the self-referential nature of all of Joyce's project. For example, the "belatedness" that Julian Kaye sees as a central theme in much of Joyce's early work (32-3) can now be related to Joyce's recognition of the necessary belatedness and metaphoricity of all language.

Gabriel, as transcendent westward voyager, is inevitably undercut by the irreducibly paradoxical ramifications of Joyce's text within the discourse of the *translatio* of the sun as a figure of history, and it is again impossible to separate death and rebirth as interpretations of Gabriel's final experience. It is worth noting that Dante, too, undercuts the principal westward voyager (other than himself) in the *Commedia*. In the context of Joyce, it is also notable that this voyager in Dante is Ulysses, whose westward voyage ends in disaster and damnation.[9] Dante's use of Ulysses in *Inferno* XXVI provides a striking example of his own technique of transformative appropriation. Though Dante did not know Homer's text directly, he almost certainly knew *of* it, and the fact that Dante's Ulysses comes to a completely different end from Homer's cannot be attributed to simple misinformation on Dante's part. Rather, Dante builds on the neoplatonist interpretation of the voyage of Ulysses as an allegory of the flight of the soul to transcendent truth, then "sabotages" that voyage to demonstrate that such transcendence cannot be achieved by human and secular means alone. Freccero notes that "Dante's Ulysses ends up a shipwreck rather than in the arms of some paradisiac Penelope in order to indicate what Dante thought of such purely philosophical excursions" ("Prologue" 15). Moreover, it is useful and interesting to note, as does Freccero, that the flight of Daedalus was interpreted by the neoplatonists as a movement toward this same transcendence, providing another link to Joyce, in whose texts the Daedalus myth is constantly present.[10]

Later, in *Paradiso* II, Dante transforms the Ulysses myth once again, this time casting himself as a Ulysses-like figure, describing the

inception of his final voyage toward God as the beginnings of a daring nautical journey:

> O You who are within your little bark,
> eager to listen, following behind
> my ship that, singing, crosses to deep seas,
> turn back to see your shores again: do not
> attempt to sail the seas I sail; (l. 1-5)

The difference now is that Dante is seeking *divine* transcendence, so that his voyage can succeed, whereas his earlier pagan Ulysses sought transcendence through purely human means. Ulysses, then, is the failure that Dante might have become had he not found religion, just as Gabriel is often seen as the failure that Joyce might have become had he not escaped Irish religiosity.

Virginia Moseley identifies a large number of parallels between "The Dead" and Dante's *Commedia*. Identifying Gabriel with Dante (rather than with the failed Ulysses), Moseley thus sees Gabriel as achieving a final transcendence, claiming that his ability to hear the snow falling during his final vision "Is especially meaningful because it indicates that Gabriel, like Dante, has become so transhumanized that he is now able to hear the music of the spheres" (433). But Joyce does not incorporate the works of other writers as monological authorities. He enters into dialogical relations with those texts, transforming them within the new context of his own writing. Moseley perceptively identifies parallels between "The Dead" and the *Commedia* but fails to appreciate the ironic gap between Joyce's text and Dante's. The very similarities that she notes contain profound differences, and Joyce's text challenges Dante's just as Dante's challenges Homer's. In light of Moseley's invocation of

the "music of the spheres," it is worth noting that within the milieu of the Morkan party music "signifies 'higher things,' the realm of the spiritual" (Kershner, *Joyce* 146). However, this identification is surely ironized by the events of the story. In particular, note that the events leading to Gabriel's supposed final transcendence are set in motion by Bartell D'Arcy's hoarse-voiced warbling of *The Lass of Aughrim* in a blatant attempt (apparently successful) to seduce Miss O'Callaghan--hardly the "music of the spheres." In Joyce, transcendence by neither secular nor sacred means is available as a solution.[11]

One of the means by which Joyce confounds attempts to read Dante as a direct textual model for "The Dead" is by building in so many other potential candidates for that role. In particular, one of the strategies that Joyce uses to overturn Dantean transcendence and thus problematize this view of Gabriel's "conversion" is through the carnivalesque intermixture of echoes from "high" literature and "low." Just as surely as Gabriel's westward turn recalls the significance of westward movement in Dante's *Commedia*, so too does it recall the Wild West of those "chronicles of disorder" so beloved to the boys in "An Encounter." In fact, as Gerhard Friedrich has pointed out, it is quite possible that Gabriel's name is a reference to the western novel *Gabriel Conroy*, by Bret Harte ("Bret Harte"). This connection also indicates a certain turn toward the future (the wagonmaster's cry of "westward ho!" manifesting a desire to get on with things), but without the transcendence.

But remember that, in "The Dead," "low" culture is also to be associated with Shakespeare. The cry of "westward ho" predates the Wild West, having been used by westward-bound Thames boatmen at least as early

as the sixteenth century. In literature it occurs in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night* in a scene in which Olivia acknowledges that Cesario (Viola disguised as a boy) may be too young for her, that perhaps he/she needs some more seasoning before being ready for marriage:

> OLIVIA: Be not afraid, good youth, I will not have you;
> And yet, when wit and youth is come to harvest,
> Your wife is like to reap a proper man.
> There lies your way, due west.
> VIOLA: Then westward ho!
> (III.i.131-4)

Here, a westward journey is associated with a move toward greater maturity that will allow a man to become a more adequate husband. In this light, Gabriel's plan to travel westward seems to indicate a resolve to be a better and more understanding husband to Gretta. In this case, then, the invocation of *Twelfth Night* as intertext appears to support affirmative interpretations of the ending of "The Dead" that would have Gabriel learning a valuable lesson and turning away from his former folly. Alternatively, one might interpret this passage as indicating that mature men make better husbands than do boys, so that Gabriel's invocation of the westward journey becomes a defensive attempt to elevate himself above Michael Furey. However, in the context of *Twelfth Night*, appearances can be (and almost invariably are) deceiving. Indeed, Feste's declaration that "[n]othing that is so is so" (IV.i.8) can stand as a statement of the theme of the entire play. Despite Olivia's confidence, Viola will never become an adequate husband, because she simply doesn't have what it takes to do so--and perhaps the implication is that Gabriel doesn't either.

In any case, both explicit and implicit triggering of intertextual connections in "The Dead" have ultimately led to *Twelfth Night* as a relevant intertext. One might still argue the tenuousness and circuitousness of the routes that led to these identifications. However, the fact is that the relevance of *Twelfth Night* is actually quite obvious. Since the identification by Julian Kaye some years ago, Joyce scholars have generally agreed that the Misses Morkan's annual dance occurs on Twelfth Night, though there has been some confusion and blurring of terminology (including by Kaye himself) between Twelfth Night and the Feast of the Epiphany.[12] This confluence of dates alone is enough to indicate that Shakespeare's play might be relevant to "The Dead," and indeed an examination of *Twelfth Night* shows a number of pertinent points in addition to those pointed out above.

For one thing, the central plots of the two works have a great deal in common. Kershner has pointed out the relevance of the tradition of courtly love in Gabriel's attitude toward Gretta (*Joyce* 145), and surely one of the more vivid (and at the same time parodic) depictions of the courtly lover in all of literature is that of Duke Orsino in *Twelfth Night*. As the play opens, we find the good Duke pining away in fine fashion over his rejection by Olivia, his ideal true love. And his idealization of Olivia (like all idealism) results in a turning away from life:

> DUKE: If music be the food of love, play on;
> Give me excess of it, that, surfeiting,
> The appetite may sicken, and so die.
> (I.i.1-3)

In response, the Duke's aide Curio asks if perhaps he would like to go hunt the hart to get his mind off his troubles. Orsino, not too depressed to miss an opportunity to employ an easy pun, responds:

> DUKE: Why, so I do, the noblest that I have.
> O, when mine eyes did see Olivia first,
> Methought she purg'd the air of pestilence!
> That instant was I turn'd into a hart,
> And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds,
> E'er since pursue me.
> (I.i.17-22)

As Lamb points out in relation to this passage, "Orsino's comparison of himself with Actaeon is trite, and it shows him in the stereotype of the courtly lover" (65). Lamb further points out that by the sixteenth century it was common to interpret the various stories in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* as allegories of changing spiritual states, with Actaeon serving as a figure of failed metamorphosis who "has reached a point of inner stasis from which there is no apparent rescue" (66). In this sense, the Actaeon story is clearly relevant to the general spiritual paralysis that pervades all of *Dubliners*. In addition, Dilworth points out that the name "Conroy" has often been taken as a reference to royalty, but that it actually means "hound of the plain" (163). Thus Gabriel, like Orsino, is being torn apart both by his own hyperbolic emotions and by a metaphoric pack of dogs.

But the relevance of the beginning lines of *Twelfth Night* to "The Dead" does not depend upon this identification of Gabriel as a figure of Actaeon, though Actaeon is a traditional stock figure for the courtly lover. The Duke's reference to the traditional link between music and

love puts in place a standard Renaissance *topos* that sounds throughout the play,[13] and his later reference to "[t]hat old and antique song we heard last night" (II.iv.3) provides a further link to the role played by songs such as *The Lass Of Aughrim* in "The Dead." Also, it is important to note that the reason for Orsino's melancholy (other than the obvious fact that he enjoys his suffering so greatly) is that Olivia cannot give herself to him because she is mourning the recent death of her brother, no doubt a frail young lad who might have been mistaken for Cesario (or Michael Furey) on a dark night.

There are many other specific points of correspondence between *Twelfth Night* and "The Dead." For example, both pieces express anti-clerical sentiments, and it is clear that both Shakespeare and Joyce see the overly-religious as enemies of art. Though Shakespeare's religious targets are the Puritans (as represented by the vain, humorless Malvolio), there is a reference to Catholic clergy in the play in Feste's declaration that "cucullus non facit monachum" (I.v.52-3). Literally, "the cowl does not make the monk," with especially ironic resonances in Shakespeare's Illyria, where clothes do most decidedly and literally make the man. And the story of Joyce's monks at Mount Melleray, who purportedly sleep in their coffins "to remind them of their last end" (200-1) is very usefully illuminated by Feste's statement. For one thing, as Gifford points out, Trappist monks do not actually sleep in their coffins, but in their habits (their cowls), in which they are later buried *sans* coffin (122). The story provides a clear statement on the way in which Catholicism rejects life and embraces death. Moreover, if "the cowl does not make the monk," the Mount Melleray anecdote seems to

imply that spiritual salvation requires more than a turning away from life.

The most important ways in which *Twelfth Night* can contribute to the generation of meaning in the "The Dead," however, involve general parallels more than specific ones. One of the more striking features of *Twelfth Night* as a play is the central importance of Viola's gender transformation into the boy Cesario, and then back again at the end. This motif is a common one in Shakespeare, but as Catherine Belsey points out, "Of all of Shakespeare's comedies it is perhaps *Twelfth Night* which takes the most remarkable risks with the identity of its central figure" (185). Indeed, the perfection of gender disguises in Shakespeare's Illyria powerfully recalls recent critical discussions of clothing as a metaphor for the socially determined nature of all gender roles. Even in the end of the play, when Viola's twin brother Sebastian has made his appearance and Viola's true identity revealed, we find that she is *still* a boy for all practical purposes, at least as long as she remains clad in her boy's attire. To the Duke, she is still Cesario, despite all the revelations:

> DUKE: Cesario, come--
> For so you shall be, while you are a man;
> But when in other habits you are seen,
> Orsino's mistress and his fancy's queen.
> (V.i.382-5)

Sandra Gilbert, among others, has emphasized the way in which women modernist writers seem to regard gender identity as a matter of so much costuming, and as something that can be put on and taken off like clothing. Moreover, "feminist modernist costume imagery is radically

revisionary in a political as well as a literary sense, for it implies that no one, male or female, can or should be confined to a uni-form, a single form or self" (Gilbert 196). Gilbert appropriately invokes Virginia Woolf's *Orlando* as a central example of the effect she is describing, and it is significant that Woolf herself identifies Shakespeare as an important predecessor in the recognition of the fluidity of gender boundaries, noting that "one goes back to Shakespeare's mind as the type of the androgynous, of the man-womanly mind" (*Room* 102).

An identification of *Twelfth Night* as a relevant intertext for "The Dead" helps to show that Joyce's writing also challenges traditional gender roles and that it was doing so even as early as *Dubliners*. Kershner discusses the relevance of Harte's novel *Gabriel Conroy* and of the operas *Mignon*, *Dinorah*, and *Lucrezia Borgia* mentioned by Mary Jane Morkan and Mr. Browne during the dinner for a reading of Joyce's story, pointing out that "the major intertextual interventions in 'The Dead' point variously to male-female confusions, disguised and mistaken identities, and sexual ambivalences and frustrations" (*Joyce* 148). He does not mention *Twelfth Night*, though it would be difficult to produce a better description of Shakespeare's comedy than the one he provides. Further, he convincingly demonstrates the way in which these intertextual presences help to reveal Gabriel's constant movement toward the assumption of a feminine position in "The Dead."

Reversals of traditional gender roles can be found throughout *Dubliners*. In "The Sisters" Eliza and Nanny assume that most patriarchal of all roles, playing the part of priests after the death of Father Flynn

and offering a parody communion of sherry and crackers to the boy and his aunt. In "An Encounter" the old josser shows a fundamental sexual inversion in the erotic fascination that he feels for boys. During the waltz in "After the Race" we have "Farley acting as cavalier and Rivière as lady" (47). In "Two Gallants" Corley mentions the way he used to spend money to win the favors of the "girls off the South Circular" (52), but then reverses that traditional trend by himself sponging money off the slavey in the end of the story. In "A Mother" Mrs. Kearney's respectable husband stands passively by while she conducts business negotiations in an aggressive manner. But it is in "The Dead" where these sorts of reversals become most prominent. If Gabriel is effeminate, the delicate Michael Furey is clearly even more so, while the intelligent, independent Molly Ivors overturns a variety of turn-of-the-century stereotypes of the feminine. We also find Mr. Browne comparing himself to "Mary Grimes" (183) and boys replacing women in church choirs (194). Finally, note that Gabriel's mother has chosen the names for her sons. But, as Augustine's theory of language shows, naming is the prototype of the patriarchal use of language in general. It presents in an obvious form the traditional theory of language as representation, and it is clear that the naming of objects represents an attempt to circumscribe and control those objects within language.[14] The usurpation of this patriarchal prerogative by Ellen Conroy (further emphasized by the highly patriarchal nature of the names she selects) has a destabilizing effect on this theory of language.

A return to *Twelfth Night* helps to illustrate the way in which destabilization of gender roles and of traditional metaphysical views of

language as representation and direct reflection of the speaker's intention go hand in hand. Belsey notes that language involves "sets of terms and relations between terms in which a specific understanding of the world is inscribed" (166). She further notes (à la Derrida) the way in which the metaphysical model of language depends upon well-defined systems of polar oppositions (of which the opposition male/female is paradigmatic), and that an insistence on this view of language involves an affirmation of the existing values of a society. Challenges to such a view of language, then, might be expected to arise during periods of crisis when these values are in question. Belsey recognizes that the tradition of female transvestitism in literature goes back at least as far as Ovid's story of Iphis and Ianthe, but suggests that the unusual frequency of such images in English Renaissance literature points to a fundamental contemporary crisis in the values of society.[15]

Belsey's placing of Shakespeare's treatment of transvestitism in a contemporary cultural context sheds important light on the implications of that motif in his plays. It is also highly reminiscent of Cheryl Herr's observation that Joyce's treatment of the theme (especially in "Circe") should be viewed within the context of the culture of turn-of-the-century Dublin, where popular pantomimes consistently featured transvestitism. In an era in which gender typing was particularly strong in everyday life, this theatrical transvestitism served as a reminder of the artificial and constructed nature of such gender divisions. If a male actor could assume standard feminine characteristics with a mere change of clothing, then how could those characteristics be claimed to be a natural result of being female? "*Ulysses* argues that sexuality is

sheer theater, at least on the social stage on which we dramatically construct the selves we play" (Herr 154).

In Joyce "Jewgreek is Greekjew. Extremes meet" (*Ulysses* 411). Dual oppositions are undermined everywhere in his work, and the blurring of gender identities is merely one example (albeit an important one) of the Brunoesque union of contraries that provides a major Joycean theme. But society is founded on such oppositions, and their deconstruction is clearly subversive. As Belsey points out, doing away with such oppositions does away with the possibility of univocal meaning in language. Thus, Joyce's challenge to traditional gender roles again has a reflexive function, pointing to the irreducibly polysemic nature of his own discourse.

Again, however, there is more at stake here than mere wordplay. If language is constitutive of self, and language is unavoidably plural, then the self must be plural as well. One of the fundamental oppositions that is broken down in Joyce's work is that between self and other, with the result that subjectivity becomes inseparable from intersubjectivity. I will begin to explore Joyce's treatment of subjectivity in detail in the next chapter. For now let me simply indicate that this conception of subjectivity is very similar to that put forth by Bakhtin and his circle in works such as *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and *Freudianism*. But it is not surprisingly that a challenge hierarchical oppositions should lead to a Bakhtinian conception of subjectivity. After all, the breakdown in such oppositions is a central characteristic of the phenomenon of the carnival, which is so central to Bakhtin's thought.

The connection between Bakhtin's discussions of the carnivalesque and "The Dead" (not a conspicuously carnivalesque piece) is made apparent by the link between Joyce's story and *Twelfth Night*. The Twelfth Night celebration has its roots in the carnivalesque festivities of the Roman Saturnalia, and Twelfth Night is traditionally a time of ceremonial rule-breaking and role reversal. Bakhtin notes the carnivalesque background of the feast of the Epiphany, suggesting that this feast shares with all "popular festive forms" the characteristic of being "related to time, which is the true hero of every feast, uncrowning the old and crowning the new" (219). Shakespeare's choice of the Twelfth Night milieu for his most radical challenge to traditional gender roles is thus highly appropriate. Indeed, Hartman invokes Bakhtin's reading of Rabelais in noting that in *Twelfth Night* "there are crownings and uncrownings at every level" (40).

Since the Morkans' party is so clearly related to the traditions of Twelfth Night and the feast of the Epiphany, one might expect to find openly carnivalesque elements in "The Dead" as well.[16] However, one does not, at least not at first glance. The ritual uncrowning and crowning associated with the folk traditions of such festivals is related to myths of death and rebirth, but Joyce's Dubliners, who,like Gretta, are "perished alive" (177) constitute a group of the walking dead for whom no rebirth has come. The very absence of an overt spirit of carnival in the story thus serves an important thematic function. In this sense, "The Dead" also offers a perfect illustration of Bakhtin's belief that in modern society the carnival has been deprived of much of its subversive force:

> A major concern of Bakhtin, one that often colors his views of the past, is what he saw as the drastic diminution of a carnivalesque component in modern social life and the concomitant restriction of carnivalization to literature where it often turned bitter or involuted for want of a sustaining social and cultural setting. (LaCapra 306)[17]

The contrast between the spiritless dinner at the Morkans' party and the riotous revels of Rabelais' *banqueteurs* is made all the more striking by a recognition of the fact that so many elements of the Rabelaisian revel are present in Joyce's story stripped of their carnivalesque exuberance. One of the more striking instances (and one of Bakhtin's favorite examples) of carnivalesque banqueting in Rabelais occurs in the fifth chapter of Book I of *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, titled (in the translation I cite here) "The Palaver of the Potulent." Rabelaisian "palaver" serves a genuine subversive function, but in Joyce's Dublin the function of "palaver" has been reduced to one of men showering girls with blarney for "what they can get out of you"--as Lily so bitterly remarks (178). Similarly, the larger-than-life roisterous drunkards of Rabelais' chapter have shrunken to the debased dimensions of Joyce's Freddy Malins and Mr. Browne, snickering secretively over dirty stories that no doubt could never measure up to the kind that any good Rabelaisian celebrant would declaim at the top of his lungs. And finally, note that images of madness play an important role in the carnivalesque tradition. In "The Dead" it is Michael Furey who is the "marker of madness" (Kershner, *Joyce* 150), and Bakhtin might almost have Michael in mind when he links the modern debased carnival to the Romantic grotesque, noting that here "madness acquires a somber, tragic aspect of individual isolation" (*Rabelais* 39).[18]

Perhaps the difference between the Rabelaisian feast and the Morkans' feast in "The Dead" is best summed up in the multilingual punning of one of Rabelais' revelers:

> *Respice personam*, respect the person; *pone pro duos*, pour for two! You marvel that I say *duos* for *duobus*, that I, an erudite man, make such an error? Let me tell you that *bus* is obsolete. *Je bus* means I *have* drunk, in the *past*; while our drinking is forever conjugated in the present tense. (18-9)

In contrast, it is forever the fate of Joyce's drinkers to be conjugated in the past tense. However, the heavy reliance on wordplay in Rabelais suggests a way in which Joyce's work points to a remedy for the paralysis of Dublin through the medium of language itself. Dublin society may have succumbed to a numbing monologism for the present, but even within the oppressive discursive framework of Catholic Ireland there is hope in language itself. To Bakhtin, there is a dialogic potential inherent in all discourse. In every society there will be a dominant discourse, but that discourse can only define itself in relation to other repressed discourses with which it maintains a dialogical tension. Bakhtin sees language as a powerful political weapon, but it is a weapon that is inherently a two-edged sword--it may serve as a means of oppression, but it serves at the same time as a means of liberation. As Patricia Yaeger notes, emphasizing the importance of Bakhtin for an understanding of the subversive possibilities of women's discourse:

> Any dominant discourse is inherently flawed, for it can only come into dominance by repressing other discourses . . . Discourse is, then, an arena of permanent struggle in which any language that seems 'unitary' is always embattled. (255)

Thus, the very nature of language itself indicates that there will always be a possibility that opposing voices can arise, even if they must do so through parodic manipulation of the language of authority. On an explicit level, such parodies can be seen in the mocking of religious ceremony in Rabelais. For example, "[i]n the comic banquet there are nearly always elements parodying and travestying the Last Supper" (Bakhtin, *Rabelais* 296). Such anti-clerical elements are clearly present in "The Dead," and the parodic echoes of the Last Supper in the Morkans' feast seem clear. However, it is a parody without spirit, at least when contrasted with Rabelais. Dublin society has effectively stifled such overt subversion. What it cannot stifle, however, is language itself, and once again it is the way in which language consistently escapes the boundaries that would be forced upon it that shows the true energy of the Joycean text.

Bakhtin, in his discussion of Rabelais' "Palaver" chapter notes the plays on *tripes*, which may refer either to the guest's own bowels or to the bowels of the ox being consumed by the guest. This confusion blurs the distinction between inside and outside and calls into question the traditional dichotomy that would draw a strict line between that which is the body and that which is the world external to the body. "The dividing line between man's consuming body and the consumed animal's body is . . . erased" (*Rabelais* 225). Rabelais' guest apparently renders this pun intentionally. However, in the "The Dead" Joyce produces the same effect in a more subtle way through the naming of his central character. Dilworth, in pointing out the etymological significance of "Conroy" as "hound," further notes that a "Gabriel hound" is, in fact, a goose (168).

Thus, though Gabriel masterfully carves and distributes the Morkans' dinner bird, it is in a very real sense his own goose that is cooked in the events of the evening, à la Rabelais.

Now one might argue that this textual effect is far too subtle to have any real significance. After all, even if Joyce was aware of the implications of what he was doing, surely he could never have expected his readers to "get the joke." But the very subtlety of this phenomenon is largely the point: such potentially subversive effects inevitably lurk beneath the surface of language whether placed there intentionally or not, waiting to be released in an explosion of serendipitous intertextuality. And these effects play havoc with any monological attempts to control language and keep it within the limits of decorum.

Language becomes particularly unruly when sexual connotations are involved, as Laurence Sterne amply demonstrated with the rampant *double entendre* of *Tristram Shandy*.[19] In Joyce, sexually-charged language has a particularly political flavor. Sexuality and politics are consistently conflated in Joyce. Joyce saw the repression of natural sexual instincts as a central evil of the Irish Church, and he frequently turned that perception to his advantage by employing the sexual as an image of subversion of oppressive structures of all kinds. By the time of *Finnegans Wake*, sexual *double entendre* will become a major structural feature of Joyce's writing, and Beitchman notes the way in which the *Wake* "presents the sexual as a perfect model of a process that abrogates and undermines the separation and hierarchy of traditional attitudes--in the sense that it dissolves and renders nugatory all identities, certainties, and absolutes" (144).[20]

In "The Dead," Gabriel is chided by Gretta and his aunts for his solicitude concerning matters such as overcoats and goloshes, with the suggestion that his fastidiousness may soon extend to buying Gretta a "diving suit" (180). One need only recognize that terms such as "raincoat," "overcoat," and "diving suit" are all established slang expressions for "condom," and all sorts of carnivalesque energies are released, especially in light of the Catholic interdiction against artificial means of contraception, which (again) goes back at least as far as Augustine.[21] Thus, when Aunt Kate innocently proclaims about goloshes that "You wear them over your . . ." (181), the ellipse results in another striking example of the connotations of language exceeding the intentions of the speaker and in a pause that is a pregnant one indeed.

This connection is strengthened by the fact that Joyce had an extensive interest in birth control.[22] And Joyce was by no means above employing such risqué constructions intentionally, as shown by the fact that the letter which plays such a central part in *Finnegans Wake* is so clearly (among other things) a French one. It is certainly amusing to picture Joyce having fun with the staid strictures of Irish literary censorship by building such wordplays into his work. In the *Wake*, he even takes a direct jab at censorship in his discussion of Malthus, who as a forerunner of modern family planning, "taught love's lightning the way to conduct itself (mercy, good shot! only please don't mention it!)" (*Wake* 585.12-4).

Joyce's interest in birth control is particularly prominent in the "Oxen of the Sun" chapter of *Ulysses*. The swaggering Bannon, for example, makes a reference to condoms when he reveals his plans to

increase the security of his sex life by acquiring "as snug a cloak of the French fashion as ever kept a lady from wetting" (331). As Bowen points out, this line refers to the fact that condoms were available in France--like Gabriel's goloshes that everyone wears on the continent--but contraband in Ireland (258). Lynch, however, responds that, for contraceptive purposes, an "umbrella" (probably a diaphragm) is better: "One umbrella, were it no bigger than a fairy mushroom, is worth ten such stopgaps" (331). The banter of Bannon and Lynch makes it clear that, in the world of Joyce's Dublin, raingear of all kinds is clearly to be associated with contraceptive devices, further reinforcing the reading of the conversation in "The Dead" as *double entendre*. And if any further support is needed, note that Gretta's response to Aunt Kate's above *bon mot* is to note that goloshes are "[g]uttapercha things" (181). Now "guttapercha" is just the sort of odd word that one might expect to trigger an intertextual connection, and it is conceivable that Joyce is here indulging in a little inside Dublin humor. Bowen quotes an extant piece of doggerel verse by Joyce's "friend" (or at least acquaintance) Oliver St. John Gogarty that refers to a condom as a "[g]utta-percha coffin" (258), perhaps shedding new light on the significance of the fact that the Mount Mellaray monks sleep in their coffins, or cloaks, or whatever.

My point is that such meanings are accessible whether Joyce intentionally placed them there or not, just as they are accessible whether the characters involved realize it or not. Attempting to jump the banks of those channels of conventionality, the Joycean text is a maelstrom of meaning, filled with currents of connotation and eddies of

innuendo that sweep through the text like a flash flood beyond all possibility of authorial control. However, the proliferation of this semantic flooding can be greatly aided by the "seeding" of a text with conspicuous *double entendres* and by the free transgression of boundaries that occurs in carnivalized situations in general. Several famous exchanges in *Twelfth Night* between Viola (as Cesario) and Orsino provide classic examples of the way in which carnivalesque inversions can lead to multiple meanings in discourse. When Viola admits that he/she is in love (her real object is Orsino), the Duke asks her to describe the "woman" in question. Viola responds that the woman is "Of your complexion" and "About your years, my lord" (II.iv.26, 28). Later when, Orsino claims that women cannot love as strongly as men, Viola responds:

> VIOLA: In faith, they are as true of heart as we.
> My father had a daughter lov'd a man,
> As it might be, perhaps, were I a woman,
> I should love your lordship.
> (II.iv. 105-9)

And when the Duke asks to hear the history of this daughter, Viola continues:

> VIOLA: A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
> But let concealment, like a worm i' th' bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek. She pin'd in thought,
> And with a green and yellow melancholy
> She sat like Patience on a monument,
> Smiling at grief. Was this not love indeed?
> (II.iv.110-15)

Viola's duplicitous hints are highly amusing (because the audience knows her secret, but Orsino doesn't), but at the same time they initiate a chain of linguistic paradoxes that can only be unraveled by a de-

centering of the speaking subject and a recognition of Viola's nonidentity with herself, that the speaker here is "neither Viola nor Cesario, but a speaker who at this moment occupies a place which is not precisely masculine or feminine, where the notion of identity itself is disrupted to display a difference within subjectivity" (Belsey 187). Or, as Viola herself later puts it, "I am not what I am" (III.i.141).

"The Dead" as Palinode

One might refer to Viola's condition as palinodic subjectivity. Viola's statement here posits a meaning ("I am") then immediately retracts it ("not what I am"). It is, in short, a palinodic sentence of the sort often employed by Joyce. In fact, *Twelfth Night* operates in a constant mode of palinodic stipulation and retraction of meaning, as highlighted by the constant confusions over the identities of Sebastian, Viola, and Cesario, who all serve as palinodes of a sort of one another. Feste summarizes the resultant aporia in interpretation when Sebastian (whom Feste mistakes for Viola/Cesario) greets his imprecations from Olivia with total bewilderment:

> CLOWN: Well held out, i' faith! No, I do not know you; nor am I sent for you by my lady, to bid you come speak with her; nor your name is not Master Cesario; nor this is not my nose neither. Nothing that is so is so.
> (IV.i.5-8)

The palinodic mode of *Twelfth Night* is entirely consistent with the carnivalesque motif of ritual crowning and uncrowning, with the object of coronation here being meaning itself. Moreover, the Twelfth Night occasion itself, as the final night of the Christmas season, is

inherently palinodic, representing both celebration and the end of celebration. Finally, note that the overall structure of *Twelfth Night* is itself palinodic, with the traditional communal resolution of the comedy ending first being jarred by Malvolio's obstinate vow of revenge, and then being contradicted by Feste's melancholy ending song, an intimation of mortality in the mode of Jaques' "Seven Ages of Man" exposition in *As You Like It*. Anne Barton summarizes this ending in terms that make its relevance to "The Dead" quite clear:

> The child is allowed his fancies: a foolish thing is but a toy. When he grows up he pays for them, or else discovers that the self-deceptions in which he is tempted to take refuge are easily penetrated by the world. Marriage ultimately becomes tedious, and so do the infidelities to which it drives a man. The reality of wind and rain wins out, the monotony of the everyday. The passing of time is painful, may even seem unendurable, but there is nothing for it but resignation, the wise acceptance of the Fool. (310)

Barton's summary (with wind and rain replaced by snow) in many ways provides an excellent description of Gabriel Conroy's meditation at the end of "The Dead." Perhaps this confluence is not surprising. After all, the similarity of Feste's song to Jaques' famous soliloquy is often remarked. And Hugh Kenner (curiously ignoring a number of other similarities) has suggested that the only real thing Joyce has in common with Shakespeare as an artist is their mutual recognition that all the world's a stage (*Voices* 51-2).

A recognition of the palinodic quality of Gabriel's final interior monologue thoroughly undermines any attempts to see that monologue as a moment of transcendence. Transcendence requires a viewpoint of unchallenged certainty and authority, but Joyce's palinodic mode of narration undermines such viewpoints, introducing a fundamental

hermeneutic instability through the production of mutually incompatible meanings within the same text. Indeed, Gabriel's final vision is not merely an isolated palinode tacked onto the end of the text. The mode of narration in "The Dead" is fundamentally palinodic from that very first sentence in which it is stated that Lily was literally swept off her feet and then made clear that she wasn't. Yet the fact that we know she is still standing cannot completely erase the residue of that other meaning, which lingers nearby with, as I argued above, important implications.

The treatment of Gabriel throughout the story helps to demonstrate the thoroughly palinodic nature of the entire narrative. After all, his primary experience is to be contradicted, cancelled out, and undermined by all of the events that occur. His rebuff at the hands of Lily, his chiding for solicitude by Gretta and his aunts, and his encounter with Molly Ivors over his lack of nationalistic pride represent prominent examples. And a closer look at the climactic events late in the story shows just how thoroughly this mode of self-cancellation is built into Joyce's story.

These events begin when Gabriel observes his wife standing at the top of the stairs listening to Bartell D'Arcy sing. It is a moment of apparent epiphany, with Gabriel feeling a surge of emotion at finding his wife in such a romantic pose. However, this sentiment is undercut on every level. For one thing, the clichéd nature of Gabriel's courtly love pose calls the authenticity of the moment immediately into question. Gabriel's attempt to apotheosize Gretta into art participates in the courtly love tradition, and is even further undermined by its specific treatment in the text. "There was grace and mystery in her attitude,"

Gabriel thinks, "as if she were a symbol of something. He asked himself what is a woman standing on the stairs in the shadow, listening to distant music, a symbol of" (210). "Grace" is already suspect after the preceding story in *Dubliners*, and it is noteworthy that Gabriel seems unable to sustain his burst of emotion for Gretta *qua* Gretta, but instead must transform her into a symbol of something greater. Moreover, his attempt at a symbolic reading of his wife smacks of the kind of simplistic reading that Joyce was later to mock in *Finnegans Wake* in relation to Marxist-allegorical attempts to interpret the letter, which might lead one to conclude that "Father Michael about this red time of the white terror equals the old regime and Margaret is the social revolution while cakes mean the party funds and dear thank you signifies national gratitude" (116.7-10).

Gabriel, still trying to transmogrify Gretta into art, then muses on the possibility of painting her in this pose (in which he cannot even see her face). "*Distant Music* he would call the picture if he were a painter" (210). Within context, as Kershner points out, the suggestion is that, were he a painter, "Gabriel would paint the way a third-rate Tennyson imitator would write" (*Joyce* 145). Or perhaps he would paint like Dickens wrote, since the "Distant Music" is an apparent allusion to *David Copperfield* (Gifford 123). Indeed, certain parallels between the work of Joyce and that of Dickens have been suggested (Cope 2, Lehan 249-51, Parrinder 1-4). However, in terms of the romance of Gabriel's vision, one might note Lehan's suggestion that, in order to make use of the tradition of nineteenth century naturalism, Joyce first had to purge that tradition of sentiment and melodrama, and that "Dickens's world

turned on sentiment" (250). Lehan cites Joyce's parody of Dickensian sentiment in "Oxen of the Sun" as evidence of a distrust in this sort of sentiment, and the reference to "Distant Music" transforms Gabriel into a Dickensian character whose sentiments are suspect as well.

It is also important to keep in mind that this moment of "epiphany" is triggered by Bartell D'Arcy's singing of *The Lass of Aughrim*. But D'Arcy is not in good voice and doesn't know the song: "the singer seemed uncertain both of his words and of his voice" (210). Gretta, herself locked into a Dickensian narrative of the romantic past, is simply primed and ready for a burst of nostalgic sentiment, and one gets the impression that virtually anything could have set her off. Moreover, as I pointed out above, it appears that D'Arcy's motive in singing is strictly one of seduction of the lovely Miss O'Callaghan who, after all, has "been at him all evening" (211). And finally, note that Gretta, who has apparently been bearing the memory of this grand passion all her life, can't even remember the name of the song that Michael Furey had sung to her and that D'Arcy here reprises.

After Gabriel and Gretta leave the party with D'Arcy and Miss O'Callaghan, Gabriel finds that Gretta "had no longer any grace of attitude" (213), so he is forced to sustain his emotions with fantasies and memories of the past. But the best he can conjure up is a clichéd male wish "to defend her against something" and a string of banal memories featuring a heliotrope envelope, stereotypical twittering birds, and Gretta's inane question to a bottlemaker over whether the fire in a roaring furnace was hot. But these memories are enough to allow him to construct a narrative of what the coming evening will be like. He would

call her name: "Perhaps she would not hear at once: she would be undressing. Then something in his voice would strike her. She would turn and look at him . . ." (214).

Up to this point there is nothing here that interferes with the interpretation that Gabriel achieves at least some sort of transcendence at the end. Maybe he is a fool and an ass in most of the story, but this does not preclude the possibility of his being transfigured by Gretta's revelations concerning Michael Furey. Suzette Henke provides one of the more enthusiastically hyperbolic of such readings of the story:

> Like Anna Livia Plurabelle, Gretta Conroy miraculously resurrects the shade of a dead man as a living, potent spirit. And like Molly Bloom, she draws the past into the present in the mode of impassioned memory. Revitalizing the ghost of her long-dead lover, Gretta gives mythic, poetic stature to a man whose life ended in tragic consummation. . . . By offering a vivid myth of salutary passion, Gretta resuscitates the moribund spirit of her husband, who will "announce" the message of life-in-death at the conclusion of *Dubliners*. (26-7)

Well, it would certainly be pretty to think so, but unfortunately Joyce's text seems to do everything in its power to deflate such grand visions of Gretta's passion. Michael Furey's life ended not in "tragic consummation," as Henke would have it, but in tragic consumption, and there seems to be very little that is "salutary" about a passion that would help to hasten his death. The man Henke is endowing with "mythic, poetic stature" is a pathetic teenage gasworker who lacks the sense to come in out of the rain. Though Gretta convinces herself that "he died for me" (220), it is quite clear from the text that he was already mortally afflicted quite apart from the effects of his ill-considered

visit to her in the rain. And it is not at all clear whether Gabriel's message proclaims life-in-death or death-in-life.

It seems clear that Gretta's fantasies about Michael Furey partake of many of the same courtly love stereotypes and clichés as do those of her husband. As Vincent Pecora notes, "Gretta fabricates the 'legend' of Michael Furey, just as surely as Gabriel has fabricated his 'secret life' with Gretta" (241). And she fabricates the legend out of paltry stuff indeed, triggering it with Bartell D'Arcy's incompetent rendering of a vaguely remembered tune and then topping it off by hurling herself onto the bed and crying herself to sleep like any good Victorian melodramatic heroine should. The only difference between Gretta's constructed fantasy and Gabriel's is that Gretta's fabricated legend, featuring that touch of death which is so irresistible to the romantic, is even more powerfully melodramatic than his, so much so that he immediately drops his own deluded fantasies and adopts hers instead, making Michael Furey his hero. Since Gretta doesn't bother to stay awake for the end, the story and the book then conclude with Gabriel's voice dominating the narrative in a flight of excessive rhetoric that elevates Michael Furey to Christhood, with luck taking Gabriel along on his coattails.[23]

Many conclusions can be drawn by reading the ending of "The Dead" in this way. For one thing, it suggests that characters such as Gretta and Gabriel cannot transcend the current conditions of their lives because the only means they have of doing so is through recourse to narrative conventions that are already thoroughly inscribed within those conventions. In remembering a letter he had written to Gretta, Gabriel muses that "these words that he had written years before were borne

towards him from the past" (214). In fact, all words are borne towards all of us from the past, and therefore words can never be used to transcend that past. Nor can the past be escaped by any other means. Joyce's entire Nietzschean view of history argues for a radical confrontation of history and for a rupture in the continuity of past trends. But it also argues against the sort of neat conversion experience that would lead to new life in which the past can be ignored, the slate wiped clean. The very notion of such a conversion, such an awakening from the nightmare of history, implies an escape from temporality that is shown everywhere in Joyce's fiction to be neither feasible nor desirable.

The palinodic structure of "The Dead" recapitulates the structure of *Dubliners* as a whole, in which this final story acts as a palinode to the previous ones. Any number of commentators have noted the way in which "The Dead" seems to summarize and recapitulate the themes and motifs of the earlier stories. Wirth-Nesher calls "The Dead" a "repository of all of the previous stories" (284), while Homer Brown notes that the story serves as a "kind of coda" to the theme of nostalgia for a more significant past that permeates the entire book, "recapitulating every nuance of the meaning of the some other time, some other place" (45). It is important, however, to also note that "The Dead" is in many ways very different from the other stories in the book. It is fashionable to attribute this difference to a change in Joyce's own attitude as reflected in some of his own correspondence (Homer Brown 86-8). Indeed, Homer Brown sees the writing of "The Dead" as a turning point in Joyce's career at which he arrives at a radically different conception of reality

from that shown in his earlier work. Brown attributes this change to a Joyce's bridging of the traditional subject/object dichotomy. Because of this change, Brown argues, both *Dubliners* and *Stephen Hero* "carry the mood of their own reversal; in a sense, of their own destruction. Both reveal the same emerging pattern. If the self cannot stand alone but is dependent on others, Stephen's desire is fraudulent, self-destructive. The idea of any isolated ego which stands separate from its world is an abstraction and therefore a fiction, since it masks a secret participation in that world" (82).

Homer Brown's perception of Joyce's movement toward a breakdown in the traditional subject-object dichotomy is useful, and his observation that *Dubliners* "carries the mood of its own reversal" is, I think, a sound one. However, he would couch this reversal in terms of a sort of conversion experience for not only Gabriel Conroy but Joyce as well. But if that were the case, "The Dead" would simply stand as an authoritative rebuttal of the earlier stories, remaining alone at the end as an unchallenged statement of the "right" attitude. But there are no conversion experiences in Joyce and there are no "right" attitudes or unchallenged statements. "The Dead" challenges the preceding stories in a number of ways, but it also constantly challenges itself, avoiding monologue through the palinodic movements that I have described. Moreover, it interacts with and comments upon the other stories in the book, but those other stories interact with and comment upon it as well, in a true dialogic relation.

I would argue, then, for a less clear break between "The Dead" and the earlier stories, in the vein of Rabaté's suggestion that this last

story of the book "not only mirrors the earlier stories, but modifies them retroactively, pushing them into a new mode of writing" (64-5). Gabriel's final meditations do act as a sort of palinode to the rest of "The Dead," much in the mode of Feste's final song in *Twelfth Night*. However, neither Gabriel's musings nor Feste's result in a complete retraction of the previous parts of the texts that they conclude. Since all meaning ultimately escapes the bounds of the intentions of the author, it is clearly not within the author's power to eradicate a meaning once it has been released. He can, however, interrogate former statements and engage them in dialogue. "The Dead" engages in such dialogic relations with the earlier stories of *Dubliners* through a complex web of interconnections of many sorts.

Some of these connections are quite overt, and in many cases the very obviousness of a connection is largely the point, such as in the case of Gabriel's story of the "never-to-be-forgotten Johnny," whose circling of the statue of King Billy images the inability of Dubliners to break out of the vicious circles in which they are trapped in all of the other stories. This image is so obvious that it is ludicrous. Joyce's text itself, by presenting story after story of Dublin paralysis, is itself in danger of falling into the same unproductively repetitive situation as Johnny. But, by presenting Johnny as a comic counterpart to the earlier paralyzed Dubliners, the text engages in a self-reflexive (and self-parodic) palinodic commentary that prevents it from falling into paralysis by unleashing a torrent of revitalizing irony in the text.

Other instances of dialogue between "The Dead" and the earlier stories are more local and specific. Thus Lily's bitter retort that

contemporary Irish men are only "what they can get out of you" clearly recalls Corley's venal manipulation of the slavey, and Gabriel's response, to give her a coin, reverses the gesture of Corley toward the slavey while at the same time adding a great deal of complexity to the interpretation of such gestures. Corley's action in extracting money from the slavey seems at first to be a clear-cut case of sexual power politics, and yet Gabriel's action in *giving* money to Lily can equally well be interpreted as a strategy of domination. Thus, while it is certainly true that Corley is presented as an unattractive figure, the dialogue between "The Dead" and "Two Gallants" places him in new light. If diametrically opposite gestures can both be interpreted as exhibitions of power and domination, then clearly the dynamics of such relationships are not nearly so simple as they might at first appear.

These sorts of individual power relations in Joyce echo larger political relations (though perhaps less directly and simplistically than some readers would have it), with dominant individuals bearing strong resonances of British imperial power and subjugated individuals evoking the oppressed Irish. And Joyce's clearly critical attitude toward both the British oppressors of Ireland and the overly simplistic opposition to this oppression by certain Irish nationalist elements demonstrates the subtlety of his understanding of the dynamics of such relationships. Irish nationalism seeks to reverse the current political hierarchy, but the mere reversal of hierarchical poles is really no change at all.

Nietzsche again seems to be an important forerunner of Joyce in understanding the complexities of such hierarchies of power. Indeed, once Nietzsche has been identified as a relevant intertext, the slavey in

"Two Gallants" cannot help but evoke Nietzsche's analyses of dualistic power relations in terms of his significant rewriting of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. According to Nietzsche, modern society had come to be dominated by a slave morality such that it was in fact the oppressed who were manipulating the oppressors rather than vice versa. But the turning away from life associated with slave morality then inevitably leads to an entropic spiritual paralysis, to the world of the "'last men'--who are no longer capable of generating new values, but merely of justifying their plight" (Strong 238).

The bleak world of Nietzsche's "last men" clearly bears some striking resemblances to the world of Joyce's Dublin, and a much more detailed analysis of the resonances between Nietzsche's analysis of the master-slave relationship and Joyce's concept of social power relations would clearly bear much fruit. Nietzsche, for example, singles out the ascetic morality of Christianity as a major factor contributing to the triumph of slave morality, just as Joyce points to the Catholic Church as a prime instigator of the paralysis of Ireland. But Nietzsche's analysis of power relations is extremely complex and has been interpreted to support views from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Therefore, use of Nietzsche as an intertext clearly poses a threat of muddling rather than illuminating the issue of the political orientation of Joyce's work. On the other hand, the very undecidability of the implications of Nietzsche's position may itself provide the best gloss to the effect of the Joycean text, which eschews easy explanations and simplistic dichotomies. Corley unquestionably manipulates the slavey, but perhaps he himself is being manipulated as well, if not by the slavey

(and by Lenehan), then certainly by the constraints of the Dublin society in which he lives. Corley objectifies and dehumanizes the slavey, but in the process loses his own humanity as well. He, too, is a victim, and his status as such is much more readily available through a dialogic reading of both "Two Gallants" and "The Dead" than by a reading of "Two Gallants" alone.

Any number of such direct and specific echoes of motifs from earlier stories can be found in "The Dead." However, perhaps more interesting are the more subtle echoes. Often the mere repetition of a word or phrase will trigger a chain of association that reflects significantly on the earlier stories. For example, I have argued that there is a strong justification for associating the images of raingear in "The Dead" with contraceptive devices. Once identified, this effect ripples through the rest of *Dubliners* as well. Bowen notes this parallel between contraceptive devices and protective gear of all kinds, seeing it as a general theme runs throughout *Dubliners*:

> The characters in these stories have sought to cloak themselves from exposure to weather, sex, and emotion in insulation, waterproof coverings, and institutions through which they may survive. Like its prophylactic counterpart, the covering severely limits sensation, pleasure, and the creative force. (259)

Bowen's analysis may be somewhat dated by his diatribe against condoms, but it is insightful nevertheless. Lynch's reference to umbrellas in *Ulysses* thus begins to infect the text of "The Sisters," shedding new light on the significance of the umbrellas that are sold and "Re-covered" in the shop in the dwelling where Father Flynn dies. Bowen suggests some specific religious satire here, arguing that "the sale of these exposure-

avoiding items might easily be linked with the sale of religion as an exposure-avoiding item" (260). Also note Richard Brown's discussion of Joyce's sometimes peculiar conflation of contraceptive images with the Church, resulting in the "astonishing vision of the confessional as a kind of contraceptive sexual institution" (73). And finally, note that Gogarty's reference to condoms as coffins provides a link between the current of sexuality that runs through *Dubliners* and the coffins of both the Mount Mellaray Monks and the dead Father Flynn.

On an even more subtle level, we are given in "The Dead" the fact that Gabriel's brother, a cleric, is named Constantine. I have already noted the significance of the fact that the Conroy brothers were given their exceedingly patriarchal names by their mother. But the very name "Constantine," applied to a priest but taken from an historical Roman emperor, suggests a confusion of secular and religious power that immediately partakes of the strain of simony that swirls throughout the rest of Joyce's text. Indeed, in a text so heavily permeated by Dante, this association evokes the fiercely antagonistic view that Dante held of the Roman Emperor Constantine as the initiator of the contemporary trend toward simony and corruption in the Church. In rebuking the former Pope Nicholas III, whom he finds among the damned simoniacs in *Inferno* XIX, Dante specifically alludes to this view of Constantine:

> Ah, Constantine, what wickedness was born--
> and not from your conversion--from the dower
> that you bestowed upon the first rich father! (l. 115-7)

This association recalls the situation of Father Flynn in "The Sisters," especially since Dante has attempted to explain earlier in this

same canto his own breaking of a baptismal font in a Florentine church (l. 16-21). This anecdote clearly echoes Father Flynn's breaking of the chalice, and Dante's justification (he was trying to save a baptism victim who was drowning) not only calls into question the authority and efficacy of Church rituals, but also suggests by association a defense of Father Flynn. Our view of Joyce's paralytic priest is even further complicated by the fact that Dante's condemnation of Constantine was actually based on false evidence--perhaps the gossip spread by Old Cotter and others about Father Flynn simply isn't true, perhaps he didn't have syphilis, wasn't a simoniac, and engaged in no perverse sexual practices.[24] Thus the dynamics of the Joycean text are such that, by simply giving the name of Gabriel's brother in "The Dead" as Constantine, a dialogue is initiated with "The Sisters" suggesting that we should not be too hasty to judge Father Flynn--or to reach conclusions in general.

Such amazing chains of coincidence can be found everywhere in Joyce and illustrate the way in which meaning endlessly proliferates through the Joycean text. This particular example nicely illustrates the way in which both intertextual and intratextual associations contribute to the peculiarly dynamic phenomenon of meaning generation in Joyce. Such examples can be produced endlessly. For now, let me simply note the way in which the palinodic ending of "The Dead" leads to an understanding of why Joyce's texts in fact *must* work in the way that they do.

Pecora agrees with the interpretation that Gabriel and Gretta are trapped within the Dublin cultural milieu because their only means of escape is through the construction of fantasies that are themselves part of that milieu. But he also notes the way in which Joyce realizes that

his own work arises from the same discursive context as do the narrative constructions of his characters:

> Along with the implicit repudiation that propels Joyce's view of Dublin's cultural malaise, especially if that repudiation is at times painful for him, comes a parallel repudiation, through irony, of his own work *as it inevitably reflects and reproduces the values of that culture.* (236, Pecora's emphasis)

Joyce, too, is a Dubliner, and he can no more transcend the origins of his narratives in pre-existing discourses than can Gabriel or Gretta--you can take the boy out of Dublin, but you can't take Dublin out of the boy. As Pecora notes, this recognition forces Joyce to take an ironic stance toward his own work, which reflects a Nietzschean "irony toward the self as conscious intentionality" (Pecora 236). This insight contributes greatly to an understanding of the constant move toward self-contradiction and self-parody in Joyce's palinodic fictions--it is only in this way that his writing can escape monologic petrification and complacence. One effect of the resultant undermining of authorial intention in Joyce's work is that the reader is freed to pursue intertextual and intratextual connections that go far beyond the confines of that work, thus exceeding the cultural limits that necessarily bound Joyce's discourse by exploring other discourses, though these discourses have their own limits as well. Because of the double-edged nature of language, Dublin culture can no more contain the meaning of Joyce's texts than those texts can completely escape from Dublin culture.

Notes

[1]Joyce's comment seems somewhat in the mode of Oscar Wilde's famous quip that George Meredith "is a prose Browning, and so is Browning" (58). Though noting Joyce's disparaging reference to Browning in the Langbridge review, Vincent Sherry goes on to argue that Browning was a strong influence on Joyce, and that Browning's dramatic monologue technique contributed to a major turning point in Joyce's career that occurs with the writing of "The Dead." Sherry's argument, based on a rather pedestrian notion of literary influence, is unconvincing, to say the least.

[2]In *Ulysses* Leopold Bloom alludes to Moore's song "The Meeting of the Waters" in noting that a statue of Moore has been appropriately erected over a urinal (133). This observation may perhaps also be a piece of literary criticism on the part of Bloom, or Joyce, or both.

[3]Kershner's Bakhtinian study of Joyce's early work (through *Exiles*) does a great deal to rectify this inadequacy in traditional Joyce criticism by emphasizing the importance to Joyce of popular literature (*Joyce*).

[4]All quotations from Shakespeare are from the Bevington edition.

[5]Florence Walzl notes that interpretations of the ending of "The Dead" tend to fall into one of these two camps and argues that, if one reads the story in isolation the affirmative ending seems more appropriate, while a reading of the story in conjunction with the rest of *Dubliners* points toward the negative view, in which Gabriel is "a dead member of a dead society" (424).

[6]Compare Kershner's suggestion that the development of Stephen's consciousness in *Portrait* shows a gradual change from orientation toward the past to orientation (occidentation?) toward the future ("Time").

[7]Mazzotta's argument is based on an identification of the heliotrope not as a flower but as the mythical stone that supposedly had the power of making its bearer invisible. The connection is close, however--invisibility suggests both a turning from the sun and the sun's own cyclic disappearance. Also note Mazzotta's observation that *Inferno* XXVI is characterized by a "pattern of appearance and concealment" especially as imaged in the tongues of fire that flicker about the sinners, alternately hiding and revealing them. Thus, to Mazzotta, the canto "has a hidden heliotropic structure and all the characters seem to emanate from the sun or go toward it" (97).

[8]For example, see Freccero's discussion of the encounter with the Medusa in *Inferno* IX as an allegory of reading, a warning against the petrification that comes from overly literal and univocal interpretation of texts ("Medusa").

[9]The implication is that Gabriel Conroy is at least in some sense a figure of Ulysses. This association obviously proliferates forward into Joyce's later career in interesting ways. Note, too, the argument by Levin and Shattuck that all of *Dubliners* is in fact organized around a series of complex parallels with the *Odyssey*, much like *Ulysses*. They see Gabriel as a figure of Odysseus.

[10]Freccero quotes the suggestion by Bernardus Silvestrus that Daedalus represents the journey of the intellect, and a complete attention to the study of philosophy ("Prologue" 17). He further notes that Augustine preceded Dante by viewing Ulysses as a figure of the "presumptuous philosopher who would reach the truth unaided" (20). The link between Ulysses and Daedalus in medieval thought is a strong one, prefiguring the links forged by Joyce between Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus in *Ulysses*.

[11]See Pecora for a persuasive debunking of the notion that Gabriel achieves transcendence in the story.

[12]Thomas Dilworth usefully clears up some of this confusion, noting that the festival of Twelfth Night begins on the night of January 5 and ends at dawn the next day, while the feast of Epiphany begins at midnight on January 6. Thus, the two occasions overlap, but are not, strictly speaking, synonymous (170).

[13]Olivia, for example later tells Cesario that she would rather hear a suit of love from him/her than "music from the spheres" (III.i.108-10).

[14]From a psychoanalytic perspective, Jacques Lacan has emphasized this same point, noting that the fact that we are named before we can speak prefigures the submission to the Law of the Father required by the entry into the Symbolic Order of language. As Lacan points out, "the subject, too, if he can appear to be the slave of language is all the more so of a discourse in the universal movement in which his place is already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name" (*Écrits* 148).

[15]For an excellent discussion of Shakespeare's predecessors in the literature of sexual metamorphosis, see Carroll.

[16]Feasts in general are favorite scenes in carnivalesque literature. Compare the "Dinner with Trimalchio" segment of Petronius' *Satyricon* (51-91). Indeed, the *Satyricon* resonates with the work of Joyce in a number of ways. Note, for example, that Trimalchio's chef is called "Daedalus" because of his cleverness.

[17]For another viewpoint on this aspect of Bakhtin's thought, see Bernstein "When."

[18]It is in the work of Beckett that the carnival seems to "strike bottom," yet curiously then begins to rebound by gaining a certain peculiar exuberance. Thus, the carnivalesque feast is reduced in Beckett to Molloy's digging through garbage for scraps, yet a Rabelaisian element

returns as Ruth (or perhaps her name was Edith) advances on Beckett's hero: "I was bent double over a heap of muck, in the hope of finding something to disgust me for ever with eating, when she, undertaking me from behind, thrust her stick between my legs and began to titillate my privates" (57).

[19]By the time of *Finnegans Wake*, this kind of *double entendre* will become a major structural feature of Joyce's writing. Beitchman notes the way in which the *Wake* "presents the sexual as a perfect model of a process that abrogates and undermines the separation and hierarchy of traditional attitudes--in the sense that it dissolves and renders nugatory all identities, certainties, and absolutes" (144).

[20]Richard Brown notes the centrality of sexuality to Joyce's writing. He parallels Joyce's art to that of Daedalus, who created a wooden cow by means of which Pasiphaë was able to perform sexual acts with a bull. Of Joyce's art, Brown notes: "No less than that of Daedalus, it is based on sexual transgression and, like that of Daedalus, its work develops as a labyrinthine concealment more than as an explicit statement of that transgression" (153).

[21]Lowe-Evans suggests that the condemnation of contraception in Augustine's *Marriage and Concupiscence* provides important background for Joyce's treatment of contraception in "Oxen of the Sun" (63).

[22]For a discussion of this interest within the context of Joyce's broader interest in the modern redefinition of sexuality, see Richard Brown (63-78). For a discussion of this interest within the context of the general Irish concern with population levels, see Lowe-Evans (58-99).

[23]See Shields for an argument that the rhetoric of this final passage undercuts any attempts at seeing Gabriel as having achieved a transcendent vision. Shields sees the final lines as so much "exaggerated alliteration, as an overwritten passage that conveys emotional deadness taking its last refuge in sentimentality" (427). Bowen's reading lends support to this sort of view, noting the Freudian description of Gabriel's boots near the end: "Joyce could not resist a little comic undercutting and a little well-placed phallic symbolism so that we never lose the threads of GPI, syphilis, and sex, which form a texture for the stories (273).

[24]Dante based his condemnation on the medieval legend of "The Donation of Constantine," which held that, before moving the Roman imperial capital to Constantinople, the emperor bestowed the temporal power of Rome on the Church, thus initiating a vein of worldliness that set the Church on the road to corruption. This legend was based on a document that was shown, a century after Dante, to have been a forgery.

CHAPTER 4
SUBJECTIVITY, TEXTUALITY, AND AUTHORSHIP IN *A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN*

If in *Dubliners* the formal properties of Joyce's text can be seen to imply a specific attitude toward history, in a *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* it is clear that the text implies a specific model of subjectivity as well. Probably the most striking feature of *Portrait* is the way in which the development of the consciousness of Stephen Dedalus is figured through the gradual stylistic evolution of the narrative language of the text. As Kershner notes, "The text of *Portrait*, with all its stylized incremental repetition and all its virtuoso verbal effects, is nonetheless fundamentally bound to the narrative of Stephen's consciousness" (*Joyce* 161-2). Moreover, the emphasis on development (both stylistic and subjective) in the book implies a model of subjectivity that is in fact very similar to (and intimately involved with) Joyce's evolutionary model of history. In Joyce the constitution of the subject proceeds by a dynamic, interactive mechanism very much like the process of history. However, whereas Hegel suggested that history is the process through which the mind discovers itself, Joyce suggests that there is no pre-existing self to be discovered apart from the flow of history. The subject is generated in and by history, so that in Joyce history, subjectivity, and textuality are all inseparable.

The Constitution of the Subject

Joyce's dynamic model for the constitution of the subject clearly undercuts the idealistic notion of a Kantian transcendental self. I will have much more to say on theoretical analogues to Joyce's treatment of subjectivity in a later chapter. For now, let me simply note that models for the constitution of the subject (as opposed to the notion that the subject is always already given) are common currency in twentieth-century thought, particularly in the questioning of the nature of human subjectivity that began with the project of Freud. Indeed, perhaps the fullest elaboration of the process of subjective constitution is that proposed by Freud's interpreter, Jacques Lacan. Lacan's work has been widely discussed, and I need not rehearse his model of human subjectivity in detail here. However, it is important for my purposes to point out certain distinctive features of Lacan's model.

To Lacan, the infant first begins to gain a sense of self by learning to distinguish between self and other in the now-famous "mirror stage." During this period the Lacanian infant gains a sense of unity of its body image through identification with his own body through its literal mirror image or through outside objects--notably its mother. A distinctive feature of this model of the self is the precariousness that it attributes to human subjectivity. In particular, to Lacan the assumption of human identity is inextricably intertwined with the assumption of a gender identity. But since gender identity is based on difference, on division and loss, then it follows that identity itself is irrevocably divided as well. Thus, "the distinction between the sexes

brought about by the castration complex and the different positions that must subsequently be taken up, confirms that the subject is split and the object is lost" (Mitchell 25).

To Lacan the assumption of subjectivity is a one-time process that occurs in early childhood and then is forever irrevocable. The subject, literally constituted through identification with ideal lost objects, will forever experience a sense of loss and incompleteness because these objects cannot be obtained. In contrast, one might compare the more dynamic model of subjective constitution proposed by Bakhtin and his circle (particularly Voloshinov). Again I will discuss this theory in more detail later, but its essential difference from Lacan is that the subjective is constituted not by interaction with imaginary ideals, but with other real subjects. Moreover, the process continues throughout life, opening the possibility of continual development. Clark and Holquist explain:

> As opposed to Lacan, Bakhtin conceives the mirror stage as coterminous with consciousness; it is endless as long as we are in the process of creating ourselves, because the mirror we use to see ourselves is not a passively reflecting looking glass but rather the actively refracting optic of other persons. (79)

The opposition between Bakhtin and Lacan here sheds a great deal of light on Joyce's treatment of the development of Stephen Dedalus in *Portrait*. In particular, I will suggest that Joyce depicts Stephen as attempting to envision himself in terms of ideal models in a process analogous to the Lacanian mirror stage. But Joyce's ironic treatment of Stephen provides a critique of this kind of envisionment, offering by implication an

alternative much more on the Bakhtinian model of interactive subjective generation in the process of history.

The thoroughly historicized model of subjectivity implied by *Portrait* is highlighted through its contrast to the desire of his central subject to escape from history. The suggestion by Stephen in *Ulysses* that history is "a nightmare from which I am trying to awake" is probably one of the two best remembered proclamations of his entire repertoire. Unfortunately, along with that other best remembered quote--Stephen's earlier claim in *Portrait* that the artist, like God, should remain invisible behind his work, "indifferent, paring his fingernails"--this remark is often quoted out of context and attributed to Joyce directly as an expression of the author's own attitude. In both cases, Joyce's texts then become an expression of the attitude of ahistorical aesthetic distance that is often associated with certain models of literary modernism in general. The stakes in examining such statements are thus particularly high, involving as they do issues that are fundamental to an understanding not only of Joyce's entire project, but of modern literary history as a whole. This is especially true since, in both cases, there is no justification for interpreting Stephen's remarks as providing a statement of Joyce's own views. A yearning for an escape from the flow of history is indeed a central characteristic of Stephen's entire psychic makeup. It is, however, a characteristic of which Joyce's texts are incessantly critical, both by direct statement and by the very dynamism of their own textual mechanics. The battle against the encrustations of the past waged so fiercely in those texts is far different from the idealist escape from temporality that Stephen seems to have in mind.

Stasis is central to Stephen's aesthetic vision; movement and change are the primary characteristics of the Joycean text. This difference highlights a tension between time and eternity that centrally informs not only the work of Joyce, but much of Western civilization from Plato onward, as figured perhaps most prominently in Book XI of Augustine's *Confessions*. Hugh Kenner notes the paradoxical character of the title of Joyce's first completed novel, since a "portrait" by nature pictures a static moment in time, while in *A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man* Stephen constantly changes and develops through time. "The book is a becoming which the title tells us to apprehend as a being" ("Cubist" 171). Indeed, not only does Stephen develop, but the text itself changes and develops as well, with the narrative style evolving approximately in tune with the growing sophistication of Stephen's consciousness. Kenner suggests that this development gives us a whole series of perspectives as opposed to the conventional single perspective of the portrait. He then suggests an artistic analogy for such use of multiple viewpoints in a single painting, arguing that "Joyce's *Portrait* may be the first piece of cubism in literary history" (173).

This analogy is certainly an interesting one, but Kenner's invocation of the simultaneous multiple perspectives of the cubist painting loses the temporal element that is so crucial to the presentation of Joyce's *Portrait*.[1] We do see different perspectives on Stephen Dedalus, but we see them as an evolution through time rather than at a single moment. A much more precise analogy for what goes on in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* can be found in Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. After all, Wilde's book centers around precisely

the *topos* of a painted portrait that, rather than remaining static, changes with time. Even more importantly, this changing portrait represents a fantasy of escape from the flow of time--the painting ages and changes with time, but its subject, Dorian Gray, does not. Dorian's musings on mortality as he first sees Basil Hallward's painting of him make this motif of escape from temporality quite explicit: "Yes, there would be a day when his face would be wrinkled and wizen, his eyes dim and colourless, the grace of his figure broken and deformed. The scarlet would pass away from his lips, and the gold steal from his hair" (167). And Dorian's response to this recognition of his own susceptibility to the passing of time is to wish that somehow he, rather than the painting, could be immune to temporal change: "But this picture will remain always young. It will never be older than this particular day of June. . . . If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old!" (168, Wilde's ellipsis).

Dorian gets his wish, and he does remain ever young while it is the painting that suffers the ravages of time and the consequences of the decadent lifestyle into which Dorian descends. However, despite Wilde's own avowed aestheticism and preference for the timelessness of art over the temporality of reality, the book makes it clear that Dorian's escape is not a viable solution to the problems of life. Driven by guilt and shame into a life of horror, Dorian finally identifies the picture as the source of his fall. He grabs the knife with which he had earlier murdered Basil Hallward and attacks the portrait, but it is he himself who falls dead as a consequence of the attack.

Wilde's *Dorian Gray* is not only the story of a portrait that changes with time, but also a story centered on the conflict between time and eternity, between becoming and being, just as is Joyce's *Portrait*. Dorian's fantasy of escaping from time through the offices of art is precisely the central driving force behind the actions of Joyce's young Stephen Dedalus, and Joyce, too, will show this fantasy to be a delusion. In fact, there are any number of striking parallels between Wilde's book and Joyce's in addition to this important central parallel. Dorian, for example, is compared at one point to "a young Greek martyr," strongly evoking Joyce's tie between Stephen and the mythical Icarus (158). He is also, like Stephen, fascinated by the power and materiality of words, asking himself, "Was there anything so real as words?" (160). And Dorian's descent into sin, with the concomitant guilt, is highly reminiscent of the self-loathing brought about by Stephen's reaction to his own adolescent sexuality: "He knew that he had tarnished himself, filled his mind with corruption and given horror to his fancy; that he had been an evil influence to others and had experienced a terrible joy in being so" (*Dorian Gray* 386). Torn by guilt, he begins to regret that the portrait suffers for his sins, wishing, like the repentant Stephen, that he himself could be punished:

> Ah! in what a monstrous moment of pride and passion he had prayed that the portrait should bear the burden of his days . . . Better for him that each sin of his life had brought its sure, swift penalty along with it. There was purification in punishment. (387)

The many parallels between *Dorian Gray* and *Portrait* provide a number of useful illuminations of both texts. Most importantly for my purposes, the similarity in the themes of these two Irish works illustrates the way

in which the aestheticist concern with an escape from temporality that so thoroughly informs Stephen's consciousness is not only both a typical tendency of the Romantic artist and an especially Catholic trait, but also a very Irish one, closely related both to a long religio-philosophical tradition and to specific contemporary trends in Irish nationalist politics.[2] Joyce's powerfully critical treatment of Stephen's attempts to escape temporality, then, makes a statement that is at once literary, philosophical, and political.

Flying to Byzantium: Stephen's Quest for a Non-historical Mode of Subjectivity

During his famous exposition on Shakespeare in the library scene of *Ulysses*, Stephen Dedalus (as is his wont) muses on a variety of complex philosophical and aesthetic issues. He especially focusses on the process of artistic creation, figured particularly in the trope of paternity, and it is clear that in many ways he is talking not just about Shakespeare but about artists in general. All artists, according to Stephen, create by projecting their own images into their works: "His own image to a man with that queer thing genius is the standard of all experience" (*Ulysses* 161). Here he again echoes Wilde's *Dorian Gray*, in which the artist Hallward declares that "every portrait that is painted with feeling is a portrait of the artist" (144). Or, as John Paul Riquelme puts it: "For Stephen, in every act of artistic creation, the artist reproduces himself" (207).

At first glance this theory of creation seems a rather banal reinscription of traditional romanticism. However, Stephen's theory is significantly complicated by the fact that the "image" of the artist is

by no means an unproblematic entity. As Stephen's musings on paternity (especially his relation of Shakespeare to the Sabellian heresy) point out, the artist is concerned not only with reproducing himself, but also with creating himself in the first place. There would seem here to be some genuine creative potential, in the mould of the self-creation and the "becoming what one is" that Nietzsche so privileges as the mode of life of the noble man.

Indeed, from his first appearance in the opening of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* through his final departure late in *Ulysses*, Stephen's principal concern is the creation of a vision of himself with which he can feel comfortable and of which he can be proud. This process of envisionment is particularly central in *Portrait*, where the *Bildungsroman* format, the title trope, and the underlying dialogue with Ovid's *Metamorphoses* all act to call specific attention to Stephen's attempts at forging (in both senses of the word) an identity for himself, attempts that take a number of forms in the book. But there is a critical flaw in all of Stephen's attempts at the development of a self-image, and that flaw is his inability to factor history into the equation. William Schutte notes, in regard to Stephen, that "*Portrait* is a record of his search for the one ideal to which he can dedicate himself forever" (96). Both "ideal" and "forever" are key terms here. Stephen seeks a single, ideal image of nobility that will be free from the tribulations and contingencies of history. In his attempts to "create" himself, he does nothing more than seek pre-existing models that he can emulate. But this, to Nietzsche, is precisely the wrong strategy:

> To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion *what* one is. From this point of view even the *blunders* of life have their own meaning and value--the occasional side roads and wrong roads, the delays, "modesties,' seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from *the* task. (*Ecce* 710, II.9).

Nietzsche's ability to embrace error is at first reminiscent of Stephen's declaration in *Ulysses* that "[a] man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery" (156). The resemblance, however, is illusory. Stephen is in fact denying contingency, suggesting that the man of genius can control his own fate without the intervention of the kinds of random mistakes that inhere in a fallen historical world. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is embracing such interventions, arguing that the noble man must learn to deal with the world's imperfection and not to be paralyzed by it. This kind of acceptance of the quirks and accidents of the world is vastly different from Stephen's attitude; it is, however, an attitude that is clearly embodied in Joyce's texts. Joyce's career begins with a story about a priest who fumbles a sacred chalice, told by a boy narrator who misuses language; it concludes in the middle of a sentence--precisely the sort of loose end that Stephen cannot tolerate. Fritz Senn notes the way in which Joyce's texts embrace error, a fact which seems curiously parallel to the number of errors that scholars have made concerning Joyce over the years: "Mistakes are everywhere and errors abound. Things have a way of going wrong. This is shown by Joyce and it happens *to* him. . . . errors seem to cluster around Joyce, more than other writers. It is annoying, and it is wholly appropriate" ("All," 161, Senn's ellipsis and emphasis).

Stephen, though, seeks to escape uncertainty and error. And above all he disobeys Nietzsche's dictum that one must create oneself in uncertainty and contingency, that one must not have a specific model in mind. Stephen seeks specific hero-figures with whom he can identify, either from his own life or from among the great men of history. He also attempts a similar form of imaginary envisionment of himself through identification with idealized images from domains such as literature and religion. This envisionment involves an attempt at identification with figures of authority, but he also attempts a transgressive envisionment in which he seeks to establish his own sense of integrity and uniqueness through his rejection of authority. The two strategies are not, however, very different. As Vicki Mahaffey points out, by allowing his resistance to unitary authority to so determine his outlook, Stephen in fact remains inscribed within that authority (26-7). Or, as Joseph Buttigieg puts it, "If Stephen had truly dispelled God from his mind, he would have no need to take a stand against him" ("Struggle" 198).

Joyce's treatment of Stephen's attempts at developing an idealized self-image are critical to an understanding of the models of both subjectivity and history that are inscribed in Joyce's works. Stephen's self-envisionment begins with the very first words of *Portrait*, as he listens to the story told him by his father:

> Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down along the road and this moocow that was coming down along the road met a nicens little boy named baby tuckoo. . . . (7, Joyce's ellipsis)

Stephen's reaction to this story involves the kind of identification that will continue to characterize his reactions to literature throughout his

appearances in Joyce's fiction: "He was baby tuckoo" (7). Meanwhile, on this same opening page we see the young Stephen surrounded by a somewhat bewildering (to him) array of adults with whom he seeks to identify and whom he seeks to impress, as when he dances to the clapping of Uncle Charles and Dante while his mother accompanies him on the piano. And finally, still on the opening page, we find that Stephen is dimly aware of the existence of Michael Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell, Irish political leaders who potentially serve as models for his own growing sense of self.

This early mention of Irish politics marks the importance that the political will play throughout *Portrait*. For Stephen, who seeks to evade politics, the significance of the political consists largely in his attempts at identification with Parnell. But this intrusion of the public discourse of politics into the private scene of the Dedalus home signals a major difficulty with this kind of envisionment. Stephen would like to imagine an identity for himself that sets him apart from those around him, that will make him a unique individual. But his efforts to do so will consistently be couched in a language that is derived from the discourses of public institutions and traditions, indicating that there is no way of defining the individual apart from the communal, the private apart from the public. As Williams notes,

> the first page and a half of *A Portrait* perform a constant dialectic between the public and the private spheres, the introduction of Eileen Vance being a clear sign that no private relationship can escape social contamination. (313)[3]

Stephen's attempted identification with Parnell is emphasized in the scene in which an ill young Stephen lies in the infirmary at Clongowes

Wood, dreaming of his death in a fantasy of escape from life of the kind that typifies his imagination. He pictures his body coming in on a funeral ship, with mourners waiting at the pierhead and Brother Michael announcing over the waters that "He is dead. We saw him lying upon the catafalque" (27). As usual with Stephen (this is one of the few ways in which he resembles even the mature Joyce), his thoughts bring up all sorts of literary associations, with the watery funeral motif recalling figures such as King Arthur and Milton's Lycidas. But at this moment another cry is heard: "Parnell! Parnell! He is dead!" (27). Again, public discourse irrupts in the midst of a private fantasy. It is possible that this cry comes not from Stephen's fantasies but from surrounding reality, as indicated by his later memory of Parnell's death: "And he remembered the evening in the infirmary in Clongowes, the dark waters, the light at the pierhead and the moan of sorrow from the people when they had heard" (35). However, in the final analysis, it is impossible to conclude whether the cry of Parnell's death is in fact shouted in public or simply imagined by Stephen--the public and private here are so intertwined that they cannot be unequivocally separated.[4] The conflation of the cries of mourning over Parnell with Stephen's fantasies of his own funeral acts to emphasize the way in which Stephen is identified with Parnell in his own mind, while at the same time demonstrating the way in which Stephen's fantasies of transcendence will consistently be interrupted by intrusions of historical reality throughout *Portrait*.[5]

Stephen's attempts at identification, particularly with hero-figures or with images of authority, will continue to typify his efforts at

imaginary envisionment throughout *Portrait*. In this vein, Simon Dedalus clearly occupies an important position as father-figure, and the problematic relationship between father and son will complicate all of Stephen's efforts at forming and maintaining a positive identity. The Oedipal reverberations of Stephen's relationship to his father are rather transparently obvious, but a consideration of the relationship in the broader context of Stephen's ongoing attempts at envisionment casts a light on the significance of the father-son interaction that goes well beyond the banality of a traditional psychoanalytic narrative. In particular, the idealism embedded in all of Stephen's efforts assures that Simon will fail as a father figure no matter what, because he is not, after all, ideal. Indeed, the most significant feature of Simon Dedalus as a figure of identification for Stephen is his failure to provide an appropriate model for the kind of self-image that Stephen seeks. Very early in the book, we find Stephen mortified that his father lacks the professional status of the fathers of many of his classmates at Clongowes Wood College. Yet his reaction at this point is characterized not so much by Oedipal bitterness as by tenderness and sympathy: "He thought of his own father, of how he sang songs while his mother played and how he always gave him a shilling when he asked for sixpence and he felt sorry for him that he was not a magistrate like the other boys' fathers" (26). He also seeks to compensate for the lack of a positive father-image by creating one, fantasizing in a variation of the Freudian family romance about his father's accomplishments during a revery about his upcoming trip home for Christmas: "His father was a marshal now: higher than a magistrate" (20).

This technique will become more important as Stephen grows older. The paradoxical ability to create the images that one uses to create oneself is, to Stephen, the distinguishing feature that separates the artist from the non-artist. Unfortunately, Stephen never creates the images with which he identifies, but simply borrows them from existing stock. Meanwhile, as Stephen grows older, Simon continually declines in effectiveness as a positive model, and the son will eventually reject the father entirely, employing him as an object of exclusionary, rather than imaginary envisionment. This father-son estrangement begins to surface clearly in the trip to Cork, when Stephen is embarrassed by his father's drinking:

> They had set out early in the morning from Newcombe's coffeehouse where Mr Dedalus' cup had rattled noisily against its saucer, and Stephen had tried to cover that shameful sign of his father's drinkingbout of the night before by moving his chair and coughing. One humiliation succeeded another. (93)

On this same trip, Simon's boasting further hinders Stephen's efforts at envisionment, as he proclaims to his cronies: "There's that son of mine there not half my age and I'm a better man than he is any day of the week" (95). From this point onward, the situation deteriorates rapidly, ending in hostility and name-calling that will eventually contribute to Stephen's decision to leave Ireland and to turn to the mythical Daedalus (who has the advantage of not being real) as a substitute father image.

In fact, failing to find an adequate model in his natural father, Stephen seeks a number of substitute figures. The search for a suitable father forms a major theme of *Ulysses*, though the theme is there deflated with a typical Joycean irony that undercuts Stephen's idealistic efforts

as usual. As Watson puts it, "Joyce, connoisseur of anticlimax, shows Japhet in search of a father finding a place to pee" (55). But Stephen also seeks a number of substitute fathers in *Portrait*. Particularly important among such paternal models are the Jesuit priests by whom he is educated, and the fact that they are addressed as "Father" is not insignificant, especially given the powerful emphasis that Stephen places on words. Though somewhat threatening, the Jesuits serve as figures of mysterious and tantalizing occult power of the kind that Simon Dedalus lacks and that Stephen yearns to appropriate for himself. This motif becomes most clear when the director of studies at Belvedere College invites a newly-pious adolescent Stephen to consider turning to the priesthood as a vocation:

> To receive that call, Stephen, said the priest, is the greatest honour that the Almighty God can bestow upon a man. No king or emperor on this earth has the power of the priest of God. No angel or archangel in heaven, no saint, not even the Blessed Virgin herself has the power of a priest of God. (158)

Significantly, all the figures with whom the director compares the power of the priest are also figures that have served at various points as models for Stephen's efforts at envisionment. Stephen, finds this invitation tempting, since it offers him not only a clear role in which to formulate his self-image, but also a role that he has envisioned before: "How often had he seen himself as a priest wielding calmly and humbly the awful power of which angels and saints stood in reverence!" (158). Further, the priesthood offers Stephen a position from which he can be special, set aside from ordinary people. The director, in inviting him to consider the priesthood, is "offering him secret

knowledge and power. . . . He would know obscure things, hidden from others" (159).

Yet Stephen rejects the priesthood, and the Jesuits ultimately fail as imaginary objects of identification. Stephen is seeking ideal models for the development of his own subjectivity, and when the priests show themselves to be flawed, Stephen reacts strongly. Such disappointments begin very early on, as Stephen's view of priests begins to be shaken during the Christmas dinner debate over the Church's condemnation of Parnell. This confrontation is particularly troubling for the young Stephen, because both the priests who excoriate Parnell and Parnell himself serve as identificatory images for him. In addition, Simon's criticisms of the priests during this debate initiate a direct conflict between father figures that is difficult for Stephen to resolve amidst his efforts at imaginary envisionment.

Stephen's attempts to envision himself through projection of an idealized image onto his priest-instructors are powerfully challenged in the pandybat episode, where Father Dolan shows himself to be ignorant and sadistic. Indeed, Stephen's apparent overreaction to the injustice of his punishment can be seen as arising largely out of the threat it poses to his developing self-image: if Father Dolan is so flawed, then Stephen's vision of himself is challenged as well. And this effect is further strengthened by the shame of the punishment. Stephen envisions himself as an exemplary student, and that vision is shattered by the punishment: "to be called a schemer before the class and to be pandied when he always got the card for first or second and was the leader of the Yorkists!" (52).

After Stephen's unjust punishment at the hands of Father Dolan, he is encouraged by his schoolmates to report the incident to the rector of the school, Father Conmee. "The senate and the Roman people," says one of the boys, "declared that Dedalus had been wrongly punished" (53). Indeed, Stephen, in his efforts to envision his own nobility, sees in this appeal to Conmee a means of restoring the loss of self-image that he suffered during the punishment, and the facetious mention of the Roman senate sends Stephen into a fantasy of identification with great heroic figures from history:

> He would go up and tell the rector that he had been wrongly punished. A thing like that had been done before by somebody in history, by some great person whose head was in the books of history. And the rector would declare that he had been wrongly punished because the senate and the Roman people always declared that the men who did that had been wrongly punished. (53)

The appeal to Conmee does result in Stephen's being treated as a hero by his schoolmates, and in that sense makes a successful contribution to his envisionment through identification with heroic figures from history. But these "historical" figures are safely de-historicized. They are harmlessly tucked away in books, effectively made into characters from literature, much as happens to Parnell in Hynes' poem in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room." In any case, later, Stephen's father learns of his son's appeal to the rector and treats it as a joke, laughing over it with Dolan himself. Thus Stephen's heroic image is deflated, and the priests are found to be in complicity with his fallen father after all.

Stephen's reaction to this recognition, as usual, is to switch from pure identification to pure exclusion. It is significant, as Schutte

points out, that Stephen never thinks of himself as a Catholic layman (96-7). He can consider being a Jesuit priest, or he can consider being a Satanic apostate, but his penchant for idealized visions leaves no room for the excluded middle in between. As a result, Stephen remains thoroughly inscribed within the authority of the Church, perhaps most so when he is at the height of his rebellion against it. As his friend Cranly perceptively points out to him, "It is a curious thing . . . how your mind is supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve" (240).

Stephen's total (and thus ineffective) rejection of the authority of the Church is contrasted by the way in which the text of *Portrait* engages the Church in a much more complex dialogue, waging a continuous campaign of subtle parody that undermines the authority of the Church rather than reaffirming it. For example, in several remarkable key passages in *Portrait*, priests make slight misstatements that tend to make them look foolish or ignorant. In fact, priests come off badly in nearly every appearance they make in the book, usually in ways that make them appear ignorant and unrefined in stark contrast to the myth of the occult learning of the Jesuit. After paddling Fleming, Father Dolan warns the boys that he will continue to return to the class to check on its progress. "Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow, said the prefect" (49). At best this line represents Dolan's ability to make even Shakespeare sound hackneyed and clichéd. But the line may be even more significant. After all, the quoted passage appears in the same speech in which Macbeth declares life to be "a tale/told by an idiot, full of sound and fury/Signifying nothing." As usual in Joyce, language escapes the

intentions of its user, and the blustery Dolan would here seem to have declared himself to be a loud but empty-minded bag of wind.

Later, a priest at Belvedere again shows a lack of literary sophistication by telling a group of boys that the hack pro-Catholic writer Louis Veuillot might be considered a greater stylist than Victor Hugo (156). And in the famous conversation between Stephen and the dean of studies at Belvedere, Stephen launches into a rarified discussion of the aesthetics of Aquinas, to which the prosaic dean replies with a jarring contrast in diction: "Quite so, said the dean, you have certainly hit the nail on the head" (186). Later the priest confuses Stephen's metaphorical invocation of the lamp of the intellect with the physical lamps that are used to give light. Finally, Stephen attempts to explain the contextuality of language: "I remember a sentence of Newman's in which he says of the Blessed Virgin that she was detained in the full company of the saints. The use of the word in the marketplace is quite different. *I hope I am not detaining you*" (188, Joyce's emphasis). To which the dean stupidly replies, "Not in the least."

Joyce's strategy is not to declare priests stupid or depraved, as Stephen might, but to let them declare themselves so. The hyperbolic descriptions of hell that Stephen encounters at the retreat are offered without editorial comment on the part of the narration, but the obvious glee with which the priests depict the sufferings of the sinners in hell demonstrates the strong tendency toward sadomasochism that is characteristic of priests everywhere in Joyce's work. For example, the extended graphic descriptions of the torments of the condemned sinners seem to partake of the same kind of sadistic pleasure as does Father

Dolan's handiness with the pandybat. Moreover, during the retreat Stephen's old teacher Father Arnall presents a sermon in which he attributes to Ecclesiastes a quotation that is actually found in Ecclesiasticus. The devil may be able to quote scripture for his own purposes, but in Joyce priests are unable to do so without getting it wrong.

The sadism of the hellfire and damnation sermons of the retreat make them all the more effective given Stephen's state of mind, driving him to a bathetic confession of his sins. He seeks out an out-of-the-way chapel where he will not be recognized and finds that the sacrament of confession is administered there in mechanical assembly-line fashion: "The slide was shot back. A penitent emerged from the farther side of the box. The near side was drawn. A penitent entered where the other penitent had come out" (142). When his turn finally comes, Stephen recites the preparatory *Confiteor*, clearly evoking a comparison between his confession to the Church and the earlier attempts of Heron and his cronies to elicit similar confessions. The implication is clear--both Heron and the Church are sadistic bullies. The sanctity of Stephen's confession is further undermined when he is told by the priest who hears him that "[a]s long as you commit that sin, my poor child, you will never be worth one farthing to God" (145). The hint of simony in the priest's economic metaphor is clear, and this link is made even more explicit when Stephen soon afterward muses on the glory of his newly-purified life:

> His life seemed to have drawn near to eternity; every thought, word and deed, every instance of consciousness could be made to revibrate radiantly in heaven: and at times his sense of such immediate repercussion was so lively that he seemed to feel his soul in devotion pressing like fingers the keyboard of a great cash register

> and to see the amount of his purchase start forth immediately in heaven. (148)

Joyce's strategy of turning the Church's own language against it results in a dialogic interchange that is far more effectively subversive than Stephen's attempts to assert his own monological superiority to the priests he encounters. The priests themselves speak monologically, a tendency that Joyce undermines by demonstrating the way in which the language of religion escapes the bounds of its religious context. To Joyce, one of the more insidious aspects of the Irish Catholic Church was its attempts to repress sexuality, and so it is appropriate that his linguistic guerrilla warfare often takes the form of allowing submerged discourses from areas such as economics or sexuality to break through into the surface of the discourse of the Church. Thus Joyce's old theme of simony and his favorite technique of using sexuality to subvert authority continue to serve him now and forever in good stead. The sexual motivation behind religion is implied throughout *Portrait* in the consistent sadomasochism of the priests, especially in the portion of the book after the retreat in which Stephen has supposedly undergone a religious conversion and turned away from the sins of the flesh. He now devotes himself not to masturbation and fornication, but to prayer: "By means of *ejaculations* and prayers he stored up ungrudgingly for the souls in purgatory centuries of days and quarantines of years" (147, my emphasis). And later, we find that, just at the moment he is tempted by sin, he is "saved by a sudden act of the will or a sudden ejaculation" (152).

Indeed, it seems impossible in *Portrait* to keep sexuality out of religion. The autoeroticism of Stephen's attempts at the mortification of the flesh is obvious. At one point he supposedly meditates on a book by Saint Alphonsus Liguori, but the passage that breaks through into his consciousness is from the erotic Song of Solomon: "*Inter ubera mea commorabitur*" (152). And when the director at Belvedere calls Stephen in to discuss the possibility of becoming a priest, he breaks the ice by mentioning *les jupes* worn by the capuchins in Belgium (155). But the director pronounces the French badly, again showing the falseness of the Jesuit pretense to intellectual sophistication. Moreover, the mention of a name often applied to women's undergarments sends Stephen, saved or not, immediately off into a flight of sexual fantasy that not only undercuts the speech of the director, but also effects a typically Joycean gender confusion between priests and women.[6]

Joyce clearly has a great deal of fun at the expense of his former Jesuit masters in *Portrait* and elsewhere, but the seriousness of his attacks on the Church cannot be overemphasized. MacCabe discusses the central position of Joyce's views on the Church and sexuality in his overall assessment of the Irish political situation of his day. To Joyce there was no hope for substantive social change in Ireland as long as the Church's power stood unchallenged. "For Joyce was all too well aware that the power of the Church was grounded in a repressive order of sexuality which could survive and negate 'inevitable' social change" (163). Moreover, the link between the Church's repression of sexuality and the evils of Irish nationalism was, to Joyce, quite direct: "The

connection between repressed desire and nationalism was insisted on by Joyce" (164).

Stephen, though, lacks Joyce's intensely political vision. Like Gabriel Conroy, when confronted with politics he would have liked "to say that literature was above politics" (*Dubliners* 188). And so, when the priests whom Stephen encounters in the course of his education ultimately fail as imaginary models, he simply raises his sights, seeking identification with the great men of church history, much as he had sought identification with the heroes of ancient Greece and Rome. The scholastic philosophy of Aquinas forms a particularly important part of Stephen's own developing aesthetic theory, to the point that Stephen himself suggests that the philistine MacAlister might call that theory "applied Aquinas" (209).[7] And those theories form an important part of Stephen's efforts at developing an ennobling self-vision. We learn that, while exploring the philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, there were moments when his thoughts became clear, resulting in a concomitant moment of clarity in his own self-image, so that "he felt that the spirit of beauty had folded him round like a mantle and that in revery at least he had been acquainted with nobility" (177).

St. Francis Xavier provides another model for Stephen, and a particularly appropriate one. The inchoate "conversion" experience that leads Stephen to be in a position to consider the priesthood occurs at a retreat in honor of St. Francis, and in this light it is significant to note that Xavier, too, was a student of the philosophy of Aristotle. Perhaps more importantly, St. Francis' importance in church history rests largely on his reputation as "apostle to the Indies." This reputation

was obtained during an extended period of missionary service in the exotic East, a fact that no doubt would appeal to the romantic imagination of young Stephen in much the same way that it appealed to the young boy in "Araby."[8]

Stephen's conversion from a previous life of sin amongst the brothels of Dublin also provides a link between himself and St. Augustine. Up to the point at which he is encouraged to consider the priesthood, Stephen's career parallels that of Augustine almost exactly. In fact, Hugh Kenner suggests that the *Confessions of St. Augustine*, with Ibsen's *Brand*, is "the chief archetype of Joyce's book" (*Dublin's* 130). However, like all of Joyce's archetypal textual models, this one is treated with extreme irony, and its significance lies at least as much in the way that it differs from *Portrait* as in the way it resembles it. I will discuss the dialogue between *Portrait* and Augustine's *Confessions* in much more detail later in this chapter. For now, let me simply note that the two books diverge at the point where Augustine undergoes his religious conversion while Stephen (like Gabriel Conroy) undergoes no such conversion.

Augustine's turn to the church specifically involves a Platonic rejection of literature as deception. Stephen, though, takes precisely the opposite course. He opts to decline the invitation to study for the priesthood, rejecting the Church in favor of the poetry that Augustine condemns. The intertextual dialogue between *Portrait* and the *Confessions* helps to highlight the extreme importance of literature in Stephen's efforts at envisionment. This importance functions as a reflexive commentary on the way in which all of Joyce's fiction is itself so

heavily informed by other works of literature. Flaubert was an especially strong influence on the early Joyce, and Stephen's envisionment through literature provides a link to Flaubert's Madame Bovary, who is similarly constituted by her reading. Thus Kershner notes: "It might be said that all Joyce's characters are *bovaristes*--that, like Madame Bovary, they narrate their own lives in ways that directly reflect their reading, and more generally in terms of the dominant discourses surrounding them" (Review 432).

As Kershner has elsewhere discussed in detail, much of the reading that informs Stephen's consciousness is of a popular and/or romantic nature of the kind that Emma Bovary might have found quite to her taste. Particularly prominent among these influences is Dumas' *The Count of Monte Cristo*, whose Edmond Dantes provides an apt figure for Stephen's attempts to develop a sense of himself as a sort of romantic outcast (Kershner, *Joyce* 195-209). Among other things, Dantes (like St. Francis Xavier) has conducted a successful campaign in the exotic East--though unlike Xavier he was driven to the East by tormentors upon whom he wreaks vengeance after his return. Dantes is a classic example of the Byronic hero, and to Stephen "[t]he figure of that dark avenger stood forth in his mind for whatever he had heard or divined in childhood of the strange and terrible" (*Portrait* 62). And though *Portrait* is replete with allusions to figures of literary authority such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Ovid, Stephen's identification with figures such as Dantes demonstrates the dual nature of his efforts at envisionment, involving both identification with great figures and a tendency toward the

rebellion and independence that Stephen comes to associate with figures such as Dantes.

But note that Stephen's efforts at rebellion are themselves thoroughly derivative. When he seeks to envision himself as unique and as rejecting received modes of behavior, he does so through identification with pre-existing figures of uniqueness. It is here that his treatment of literary sources differs so greatly from that of Joyce. Joyce appropriates literary sources from the past and engages them in dialogue for his own ends. His dialogic use of such sources is informed by a "plastic power" of the sort privileged by Nietzsche. Stephen, on the other hand, has no such plastic power and is forced either to accept his sources as they are or to reject them entirely, in a manner analogous to his reaction to the Church. His use of literary sources, then, is less like Joyce than like Little Chandler of "A Little Cloud," who in writing a poem "would put in allusions" (*Dubliners* 74).

Byron, of course, functions as one of Stephen's principal literary models of rebellion, and it may be significant that Byron is also a central hero of Little Chandler. Even as Stephen evokes Byron as an image of resistance to the conventional, he does so in an entirely conventional way. After all, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nearly every young man with even a touch of the artist identified with Byron. Consider, for example, the efforts at envisionment undertaken through identification with literary figures by Bernard, the artist-figure in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*: "I changed and changed; was Hamlet, was Shelley, was the hero, whose name I now forget, of a novel by Dostoevsky; was for a whole term, incredibly, Napoleon; but

was Byron chiefly" (249). Interestingly, Hamlet, Shelley, and Napolean all appear as figures of identification for Stephen in *Portrait* as well, though it may be that he, too, is Byron chiefly. Even the prosaic Leopold Bloom once identified with Byron. Molly tells us in her soliloquy that he used to go about "trying to look like Lord Byron" (*Ulysses* 612). And he almost fooled her, too, until she found out that there was "not an ounce of it in his composition," whereupon she begins to hope that Stephen will prove more Byronic (637).

Significantly, the most important invocation of Byron in *Portrait* occurs in a passage in which Stephen literally enacts the role of Byronic hero. Asked by his schoolmates Heron, Boland, and Nash to name the "best" poet, Stephen rejects Tennyson as a "rhymester" and opts instead for Byron, whereupon the three boys accuse Byron of heresy and immorality and attack Stephen in an attempt to force a retraction. The retraction does not come, because this abuse only helps to strengthen Stephen's vision of himself as Byronic hero--it is, in fact, precisely the desired effect.

Stephen's admiration for Byron is consistent with the streak of pseudo-rebellion that informs all of his efforts at envisionment. We find, for example, that when he was at school all of his spare time "was passed in the company of subversive writers whose gibes and violence of speech set up a ferment in his brain before they passed out of it into his crude writings" (78). And the "rebelliousness" that characterizes Stephen's taste in literature is related quite closely to his rebellion against religion. Characteristically, Stephen's ultimate religious rebellion involves his acceptance of Satan as a role model. This

strategy leaves Stephen thoroughly inscribed within the religion of which Satan is a creation, though he does give it a literary twist by clearly viewing Satan more through the optic of Milton (and perhaps of Shelley's Satanic Prometheus) than of Father Arnall. In the moment that he rejects the priesthood, Stephen echoes the Miltonic Satan's motto of *non serviam* by noting that his "destiny was to be elusive of social or religious orders" (162). In his subsequent conversation with Cranly, Stephen makes this identification even more explicit. Asked why he will not at least feign some religious sentiment to please his mother (thus foreshadowing his fateful refusal to pray over her death bed in *Ulysses*), Stephen simply answers, "I will not serve" (239). Later, in "Circe" (where so many hidden things finally come to the surface), he is even more explicit about both this motto and his all-or-nothing attitude toward his models: "The intellectual imagination! With me all or not at all. *Non serviam*!" (*Ulysses* 475).

Stephen's choice of Satan as role model is a natural one, since Satan (especially as depicted by Milton) is a prototypical figure of the proud exile, perhaps the original Byronic hero. Indeed, the anarchist Bakunin (an important influence on Joyce's political vision) cites Satan as a central representative of the kind of rebellion he sees to be vital to any hope for emancipation from political oppression. Satan, he suggests, is "the eternal rebel, the first freethinker and the emancipator of worlds," and the Satanic incitement of Adam and Eve to rebellion should be a model for us all (9-10).

Marshall Grossman notes that Milton's Satan served as a forerunner of developments in literary subjectivity over the succeeding three

centuries. In particular, he notes Satan's refusal to accept the limitations that are placed upon him, a refusal that made him a hero of the romantic imagination and a prime figure of the romantic attempt to escape temporality:

> Milton's portrait of Satan anticipates the development of literary subjectivity over the next three centuries. As Adam and Eve's self-authorship represents the subject of the realistic novel, the self developed in conflict with a given set of historical circumstances, Satan's free-running fantasies represent the autonomy of the self achieved through the rejection of history characteristic of modernism. (36)[9]

Whether or not this "rejection of history" is indeed characteristic of modernism is clearly dependent upon how one defines "modernism." But what is clear is that this rejection is very characteristic of Stephen Dedalus. The "all or not at all" turn from God to Satan as hero is also quite characteristic of Stephen. In fact, even as Stephen adopts Satan as hero, he also simultaneously envisions himself as a Christ figure. When, at the height of his Satanic/Byronic rebellion, he is persecuted by his schoolmates, that persecution is clearly linked to the suffering of Christ. The boys restrain Stephen in an overt echo of the crucifixion: "Nash pinioned his arms behind while Boland seized a long cabbage stump which was lying in the gutter. Struggling and kicking under the cuts of the cane and the blows of the knotty stump Stephen was borne back against a barbed wire fence" (82).

Links between Stephen and Christ are drawn throughout *Portrait*, such as in his repeated association of his friend Cranly with John the Baptist. Most importantly, Stephen sees Christ as a figure of suffering and self-sacrifice. Thus, in the pandybat episode, Stephen is punished

partly because Dolan is in a bad mood over the recent misconduct of Simon Moonan, Tusker Boyle, and their fellow smuggers. Fleming makes this association clear: "And we are all to be punished for what other fellows did?" (43). The obvious intertextual referent here is to the myth of the Fall of man, which functions so importantly throughout Joyce's writing--we are all tainted by the original sin of Adam and Eve. But this link with fallen mankind would make Stephen no different from anyone else, and it is clear that he prefers a link to Christ, who also was "punished for what other fellows did," but in a unique way.

Clearly, Stephen (like Gabriel Conroy before him) is fascinated by the notion of self-sacrifice, but only insofar as such sacrifice can help him to gain his own ends.[10] The "generosity" of neither Stephen nor Gabriel is motivated by an altruistic concern for the welfare of others. Rather, each character is principally concerned with the way in which sacrificial acts can help him to envision himself as noble. Joyce's presentation of the motif of self-sacrifice in both *Portrait* and "The Dead" mounts an all-out assault on the very concept. Pecora discusses Joyce's skepticism toward the tradition of the self-sacrificial hero in his treatment of Gabriel Conroy, noting that "Gabriel might be one of the bloodiest impostors of all, caught within the whole structure of a heroism . . . derived from the life of Christ" (237).

The echo of Nietzsche's distaste for "the crucified" is quite strong in the fierceness of Joyce's distaste for Christ as a figure of self-sacrifice, an association that Pecora recognizes: "Like Nietzsche, Joyce links a philosophical skepticism, and a belief in the primacy of individual passion, to a questioning of traditional Christian values"

(237). Pecora also notes that Stephen participates in this motif as well, and indeed Buttigieg, within a context in which he emphasizes Joyce's affinities with Nietzsche, points out the identification of Stephen with Christ ("*A Portrait*" 84). But, as usual, Joyce's biting satire here has both a general philosophical target (the Christian privileging of self-sacrifice) and a specific political target within the context of his contemporary Ireland. Watson notes that the Irish nationalist movement espoused a belief in the necessity of blood-sacrifice for national redemption--as evidenced by the sacrificial character of Yeats' Cathleen ni Houlihan. Having its roots in ancient pagan mythology, this cult of sacrifice is able to co-exist quite comfortably with Christianity, and by the time of Joyce had become a political byword, resulting in "a conviction of the necessity for a periodic blood-sacrifice to keep alive the National Spirit" (Watson 46).[11]

Joyce's treatment of the "generosity" of Stephen and Gabriel indicates his attitude toward this aspect of Irish politics. Stephen himself (always able to criticize others for attitudes that he himself exemplifies) makes a clear reference to this issue in his characterization of Ireland as "the old sow that eats her farrow" (203). But it is in his depiction of the constant mode of betrayal that characterizes Irish politics (particularly in the case of Parnell) that Joyce makes his skepticism toward the efficacy of individual sacrifice most clear. Moreover, in linking Parnell's betrayal directly to the dominance of the Church in Irish society, Joyce recognizes (as did many

of his contemporaries) a direct link between the Christian philosophy of sacrifice and the same notion in Irish nationalist politics.

The conflation of Christ and Satan in Stephen also speaks to this issue. What Stephen cannot see, in his conscious dedication to the Aristotelian logic of noncontradiction, is the fundamental implication of his simultaneous dedication to both Christ and Satan as role models--that these opposites, like all opposites, are mutually implicated and inseparable.[12] This conflation of the divine and the diabolic occurs frequently in Joyce's work, which conducts an incessant Nietzschean assault on polar oppositions of all kinds.[13] For example, in *Finnegans Wake* when Shaun accuses Shem of attempting to set himself up as a godlike figure, he does so by attributing to him the motto of Satan (and Stephen Dedalus), *non serviam*: "Do you hold yourself then for some god in the manger, Shehohem, that you will neither serve nor let serve, pray nor let pray?" (188.18-9).[14] Stephen's inability to deconstruct this fundamental God/Devil opposition is centrally symptomatic of his overall failure to escape from the strictures of monological authority. He is able to invert polar hierarchies, shifting from one side of the equation to the other, but he never realizes that fundamental lesson of the Joycean *oeuvre*--that such reversals leave him right back where he started and that the only escape from the vicious circle of such hierarchies is to undermine, through dialogic encounter, the very structure of opposition.

Stephen's conflict with his schoolmates over his loyalty to Byron also illustrates the way in which his dualistic thinking informs all of his intersubjective relations. Adhering to a strict dichotomy of self and other, he experiences his fellows as irreducibly alien, as objects

rather than as other subjects. Throughout *Portrait*, Stephen feels isolated and alone, different from his comrades. As a result, he gains very little in his efforts at envisionment through identification with his peers. Even very early in his career at Clongowes Wood College, we find that "[a]ll the boys seemed to him very strange" (13). And the cruelty of Wells in taunting him about the kissing of his mother or in pushing him into the ditch is incomprehensible to him. As a result of this lack of identification, Stephen generally associates his schoolmates with negative qualities from which he wishes to distance himself, using his sense of difference as a reinforcement of his hopes for uniqueness. Thus, he bolsters his own sense of nobility and sophistication through rejection of the "rude Firbolg mind" of Davin (180) and the "sharp Ulster voice" of MacAlister (193). On the other hand, he once again shows the beginnings of his "artistic" imagination by creating his own friends with whom he *can* identify. Stephen has heard and rejected the calls of his fellows in favor of the calls of his own imaginary creations: "He gave them ear only for a time but he was happy only when he was far from them, beyond their call, alone or in the company of phantasmal comrades" (84).[15]

Stephen's alienation from his surroundings can be taken as a critique of the separation between self and other that inheres in the Kantian model of the transcendent subject, a critique which extends to traditional psychoanalytic notions of the self as well. But Stephen's mention of Davin's "Firbolg" mind evokes various racial myths of the Irish past and indicates the way in which Joyce's vision, even while dealing with complex and universal philosophical and psychological

issues, is consistently focussed on the contemporary Irish political situation. A prime tenet of the Irish nationalism that Joyce so abhored involved the myth of Irish racial purity and the suggestion that the "true" Irish were a chosen people. As Watson points out, Joyce undercuts this myth, especially in *Ulysses*, by juxtaposing the Irish with that other mythically chosen people, the Jews (44).[16] Moreover, Joyce indicates just what he thinks of the myth of racial purity by presenting us in *Portrait* with its logical outcome--the dwarfish captain who was produced by the unfortunate effects of incestuous inbreeding among his noble Irish ancestors (227-8).[17]

The gap between self and other in Stephen's thought is repeated in even stronger form in Stephen's attitudes toward women. Stephen's attitude toward women is centrally characterized by an undecidable duality, as symbolized in his quandary over Wells' question concerning the kissing of his mother. Indeed, the virgin-whore dichotomy that so characterizes Stephen's attitude toward women in *Portrait* provides an enactment of the two most common means by which men have traditionally utilized women in their efforts at envisionment throughout the history of Western civilization. On the one hand, Stephen is attracted by idealized images of purity, as exemplified by the Virgin Mary. He utilizes such images as objects of imaginary identification that allow him to envision his own purity. On the other, he projects onto real-world women, as exemplified by the Dublin whores, the qualities of physical grossness and disgust which he seeks to expel from his own image.

The almost farcical efforts of Stephen to purify himself through the mortification of his senses after he has renounced the whores illustrate

his disgust with the physical, which he intimately associates with the feminine. Such images of disgust with the physicality of women are a pervasive element of the Western literary tradition. Simone de Beauvoir notes the traditional tendency for identification of women with the physical aspects of life in Western culture: "The uncleanness of birth is reflected upon the mother. . . . And if the little boy remains in early childhood sensually attached to the maternal flesh, when he grows older, becomes socialized, and takes note of his individual existence, this same flesh frightens him . . . calls him back from those realms of immanence whence he would fly" (136). This association of women with the flesh reflects a disdain with the animality of human corporeality. The male thus opposes himself as "spirit" to the woman as flesh, as "the Other, who limits and denies him" (129). The attitudes described by de Beauvoir describe Stephen's view quite precisely, and are directly figured in the Catholic myth in which Christ arises from a divine father and human mother.[18] Suzette Henke summarizes this view, noting that to Stephen women "stand as emblems of the flesh--frightening reminders of sex, generation, death" ("Stephen" 82). This Augustinian rejection of the physical derives at least partly from Stephen's Catholic upbringing, and it is not insignificant that the hellfire-and-brimstone sermon at the retreat which leads him to repudiate the whores features a standard condemnation of Eve as the temptress who led Adam into sin (Henke, "Stephen" 118).

Meanwhile, Stephen's reverence for the Virgin also derives from his Catholicism. In fact, his rejection of physical women and his attraction to the ideal Virgin are directly related, two opposing sides of the same

coin. This relationship becomes particularly clear in a scene in which his sins with the whores drive him to seek relief from his guilt in the image of the Virgin:

> His sin, which had covered him from the sight of God, had led him nearer to the refuge of sinners. Her eyes seemed to regard him with mild pity; her holiness, a strange light glowing faintly upon her frail flesh, did not humiliate the sinner who approached her. If ever he was impelled to cast sin from him and to repent the impulse that moved him was the wish to be her knight. (105)

Eventually, though, Stephen is so overcome with guilt that he feels unworthy to approach the holy Virgin. So he fantasizes that E--- C--- can serve him as an intermediary, much as Beatrice leads Dante to Mary in the *Commedia* (*Portrait* 116). The link to Dante is an important one, Dante being a clear predecessor of Stephen in such attempts at imaginary envisionment through narcissistic identification with an idealized woman. Joel Fineman argues from a Lacanian perspective that practitioners of the poetry of praise prior to Shakespeare (among whom he explicitly counts Dante) create a poetry in which

> the lover is drawn to his beloved by the force of her ideality. The lover's goal is a kind of narcissistic identification or unification of subject with object, the identity or unity of which is already prefigured for him in the compact wholeness of the beloved herself. (18)

In short, the poet is drawn not to the loved one as a separate individual, but as an ideal image of unity that contributes to the poet's own sense of psychic wholeness. Granted, there is here the complicating factor that Beatrice was a real historical personage. However (as opposed to other idealized women who disappoint their lovers through their own reality--such as Chaucer's Criseyde or Nabokov's Lolita),

Beatrice has the distinct advantage of having been long dead at the time of the composition of the poem. Thus, Dante can achieve a Narcissistic fusion with her image without having her reality get in the way.

E--- C---, though, is still alive, so Stephen is unable to separate her completely from the physical reality of her femininity.[19] He feels for her a physical attraction that interferes with his efforts to envision his own ideality, leading to further guilt: "If she knew to what his mind had subjected her or how his brutelike lust had torn and trampled upon her innocence!" (115). And Stephen's reaction to this guilt is a simple one: blame E--- C--- and push her away. She does not provide a successfully idealized identificatory image, and Stephen indicates in his diary the inefficacy of Dante's solution, referring ironically to such idealization as "the spiritual-heroic refrigerating apparatus, invented and patented in all countries by Dante Alighieri" (252).

If E--- C---'s physical reality interferes with Stephen's efforts to idealize her (and thus himself), then it is only natural that he will turn to women who are not real. The Virgin Mary is the classic example of this solution, but given the highly literary constitution of Stephen's imagination it is not surprising that he seeks solutions in literature as well. In particular, having envisioned himself as Edmond Dantes from *The Count of Monte Cristo*, he lifts the figure of Mercedes from the pages of that same book. Henke notes Stephen's evocation of Mercedes as an unsubstantial figure of fantasy, free of "physical dross. She must obliterate any palpable connection with the corporeal prison of the body"

("Stephen" 87-8). And it is clear that Stephen's fantasy of Mercedes is in fact a fantasy of his own power and capability:

> They would be alone, surrounded by darkness and silence: and in that moment of supreme tenderness he would be transfigured. He would fade into something impalpable under her eyes and then in a moment, he would be transfigured. Weakness and timidity and inexperience would fall from him in that magic moment. (65)

Ultimately, Stephen turns not to characters from literature in his efforts at envisionment, but to a hypostatization of literature itself. Henke goes on to suggest that Stephen's ultimate effort at envisionment, his escape into art, is at least partially an attempt to escape the threat of the feminine entirely. Stephen's artistic imagination is in fact highly involved with his attempts to achieve an image of feminine ideality, as seen in his ability to transform the real-world "bird-girl" (seaweed and all) into an idealized image in the mold of Mary.

That Stephen realizes the connection between his transformation of the bird-girl and his efforts at artistic creation is clear. Having failed to receive the call to the Catholic priesthood, Stephen regards the epiphanic vision of the bird girl as a call to a priesthood of a different kind, a call to enter the world of art: "Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call. To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life!" (172). Stephen is overjoyed at the vision of this girl, all the more because he believes it to be a vision that he himself has created. Indeed, the fact that he himself has created this image makes it all the more effective as an object for his own self-identification--the connection between the purity of the bird-

girl and the sought-for purity of his own soul is thereby made more direct.

The link between Stephen's vision of the bird-girl and his vision of himself as an artist is further strengthened by the fact that the bird-girl episode is actually an immediate continuation of an earlier epiphany in which, hearing the swimming boys call variations of his name, Stephen experiences a powerful moment of identification with Ovid's fabulous artificer, seeming to "see a winged form flying above the waves and slowly climbing the air" (169). And, while the romping boys provide a contrasting background of vulgarity, Stephen for once experiences a vision of himself as he seeks to be:

> His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her graveclothes. Yes! Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, imperishable. (170)

Stephen's rejection of the "graveclothes" in this moment of artistic transcendence highlights the close parallel between his early visions of art and his attitude toward the feminine. In both cases he rejects the squalor of the physical and the mortal, seeking to achieve an alternative vision of purity and ideality. Stephen, in fact, epitomizes at this stage what many have come to see as the modernist artist, steeped in aestheticism, seeking to create through the Byzantium of form a momentary stay against the confusion of the place of excrement that is everyday life.[20] Importantly, the nobility of the vision that he engenders through his art is highly self-reflexive--as he creates poetry he

believes that he is simultaneously creating himself, and the purity of his art figures the purity that he hopes to achieve in his own soul.[21]

Stephen's investment in rejecting the disorder and contingency of the historical world from his vision of art is thus a strong one. He fails to recognize the way in which the purity of his creations is undermined by their thoroughly derivative nature. In this moment of ultimate artistic splendor, Stephen can offer little more in the way of creation than banal reinscriptions of the *Metamorphoses* (his appeal to Daedalus), the New Testament (his Christlike rising from the grave), and the *Commedia* (his apotheosis of the bird girl à la Dante's treatment of Beatrice). Stephen is not unaware that the material for his art must arise from the real world, but he rejects the notion that this material therefore maintains traces of the context from which it is taken. Lacking the plastic power to face the implications of those traces, Stephen seeks to effect a radical break, to make the material wholly his own, to reject the body and to preserve the spirit of his material, in an act of poetic transformation quite analogous to the transmutation of bread into the body of Christ in the Eucharist. He sees himself as "a priest of the eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life" (221). And the divine aspect of artistic creation is further emphasized by Stephen's famous description of the purest form of artist, the artist of the drama:

> The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails. (215)

Stephen's evocation of an invisible Flaubertian author and his identification of that author with God have come to stand for many as central descriptions of the aesthetic attitude of the modernist artist. But it is important to appreciate the irony of this passage. For one thing, Stephen's statement is immediately undercut by Lynch's sardonic "Trying to refine them also out of existence" (215). For another, it is also undercut by the intratextual link to the earlier suggestion that Tusker Boyle was effeminate because "he was always at his nails, paring them" (42). Here, as so often, Joyce employs a subtle deconstruction of the polarities of gender in a conflation of God, the ultimate patriarch, with the feminine.[22] In Stephen's model, the artist is associated with the (male) spirit, while his creation becomes the (female) matter of art, but the link between "Lady Boyle" and God acts to suggest that spirit and matter, male and female, are not in fact separable in such a neat fashion.[23]

Stephen's attempts to separate the artist from his art can be seen as a manifestation of his inability to deal with paradox and contradiction. Unlike Lynch's successor, the stately, plump Buck Mulligan of *Ulysses*, who is perfectly comfortable with contradicting himself in the tradition of Whitman and Nietzsche, the idealist Stephen cannot abide such uncertainty. And yet his very notion of artistic creation is a highly paradoxical one. The title trope of *Portrait* highlights this paradox. All of Stephen's art is in a sense intended to be a portrait of the artist, as with Wilde's Hallward. But if the artist is created by the portrait even as the portrait is created by the artist, then what gets the process started in the first place?[24]

Stephen's solution to this central paradox is simply to deny it, to make the artist separate from and prior to his creation, which then emanates from the artist as fixed God-like origin. But this solution does not answer the question; it merely displaces it. After all, where did the artist come from? Joyce addresses this question frequently. As he puts it most succinctly in the *Wake*, "Where did thots come from?" (597.25). This question is typical of the textual density of the *Wake*. On one level it questions the origin of language by referring to the preceding passage ("Where did *that* come from?). It also evokes both the related conundrum of the origin of human "thoughts" and a typical childhood curiosity over the origin of babies ("tots"). All of these questions are then linked to the question of the writer's creativity by the fact that "Thoth" was the Egyptian god of writers. This association also links the question of the origin of art to the theological riddle *par excellence*: if creation came from God, then where did God come from? Joyce's answer to this question is fundamentally embedded in the very form and nature of his work, and it is an answer that is very different from the theological one that Stephen supplies.

Stephen, Augustine, and Joyce: Three Authors in Search of an Author

To see how Joyce's approach to the question of the origin of art differs from that of Stephen and to see how this approach provides fundamental information about Joyce's views not only of authorship, but of religion, philosophy, subjectivity, and history, it is helpful to go back to Augustine, whose presence is so fundamental in the Catholic tradition from which Joyce springs. The many similarities between

Joyce's *Portrait* and Augustine's *Confessions* immediately call into question the notion of artistic originality as put forth by Stephen. And the fact that Joyce's text also bears a strong resemblance to many others, ranging from Goethe's *Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meister* to popular schoolboy stories like *Tom Brown's School Days* to Nietzsche's philosophical retrospective *Ecce Homo* only acts to further undercut any notion of originality. Indeed, the dialogue with Augustine by necessity opens up a dialogue with a whole tradition of texts that have been influenced by the *Confessions*. Freccero, for example, notes the strong affinities between the *Confessions* and Dante's *Commedia*, arguing that "Dante's entire spiritual autobiography is essentially Augustinian in structure" ("Prologue" 2). Meanwhile, M. H. Abrams suggests a central role for the *Confessions* in modern literary history, seeing it as an important forerunner of authors ranging from Wordsworth to Proust. He suggests that Augustine's book is "the first sustained history of an inner life and deserves, as much as any book for which the claim has been made, to be called the first modern work" (83).

Clearly Joyce's work participates in an extensive literary tradition, as always. Yet Joyce's plastic power produces a work that differs from its predecessors as much as it resembles them. Rather than being a mere repetition of past texts, *Portrait* initiates a dialogue with those texts that adds greatly both to its meaning and to theirs. Mitchell, for example, notes the many ways in which *Portrait* is a "surprisingly conventional" representative of the *Bildungsroman* genre (63). Yet he notes that works in this genre traditionally end in a resolution between the hero and society, while *Portrait* ends with the

hero going away from his society into exile. This significant difference, says Mitchell, shows that "[p]art of Joyce's particular genius was the ability to draw upon the literary past and deliver it to the future in an enriched form" (74).

However, for my purposes it is probably the dialogue with Augustine that tells us most about Joyce's text. The *Confessions* begin with Augustine in infancy, like the young Stephen giving his principal concern to the learning of language: "as I came toward the end of infancy I tried to find signs to convey my feelings to others" (26). Significantly, the ability to use language immediately gives man a special status that evokes the question of origins: "Where could such a living creature come from if not from you, O Lord? Can it be that man has skill to fabricate himself?" (26). This question is precisely the one we are trying to answer. To Augustine the paradox of origins is unequivocally solved by an appeal to the transcendence of the divine; this solution is one that Stephen can neither accept nor reject.

As Augustine grows older, he is sent away to school (leaving his pious mother and the father of whom he is ashamed), where his major concern seems to be the avoidance of corporal punishment. He and his fellow students "feared the whip just as much as others fear the rack," he tells us (30). Moreover, his greatest humiliation was that "my elders and even my parents, who certainly wished me no harm, would laugh at the beating I got--and in those days beatings were my one great bugbear" (30). The parallel here with Stephen's encounter with Father Dolan and the pandybat is quite direct, even to the fact that Stephen's father and Father Dolan "had a famous laugh together over it" (*Portrait* 72).

Augustine does, however, manage to avoid the whip long enough to learn to write and to read, whereupon he, Stephen-like, falls prey to the seductions of literature and becomes a promising young poet. Meanwhile, he reaches puberty and begins to fall prey to the seductions of the flesh as well: "For as I grew to manhood I was inflamed with desire for a surfeit of hell's pleasures" (43). Augustine's musings over the sinfulness of adolescent sexuality are important not only because Joyce clearly would have been familiar with them, but also because Stephen would have been. Augustine never stands more clearly as a predecessor of Stephen than when describes his reaction to his developing sexuality:

> Bodily desire, like a morass, and adolescent sex welling up within me exuded mists which clouded over and obscured my heart, so that I could not distinguish the clear light of true love from the murk of lust. (43)

Not surprisingly, this "murk of lust" leads Augustine into the company of prostitutes, whereupon he reaches a low point of sinfulness, appropriately enough "in that sixteenth year of my life" (44). (Note that Stephen's pivotal confession in *Portrait* occurs when he is sixteen.) Meanwhile, the young Augustine's father's financial circumstances have deteriorated to a point that "obliged me to leave school and live idly at home with my parents" (45).

Many other specific parallels between *Portrait* and the *Confessions* can be cited, but for my purposes the crucial moment for comparison comes when both the teenage Augustine and the teenage Stephen attempt to escape from sin by turning to God. Here the similarities between Augustine's career and that of Stephen come to an end. Augustine's decision to turn to the Church involves, among other things, a rejection of his early

efforts at writing poetry and of literature in general, since it averts the attentions of men from their true calling, which is to love God: "What can be more pitiful than an unhappy wretch unaware of his own sorry state, bewailing the fate of Dido, who died for love of Aeneas, yet shedding no tears for himself as he dies for want of loving you?" (33-4). Augustine's conversion to Christianity is complete. It presumably results in a new birth, and we are reminded throughout the *Confessions* that Augustine is no longer the sinner whose debauches he relates in the book. He has effected a clean break with the past and, through the transcendent grace of God, he is no longer to be held responsible for his former actions.

Augustine has apparently awakened from the nightmare of history, escaping both temporality and contingency through his religious conversion. And the specific nature of his awakening is highly significant. He hears a child's voice crying "Take it and read," which he interprets as a divine command to "open my book of Scripture and read the first passage on which my eyes should fall" (177). He does so, and the verse so found turns out to be Romans 13:13, 14:

> Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, arm yourselves with the Lord Jesus Christ; spend no more thought on nature and nature's appetites. (Quoted 178)

A more apt command to turn away from his former life could never be found, and so Augustine turns away from his sinful past and is saved. What is especially significant about this passage is the way that it resonates with an earlier one in the same *Confessions*. In this earlier passage, the young Augustine is given advice by a learned doctor:

> He said that people sometimes opened a book of poetry at random, and although the poet had been thinking, as he wrote, of some quite different matter, it often happened that the reader placed his finger on a verse which had remarkable bearing on his problem. . . . If so, it would be due to chance not to skill. (74)

In this extremely rich passage, Augustine offers, among other things, a description of the experience I have referred to in relation to the reading of Joyce as serendipitous intertextuality--in which the reader of Joyce discovers all sorts of astonishingly apt intertextual connections that go far beyond any question of authorial intention on the part of either Joyce or the author of the intertext. In this sense, the reader of Joyce undergoes an experience analogous to contingency of history. In contrast, Augustine discounts the significance of such connections, arguing that they mean nothing. Yet when he himself performs exactly the same action in his reading of scripture, he finds the appropriateness of the passage to which he turns so significant that it changes his entire life. The difference, of course, is God. Augustine's reading (like history, in his view) is directed by God, determined by divine providence. Augustine himself clearly considers this fact so obvious that he does not bother to even comment upon the apparent intratextual dialogue between these two instances of serendipitous reading. To Augustine there *is* no intratextual dialogue. The first reading is a matter of literature, the second of religion. The intervention of God effects a fundamental rupture in the flow of history (and in the flow of Augustine's text), making the past no longer relevant to the present.

But to Joyce no such ruptures are possible, and in *Portrait* religion and literature are inseparable, especially in the mind of Stephen himself. Read through the optic of Joyce, Augustine's second instance of serendipitous reading adds new significance to the first, while the first undercuts and ironizes the second. The result is an ongoing and unstable dialogue no final resolution of which is possible or desirable. Meanwhile the complete efficacy of conversion in Augustine highlights the radical lack of such a conversion in Joyce. Stephen's turn to religion fails because such an attempt at escape through transcendence *must* fail in Joyce's universe. And Joyce never leaves any room for doubt that Stephen's attempts at transcendence through art will fail as well--thus Kenner's emphasis on the fact that Stephen is Icarus, not Daedalus: "It seems clear that Joyce sees Stephen as a lad who is going to fall, not as a chrysalis from which the author himself is about to wing forth" ("Cubist" 177). The implication of Joyce's denial of conversion in terms of his view of history is clear: if we can never be "born again" in such a way as to make the past irrelevant, then we must always face the past and always take responsibility for our past actions, even if this responsibility involves a repudiation of those actions. This view of history is thoroughly inscribed in Joyce's texts, where subsequent developments never render earlier events moot, regardless of how violently they may contradict those earlier events. Joyce's texts conduct an ongoing intratextual dialogue with themselves, continually reactivating and reaccenting previous passages in the same way that ongoing historical events continually cast new light on previous events without rendering those events irrelevant.

But there is much more at stake here than an abstract meditation on narrative models for history. Within the context of his Irish Catholic background, Joyce's challenge to the Augustinian notion of the conversion experience also represents an attack on the authority of the Church and thus on the fundamental underpinnings of the power structure of Irish society. Moreover, Joyce's skeptical attitude toward conversion again participates in an even more specific political dialogue with the Irish nationalist movement. Watson points out the way in which the vision of Irish history espoused by the nationalist movement, as exemplified by Yeats' *Cathleen ni Houlihan*, involved a central "reliance on an enabling fiction of sudden metamorphosis, or transfiguration" (52). Watson notes the way in which Joyce, particularly through the bizarre transmogrifications of "Circe," mocks this notion of transfiguration, but I would suggest that the intertextual disjuncture between the conversion of Augustine in the *Confessions* and that of Stephen in *Portrait* provides a powerful commentary on this aspect of Irish nationalism as well. The dreariness of Irish history is not to be escaped through the transcendence of sudden magical salvation, but through specific real-world political action aimed at the underlying causes of that dreariness.

This view of history is thoroughly implicated in Joyce's view of authorship and in the related question of subjectivity. I will discuss in more detail in the following chapters the intense mutual involvement of Joyce's views on history and on subjectivity. For now let me focus on the paradox of the origin of the work of art, as described above. Clearly, within a worldview such as that espoused by Augustine, there *is* no paradox. All creation comes from God, and the author merely acts as a

sort of conduit--he makes it clear throughout the *Confessions* that God is the ultimate source, as well as the object, of all of his meditations. To the questions of *God's* origin, Augustine offers no answer, and indeed clearly feels that such questions are simply beyond the limitations of human understanding and can thus safely be ignored. For all practical purposes God was simply always there and always will be.

This view of the artist as conduit is thoroughly inscribed in medieval notions of authorship. In this view, even writers of secular poetry, who may not be working under the direct influence of divine inspiration, are still viewed as conduits, this time from their pre-existing source materials in other literary works. A. C. Spearing notes that medieval poets "assume that the poet's role will not be that of a creator or inventor. He will begin with a pre-existing *materia*, and his task will be to re-present and reinterpret that *materia* for the benefit of his audience. . . . poetry is less a matter of inspiration than of craftsmanship" (74). The similarities between this model of authorship and the poetics of appropriation practiced by Joyce are quite obvious. Indeed, this notion of the artist as craftsman rather than inventor resonates in a number of interesting ways with the widely promulgated picture of the distant modernist artist, emphasizing technique rather than expression of personal emotion.

In this medieval model of authorship (which largely became the Renaissance model as well), artistic creation arises from repetition of previous works of art. Or, as Terence Cave notes in his extremely suggestive treatment of Erasmus, "the discussion of *copia rerum* culminates in a method for 'imitation' . . . where it is not reality that

is imitated, but other writers; not ideas, but texts" (19). The resultant extreme textuality of medieval and early Renaissance works leads (not surprisingly) to frequent intertextual connections among various works, as demonstrated perhaps most clearly in the phenomenon of the medieval gloss. The apparently serendipitous way in which these connections often occurred inheres in the concept of "juxtology" that R. A. Shoaf has seen to inform the practice of many medieval poets ("Play" 45). But, as Augustine's example shows, these connections are felt not to be coincidental, but to be authorized by divine providence, as in John 3:8: "the Spirit blows where it will, and you hear its voice, but you do not know whence it comes or where it goes."

Shoaf suggests that the principle of the juxtological methods through which diverse concepts are linked together in medieval texts is primarily a linguistic one, based on a recognition that language itself is "in charge" and that "words yoke themselves together, and together with things, in the most unpredictable ways" ("Play" 45). Shoaf further supports this rather Joycean notion with a discussion of the use of puns by Chaucer, Langland, and the *Gawain*-poet. Elsewhere, he describes juxtology in even more strikingly Joycean terms:

> Juxtology emerges from the ancient epistemology of knowledge by contraries and pursues, by comparisons--be they of thinkers and their ideas or of the minutest items of a text, syllables and even individual letters--the aleatory juxtapositions of minds or of sounds that produce the phenomena of meanings. ("Studies" 23)

It would be difficult to describe the workings of Joyce's texts (especially *Finnegans Wake*) any better, and Jonathan Culler, in fact, refers to Shoaf's work in calling Joyce the "supreme juxtologist" (9).

But similarities between medieval thought and the work of Joyce should surprise no one. After all, as Shaun complains of his brother Shem the Penman, Joyce's major representative in the *Wake*: "He's weird, I tell you, and middayevil down to his vegetable soul" (423.27-8). Umberto Eco presents an extensive and enlightening discussion of the affinities between the work of Joyce and various medieval thinkers, suggesting that the medieval view of the world as a chain of relationships

> generates the grid of allusions in *Ulysses* and the system of puns in *Finnegans Wake*. Every word embodies every other because language is a self-reflecting world. . . . If you take away the transcendent God from the symbolic world of the Middle Ages, you have the world of Joyce. (7)

Eco's insight here is impeccable, and I can think of no better succinct summary of the worldview embodied in Joyce's texts than this last sentence. Still, taking away the "transcendent God" from the Middle Ages is a very large and significant step, and one that radically redefines the implications of almost all of the medieval techniques that Joyce employs. To medieval poets language may be in charge, but God is in charge of language. To Joyce language is in charge, period. Thus, the emphasis on imitation and repetition in Joyce arises not from a recognition that only God can truly create but from a recognition that the author must work with an inherited language that has been used before in other contexts and that traces of these contexts remain even when the words are re-used in new contexts that are radically different from the former ones. This difference is a crucial one. The Augustinian author, working under the auspices of God, is authorized in his appropriation of source materials by the Pauline pronouncement that "whatever was written

in former days was written for our instruction, that by steadfastness and by the encouragement of the scriptures we might have hope" (Romans 15.4). As a result, just as Augustine's conversion allowed a clean break with the past, so too does divine intervention allow a clean break with any contextual resonances of prior language use (particularly in pagan texts) that might complicate the meaning of the text at hand. Language, brought into the Christian text, is purified of its prior non-Christian uses, undergoing the same kind of conversion as Augustine.

On the other hand, when the author is working with certain Christian sources (particularly sacred texts), no such conversion is required. The context of the original work can then be adopted *in toto* without conversion or reaccentuation. This is the mode of religious appropriation that figures in *Portrait* in the boys' mindless repetition of the priest's prayer (135). But in either form of medieval Christian appropriation, there is no dialogic relation between the new context and the old--either the old one is accepted unquestioningly, or it is ignored entirely. This all or nothing attitude in the Christian appropriation of textual models can easily be recognized as the mode in which Stephen Dedalus interacts (or fails to interact) with his own subjective models, which is not surprising--in Joyce texts and human subjects are constituted by the same processes.

Thus the medieval Catholic model of appropriation is also the one that Stephen employs in his own artistic use of source materials. As a result, his aesthetics can be based on Aquinas even though Thomistic philosophy preserves a dominant place for the God that Stephen rejects. Stephen, turning the Christian model of appropriation of source materials

against itself, thus ignores the Christian echoes in his secular texts rather than *vice versa*.

The perceived ability to use source materials independent of any dialogue with their contextual connotations (a perception that Joyce will show to be a delusion) gives Stephen (and other Augustinian authors) a great deal of freedom to manipulate those materials. Thus Stephen explains his appropriation of the ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas:

> I need them only for my own use and guidance until I have done something for myself by their light. If the lamp smokes or smells I shall try to trim it. If it does not give light enough I shall sell it and buy another. (187)

This key passage vividly describes the technique through which Stephen (like Joyce) builds his art not by creation *ex nihilo*, but through transformation of pre-existing materials. But it also shows that Stephen (unlike Joyce) believes that he can use words and ideas like static objects, ignoring the resonances of their past use, deforming them as he sees fit, and discarding them entirely whenever he chooses. As a result, his appropriated theories tend to take on a patchwork quality and to lack coherence.

Medieval writers felt similarly authorized to modify their secular source materials to fit the task at hand, though in this case coherence is assured because the centering concept of God ties everything together. Thus medieval imitation is not *just* repetition:

> Imitation theory is more complex in that it recognizes the extent to which the production of any discourse is conditioned by pre-existing instances of discourse; the writer is always a rewriter, the problem then being to differentiate and authenticate the rewriting. This is executed not by the addition of something wholly new, but by the

> dismembering and reconstruction of what has already been written. (Cave 76)

The violence of Cave's metaphor is, I think, significant. Erasmus himself refers to repetition without variation as a "great evil" that can be avoided by acquiring "the facility of changing the same thought (*sententiam*) into more forms than Proteus himself is said to have transformed himself" (Quoted in Cave 23).

Without God as authority, Stephen's belief in his total dominion over his source materials can have only one source--the myth of the romantic artist as creator. This contradictory view is central to his art--he thoroughly believes in originality, but is never original. The similarity in Stephen's view that he need not consider the dialogic implications of his appropriations highlights the central way in which the medieval and romantic views of authorship are (like all apparent polar opposites) in fact quite similar. They are both, after all, ultimately based on the theological notion of an originating creator. It comes as no surprise that Abrams can see Augustine as a clear predecessor of Wordsworth, and Abrams' central insight that romanticism was largely a secularized version of Christianity (with God replaced by the human subject) seems to be particularly sound when viewed in the light of these parallel attitudes toward source materials.

The Protean ability to transform source materials cited by Erasmus is perhaps *the* founding trope of the Joycean text. Not only does Joyce reprise and re-energize *materia* from texts by previous authors, but he also does the same to previous portions of his own texts. But Joyce, *by definition*, never fails to consider the implications of his re-use of

previous materials. He has no choice. Without either God or the romantic artist as an authority who can somehow overrule the workings of language, the contextual implications of former uses will resound within language itself whether the author likes it or not. Of course, *all* texts, whether authored by Joyce, or Stephen, or Augustine, resound with the traces of the former uses of the language that they employ. What makes Joyce's texts particularly representative of this effect is simply that they make explicit what might in other texts remain implicit.[25]

Derrida has suggested that this phenomenon is the distinguishing feature of a "text" as opposed to a "book"--"the destruction of the book, as it is now under way in all domains, denudes the surface of the text" (*Grammatology* 18). Indeed, Joyce's insight that writing does not involve the creation of new meaning, but merely the assembly of pre-existing meanings is highly reminiscent of the work of Derrida, as well as that of Bakhtin, Barthes, Macherey, Kristeva, and others. In this vein, Derrida speaks of the way in which his own texts are quite literally "assembled":

> I insist on the word "assemblage" here . . . The word "assemblage" seems more apt for suggesting that the kind of bringing-together proposed here has the structure of an interlacing, a weaving, or a web, which would allow different threads and different lines of sense or force to bring others together. (*Speech* 132)

Derrida's suggestion that his writing be considered assemblage brings to mind a statement made by a certain "James Joyce," who appears as a character in Flann O'Brien's *The Dalkey Archive*, and who notes that, in his own case: "Writing is not quite the word. Assembly, perhaps, is better---or accretion" (145). This "James Joyce" is a fictional character, not *the* James Joyce, but the composition practice described

sounds suspiciously familiar. Joyce himself once declared (in a letter to George Antheil, January 3, 1931) that he was "quite content to go down to posterity as a scissors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description" (*Letters* 297).

Joyce's texts (particularly *Finnegans Wake*) demonstrate the "assemblage" model of textuality in exemplary fashion, as they should given the direct influence of Joyce's work on Derrida's thought.[26] Derrida's comments on intertextuality are also highly reminiscent of the thought of Bakhtin. However (and this point cannot be overemphasized), the extra element of discursive engagement in Bakhtin's thought provides a crucial corrective to the tendency toward viewing literature as a self-enclosed system shown by certain of Derrida's American appropriators. In Bakhtin, the linguistic traces that proliferate through the system of differences that is language always come with social and political "strings attached," and the echoes of former use always include an acknowledgement of the fact that those former uses were performed by specific human subjects in particular social and political contexts.

The controversial Indian-English novelist Salman Rushdie has emphasized the historicity and political embeddedness of language, arguing that the vestiges of empire are still to be found in the "cadences" of the English language itself. On the other hand, he sees the political charge that inheres in language to be potentially energizing. Citing the great Irish writers Joyce, Beckett, and O'Brien as predecessors, he argues that much "vitality and excitement" can be derived from attempts to "decolonize" the language, citing a number of contemporary writers such as Chinua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong'o who are

resisting the history of imperialism that inheres within the language by "busily forging English into new shapes":

> But of course a good deal more than formal, stylistic alteration is going on in this new fiction. And perhaps above all, what is going on is politics. . . . There are very few major writers in the new English literatures who do not place politics at the very centre of their art. (8)

Stephen's fascination with the sounds of words points toward the Derridean notion that the traces that inhere in words and provide links between them are often phonic ones. But *Portrait* also points toward a Bakhtinian recognition of the political implications of these traces as well. Rushdie's emphasis on the particular positioning of the former colonial within the English language recalls in a very direct way the famous passage in *Portrait* in which Stephen becomes intensely aware of the political orientation of language, comparing his own speech to that of the English dean of studies:

> The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words *home*, *Christ*, *ale*, *master*, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. (189, Joyce's emphases)[27]

One could see the radical linguistic experimentation of *Finnegans Wake* as Joyce's attempt to engage in a dialogue with the echoes of colonization embedded in the English language through its relation to British imperial history. Derrida reads the language of the *Wake* as a sort of allegory of resistance to linguistic imperialism in very much the mode that Rushdie describes as "decolonization." Derrida notes the Babelian multilingualism of the *Wake* and suggests that the interaction of

English as the dominant language in the text with the other secondary languages in the same text is a mirror of the sort of imperialism that England imposed on Ireland:

> English tries to erase the other language or languages, to colonize them, to domesticate them, to present them for reading from only one angle. But one must also read the resistance to this commonwealth, not only pronounce oneself but also write oneself against it. Against Him. And this is indeed what happens. Between islands of language, across each island. Ireland and England would be only emblems of this. What matters is the contamination of the master by the language he claims to subjugate, on which he has declared war. ("Two Words" 156)

Joyce's profound appreciation for the importance of the traces of former usage that inhere in language is largely responsible for the richness of his texts, resulting in complex multi-level dialogues even in apparently innocuous uses of language. Consider, for example, Stephen's repeated musings on the sounds of the cricket bats at Clongowes Wood: "In the soft grey silence he could hear the bump of the balls: and from here and from there through the quiet air the sound of the cricket bats: pick, pack, pock, puck: like drops of water in a fountain falling softly in the brimming bowl" (59). This passage nicely illustrates the textual density that Joyce achieves by careful use of the traces that inhere in language. Immediately one sees here Joyce's characteristically palinodic mode of narration (it is silent, yet Stephen hears the bats), as well as Stephen's usual fascination with the sounds of onomatopoeic words. But this is only the beginning of a rich and complex chain of associations. For one thing, this passage repeats, in different form, an earlier one: "And from here and there came the sounds of the cricketbats through the soft grey air. They said: pick, pack, pock, puck: like drops of water in

a fountain slowly falling in the brimming bowl" (41). Kershner points out that the earlier passage can be recuperated as external narrative comment, but that the later one seems to arise from the mind of Stephen (*Joyce* 161). This change calls attention to the dialogic interaction between the voice of Stephen and the narrative voice that characterizes all of *Portrait*. In fact, the shift in voice between the two passages parallels the movement from third-person to first-person narration of *Portrait* as a whole.[28]

The unusual language of this passage represents a moment of textual strangeness that points to outside discursive influences, particularly literary ones. Kershner suggests that the peculiar phrasing of this passage arises from "the language of his own future consciousness, which is to be formed in part by the 'subversive authors' from whom his verbal style will derive" (161). This insight is a good one, and illustrates the dialogic way in which Stephen's past and future selves interact, again undercutting the Augustinian notion of conversion, of radical separation between past and present selves. But language in Joyce arises from many sources, and this literary influence on young Stephen's language is immediately exposed to a more prosaic context as Uncle Charles smokes his pipe in the jakes on the very next page: "While he smoked the *brim* of his tall hat and the *bowl* of his pipe were just visible beyond the jambs of the outhouse door" (60, my emphases). Clearly, the language of the previous page is still lingering in the air around this passage (perhaps much like the smoke from Charles' pipe or the later more earthy rising smell of Leopold Bloom), affecting the

ongoing narrative, which in turn ironizes the formerly literary language by means of the new outhouse context.

Interestingly, this passage featuring Uncle Charles is the very one from which Hugh Kenner derives his name for the way in which the narration of Joyce's texts often takes on qualities of the speech of the individual characters being discussed--the "Uncle Charles Principle" (*Voices* 18). This principle is closely related to the concept of the "character zone" as put forth by Bakhtin, and defined as "the field of action for a character's voice, encroaching in one way or another upon the author's voice" (*Dialogic* 316). Bakhtin's concept, however, is somewhat more theoretically sophisticated than Kenner's, preserving as it does more of an interaction between the voices of character and narrator. But the above intrusion of a voice from Stephen's description of the cricketbats into the presentation of Uncle Charles smoking illustrates how extremely complex the narrative voice can be in Joyce. At any given moment, any number of voices may be contributing to the narration, including a narrator figure, one or more characters, and a variety of other textual and intertextual forces.[29] At a given moment, Uncle Charles, or Stephen or someone else may heavily influence the character of the narration, but there is never any single voice that is *in control* of the narration, which itself remains highly decentered and avoids recuperation as the intentional expression of any one originating subject.[30]

The sound of the cricketbats at Clongowes also both anticipates and recalls the sound of Father Dolan's pandybat, which makes its ignominious appearance on pages 48-51, between the iterated "pick, pock" passages.

Indeed, the intervening pandying contributes greatly to the reaccentuation of the sound of the cricketbats from one occurrence to the next, adding an ominous dimension. This dimension is further reinforced by the way in which this passage links to that later one in the "Nestor" chapter of *Ulysses* in which Stephen, now a teacher, again overhears the playing of schoolboys: "Jousts. Time shocked rebounds, shock by shock. Jousts, slush and uproar of battles, the frozen deathspew of the slain, a shout of spearspikes baited with men's bloodied guts" (27).

Besides demonstrating the growing morbidity of Stephen's imagination, this passage forges a clear connection between the forms of games played by schoolboys and forms of games played by their elders: "The boys are playing a game, but Stephen's association makes it appear as a kind of practice for real combat. This sort of training will prepare them to be good soldiers" (Schneider 52). Thus the earlier drops of water become drops of blood, and the discourses of history (particularly of militarism) are introduced into Stephen's apparently innocent musings on the cricket game. Escapist activities such as game playing cannot, in the final analysis, save us from the necessity of confronting history.

The picture of a fountain of blood rather than water also evokes Christianity again, as well as the Irish nationalist cult of blood sacrifice. Textually, the fountain imagined by Stephen thus becomes linked to the ciborium that comes to Stephen later in *Portrait* (146), to the broken chalice of Father Flynn back in "The Sisters," and so on. Introducing Christianity into this swirl of discourses implies that

religion, like cricket, is a game, but that it is a game of cruelty and death with serious (and bloody) implications for history.

The bloody images in "Nestor" show the dangerous ramifications of the discourses of religion and militarism (which are not, to Joyce, ultimately very different). But Joyce's conflation of these highly "serious" discourses with the discourse of children's games highlights their fatuousness as well. This carnivalesque juxtaposition of images of play with images of high seriousness is emphasized by the way in which the "bump of the balls" links forward in *Portrait* to the physics teacher's reference to the billiard player of Gilbert's *Mikado*, who is forced to play with elliptical billiard balls" (192). Moynihan's immediate irreverent exclamation "What price ellipsoidal balls!" introduces a sexual pun into the equation that further carnivalizes the "pick, pock" passage. Moreover, the link to the *Mikado* itself has further ramifications. In the first act of Gilbert's play, the three sisters Yum-Yum, Pitti-Sing, and Peep-Bo intone:

> Three little maids from school are we,
> Pert as a school-girl well can be,
> Filled to the *brim* with girlish glee,
> Three little maids from school! (356, my emphasis)

The carnivalesque conflation that thus occurs between school*girls* and school*boys* represents another instance of the problematization of gender boundaries that so often functions in Joyce as a central means of undermining monologic discourse. Further, the traditional recognition of the chalice as a vaginal symbol, combined with Moynihan's invocation of balls as testicles, results in a highly obscene con-notation of the significance of the girls (Oriental girls, no less--with the usual hint

of sexuality associated with the East) who are filled to the brim. As Bakhtin has shown in his treatment of Rabelais, such obscenities can be powerfully subversive of the solemnities of authoritarian discourse. Further, the implied relationship among sexuality, militarism, and religion is strong, and one that has been pointed out many times.

This relationship is also placed directly in the context of Irish life. In particular, a Gilbert and Sullivan opera represents a quintessentially British entertainment, just as the cricket field of a boys' school is the very embodiment of Britishness. The projection of these associations onto an *Irish* boys' school echoes the British imperial domination of Ireland. The idyllic playfield thus becomes sinister, indeed--not only are the boys being trained to be soldiers, but they are being trained to be *British* soldiers, being indoctrinated by their oppressors to serve in the interest of their own oppression.[31]

Clearly, a consideration of the implications of the various intertextual connections that emanate from the Joycean text results in a model of reading that exceeds any possible notion of authorial intention. Just as this mode of reading leaves us with a decentered narrative voice, it also leaves us with an extremely decentered notion of authorship, in which meaning arises through the intersection (and perhaps conflict) of a whole variety of discourses. Joyce's productive dialogue with his source materials provides a powerful critique of the theological notion of authorship (whether Christian or Romantic) while at the same time offering an alternative: authorship arises from the intertextual field of pre-existing discourse. The author then becomes not a God-like originator, but a discursive position, a point of intersection of the

various discourses that go into the construction of his text.[32] This model of creation also offers a potential solution to the paradox of the artist who both creates and is simultaneously created by his own work. The aporia of creation *ex nihilo* never occurs, because writing never arises *ex nihilo*; it is always already inscribed in the discursive conventions of the other writing that came before. Rather than creating (and being created) from nothing, the artist incrementally adjusts his developing identity through reflection from the mirror of his art, even as the art that he produces gradually changes in the wake of his evolving identity. This change in his art produces a further change in the artist's vision of himself, which further changes the kind of art that he is able to produce, which further alters his identity in a continuing loop of feedback and evolutionary adjustment.

It is important to recognize, however, that this "feedback loop" does not represent a solipsistic one-to-one interaction between the artist and his own creation. Because of the dialogic nature of language itself, the author's interaction with his own productions inherently involves an interaction with other texts as well, and particularly with the discursive conventions in which those texts are inscribed. Moreover, this kind of dialogue cannot be limited to literature, or even to written texts. The traces of former use that are carried in the author's words bear specific political and ideological connotations that initiate a dialogue with the "real" world as well.

This dialogic model of authorship is diametrically opposed to Stephen's attempts to develop a vision of himself as transcendent artist, abstracted from the squalor of his Dublin surroundings through the power

of his art. Joyce's art is characterized not by transcendence but by a radical immanence, and it is clear in *Portrait* as in all of Joyce's work that neither art nor the artist can ever be autonomous, sealed off from the real world. Stephen, in his efforts at envisionment, rejects his schoolmates, his father, his priests, the Church, the physical reality of women, and the real world nightmare of history. But all of those influences contribute greatly to his developing self-image, even if only as representations of attributes that he seeks to exclude from his own envisionment. He does not transcend his Dublin environment at all, but instead is powerfully constituted by it. After all, he cannot form an image of himself as transgressive Byronic artist without Byron as model and without something to transgress *against*. The fabulous artificer Daedalus is made all the more effective as an object of identification by Stephen's rejection of his real-world father, and Stephen's image of himself as a "priest of the eternal imagination" is a direct re-accentuation of his rejected image of himself as a priest of the Church.

Despite (and because of) his own efforts at transcendence, Stephen stands as a striking reminder that transcendence is impossible. The Joycean subject is constituted in and by language, a suggestion with which Stephen could no doubt agree. But to Stephen language represents a potential means of escape from reality, while to Joyce language itself is profoundly historical and thoroughly embedded in the real world of history. As a result, history, language, and subjectivity are all implicated in the same processes.

Notes

[1]This fact may be a telling one. Note William Spanos' argument that the privileging of the plastic and visual arts, especially by the new critics, demonstrates an attempt to escape from the existential contingency of history that is implied by the inherent temporality of language ("Modern" 88-9).

[2]Wilde's work informs that of Joyce in a number of ways. Kenner suggests that the name "Stephen Dedalus" was inspired by Wilde's sometime pseudonym, Sebastian Melmoth, implying that in some ways Stephen is as much a figure of Wilde as of Joyce ("Cubist" 175-6). Meanwhile, Kershner shows that Stephen's own portrait of the artist, in the "Scylla and Charybdis" chapter of *Ulysses*, echoes Wilde in important ways ("Artist"). For some other parallels between *Portrait* and *Dorian Gray*, see Manganiello ("Through").

[3]The "contamination" referred to in relation to Eileen is the fact that Eileen's Protestant background will interfere with Stephen's puerile plans to marry her.

[4]Parnell died on October 6, 1891, which is eighty days before Christmas. However, the body was not brought back to Ireland, where it lay in state, until October 11, seventy-five days before Christmas. Joyce has been careful to tell us, in showing Stephen count the days, that it is now seventy-five days before Christmas vacation. The evening before going to the infirmary, Stephen changes his "countdown" to seventy-six (15). Assuming that the students at Clongowes Wood would go home for Christmas at least a day or two before the actual holiday, then the dates would not match properly. However, this is the sort of mathematical miscue for which Joyce is notorious--see, for example, McCarthy's discussion of mathematical errors in the "Ithaca" chapter of *Ulysses* ("Joyce's"). On the other hand, it is not certain from the text that the year in which Stephen lies in the infirmary is in fact 1891.

[5]As is often the case, the young Stephen here reflects a quality of the young Joyce, who apparently also identified himself as Parnell. As Ellmann puts it, "Most young men fancy themselves as Hamlets; Joyce, as later hints make clear, fancied himself as Parnell" (James Joyce 32). Stephen, of course, master of envisionment that he is, fancies himself as *both* Hamlet *and* Parnell.

[6]Stephen's fantasy about women's undergarments is typically ambivalent. Despite his fascination with such things, he notes the surprisingly "brittle texture of a woman's stocking," relating that to his earlier surprise that horses' harnesses were of greasy leather rather than of silk. In short, he shows the disgust with the physical world that makes it possible for him to at least consider the priesthood as an option.

[7]In *Stephen Hero* this reference to Stephen's aesthetics as "applied Aquinas" is made directly by the narrator, in a mode that clearly links this suggestion to Stephen's own attitude (77).

[8]Homer Brown notes the "exotic Oriental motif" of *Dubliners* (42). This motif runs throughout Joyce's work. For a treatment of Joyce's symbolic use of Oriental motifs in *Ulysses*, see Kershner ("*Ulysses*").

[9]Among other things, this characterization would make Satan a central figure of subjectivity per Lacan's model (Satan's fall being consistent with the loss associated with "castration" in Lacan), while making Adam and Eve representatives of a Bakhtinian mode of subjectivity.

[10]Moreover, Stephen likes the *idea* of sacrifice better than sacrifice itself. He apparently envisions his self-imposed exile as a noble gesture, but it clearly entails an escape from the sacrifices that might be associated with his responsibilities (familial and otherwise) on the home front. Compare the ambivalence of Robert Hand's description of the exile of Richard Rowan in *Exiles* (99).

[11]The link between this cult of self-sacrifice and Christ as a figure of sacrifice is quite direct. For example, note Jim Connolly's pronouncement in the *Irish Worker* of February 5, 1916: "Without the slightest trace of irreverence but in all due humility and awe, we recognise that of us, as of mankind before Calvary, it may truly be said 'without the shedding of blood there is no redemption'" (quoted in MacCabe 169).

[12]See Mahaffey for an interesting suggestion that Joyce's conflation of God and devil also has literary implications, involving "the classical and the Romantic tempers, which Joyce associates with Christ and Lucifer, respectively. Joyce's presentation of these tendencies as fundamentally identical, their apparent differences merely differences in accent, disrupts the simplicity of the more familiar accounts of their antithetical relationship" (85). As usual, though, Joyce's mature insight is not shared by Stephen, who (in typical Stephen fashion) privileges the classical even while himself seeming to embody the Romantic. Stephen's privileging of the classical is especially clear in the essay he constructs in *Stephen Hero* (78-9), which echoes an early essay written by Joyce on James Clarence Mangan (*Critical* 73-83).

[13]For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche and other philosophical predecessors of Joyce's attacks on noncontradiction, see my argument elsewhere ("Western").

[14]This passage also evokes that favorite Joycean deconstructive motif, the conflation of "god" with "dog."

[15]Even "real" comrades such as Cranly and E. C. are often represented by Stephen as if they were his own linguistic constructs.

[16]In this light, the anti-Semitism of the Irish "chosen race" resonates in interesting ways with the anti-Semitism of that later chosen people, the master race of Nazi Germany. Clearly, it is difficult for two different chosen peoples to co-exist in the same space.

[17]Also, even if one is racially "pure," it is not at all clear which race is "Irish," as shown by the Milesian-Firbolg dichotomy, which is invoked in *Portrait* by Stephen's characterization of Thomas Moore as "a Firbolg in the cloak of a Milesian" (180).

[18]In *Stephen Hero*, Stephen mulls over this dichotomy quite explicitly: "He toyed also with a theory of dualism which would symbolise the twin eternities of spirit and nature in the twin eternities of male and female" (210).

[19]There is, however, an attempt on Stephen's part to "derealize" her, as seen in the movement from *Stephen Hero*, where she is directly named as "Emma Clery," to *Portrait*, where her presence is much less concrete and where Stephen refers to her only by her initials. This removal of Emma's name has enough implications (particularly Lacanian ones) to form a whole subject of study in itself.

[20]Huyssen sees modernism as being characterized by such an elitist aestheticism, suggesting that the repudiation of low art "has always been one of the constitutive features of a modernist aesthetic intent on distancing itself and its products from the trivialities and banalities of everyday life." Further, Huyssen suggests that, for the modernist artist, this repudiated mass culture is directly associated with the feminine (47). Huyssen unfortunately includes Joyce in the list of modernist artists who can be so characterized, apparently confusing (as have so many others) Joyce with Stephen Dedalus.

[21]Contrast the more realistic acknowledgement by Richard Rowan in *Exiles* that the artist cannot in fact create himself *ex nihilo*: "I did not make myself. I am what I am" (103). On the other hand, Rowan's statement here seems to indicate a passivity and lack of responsibility that has its own difficulties and must be taken in context. Elsewhere, for example, he declares (à la Stephen) that "I don't take my ideas from other people" (53). Joyce's attitude, I would suggest, lies between these two poles. As usual, in Joyce extremes meet.

[22]Joyce's frequent blurring of gender boundaries also speaks to the Lacanian notion that the assumption of a fixed gender identity is necessary in order to assume any subjective position at all. Thus, by attacking the notion that gender boundaries are entirely stable, Joyce suggests a more fluid and continuing notion of subjectivity, as I noted earlier.

[23]This motif is reinforced by Stephen's association of Mr Gleeson with Boyle's nail paring as well (45).

[24]This paradox suggests the typical *mise en abyme* image of mirrors reflected in mirrors, leading to an infinite regression of images. One might compare here Schlegel's depiction of poetry as ideally hanging in suspension midway between the poem's subject and the poet, who forever reflects on what has been reflected and is thereby multiplied endlessly in a series of mirrors.

[25]Of course, medieval and early Renaissance texts often showed a much more complex relationship to their source materials than the non-dialogic model I have described. Bakhtin's work on Rabelais provides an obvious example. Another can be found in the highly dialogic texts of Chaucer. As I have describe elsewhere within a Bakhtinian framework, Chaucer's textual practices have much in common with those of Joyce ("Postmodernism").

[26]The *Wake*, in fact, extends the notion that all words in a language are connected even further, suggesting in its many multilingual portmanteaux that all of the words of *all* languages are connected. For a treatment of Joyce's influence on and affinities with Derrida, see my argument elsewhere ("Western"). The parallel between Derrida's notions of textuality and certain medieval notions is also significant. See Shoaf on the resonances between the thought of Derrida and the work of many medieval writers ("Medieval").

[27]This emphasis on the political investedness of language extends to Stephen's encounters with religion as well. Kershner notes that Stephen's "relationship with the church is a linguistic affair . . . His religious crisis thus appears a clear case of possession by liturgical language" (*Joyce* 162).

[28]Noting the movement from first-person to third-person narration in *Turpin Hero*, an important original model for *Stephen Hero*, MacCabe suggests that the reversal of this movement in *Portrait* is highly significant, showing a tendency toward "dissolving narrative into discourse" (62).

[29]Along these lines Shari and Bernard Benstock suggest their own "Benstock Principle" which generalizes Kenner's analysis to allow the narrative voice in *Ulysses* to include inanimate objects, mechanical and organic processes, and so on as well as characters: "Fictional texts that exploit free indirect speech (the narrational mode most common to *Ulysses*) establish the contextual supremacy of subject matter, which influences the direction, tone, pace, point of view, and method of narration" (18). The Benstocks do not, however, appear to grant sufficient importance to the intrusion of voices from outside the text, such as stylistic echoes of other authors or specific genres.

[30]This phenomenon is similar to MacCabe's argument that in Joyce's text there is no meta-language that subsumes and dominates all of the other many languages that sound in the text: "Joyce's texts . . . lack any final and privileged discourse within them which dominates the others through its claim of access to the real" (27).

[31]One might compare this passage to the very different symbolic significance given to the sound of a cricket bat in Tom Stoppard's play *The Real Thing*. Here, the sweet sound of a solid hit with the cricket bat is likened to the affect achieved by a writer who achieves precisely the right expression of an idea (51). Here, the sound of the cricket bat results almost in a sort of epiphany, in a transcendence that is very foreign to Joyce's project, and the suggestion that words can ever achieve an expression of the "truth" is quite different from Joyce's view of language.

[32]This model of authorship participates in an obvious way in the more contemporary discussions of figures such as Barthes and Foucault, as I will discuss further in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 5
"A PROBAPOSSIBLE PROLEGOMENA TO IDEARREAL HISTORY": THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF HISTORY IN *ULYSSES* AND *FINNEGANS WAKE*

In Joyce's later work the link between the formal properties of his texts and the associated models of history and of subjectivity is increasingly foregrounded. Moreover, beyond these sorts of implications by form, history and subjectivity are themselves directly treated as subject matter in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. For example, according to the "Handlist" compiled by Steppe and Gabler, the word "history" (in various grammatical forms) occurs forty-six times in the Gabler edition of *Ulysses*, while Hart's concordance to *Finnegans Wake* lists approximately forty-seven such occurrences. This very frequency already indicates that history itself is a major subject of inquiry in Joyce's last two major works. Moreover, one of the most striking features of both of these works is the sheer mass and diversity of real-world historical information that Joyce has imported into them. The increased openness with which these two later works posit models of history and subjectivity thus places us in a position to explore those models in greater detail than in the earlier works and to compare them with parallel theoretical developments in fields such as psychology, philosophy, science, historiography, and language theory. In this chapter, I will explore Joyce's treatment of history in his last two novels. The theme of subjectivity will be discussed in the next chapter.

"A Tale Like Any Other": Narrative and History

The topic of history takes center stage very early in *Ulysses*, where we once again encounter Stephen Dedalus, that arch-enemy of all things temporal, now employed as a teacher of (among other things) history. And we are presented within the first two chapters with no fewer than four different models of history that we can mull over. In "Nestor" Stephen reflects on Blake's poetic alternative to history and on Aristotle's notion of history as the passing of possibility into realization, potential into entelechy. But later Stephen shows a growing maturity as he rejects the vision of aesthetic escape from temporality offered by Blake. Unlike many of his contemporaries among Irish poets, Stephen refuses to "creepycrawl after Blake's buttocks into eternity" (153). Aristotle, on the other hand, functions as a sort of opposite pole to Blake, representing a view of history as concrete fact that will also be shown to be lacking in the course of the book.[1] *Ulysses* is filled to the brim with facts, but the impossibility of reducing those facts to any single interpretation dramatizes in spectacular form the insufficiency of factual information alone to characterize the flow of human history.[2]

The authority of "real" historical information in Joyce's texts is further destabilized by the fact that such information is often erroneous. Joyce makes particularly good use of anachronisms to prevent an overly comfortable realistic recuperation of his texts. For example, a prominent thread in *Ulysses* involves Deasy's letter concerning the foot and mouth disease, yet there was no outbreak of this disease in Ireland until 1912 (Gifford, "*Ulysses*" 37). There is more involved here than Deasy's stupidity--many other characters in the book grant the currency

of this problem as well. One could recuperate this anachronism as a mere mistake on the part of Joyce, but whether or not Joyce made such errors intentionally is entirely irrelevant--the effect is still to caution us not to believe too easily the other historical "facts" in *Ulysses* either. And if *Ulysses* can contain such mistakes, so can other books, even books of history. The message is clear: don't believe everything you read.[3]

Two other characters in the early pages of *Ulysses* also offer theories of history. As Stephen prepares in the Martello Tower to go off for his day of teaching, he remarks on the imperialistic domination of Ireland by both the Catholic Church and the English government. So the Englishman Haines offers a halfhearted (and condescending) "apology" for the treatment Ireland has received at the hands of his countrymen over the centuries: "We feel in England that we have treated you rather unfairly. It seems history is to blame" (17). In short, Haines denies any English responsibility for the treatment of Ireland, placing the blame instead at the doorsteps of some impersonal force called "history" which apparently pursues its inexorable course independent of human intervention.

A similar theory of history will be espoused in the "Nestor" chapter by Mr. Deasy, who announces the teleological view that "[a]ll human history moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God" (28). Deasy here, after his fashion, echoes a long-standing Christian tradition that includes Augustine's notion of God's eternal plan. But the most direct referent here would seem to be Hegel's scientific/rational version of providential history:

> That world history is governed by an absolute design, that it is a rational process--whose rationality is not that of a particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason--this is a proposition whose truth we must assume. (Hegel 28)

But this view of the divine plan behind history leads Hegel to the ethnocentric conclusion that his contemporary European culture is the culmination of that plan and to the nationalistic belief that his own Germany is supreme among the nations of the earth. The echoes here of the Irish nationalism that Joyce so opposed are clear, and it is obvious why Joyce, always sensitive to concrete political implications of abstract philosophical ideas, would make Hegel's model a target for criticism.

As Ellmann has pointed out, Haines' and Deasy's views are in a sense polar opposites, the two statements representing theories "of history as infernal and of history as divine" (*Liffey* 21). But the God-devil dichotomy, as I have already suggested, is commonly deconstructed in the work of Joyce, with both poles of the opposition being shown to amount to very much the same thing. Here both the "infernal" and the "divine" models of history are shown to be no models of history at all, but are instead means through which their authors seek to deny the contingency of history by suggesting that everything was predetermined according to some superhuman master plan over which they had no control. In this case, whether it be through the agency of a divine being, an infernal being, or simply the "natural laws" of positivistic science, according to such teleological models all of history is of a piece, essentially spatial in that the condition of the entire universe at any given point can be calculated with precision from the condition at any other time. In such

models the present is fully determined by the past, and a belief that the events of history are predetermined leads to the kind of stagnation and paralysis that Joyce sees as being characteristic of Dublin.

By situating the comments of Haines and of Deasy on history within discussions of British imperialism, Joyce places them firmly within the context of the contemporary Irish political situation. The connection is direct--such models render pointless programs of political action through which the Irish (or anyone) might seek to improve their lots. Joyce thus makes clear the nightmarish quality of such deterministic models of history, since they would obviate any attempts to improve existing conditions. If "history" is to blame, and not human agency, then our only recourse is to sit idly by to see what "history" does to us next. The text of *Ulysses* does everything in its power to undercut such models, both by placing them in the mouths of unattractive characters like Deasy and by playing them off against one another. If there is a theme to the discussions of history in *Ulysses* it is that human action *does* affect the course of things and that we must, therefore, take responsibility for our actions.

Characteristically, Joyce undermines the ideology of Deasy not through pre-emptive authorial commentary but through Deasy's own fatuous statements, allowing the self-proclaimed expert on "foot and mouth disease" to insert his own foot into his own mouth. In the context of Deasy's stated theory of history, we also hear his rendition of a number of "facts" from that history, such as the story of Sir John Blackwood and the information that Jews were never allowed in Ireland. But, as Robert Martin Adams has demonstrated, Deasy's statements of historical fact are

consistently erroneous (18-26). As if that weren't enough, Deasy also demonstrates a virulent anti-Semitism and misogyny. Apparently all of history proceeds exactly according to God's plan, but "if anything goes wrong, then either the Jews or women are responsible" (Schneider 47). Deasy's foolish statements parody not only Deasy himself, but Hegel as well. The implication is clear: not only is Deasy's Hegelian theory of history erroneous, but that theory is inextricable from an ideology of bigotry and oppression.

Stephen himself categorically rejects these deterministic models of history, as his strongly negative attitude toward both Haines and Deasy makes quite plain. He also recognizes that Haines and Deasy are cut from the same cloth, as shown by the fact that Haines' words run through his mind while he talks to Deasy. However, one must avoid an overly simplistic identification between the desires of Stephen and of Joyce to escape the nightmare of history. It is clear from both *Ulysses* and *Portrait* that Stephen indeed desires to escape from the *flow* of history, to evade temporality, contingency, and the mortality that they imply.[4] Joyce, on the other hand, is seeking to subvert particular *models* of history in order to *restore* the contingency and temporality that those models ultimately deny.

No model of history with a pre-determined *telos* (whether that *telos* be Deasy's "manifestation of God" or something else) can ultimately preserve a place for human agency in affecting the outcome of historical events. Joyce's dialogue with history can be seen to consist largely of a lifelong assault on the kinds of teleological models of narrative history that so dominated the nineteenth century imagination. But these

same models also informed the great nineteenth-century realistic novels, so that Joyce's literary challenge to the traditional forms of narrative inherited from the nineteenth century thus simultaneously involves a dialogue with received models of history.

It has become increasingly recognized in recent years that narrative techniques have implications far beyond the mere study of literature. At the very least, our narratives tell us a great deal about our societies and ourselves; perhaps our narratives even play an important role in determining the very nature of our societies and ourselves. Frank Kermode has discussed the way in which generally accepted cultural models for narrative impact the expectations that readers bring to the reading of literary texts:

> There is a necessary relation between the fictions by which we order our world and the increasing complexity of what we take to be the "real" history of that world. (67)

In particular, Kermode suggests that our expectations of narrative are driven by religious models, by apocalyptic visions of the end of the world. These visions are in turn related to man's recognition of his own mortality. Every life must come to an end; therefore the world must come to an end; therefore narratives must come to an end. Moreover, in order to make some sense of life, the end must in some way be related to the beginning and to the events in between. Thus, to Kermode, the expectation of closure in fiction is related in a direct way to the fundamental nature of the human animal as that which anticipates its own death. Certainly Joyce, more than almost any other author, acknowledges in his fiction that death is a part of life. But his central statement

on the subject, the magnificent final monologue of ALP in the *Wake*, also implies a vision of rebirth, an ending that is also a beginning. All of Joyce's books end oddly, in strangeness and perplexity rather than resolution, and the radical avoidance of closure in his work is emphasized by the fact that the book which ends his career stops in mid-sentence.

That Joyce would seek to subvert in his fiction the "sense of an ending" described by Kermode comes as no surprise. As Kermode points out, this sense is largely religious (especially Christian) in origin, and religion everywhere in Joyce's work functions as an image of repression and oppression that must be opposed at any cost. Moreover, Hegelian history springs directly out of the implications of Christianity. J. Hillis Miller brings history into the equation, sounding a note somewhat similar to that of Kermode, but emphasizing the importance of accepted models of history to the formulation of conventions and reader expectations in fiction. "The notions of narrative, of character, and of formal unity in fiction are all congruent with the system of concepts making up the Western idea of history" ("Narrative" 461). In particular, Miller argues that the Hegelian model of rational history infects our view of fiction in a quite inclusive way:

> The assumptions about history which have been transferred to the traditional conception of the form of fiction . . . include the notions of origin and end ("archeology" and "teleology"); of unity and totality or "totalization"; of underlying "reason" or "ground" of selfhood, consciousness, or "human nature"; of the homogeneity, linearity, and continuity of time; of necessary progress; of "fate," "destiny," or "Providence"; of causality; of gradually emerging "meaning"; of representation and truth. (459-60)

Moreover, as Miller points out, all of these assumptions are mutually implicated in a single overarching system of metaphysics. He then cites Derrida to support this statement, and Derrida's comments are worth repeating here:

> This is the concept of history as the history of meaning . . . the history of meaning developing itself, producing itself, fulfilling itself. . . . The metaphysical character of the concept of history is not only linked to linearity, but to an entire *system* of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and interiorizing accumulation of meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of continuity, of truth, etc.). Therefore it is not an accidental predicate which could be removed by a kind of local ablation, without a general displacement of the organization. (*Positions* 56-7, Derrida's emphasis)

This historical model, then, is so thoroughly entwined in our general cultural matrix that challenging it is a highly difficult enterprise. The novel is, however, one mechanism by which these assumptions can be called into question:

> Insofar as a novel raises questions about the key assumptions of story-telling, for example about the notions of origin and end, about consciousness and selfhood, about causality, or about gradually emerging unified meaning, then this putting in question of narrative form becomes also obliquely a putting into question of history or of the writing of history. (Miller, "Narrative" 462)

That Joyce's fiction, especially in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, raises such key questions is entirely obvious. However, the implications of those questions have often been misunderstood. For example, Joyce's disruption of the smooth narrative flow that corresponds to linear versions of history has been largely responsible for readings (such as Frank's) that would see Joyce as attempting an escape from history, à la Stephen.

Frank's highly influential discussion of the spatialization of form in modern art begins with a brief review of Lessing's suggestion that form in the plastic arts is necessarily spatial because of their visual nature, and that literature is primarily temporal, because it is composed of language that must be read in a sequence proceeding through time. Following Wilhelm Worringer's work on the history of art, Frank then suggests that time and space are the two extremes describing the limits of literature and the plastic arts, and that the evolution of art forms can be traced by their oscillations between these two poles. He presents Eliot, Pound, Proust, Joyce, and Djuna Barnes as exemplars of the modern trend toward "spatial form" in literature. "All these writers ideally intend the reader to apprehend their work spatially, in a moment of time, rather than as a sequence" (9). He cites Pound's definition of an image ("that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time") as an example of the philosophy behind this concept. According to Frank, what these writers attempted in their major works was "to undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the elements of the poems as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time" (10).

Frank, I think, is half right, at least where Joyce is concerned. Joyce's work certainly seeks to undermine the reader's "normal expectations" and definitely disrupts any notion of smooth temporal flow. Here the particularly effective way in which Joyce's work conducts a subversive dialogue not only with the literary tradition but also with itself becomes important. Joyce's work disrupts normal reader

expectations in such a radical manner that the reader is forced to seek new approaches. Attridge points out that literary works always to some extent define the expectations of their readers:

> Any extended literary text is involved in a double process: it constantly evokes norms that preexist in the cultural community, but it also constantly establishes its own norms, which it then challenges or confirms as it goes on. (*Peculiar* 179).

This effect is particularly strong in Joyce's work, leading to Kenner's suggestion that Joyce "invented" his own new kind of patient, diligent reader ("Faulkner" 30). But in fact, there is no single "new" kind of approach that the reader can take that will give her comfortable access to Joyce's texts, because those texts themselves are constantly shifting and changing styles and strategies. Karen Lawrence has traced this phenomenon in detail in her excellent discussion of *Ulysses*, noting that "[t]he reader of *Ulysses* comes to each chapter with expectations that are contingent upon what he has experienced not only in other novels but also in the preceding chapters of this one" (6). But in *Ulysses* these expectations constantly change--each succeeding chapter seems to be constructed on radically different formal principles, preventing the reader from ever settling into any single mode of recuperation of the text. *Finnegans Wake* disrupts the reader's efforts even more radically, with meaning emanating in all directions from virtually every word, thus preventing the reader from being able to trace any single path through the text.

One might say that in *Ulysses* the style of narrative presentation constantly changes, while *Finnegans Wake* is essentially written in many styles at once. In relation to my earlier structural model of the

palinode, one might say that in the *Wake* both statement and palinodic counter-statement are made simultaneously rather than serially, with the result that the dialogue between the two opposing statements is made even more effective. Moreover, the simultaneous contradictory meanings embedded in the words of the *Wake* often represent politically opposed positions, opening a political dialogue within the texture of the book's language. Joseph Valente connects these stylistic effects to Bakhtin's concept of polyphony, noting "the *Wake*'s simultaneous polyphony--as opposed to the successive styles of *Ulysses*." Valente sees a powerful political potential in this stylistic multiplicity, especially in the "simultaneous polyphony" of the *Wake*, which he relates to the fact that "Ireland's cultural identity *is* multiplicity--a multiplicity of conflicting cultural traditions, literary types, political positions and programs, social outlooks, religious persuasions" ("Politics" 66).

This simultaneity of conflicting voices in *Finnegans Wake* should not be taken as an indication of the kind of "spatial form" that Frank sees as an attempted escape from temporality. While it is true that, as numerous commentators have observed, past, present, and future times seem superimposed in the *Wake*, this superposition does not imply an atemporal perspective in which all times are one. On the contrary, this superposition of times places them in dialogic opposition, showing that all times are, indeed, related, but that they are also very different. This dialogic simultaneity does not suggest an escape from time--it merely suggests that time does not flow nearly so smoothly as the great nineteenth-century narrative models would have us believe. David Lodge

discusses this effect in the *Wake* and (rightly) suggests a link to Nietzsche, calling Joyce's combinatorics of time

> a systematic deconstruction of that orthodox historical consciousness on which fictional realism is based, an enterprise strikingly similar to Nietzsche's heretical philosophy of history, characterized by Hayden White as "metaphorical historiography." (135)

Nietzsche himself provides a powerful gloss on the *Wake*'s appropriation of materials from other times and other cultures, associating such an appropriation with strength:

> The stronger the innermost roots of a man's nature, the more readily will he be able to assimilate and appropriate the things of the past; and the most powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood. ("Uses" 62-3, 1)

A consideration of the superposition of different times in the *Wake* in the light of Nietzsche suggests that the *Wake* is not *ahistorical*, but is in fact *suprahistorical*. The suprahistorical perspective becomes increasingly important in Nietzsche's later work, but this perspective does not allow one to escape history so much as to view it from a different angle. And this angle is intensely political. As Ofelia Schutte points out, Nietzsche's view of history in his later work involves a growing "conceptual activism" that emphasizes "the potential role of human beings in history as agents of historical transformation" ("Place" 108). Indeed, Schutte provides an extremely powerful perspective on the historical sense in *Finnegans Wake* when she notes the

way in which the Nietzschean suprahistorical operates in direct opposition to the Christian notion of atemporal eternity:

> the Zarathustra-idea is one whose structure constitutes a parody of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, where the motion of the divine will is from eternity into history and back to eternity rather than from history to the suprahistorical, and from there back to history and time, as Zarathustra's case exemplifies. ("Place" 110).

As with Nietzsche's parodies of the Bible in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, Joyce's stylistic variations take on added political force from the fact that they generally represent recognizable parodies of sources that can be identified with particular ideologies. Again, Joyce's specific Irish Catholic background is important, and the two most common targets of his parody are Irish Nationalism and Catholicism. The self-righteousness of the languages of both of these institutions makes them rather convenient targets, but Joyce does not take the easy road of pure mockery. If he did, he would be performing the all or nothing movement of Stephen Dedalus, merely repeating the authoritarian attitudes that he seeks to subvert. Instead, he adopts a dialogic relation to his targets, subverting them and yet letting them continue to stand as well. Joyce's parody does not conform to the pedestrian sense of a mocking of a previous text, but rather to the Bakhtinian sense of "an intentional dialogized hybrid. Within it, languages and styles actively and mutually illuminate one another" (*Dialogic* 76). The exact relationship between Joyce's text and the texts it parodies is complex and often ultimately undecidable, as Stephen Heath has pointed out:

> What is in question in Joyce's writing is not the proclamation of irony or ridicule *against* the model imitated, but a copying that

> fixes no point of irony between model and imitation, that rests, in this respect, in a hesitation of meaning. ("Ambiviolences" 41-2, Heath's emphasis)

In this sense, then, Joyce's parody is often what Gary Saul Morson has called "metaparody" ("Parody" 81-6). Morson notes that metaparodic texts leave the reader suspended between sympathy and condemnation of represented viewpoints. They thus "remain fundamentally open, and if readers should choose either interpretation as definitive, they are likely to discover that this choice has been anticipated and is itself the target of parody" (81). This kind of phenomenon, in which Joyce's texts continually spring booby-traps on the reader who would seek to impose a final meaning, is well known. Fritz Senn summarizes the effect nicely in noting that "*Ulysses* refuses to stay put. Once we know what it *is* we are sure to be wrong" ("Righting" 27).

In specific politically-charged cases, though, such as in his opposition to nationalism and Catholicism, Joyce makes a clear identification of the "bad guys," even while acknowledging that the "good guys" have their flaws as well. By refusing explicit authorial condemnation of his parodic targets, Joyce avoids becoming the mirror image of those targets. But the complexity of this stance opens the possibility of misreadings, especially when the reader already strongly sympathizes, say, with the goals of nationalism or religion. Thus, someone like Hugh Kenner, a generally brilliant reader of Joyce but himself a conservative Christian, is able to conclude that "Joyce never doubted the existence of God nor the validity of the priestly office" ("Portrait" 166).

Kenner's consistent emphasis on Joyce-the-great-artist shows a lingering dependency on models of authorial intention that are themselves related to religious conviction in a direct way.[5] There is clear evidence (such as in Joyce's irreverent invocations of the "Bloody Hairy Jaysus" in various letters) that Kenner's early interpretation of Joyce's position is egregiously wrong. But in the final analysis, Joyce's own personal religious views are largely irrelevant, since his texts so thoroughly escape any conventional idea of authorial intention. Whether Joyce believed in God or not, his texts clearly don't. But Kenner's statement is itself double-voiced. I agree that Joyce's texts show no doubt where religion is concerned. These virulently anti-theological and anti-clerical texts are quite certain that there is no God and that the priestly office has no validity. The fierceness (and simultaneous complexity) of this antireligious attitude can be seen most powerfully in *Finnegans Wake*, the book that Northrop Frye has suggested belongs in the same genre with the Bible (314). It is certainly true that the *Wake* is filled with religious language and religious images, but it is the very nature of religious discourse to be undermined by the multifarious language of the *Wake*. Bernard Benstock reviews the various discussions of Joyce's religious attitudes in the *Wake*, noting that some have tried to argue that it shows a return to basically Catholic values, or at least a powerful concern with those values, but concludes that Joyce's attitude in the book is one of "complete blasphemy" (101). I think Benstock is entirely correct, as long as one reads "Joyce" to mean "Joyce's text." Further, I think he captures the flavor of Joyce's text precisely when he suggests that "Joyce is derisive of the entire hierarchy from the God of

the Catholic to the Catholic priest, not excluding the Catholic saints" (103).

The *Wake* undermines religion in a number of ways, including the old favorite Joycean technique of juxtaposing religion with sexuality. Margaret Solomon has studied the *Wake*'s intense involvement with all things sexual, noting that "I believe this preoccupation with sex was Joyce's cosmic joke. Taking upon himself the role of God engrossed in sex--and using all the religious myths and symbols of creation to perpetuate his joke--was one way of using his jesuitical training as an act of defiance" (viii). Indeed, the subversively blasphemous nature of the dirty-minded, voyeuristic, masturbating God that we see in the *Wake* is quite clear.

The rigor of Joyce's subversion of the traditional notion of God, combined with certain misreadings of Joyce's notion of the author as a God-like creator have led to arguments based on a sort of "anxiety of influence" in which Joyce seeks to declare himself divine by overcoming his "strong precursor," the Catholic God. Valentine Cunningham has produced an interesting study of the relationship between the *Wake* and the Bible. Noting Joyce's frequent parody of the Bible itself, Cunningham suggests that the *Wake* presents itself as "an altogether more valuable" substitute (39). Indeed, the *Wake* includes in a list of rules to live by the suggestion that one should "Renove that bible," indicating that the Bible should be both removed and renewed (579.10). Joyce's book also includes numerous parodies not only of the Bible itself, but of a variety of other religious institutions and ceremonies as well, including the Last Supper, various sacraments, and even the crucifixion of Christ.

The Lord's Prayer is a favorite target, forming a recurrent motif that appears throughout the book in various forms, such as "Haar Faagher, wild heart in Homelan; Harrod's be the naun. Mine kinder come, mine wohl be won. There is nothing like leuther" (536.34-6). Or there is ALP's feminized version: "In the name of Annah the Allmaziful, the Everliving, the Bringer of Plurabilities, haloed be her eve, her singtime sung, her rill be run, unhemmed as it is uneven!" (104.1-3). These various bits of fractured religious ritual can be highly amusing (especially to the nonreligious), but they have a serious side as well. The words of the Bible and of various religious ceremonies are just words, Joyce seems to be saying, like all other words. They are thus prey to the same uncertainty and uncontrollable proliferation of multiple meanings as all other words. All attempts to authorize the meanings of the words of religion through a relation to the intention of God as originator of the Word are bound to fail, because words always escape such attempts.

Clearly, in the *Wake* it is not God who is in charge, but language itself. Cunningham thus sees the *Wake* as being largely an attempt to promote language itself as a source of all meaning in the universe, as "an attempt both to parody and out-do the Christian idea of Logos and Scripture" (25). Or, as the *Wake* puts it (in a parody of the Gospel of John), "In the buginning is the woid" (378.29).

But if all of this is so, then what of Cunningham's suggestion that Joyce's intention is to posit the *Wake* as a replacement for the Bible and to offer Joyce himself as a successor to Christ, as "a rival to the Divine Logos?" (45). Clearly, that suggestion misses the point entirely. The *Wake* does not seek to take the place of the Bible--there would be no

point to that, since one sacred text is as good (or bad) as another. What Joyce in fact assaults is not the content of the Bible itself but the very presumption of the sacredness and corresponding authority of *any* text. No book can be authoritative, not even the Bible (or the *Wake*), because language (as emphasized by the multistylic, polyphonic discourse of Joyce) can simply mean too many things.[6]

Bakhtin himself makes it clear that variations in style in the novel are more than formal exercises, contributing greatly to the overall dialogism of novelistic language. To be truly dialogic, the different styles and voices that emerge in Joyce's fiction must come from and be directed toward different social and political positions. But to Bakhtin language is always interested, always invested with ideological force, and any work that seeks to explore the workings of language unavoidably investigates the ideological climate of its world: "In the novel formal markers of languages, manners and styles are symbols for sets of social beliefs" (*Dialogic* 357). Further, he notes that "[w]hen there is a deliberate (conscious) multiplicity of styles, there are always dialogic relations among the styles" (*Speech* 112).

In addition, the multiplicity of Joyce's styles calls attention to his language and makes language itself an object for representation in his work. This effect is precisely the heart of "novelization," as defined by Bakhtin:

> Language in the novel not only represents, but itself serves as the object of representation. Novelistic language is always criticizing itself. In this consists the categorical distinction between the novel and all straightforward genres--the epic poem, the lyric and the drama (strictly conceived). All directly descriptive and expressive means at the disposal of these genres, as well as the

> genres themselves, become upon entering the novel an object of representation within it. (*Dialogic* 49)

The self-criticism that Bakhtin here cites in regard to novelistic language is inherent in the palinodic movement of Joyce's fiction. As Terry Caesar points out in regard to the *Wake*, "Joyce has written a book that cannot be parodied, and it cannot be parodied because he has already parodied it himself" (234). Indeed, the language of the *Wake* seems to be constantly in motion, constantly re-appropriating and transforming itself from within, so that there is no stylistic target upon which an external parody can establish a fixed purchase. As Hart puts it, the *Wake* is "a kind of endless regress of self-parody" (41-2).

But parody is to Bakhtin one of the principal forms for the subversion of authoritarian discourse. Both the constant change from one style to another and the simultaneous presence of multiple styles in Joyce's fiction demonstrate that no one style has a privileged claim to the representation of reality. Joyce's exercises in style remind us that all linguistic representations must be done in *some* style, and that changing the style will change the meaning of the representation. And since history itself exists only in linguistic representations, the lack of an authoritative style implies that there can be no one authoritative version of history. The link between parody and history is an important one. According to the models of literary history espoused by Russian formalists such as Tynianov, parody is the driving force for evolutionary change in literature. Moreover, as Morson points out, parody inherently calls attention to the historical circumstances in which the parodied

model arose: "Parody historicizes, and in so doing, it exposes the conditions that engendered claims of unconditionality" (78).

Joyce's most explicit statement of the mutual involvement of style and history occurs in the "Oxen of the Sun" chapter of *Ulysses*. Here, he constructs a collage of prose styles that roughly trace the historical development of English prose from its early Anglo-Saxon origins through the early twentieth century. Clearly, this chapter makes a number of important fundamental statements about language, style, reality, and the interrelationships among the three. In doing so it echoes Bakhtin's idea that "[u]tterances and their types, that is, speech genres, are the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language" (*Speech* 65). It also perhaps shows an early affinity between Joyce and Vico, since Vico's highly linguistic model of history implies that "the course of history could be inferred from etymology since the story of man's progress was embedded in the structure of the words we use" (Atherton 34).

Stephen Heath notes that the parallel between history and the development of language in Joyce may also reflect an interest in the etymological studies of the Abbé Marcel Jousse. But Joyce debunks the notion of any single, smooth etymology just as he debunks the notion of a single, smooth path of history. Thus, when Joyce turns to etymology as a model for history he "finds not a simple history but a network of fictions in a perpetual process of stories in words" ("Joyce" 132). Here Joyce's use of etymology closely parallels the studies of "genealogy" conducted by Nietzsche, in which the meanings of words are found to have evolved through an unpredictable series of coincidences and

contingencies, so that the present meanings of many words have little or nothing to do with their original meanings.

Nietzsche's emphasis on the contingency of genealogical history also illuminates Joyce's acknowledgement of the ubiquity of error in human events. In recent years this model of history has been more fully developed by Foucault, whose work on history provides an extremely useful framework for reading Joyce. Foucault specifically identifies Nietzsche's notion of genealogy as a forming influence on his own views of history, explaining that

> to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations--or conversely, the complete reversals--the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. ("Nietzsche" 146)[7]

Joyce's use of multiple styles to reflect multiple realities is also reminiscent of the perspectivism of Nietzsche. It should be remembered that Nietzsche himself employed a variety of styles. In *Ecce Homo* he declares that "considering that the multiplicity of inward states is exceptionally large in my case, I have many stylistic possibilities--the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man" (721, III.4). Here Nietzsche suggests style as a means of communicating an inner state, but elsewhere he thoroughly undermines such intentional models. In particular, the stylistic variations in Nietzsche, as in Joyce, often suggest that style does not merely *represent* reality, but in fact is constitutive of it. In "Oxen" Joyce's styles are scrupulous imitations of the manners of Malory, Bunyan, Swift,

Sterne, Dickens, and others; they are not exaggerations. And yet most of the styles, taken from their original contexts and defamiliarized by their new surroundings in *Ulysses*, appear to be highly extreme and artificial. Style is profoundly historical--the style that is "normal" in one era, the chapter clearly shows, will not be so in another.

That the temporal progression of styles in "Oxen" does not follow a smooth route, but is in fact interrupted by a number of anachronistic detours only acts to further reinforce the fact that history does not proceed according to some pre-determined master narrative. As McGee puts it, Joyce's polyphonic writing "undermines the principle of univocal meaning on which history is customarily founded" (71). The resultant subversion of the notion of any one privileged model of history is tremendously liberating; it suggests that things need not continue the way they are going, that they might have been otherwise to begin with, and there is a genuine potential for human agency to resist the encrustrations of the past and to impact the way things go in the future.

Nietzsche's model of the evolution of language in the "On Truth and Lies" essay argues that language must be perpetually renewed to avoid hardening into an illusion of "truth," echoing his thoughts on history and providing a further link between history and the evolution of language, à la Vico and Bakhtin. According to Nietzsche we must constantly interrogate our assumptions about language and about the world to avoid this hardening, in a movement that corresponds to what Schutte has called his "demand for self-criticism in human knowledge" ("Place" 108). In the novel this "hardening" effect is similar to what Bakhtin describes as "canonization"--the process by which literature appropriates

and subsumes social voices, turning them into a merely literary language that is divested of dialogic force (*Dialogic* 417-8). But the palinodic movement of Joyce's fiction assures that no one voice can ever establish authority and that his own narratives will not "canonize" the various voices that sound in them. By constantly changing styles in *Ulysses* and by using several styles simultaneously in the *Wake* Joyce preserves a liberating air of diverse possibilities, assuring that his language will not calcify into a unitary authoritarian discourse.

In his contribution to the *Exagmination*, William Carlos Williams described the defamiliarizing effect of the language of the *Wake* in terms that are strikingly reminiscent of Nietzsche's "hardening" model:

> Joyce maims words. Why? Because meanings have been dulled, then lost, then perverted by their connotations (which have grown over them) until their effect on the mind is no longer what it was when they were fresh . . . Joyce has not changed words beyond recognition. They remain to a quick eye the same. But many of the stultifying associations of the brutalized mind (brutalized by modern futility) have been lost in the process. (184-5)

In short, Joyce assures that we will remain alive to the creative, especially figurative, possibilities inherent in language, avoiding the paralysis of those Dubliners who (like Lily, the caretaker's daughter) cannot tell the difference between the literal and the figurative.

The Nietzschean self-critical attitude embodied in Joyce's self-parodic language assures that such paralysis will not occur. But such auto-criticism of discourse is, to Bakhtin,

> one of the primary distinguishing features of the novel as genre. Discourse is criticized in its relationship to reality: its attempt to faithfully reflect reality, to manage reality and to transpose it (the utopian pretenses of discourse), even to replace reality as a

> surrogate for it (the dream and the fantasy that replace life). (*Dialogic* 412)

This constant experimental and self-conscious striving for different and better languages with which to "reflect reality" summarizes as well as anything the style of Joyce's later fiction. Moreover, it is clear that Joyce's constant stylistic variations represent much more than a mere demonstration of poetic virtuosity. In fact, the complex concoction of literary and nonliterary, official and unofficial languages in Joyce's fiction calls into question the very notion of stylistic virtuosity, that some styles are inherently "higher" than others. When Bakhtin rails against the "idea of a special unitary and singular language of poetry," he is carrying on very much the same struggle as that embodied in Joyce's fiction (*Dialogic* 288). Nietzsche, meanwhile, mounts the same attack, pointing out the metaphysical assumptions behind the notion of high style: "Good style *in itself*--a pure folly, a mere 'idealism,' on a level with the 'beautiful in itself,' the 'good in itself,' the 'thing in itself'" (*Ecce* 721, III.4).

The palinodic nature of Joyce's narratives assures that the reader cannot merely adjust her expectations so as to receive his work comfortably as a smooth temporal flow. But I would argue that this disruption does not spatialize the reading process, as Frank would have it, but that instead it intensifies the temporality of Joyce's work. It is, in fact, the well-constructed, well-behaved narrative plots of nineteenth-century realistic fiction that deny temporality. In these plots, one event leads smoothly to another. Even in moments of apparent confusion, the reader can feel confident that all important elements will

be resolved in the end. The entire plot is of a piece, and the strictly causal structure of such narratives (modeled on the strict causality of classical physics) implies that the situation at any point in the narrative can be fully derived from the situation at any other point. Alan Singer describes this effect of traditional narrative structure:

> we might say that narrative denouement is predicated on a synecdochic causality. That is, it produces an identity between parts and wholes that collapses time into space, mobility into stasis, Narrative plot reduces each incremental episode of action to a proleptic type of the cathartic reversal. ("Dis-Position" 11)

In contrast to Frank's model, the true spatiality implied by the organic structure of traditional realistic narrative forms (and of traditional teleological models of history) can be seen in nineteenth-century statements on poetics such as Poe's "The Philosophy of Composition." Here, Poe makes clear his view that the author must conceive his work in the entirety before beginning writing, allowing the eventual *telos* of the work to motivate and determine all that comes before:

> Nothing is more clear than that every plot, worth the name, must be elaborated to its *dénouement* before any thing be attempted with the pen. It is only with the *dénouement* constantly in view that we give a plot its indispensible air of consequence, or causation, by making the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the intention. (1431)

The strikingly spatial quality of this model of narrative is later emphasized by Poe's famous suggestion that, to preserve unity of effect, a literary work should be short enough to be read in one sitting so that, à la Frank, it can be comprehended by the reader in its entirety.[8]

To Poe, every element of a composition from beginning to end works toward a predetermined *telos*, with even the first sentence already embodying all that will come after.[9] Pierre Macherey has examined the idealism that lies behind Poe's notion of spatial form: "Concentrated around and towards an ending, the work as a whole is no more than an approximation, a preparation, all in relationship to that final term" (22). The similarity of this notion to Hegel's model of rational history is striking, and Poe's emphasis on organic unity of effect helps to reveal the truly spatial quality of Hegelian history.

Actually, such clockwork visions predate Hegel, having arisen in the beginnings of the enlightenment. And writers of subversive literature have always opposed such models. In *Tristram Shandy*, the harried narrator-author explains his method of composition: "I am confident my own way of doing it is best--I'm sure it is the most religious--for I begin with the first sentence--and trusting to Almighty God for the second" (381). The implication here is that the divine plan model of narrative will lead to a smooth development of the story from one sentence to the next toward its eventually pre-ordained *telos*. Sterne then proceeds to undermine this notion in radical fashion by presenting us with a text full of digressions, fits and starts, gaps, dead ends, false leads, and general chaos in which nothing appears to lead to anything and the narrative has a great deal of difficulty getting anywhere at all. Indeed, smooth progressions of all kinds are radically undermined in Sterne's text, as the constant hints at Tristram's questionable parentage indicate.[10]

Sterne's technique of constant digression (influenced, perhaps, by Swift's use of a similar technique in *A Tale of a Tub*) does more than interrupt the smooth flow of his narrative. In *Tristram Shandy* the digressions are so dominant that in a sense they *are* the narrative, seriously calling into question the normal hierarchy of plot and digression, or center and margin. But teleological models of history depend vitally on such dichotomies. In the heteroglossic multiplicity of the world, it is manifest that no single linear narrative can describe the flow of history unless it is impossible to ignore marginal events and concentrate instead on the great men and great deeds that define the central current in history.

Joyce, too, emphasizes the importance of the marginal, both in his subject matter and through the use of a digressive form reminiscent of that employed by Swift and Sterne. For example, Riquelme notes that in the "Circe" chapter of *Ulysses*, the narrative appears to consist of digressions alone, with no central thread whatsoever (139). Joyce's most explicit formal inversion of center and margin occurs in the "Night Lessons" section of *Finnegans Wake*. Here we are given a "central" narrative surrounded on three sides by marginal commentary. But, as Shari Benstock notes, the "'primary' text, the storytelling of the chapter is not always the principal or dominant text. It is always surrounded by, enclosed, and sometimes almost engulfed (as on page 279) by the marginal commentary" ("Margin" 211). Indeed, marginal notes are supposed to operate in service of the main text, illuminating complex points with additional clarification. But these notes seem to have a mind of their own and staunchly refuse the imperative of relevance to the

central text. Thus, instead of the normal hierarchy of text and margin, "we find, from the first footnote on, that the hierarchies slide and crumble around us. We are given neither points of origin nor explanations but plunged in medias res, it seems, into another discourse, which has no less significance (i.e. no less complex signifiers), and that certainly no fewer mysteries waiting to be footnoted, than the central text to which it refers" (Levine 111).

In fact, it is always impossible to sustain such hierarchies in the *Wake*. Attridge notes the inversion of the normal relationship of plot to digression in the *Wake*, suggesting a definite political implication:

> What we are considering, then, is an opposition in which one member is defined as subordinate and is regarded as valuable in so far as it *is* subordinate, but the dominant member retains its dominance only by the systematic exclusion of those properties which characterize the subordinated opposite. (*Peculiar* 226, Attridge's emphasis)

Attridge here identifies a familiar dynamics of social power that has been discussed, for example, within a Bakhtinian framework by Stallybrass and White (191-3). It is also precisely the dynamics of social relation that Stephen Dedalus exhibits toward women in *Portrait*. In fact, it is traditionally the standard mode of gender relations in Western society, so that Joyce's problematization of center and margin participates in the same subversive movement as his frequent reversals of gender roles.

Attridge goes on to suggest that perhaps we might consider a similar inversion in literary history:

> Could we--not as a matter of theory but in practice--reverse the priority in the opposition between the progressive mainstream and the digressive aberration as it operates in the canon by placing

> *Finnegans Wake* at the center and reading all other novels in its light, instead of the other way round? (*Peculiar* 232)

Unfortunately, Attridge would here seem to be inadvertently participating in the movement toward the taming and legitimation of Joyce's work that I discussed in the opening of this study. I enthusiastically agree that other texts can be read fruitfully through the optic of the *Wake*, but it seems to me that Attridge's suggestion of such a central position for Joyce's most radical (and marginal) work is in diametrical opposition to Joyce's program of undermining such cultural monoliths. The *Wake* does not suggest that we invert hierarchies, establishing new privileged texts. It suggests that privilege itself is illegitimate, that it is impossible to determine in an authoritative way what is important and what is not.[11] This movement can be seen in the overdetermined proliferation of information in Joyce's later fiction. There are so many redundant facts in these texts that any reading must necessarily ignore a large number of them. But it is generally impossible to tell which facts should be ignored and which should not. This redundancy effect is also implicated in the use of repetitions in Joyce's work, a motif that begins to lead us away from the models of history that Joyce seeks to undermine and toward the kinds of models that he seeks to promote.

"Good Idea the Repetition": Joyce's "Cyclic" Model of History

Joyce directly posits no well-developed alternative model in opposition to the Hegelian view of teleological history, just as he never aligns himself with specific alternatives to the political programs such as British imperialism and Irish nationalism that his work so fiercely

attacks. Joyce's failure to take specific well-defined political stands (and, indeed, his radical avoidance of such stands) contributed greatly to the readings of his work as apolitical that proliferated for so many decades. In a sense, Joyce is, as Nietzsche declared himself to be, "anti-political." But this stance should not be construed as political irresponsibility or indifference on the part of Joyce. It is, in fact, a necessary corollary to his subversive project that it produce no fixed programs of its own. Otherwise, it would be in danger of settling into the same kind of monologism that it opposes.[12] Joyce's opposition to programs such as Irish nationalism and Catholicism is grounded in a thorough-going antagonism toward dogmatic and authoritarian discourses of all kinds. Here again Joyce's career parallels that of Nietzsche, whose fierce opposition to Christianity arose not so much from his specific objection to particular tenets of Christianity as to the fact that Christianity dogmatically insisted on imposing its tenets without entertaining discussion or the possibility of alternatives. "What Nietzsche eventually comes to attack directly is not any particular judgment but the very tendency to make general judgments about the value of life itself" (Nehamas 135).

Nietzsche has often been criticized because he produces no new system of thinking to stand as a viable replacement for the philosophical tradition he undermines. But Nietzsche's "failure" is highly motivated. He "sidesteps the threat of dogmatism by insisting on the impossibility of a definitive interpretation that would exhaust the richness of reality: Being is equivocal and there is no absolute truth for man to possess as an inalienable right" (Granier, "Perspectivism" 197). Nehamas

defends Nietzsche against charges of nihilism, noting the aesthetic aspects of Nietzsche's project and suggesting that it would be hypocritical of Nietzsche to suggest an alternative program, because "just as there is no single type of great artist or artwork, there is also no type of life that is in itself to be commended or damned" (229).

Nehamas' suggestion of the aesthetic quality of Nietzsche's philosophy provides additional support to the suggestion that Joyce and Nietzsche are elaborating similar projects. Both Joyce and Nietzsche are fiercely opposed to the traditional notion of aestheticism as a withdrawal from the world. Neither suggests that art can lead to stunning epiphanic moments of transcendence when the "truth" is revealed at last. This does not mean, however, that they do not privilege art as a means of access to the various multiple interpretations of the textuality of the world. To Nietzsche, for example, "it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally *justified*" (*Birth* 52, 5, Nietzsche's emphasis).[13]

This aestheticism is not, however, the symbolist aestheticism of withdrawal from the world. Rather it is just the opposite. As noted by Megill, Nietzsche's aestheticism refers "not to the condition of being enclosed within the limited territory of the aesthetic, but rather to an attempt to expand the aesthetic to embrace the whole of reality" (*Prophets* 2). Nietzsche is not suggesting an escape from reality into the world of art and imagination. In fact, he strongly opposes the notion that the two can be separated. "In their being, therefore, nature and mask are the same, and the worst possible mistake would be to oppose these two terms" (Granier, "Chaos" 137). What Nietzsche is proposing in

fact, is a very practical program for dealing with the world as it is. It is no accident that Rorty cites Nietzsche, along with William James, as the great forerunners of his modern pragmatic philosophy:

> This was the step taken by Nietzsche and William James. Their contribution was to replace romanticism by pragmatism. Instead of saying that the discovery of vocabularies could bring hidden secrets to light, they said that new ways of speaking could help get us what we want. (*Consequences* 150)

This Nietzschean idea of a centrifugal aestheticism that embraces the world is diametrically opposed to the kind of disinterested aestheticism usually implied in formalism and often attributed to a Kantian aesthetic of "purposiveness without purpose." Clearly, the aesthetic attitudes of Nietzsche and of Joyce do not indicate a belief that art has no relation to the real world, but in point of fact neither does Kant's. While Kant has often been seen to provide the philosophical background for a formalist aesthetics of nonengagement (John Crowe Ransom often cited Kant as a ground), a number of recent rereadings have emphasized the way in which Kant's attempts to demarcate the boundary between art and life have the function not of absolutely separating the two but of providing a framework within which to treat the movement or passage from one to the other across this interface.[14] The result is a complex problematization of the differentiation between the inside and outside of the aesthetic frame. And while this sort of calling into question of margins and boundaries inevitably brings to mind the entire project of philosophers such as Derrida and Nietzsche, it is also precisely the kind of phenomenon that I described above in relation to authors such as Sterne and Joyce. It is also the attitude shown by

Bakhtin in his own attacks on formalism: "Bakhtin in all of his work problematizes the relationship between the 'outside' and 'inside' of a text" (Carroll, "Alterity" 68).

The point is that a privileging of aesthetics does not necessarily imply a denial of history. It can imply a program of engaging history with renewed energy and vigor--after all, if history is a text, there is no reason why it cannot be an artistic one. Though neither Joyce nor Nietzsche proposes a systematic model for history, they do suggest a new attitude, which might be described as the "poeticization" of history. This project is also recognizably that of Vico, whose importance in Joyce's later work has been recognized at least since Beckett's 1929 *Exagmination* essay.[15] There are, in fact, interesting parallels between Vico's cyclic model of history and the work of Nietzsche. Mali notes that

> Vico, much like Nietzsche in his time, and Foucault in our time, saw his task in decoding or deconstructing the established historical traditions in their respective Ages of Reason. All three, one may add, were historians who helped create the counterculture of their times, and all did so by reverting to and creating anew the counter-histories of their cultures. (43)[16]

The counter-cultural aspect of this "counter-history" has much in common with the Bakhtinian notion of the carnival.[17] Vico sees myths as embodying certain truths that have been suppressed in official versions of history much as Bakhtin sees the carnivalesque energies of folk culture as exceeding the limitations imposed by official culture. Indeed, as Mali points out, Vico privileges such counter-cultural genres as "folk-tales, carnivals, songs, and so on" as avenues for subversion of official history (42). But the principal means by which Vico subverts

the notion of a single rational, institutionalized version of history is through recourse to the creative, poetic energies of myth. Myth also functions as a privileged category for Nietzsche, and for similar reasons. Megill discusses the importance of myth to Nietzsche at some length. He notes that in Zarathustra Nietzsche moves toward a myth of the future in the doctrine of eternal return in an attempt to give human life something that has been lost, "a meaning, a pattern" (*Prophets* 82).

Meanwhile, the fame of the "mythic method" is such that the importance of myth to Joyce need not be restated. However, the implications of this importance have been widely misunderstood. Frank again functions as a representative culprit, suggesting that the emphasis on spatial form leads to a removal of historical depth from modernist works, and that the mythical method is a means of escaping history:

> What has occurred . . . may be described as the transformation of the historical imagination into myth--an imagination for which historical time does not exist, and which sees the actions and events of a particular time only as bodying forth of eternal prototypes. (60)

But an understanding of the way in which both Vico and Nietzsche employ myth to inject a creative, aesthetic dimension into history that will resist stagnation and encourage people to actively participate in history helps to illuminate the profound historical engagement implied by Joyce's use of myth. As Mali puts it, Joyce turned to mythical models such as those proposed by Vico because he "sought to form a new commitment to a kind of history which does not oppress its agents with burdens from the past but liberates their creative potential and affirms their ongoing life" (34).

Frank's view of the mythic method as an attempted escape from history is consistent with Roland Barthes' more recent argument that myth usually plays a conservative role in society. Barthes suggests that myth opposes the possibility of change by presenting itself as already complete and hiding the contingency of its own historical development (*Mythologies* 117). But Joyce infuses his mythic fictions with contemporary political significance, thus returning myth to history and re-instituting the possibility of using myth in productive and even subversive ways.[18]

Myths function largely via a motif of repetition, and mythical time tends to be cyclic in nature, so it comes as no surprise that Vico's emphasis on myth leads him (as it later will Northrop Frye) to a cyclic model of history. Meanwhile, Arthur Danto, who reads Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence quite literally, discusses the implications of that doctrine, noting that among the positive (to Nietzsche) implications "[b]y far the most important was that the world must give the lie to any proposal that it had a goal, or purpose, or meaning, or end-state of any kind" (211). Actually, it is not at all clear that eternal recurrence implies a cyclic model of history. It is apparent, though, that any element of cyclicity acts to undermine teleological models of history such as those proposed by Hegel. Thus Megill, arguing that the eternal return clearly does not involve a cyclic conception of time, notes that "Nietzsche intended eternal return as a denial of both the Christian myth of redemption and the nineteenth-century bourgeois myth of progress" (*Prophets* 84).

Repetition need not mean literal re-presentation. Even Vico does not suggest that events and situations literally repeat themselves in cycles. Rather, he suggests that human history proceeds in accordance with certain broad patterns that are themselves cyclic in nature. In a study of repetition in fiction, Hillis Miller has noted (following the work of Deleuze) that there are two different basic understandings of repetition. The first, based on the Platonic notion of a fixed ideal model, involves repetition of the same. The second, based on Nietzsche's conception of the world as constituted by difference, involves a repetition that is simultaneously a variation: "It seems that X repeats Y, but in fact it does not, or at least not in the firmly anchored way of the first sort of repetition" (*Fiction* 6). The models of cyclicity of both Vico and Nietzsche, then, are fundamentally consistent with the kind of repetition with a difference that so thoroughly informs the structure of Joyce's fiction.[19]

All of Joyce's texts are in some sense cyclic in form. *Dubliners* begins with a story about a dead priest and ends with a story about "the dead" in general. *Portrait* begins as an infant Stephen turns to his father as a model for his own self-image, and ends as Stephen turns to his mythical father for a similar purpose. *Ulysses* is loosely based on the cyclic journey of Homer's Odysseus, and Bloom's travels in the book turn out to be cyclic as well. And the cyclic nature of *Finnegans Wake*, which ends in the middle of a sentence that can be taken as being completed by the sentence fragment that begins the book, is conspicuous. Indeed, the *Wake* ends with a death, so that Joyce's last work of fiction ends on a note that echoes the beginning of his first. But what is

important to recognize is the way in which these endings also vary so significantly from the beginnings that they mirror. Joyce appears to have anticipated Macherey's suggestion that "literature exists only through repetition in the guise of variation" (56), and repetition with a difference is perhaps *the* central structural feature of Joyce's entire body of work.

Repetition effects a disruption of teleological models of history and the concomitant preservation of a role for human agency in determining the course of events. Thus in *Ulysses* (and, more spectacularly, in *Finnegans Wake*), one of Joyce's central techniques for disrupting the dehumanizing effects of the smooth flow of teleological history is an emphasis on repetition with a difference. Joyce's formal use of internal repetition and his acknowledgement that the materials of which he constructs his texts have been used before in other texts both show an appreciation for the repetitiveness of history. But the way in which he employs repetition in his texts suggests that these repetitions always occur with a difference, that no exact repetition is possible. As a result of the repetition, history will never reach any kind of final goal; as a result of the difference (which can be affected by human agency as well as by natural and random events), history will never stagnate, but will be responsive to human action.

In *Ulysses* the theme of repetition with a difference is repeated many times in different forms. Thus Leopold Bloom, following his encounter on the beach with Gerty MacDowell in "Nausicaa," muses nostalgically on the lost past of his courtship with Molly, recognizing both that that past cannot be recovered, and that it is continually being

repeated all around him by a new generation of young lovers: "History repeats itself. . . . Names change: that's all" (308). This recognition of the repetitiveness of history leads him to consider taking a journey out to the hill of Howth to relive some of his past memories, but he is perfectly aware that the repetition he invokes cannot be a literal one: "No. Returning not the same. Like kids your second visit to a house. The new I want. Nothing new under the sun" (308). Meanwhile, the entire scene on the beach in "Nausicaa" is an ironic repetition of Stephen's "bird girl" epiphany in *Portrait*, with Stephen's flight of artistic transcendence being replaced by the *Bovarisme* of Gerty's immersion in the language of popular romance magazines and the bird girl's ethereal splendor being replaced by poor masturbating Bloom--to Gerty a mysterious, romantic figure.[20] This scene then acts to expose in a powerful way the emptiness at the heart of Stephen's artistic vision of the girl in *Portrait*, even as it suggests that the quotidian reality of everyday life may have more of a poetic dimension than we sometimes realize. There is, after all, "a touch of the artist about old Bloom" (193).[21]

As in Joyce's earlier works, repetition is explored implicitly through the recurrence of key phrases and motifs throughout the text, as well as in Joyce's creative appropriation of materials from other texts, including his own earlier work. In fact, these sorts of repetitions become much more frequent (and therefore more prominent) in *Ulysses* than in the earlier work, culminating in the bizarre shenanigans of the "Circe" chapter, in which virtually everything that has occurred in the earlier chapters is repeated in drastically modified form. "Circe" is

highly allusive, importing and transforming a vast array of intertextual materials, including the earlier parts of *Ulysses* itself. In this sense the many strange metamorphoses that occur in this chapter can be taken as a reflexive commentary upon Joyce's writing practice in general. The literariness of "Circe" cannot be overemphasized, as Riquelme suggests when he notes the way in which the language in "Circe" draws attention to itself as parody rather than as a representation of consciousness or action (141). But Joyce's literariness is never *just* literary. As usual in Joyce, there is also a political dimension to the transformations of "Circe." Valente thus suggests that "Circe" "reverses received hierarchies only to abrogate the oppositional structures that result and thereby affirm a fundamental ambivalence, an ongoing crisis of power" ("Politics" 64). Moreover, specific events (such as the confrontation between Stephen and the British soldiers) provide concrete commentary upon the Irish contemporary political situation.

"Circe" may represent a particularly spectacular form of repetition with a difference, but *Ulysses* is also filled with more subtle instances of such repetition, in which a given phrase or motif continually recurs in changing contexts that give it different meanings. In fact, such repetition occurs so often in *Ulysses* that William Schutte has compiled an entire book listing "recurrent elements" in *Ulysses*. Similarly, Clive Hart has compiled a list of over one thousand repeated phrases, or "leitmotifs," that occur throughout *Finnegans Wake* (*Structure* 211-47).[22] Among other things, in the dense textual wilderness of the *Wake* these repeated phrases act as friendly signposts of familiarity for the reader, assuring her that she is not lost in an entirely alien universe. This is

especially true since so many of the leitmotifs derive from broadly familiar phrases and quotations.[23]

Since the leitmotifs of *Finnegans Wake* generally derive from clearly identifiable sources, they function as triggers for intertextual connections much like the "moments of strangeness" that I discussed in conjunction with *Dubliners* and *Portrait*. The difference, however, is that the connections in the *Wake* are much more explicit, functioning as overt allusions rather than as disruptions in the normal flow of language that indicate subtle intertextual perturbations. In fact, the language of *Finnegans Wake* is almost entirely "inside-out" in this respect, much in the same way that it is inside-out with respect to center and margin of the narrative. In Joyce's early texts, relatively normal language use (what Kristeva would call the symbolic) is periodically interrupted by moments of strangeness (what Kristeva would call the semiotic) when language openly announces its dialogic nature and intertextual connections are thus indicated. In the *Wake*, the bulk of the text is composed of one long moment of strangeness and constant implicit intertextual triggering which continually focusses the reader's attention on the dialogic nature of language. The portmanteau construction of the strange words of the *Wake* literally shows language bursting apart with dialogic energy.[24] This flow of strangeness is then periodically interrupted by the normalcy represented by the comforting appearance of familiar phrases that keep the reader from becoming entirely disoriented. Using Kristeva's terminology, the early texts (like most poetic texts) consist of symbolic language periodically interrupted by the semiotic.

But *Finnegans Wake* is composed of semiotic language that is periodically interrupted by the symbolic.[25]

The leitmotif structure in *Finnegans Wake* performs a function similar to the "repertoire" described by Iser:

> The repertoire consists of all the familiar territory within the text. This may be in the form of references to earlier works, or to social and historical norms, or to the whole culture from which the text has emerged -- in brief, to what the Prague structuralists have called the "extratextual" reality. (*Act* 69)

The function of this repertoire is to establish a common ground of understanding between text and reader, to give the text a certain air of relevance to the reader's own experience so that she may relate more fully to the text. And it is entirely appropriate that in *Finnegans Wake* this repertoire be constructed not of specific things or facts, but of language itself.

But if the leitmotifs of the *Wake* function as signposts, it is important to remember that signposts are not merely static icons. They point *to* something that is elsewhere, opening up a dialogue between the *Wake* and the texts that it (mis)quotes. The kinetic, evolutionary character of the repetitions in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* cannot be overemphasized. Hart suggests a dynamic quality to the use of leitmotifs in the *Wake*:

> Real *leitmotiv* entails the use of statement and restatement in such a way as to impel the reader to relate part to part; each recurrence of such a motif derives in some necessary way from all its previous appearances and leads on to future resurgences, pointing to correspondences and relationships far beyond those that hold between the individual motif and its immediate context. (165)

Unfortunately, Hart's belief that the different recurrences of a given leitmotif are related "in some necessary way" makes it impossible for him to appreciate fully the powerfully kinetic aspect of this technique. He therefore concludes that the use of leitmotifs in the *Wake* "creates the effect of a cosmic simultaneity and immediacy of experience" (173). However, it is precisely the fact that the connections evoked by these repeated motifs point to "correspondences and relationships far beyond those" suggested by the immediate context that prevents any effect of "simultaneity" from occurring in the text. Hart feels that Joyce has constructed an elaborate edifice of intricately interrelated motifs, but his own observation suggests that these motifs go far beyond any possibility of authorial control. It is this special ability to take the reading experience beyond any pre-conceived authorial *telos* that gives the text of the *Wake* its distinctively kinetic quality. As Hayman notes, "The *Wake* belongs to a class (not a genre) of works which invite the reader to perpetuate creation" (Hayman, "Some" 177).

As I discussed in the last chapter, Joyce involves his texts in the flow of history by acknowledging the sources of the linguistic material from which the *Wake* is constructed. By embedding so many familiar phrases and specific allusions in his text, Joyce demonstrates an open awareness of the historicity of language by calling attention to the fact that his words have been used before.[26] Moreover, he shows that, though all language use is re-use and repetition of pre-existing words, one can still generate new meanings by placing those words in new contexts. In the *Wake* this kind of repetition with a difference is illustrated by the way in which Joyce warps the words themselves, frequently combining two

or more words (often from different languages) into a single portmanteau construction. The resulting strange quality of the text of the *Wake* thus acts to defamiliarize even words that aren't modified and to place them in new light. As a result of Joyce's creative repetition of language, the familiar leitmotifs that he imports into his text are warped and fractured, initiating a productive dialogue with the sources of those phrases. As Edward Said has remarked, even the most seemingly innocent use of quotation signals a potentially violent intertextual confrontation:

> For although quotation can take many forms, in every one the quoted passage symbolizes other writing as encroachment, as a disturbing force moving potentially to take over what is presently being written. . . . [A]lways, even when in the form of a passing allusion, it is a reminder that other writing serves to displace present writing, to a greater or lesser extent, from its absolute, central, proper place. (22)

The confrontation that Said suggests can be particularly strong when a text opens an ironic gap by willfully misquoting the texts from which it appropriates material, as the *Wake* almost invariably does. Misquotation is a classic example of repetition with a difference, and it can be used to powerful effect. Dante, for example, employs misquotation in the *Commedia* for specific thematic purposes. In fact, misquotation becomes a fundamental structural principle of Dante's hell, that land of misreading and lack of understanding. Barolini thus notes: "Textually, the governing principle of the *Inferno* is misuse, which is objectified into a series of misquotations operating at all levels of textual activity" (4). But as Dante proceeds along his journey to enlightenment the quotations given in the text tend to become more and more accurate, demonstrating

the increased clarity of vision that accrues in the course of his progress.

No such teleological progression occurs in Joyce, though Joyce's texts do get a great deal of mileage from misquotation. In *Portrait*, for example, misquotation is given a thematic twist as Stephen is sent into one of his famous epiphanies at nightfall by the memory of a line from Nash: "Darkness falls from the air" (232). Unfortunately, he later realizes that it is "brightness," not "darkness," that falls in Nash's line, which ironizes the whole experience (234). In *Ulysses* a compound form of misappropriation occurs as Stephen misquotes John 15:13 as "greater love than this . . . no man hath that a man lay down his wife for his friend" (322). This altered form resonates with Bloom's cuckoldry, of course, and Stephen further complicates the effect by then attributing his quotation not to the Bible, but to Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the enunciator, after all, of the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

Examples of misquotations in the *Wake* come from such memorable sources as Shakespeare: "My fault, his fault, a kingship through a fault! (193.31-2), and Keats: "A king off duty and a jaw for ever!" (162.35). Joyce also frequently distorts popular axioms and clichés with constructions such as "look before you leak" (433.34) and "there's no plagues like rome" (465.34-5).[27] Popular culture is a favorite source of Joyce's discourse, such as his remaking of a well-known nursery rhyme: "Lonedom's breach lay foulend up" (239.34-5). These sorts of Wakisms are highly amusing, but they have a serious function as well, highlighting the sort of intertextual clashes that Said sees as a central effect of

all quotation. As usual, Joyce also uses his own discourse as fodder, misquoting his earlier works frequently in the *Wake*. Thus we see numerous fractured versions of the opening of *Portrait*, such as: "Once upon a drunk and a fairly good drunk it was" (453.20).[28] *Ulysses*, too is frequently commented upon in the *Wake*, such as its characterization as the "usylessly unreadable Blue Book of Eccles" (179.26-7) and the warped catalogue of most of the chapters in that book:

> Ukalepe. Loathers leave. Had days. Nemo in Patria. The Luncher Out. Skilly and Carubdish. A Wondering Wreck. From the Mermaids' Tavern. Bullyfamous. Naughtsycalves. Mother of Misery. Walpurgas Nackt. [Calypso. Lotus Eaters. Hades. Aeolus. Lestrygonians. Scylla and Charybdis. The Wandering Rocks. Sirens. Cyclops. Nausicaa. Oxen of the Sun. Circe--my "translation."] (229.13-6)[29]

Joyce's "quotations"--or "quashed quotatoes" (183.22)--in the *Wake* call attention to themselves as repetitions with a difference, pointing to Bakhtin's suggestion that all linguistic repetition is in fact repetition with a difference. In his essay "The Problem of the Text," Bakhtin notes that the same sequences of words can be repeated endlessly. But when these words are viewed within their communicative contexts, it can be seen that the words mean something different each time because the context necessarily changes: "But as an utterance (or part of an utterance) no one sentence, even if it has only one word, can ever be repeated: it is always a new utterance (even if it is a quotation)" (*Speech* 108). Caryl Emerson summarizes Bakhtin's attitude toward repetition in his own writing:

> Nothing 'recurs'; the same word again might accumulate, reinforce, perhaps parody what came before it, but it cannot be the same word if it is in a different place. Repetitiveness is not repetitiousness. . . . Bakhtin's nonessayistic style makes use of

> repetition almost as music makes use of the refrain. ("Editor's" xxxv)

Emerson's invocation of the musical refrain strongly recalls the leitmotif method of the *Wake*, as it should: here as so often the parallel between Joyce's writing practice and the work of Bakhtin is strong indeed. And, again, Joyce's text would appear to be making explicit a quality that is implicit in *all* texts, according to Bakhtin's model of dialogic language. Joyce parallels Bakhtin's thoughts on repetition not only in the *Wake*, but in *Ulysses* as well, where repeated phrases often take on different meanings specifically because the context in which they are uttered changes.

Often this sort of reaccentuation occurs by having one character repeat the utterance of another (either directly or as part of an interior monologue), or by shifting a statement made by a character into the narration itself. Such repetitions necessarily re-accentuate the repeated utterances, since, as Bakhtin tells us,

> the speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is--no matter how accurately transmitted--always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another's word is responsible for its dialogizing background, whose influence can be very great. (*Dialogic* 340)

In *Ulysses*, not only do Haines' words declaring the culpability of history run through Stephen's mind as he confronts Deasy, but the words (like most things in *Ulysses*) also reappear in "Circe." Stephen juxtaposes Haines' comment with his own earlier meditations on Blake, emphasizing the centrality of British imperialism to all models of Irish history by confronting two British soldiers as he announces: "You are my

guests. Uninvited. By virtue of the fifth of George and the seventh of Edward. History to blame. Fabled by mothers of memory" (479). The soldiers do not take kindly to this provocation, and a skirmish ensues, Private Carr announcing that "I'll wring the neck of any fucking bastard says a word against my bleeding fucking king" (488).

It is clear that Stephen's repetition of Haines' phrase is highly ironic, investing it, in fact, with precisely the opposite meaning than the one intended by Haines. Moreover, Carr's reference to "my bleeding fucking king" is actually made in defense of the king, but is clearly double-voiced, the irony of such a statement being clear. Carr's exclamation further emphasizes the importance of the communicative environment in which words are used--coming from Stephen, the same description of the king would no doubt result in a retaliation considerably more serious than the blow to the face that Stephen in fact subsequently receives.

Haines' statement is also invested with new meaning in the "Oxen of the Sun" chapter when the narrator, shifting into a mode in which he imitates the melodramatic presentation of a ghost story, explains Haines' "eldritch laugh" by suggesting that history is to blame for that, too (336).[30] In this case, the repetition of Haines' phrase again turns out to mock Haines for attributing so much to history. But here the repetition mocks Stephen as well, echoing Stephen's earlier characterization of history as a nightmare and the "ghoststory" that Stephen's students ask to be told in lieu of their history lesson (21). It also anticipates Stephen's later use of the phrase in the eldritch world of "Circe."

Another way that the repetitions of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* continually evolve is simply through the cumulative impact of repetition itself. The very fact that a given phrase is continually repeated tends to lend it a growing significance as the repetitions mount up, with each recurrence thus building upon all the previous ones. The rhetorical impact of such repetition is one that orators have long recognized, though in our own century such repetitions have gained particularly wide application in the recurrent slogans and jingles of advertising. Joyce, always acutely in tune with the contemporary, knows this aspect of repetition quite well. Bloom, after all, is an advertising canvasser who informs us that "for an advertisement you must have repetition. That's the whole secret" (265). In fact, Bloom's thoughts on repetition in advertising are themselves repeated in the text. After his nostalgic invocation of repetition with a difference in relation to the memories of his early days with Molly, Bloom notices the mass in the chapel that (in another instance of Joyce's comic use of overly-obvious symbolism) stands nearby. He then ruminates on the effectiveness of repetition in religious ceremonies: "Pray for us. And pray for us. Good idea the repetition. Same thing with ads. Buy from us. And buy from us" (309). Here the conflation of the discourse of religion with that of advertising reveals the two to be based on similarly venal principles, and Joyce's old theme of simony once again comes to the fore. Moreover, the scene is still highly charged with sexual content, so that sexuality, religion, and advertising are all shown to be mutually implicated in a wickedly powerful statement on the social conditions in 1904 Ireland.[31]

The significance given certain phrases merely by the fact of repetition can have extensive textual consequences. For one thing, the repeated phrases are reified, themselves becoming objects of representation in the text. Again, Joyce's work provides a perfect illustration of Bakhtin's thesis that "[l]anguage in the novel not only represents, but itself serves as the object of representation" (49). Furthermore, the continued re-presentation of a phrase such as Haines' "history is to blame" infects the language of the rest of the text to the extent that any mention of either "history" or "blame" immediately evokes Haines' comment. Sometimes the resultant dialogue can be quite significant. For example, when Bloom looks at Stephen in the cabman's shelter of "Eumaeus," he contemplates "instances of cultured fellows that promised so brilliantly nipped in the bud of premature decay and nobody to blame but themselves" (527). Here, the practical Bloom suggests that human agents must take responsibility for their own actions, and his statement stands in strong contrast to Haines' attempt to blame all misfortunes on the impersonal forces of history.

Joyce's repetitions also reinforce his deconstruction of the hierarchy of center and margin. The recurrence of motifs often results in a sort of *Nachträglichkeit* effect, in which events that initially seemed unimportant turn out to have been highly significant after all. For example, after the funeral of Paddy Dignam in "Hades," Bloom politely points out to the lawyer John Henry Menton that his "hat is a little crushed." Menton takes off and straightens the hat, thanking Bloom rather perfunctorily (95). We do not learn until nearly four hundred fifty pages later that this event repeats with a difference what was

probably Bloom's greatest moment--once when Parnell's silk hat was inadvertently knocked off in a crowd, Bloom picked it up and restored it to him. Parnell, unlike Menton, had offered his thanks quite elegantly: "*Thank you, sir*, though in a very different tone of voice from the ornament of the legal profession whose headgear Bloom also set to rights earlier in the day, history repeating itself with a difference" (535, Joyce's emphasis). Meanwhile, after Stephen is knocked down by Private Carr, Bloom is careful to save first Stephen's hat, then Stephen, reiterating Bloom's consistently solicitous attitude toward headgear, as well as repeating the typical Joycean link between Stephen and Parnell (491).

These instances of *Nachträglichkeit* teach us a mode of reading in which not even the tiniest element of the text can be ignored. Moreover, they suggest the importance of small events in the flow of history, indicating that even the most insignificant of us might be able to influence the outcome of the great events of history. It might, for example, even be possible for a thoroughly mediocre half-Jewish, half-Irish nonentity like Leopold Bloom to become the central character in what many have come to see as the central work in modern literary history. Likewise it might be possible for one of the century's most radical and marginal novelists to become the Great Man of the modern literary establishment. But if seemingly insignificant and marginal persons and events can turn out to be so important, then the traditional "great men and great events" model of history would seem to be seriously undermined. Deterministic/scientific models of history are undermined as

well, since no model could be expected to account for the potentially large contributions of such seemingly small events.

History and Science in Joyce

The extensive dialogue with science that occurs in Joyce's later work is, in fact, largely oriented toward the subversion of the deterministic models that were so dear to nineteenth-century positivism. But many of the developments in twentieth-century science subvert such models as well, so perhaps it is not surprising that Joyce's work seems so reminiscent of these developments. I have discussed elsewhere numerous parallels between the formal characteristics of *Ulysses* and modern scientific ideas such as relativity and quantum mechanics ("Joyce"). Meanwhile, Strother Purdy has suggested that, allowing for the humor with which science (like everything else) is treated in Joyce's last book, "*Finnegans Wake* remains our century's greatest artistic expression of the sense of a changed world science has given us" ("Let's" 216).

Joyce seems to see a great deal of emancipatory potential in the denial of determinism that is such an important element of developments in modern science, just as he sees a sinister potential for enslavement in nineteenth-century determinism. In identifying traditional science and religion as twin images of oppression, Joyce again shows an affinity with Nietzsche, who argues in *The Genealogy of Morals* that science and Christianity are more alike than different, since both involve an overarching and fundamental drive toward truth:

> It is still a *metaphysical faith* that underlies our faith in science--and we men of knowledge of today, we godless men and anti-metaphysicians, we, too, still derive *our* flame from the fire ignited by a faith millenia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato's, that God is truth, that truth is *divine*. (588, 24, Nietzsche's emphasis)

The most life-denying drive, says Nietzsche, is the drive toward univocal truth that categorizes both science and religion, a drive that can also be equated to a quest for mastery and dominance of the kind that makes totalitarian regimes possible. Hegel, by relying on the twin models of science and religion, thus inevitably arrives at a model of history that is univocal as well. In his understanding of this metaphorical link between science and politics, Joyce strongly anticipates the work of Thomas Pynchon, for whom this link has functioned as a major theme. Pynchon has also particularly stressed the parallels between religion (especially, in his case, Puritanism) and deterministic science, arguing a strongly sexual drive for dominance as a motivation for both. In Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49* there is a scene in which Oedipa Maas dons multiple layers of clothing in order to impede the efforts of the lawyer Metzger at seducing her. But she inadvertently knocks over an aerosol can of hairspray, which is punctured and starts to carom wildly about the room propelled by the resultant escaping gas. Oedipa, however, invokes her vague knowledge of physics to suggest that the can's movements are not so random as they appear: "The can knew where it was going, she sensed, or something fast enough, God or a digital machine, might have computed in advance the complex web of its travel" (37). But events in *Lot 49* (as in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*) conspire to indicate that such neatly deterministic models simply won't work--

something will always be left out of the equation. Pynchon explicitly points out this necessary incompleteness later in *Gravity's Rainbow*:

> And yet, and yet: there is Murphy's Law to consider, that brash Irish proletariat restatement of Gödel's Theorem--*when everything has been taken care of, when nothing can go wrong, or even surprise us . . . something will.* (275, Pynchon's ellipsis)

Pynchon's invocation of Gödel's theorem from higher mathematics indicates the way in which this notion of necessary contingency and incompleteness problematizes the views of classical science, just as his conflation of Gödel with the pop wisdom of Murphy's law effects a dialogue between disparate discourses that is reminiscent of the work of Bakhtin (and of Joyce).

In many ways, Pynchon's commentary on the numbing effects of modern technology echo Heidegger, but Nietzsche expressed similar concerns even earlier. Nietzsche strikes out against

> the god of machines and crucibles, that is, the powers of the spirits of nature recognized and employed in the service of a higher egotism; it believes that it can correct the world by knowledge, guide life by science, and actually confine the individual within a limited sphere of solvable problems. (*Birth* 109, 17)

The threat of technology, Nietzsche is saying, is that it oversimplifies the infinitely varied nature of the world, confining the individual within a "limited sphere" that shuts out alternative possibilities. Nietzsche's alternative is the poeticization of history that I described above.

Pynchon's encyclopedic fictions, like those of Joyce, emphasize the mystery inherent in the sheer volume of data in the world, a volume so great that no deterministic model can ever be adequate for the prediction

of events in the real world regardless of the speed and accuracy of one's computer. Both Pynchon and Joyce present us with their encyclopedic avalanches of information in order not to effect a complete representation of the facts of the world, but to show that mere facts are never sufficient. Thus Cheryl Herr perceptively compares Joyce's encyclopedic fictions to Flaubert's *Bouvard et Pecuchet* as showing any attempt at complete encyclopedism to be absurd (9). Similarly, in a paper devoted to parallels between Pynchon and Joyce, Sara Solberg suggests that Joyce's fiction "eludes final interpretations. One cannot exhaust the possibilities, yet one is compelled to try. This is largely the point" (35).

The parodies of completeness embodied in the encylopedism of Pynchon and Joyce thus participate in the trend toward poeticization of history. Modern science, itself increasingly poetic, lends ammunition to the assaults launched by Pynchon and Joyce against the pretensions of completeness of classical science. Niels Bohr, for example, notes that "in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomenon, but with the recognition that such an analysis is *in principle* excluded" (*Atomic* 62, Bohr's emphasis).[32] On a quantum scale, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle provides a well-known example of the impossibility of achieving a complete description of a physical situation, with distinct parallels to the work of Joyce. Phillip Herring has devoted a book-length study to the importance of error and uncertainty in Joyce's work, noting in his title the parallel to Heisenberg. But Herring's analysis of the political implications of uncertainty seems seriously flawed. He

acknowledges the "radical politics of Joyce's youth" (*Uncertainty* 9) and admits that "*Dubliners* was meant to be a revolutionary document" (*Uncertainty* 61). Yet Herring's idea of Joyce's revolutionary politics seems peculiar indeed. For example, he notes Joyce's rage against the tyranny of the Church and State, yet suggests that the true target of Joyce's ire in *Dubliners* is the individual citizens of Dublin, who are the book's "true villains" (*Uncertainty* 54-5).

By my reading, this is precisely what Joyce does *not* do. There are no individual villains in *Dubliners*, only individual victims of institutional oppression. But then Herring has elsewhere stated the strange conviction that the older Joyce was interested in politics only to the extent that he opposed any progress that might change Ireland and thus render his portraits of Irish life obsolete ("Joyce's Politics"). As a result of this misunderstanding of Joyce's politics, Herring misunderstands Joyce's use of uncertainty as well, gesturing toward questionable political implications in *Dubliners*, but then turning to a formalist analysis that reifies uncertainty for the sake of uncertainty in the later works. As Brook Thomas has argued, this kind of interpretation reaches exactly the sort of comfortable conclusion that Joyce's uncertainty is specifically designed to undermine, so that "when we isolate the inevitability of error or incertitude as a reading principle, we run the risk of turning that principle into a new critical dogma" (160).

Indeed, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, like its counterpart in mathematics, Gödel's Theorem of Incompleteness, is exceedingly ill-suited as a basis for formalist arguments. Gödel's work implies that no

self-contained mathematical system can be complete, that information must always be brought in from the outside. Heisenberg's principle states that the product of any two non-commuting conjugate variables (examples include position and momentum, and energy and time) cannot be known beyond a specific level of uncertainty. To Heisenberg, this uncertainty arises because the direct measurement of reality is hopelessly compromised by the fact that the observer himself is a part of that reality and must interact with it in order to measure it.[33] To Heisenberg, "what we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning" (*Physics* 58).

But just as a system cannot be observed without an intruding observer, so can a text do nothing until someone reads it. A transposition of Heisenberg's principle to a literary text suggests that we can never read a text in the pristine purity of its own form, but that we in fact bring our own preconceptions along with us when we read. Bakhtin understood this analogy very well: "The experimenter constitutes part of the experimental system (in microphysics). One might say, likewise, that the person who participates in understanding constitutes part of the understood utterance, the text" (*Speech* 123). It is not a question of deciding whether pure formalist analysis is desirable; such an analysis is simply impossible.[34]

Of course, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle has little to do directly with events on the scale of human history, except perhaps for its psychological impact as a metaphor. But Joyce's treatment of the inadequacy of deterministic science to capture the richness and multiplicity of the world is also echoed in recent developments in

"macro" science. The new field of "chaos theory" suggests that it is impossible *in principle* to ever develop sufficiently detailed models to encompass all of the possibilities in many real-world predictions, even without resorting to the blatant unpredictability of events on a quantum scale. James Gleick presents an interesting (and accessible) discussion of chaos theory. Indeed, one of his central examples, involving the prediction of weather by computer models, is highly relevant to Joyce's theme of repetition with a difference. In particular, Gleick notes how the importance of small events impacts the mechanics of repetition. If tiny perturbations *weren't* important, the weather would quickly settle into strictly repetitive patterns, which we all know it doesn't do. And the reason it doesn't do so is that (as Joyce already knew in other areas) incredibly small factors can initiate chains of events that lead to very large changes in the weather. "In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point of crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos meant that such points were everywhere" (Gleick 23).

Chaos theory provides scientific support for the view that, if repetition of any complex set of circumstances does occur, it must occur with a difference, obviating (among other things) literal interpretations of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence.[35] But many non-literal interpretations are possible as well. Gilles Deleuze, for example, argues that for Nietzsche recurrence always involves repetition with a difference. He sees the idea of eternal recurrence as a completely affirmative one: "The lesson of the eternal return is that there is no

return of the negative. The eternal return means that being is selection. Only that which affirms or is affirmed returns" (189).

Another possible interpretation of the eternal return is largely an ethical one, and one that again points back to Joyce's emphasis on the importance of the seemingly insignificant. Alexander Nehamas argues that the doctrine of eternal recurrence is a manifestation of Nietzsche's belief that all things, even the tiniest ones, are interconnected and affect all other things. Because of this intimate mutual involvement of all things, it is impossible to change anything without changing everything else. Thus, according to Nehamas' interpretation, "[i]f anything in the world recurred, including an individual life or even a single moment within it, then everything in the world would recur in exactly identical fashion" (156). The implication is that we might as well affirm and accept the life that we have, treating it as if it would eternally recur, because if we were granted another life it would turn out exactly the same anyway.

Nehamas' view of eternal recurrence is entirely consistent with modern chaos theory, and in fact is based on the same notion of the interconnectedness of all things implied in that theory--that changing even the tiniest of things changes everything. His interpretation is also a view that is consistent with Nietzsche's poeticization of history, and indeed Nehamas attributes the doctrine of eternal recurrence to Nietzsche's aesthetic view of the world: "Nietzsche, I argue, looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he looks at it as if it were a literary text" (3). Thus it may not be surprising that Nehamas' view has much in common with the literary

interpretation of Nietzsche implied in Milan Kundera's *The Unbearable Lightness of Being.* Kundera's narrator meditates on Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return and suggests that, in a world without this return, the flow of time makes everything meaningless, or "unbearably light."

Thus, according to Kundera without recurrence we can comfortably ignore the past, since it no longer exists. "For how can we condemn something that is ephemeral, in transit? In the sunset of dissolution, everything is illuminated by the aura of nostalgia, even the guillotine" (4). The implications of this view in terms of history are vital. Kundera gives the example of Robespierre and the French Revolution, which have been "turned into mere words, theories, and discussions . . . frightening no one" (4). The echo here of the safe containment of Parnell in Hynes' poem in "Ivy Day in the Committee Room" is strong. To Kundera, without a notion of recurrence it is difficult to blame even Hitler for his actions. But with the notion that our lives recur an infinite number of times "the weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavy on every move we make" (5). The lightness of non-recurrence thus poses the threat of a total loss of moral responsibility, while the heaviness implied by recurrence would seem to threaten us with paralysis. Either repetition or non-repetition thus seems deadly, and indeed these two poles--ignoring the past entirely, or being oppressed and overwhelmed into inactivity by the past--are the Scylla and Charybdis between which both Joyce and Nietzsche seek to navigate a course by proposing dynamic views of history in which the past is constantly confronted by, but never allowed to overwhelm the present.

One way to do so is through repetition with a difference, which embraces, yet avoids both extremes. Indeed, Kundera suggests precisely this alternative, in a passage that not only echoes the continual recurrence of hats in the life of Bloom, but also provides a better description of the dialogic functioning of repetition with a difference in Joyce's (and Kundera's) fiction than any I can hope to produce:

> The bowler hat was a motif in the musical composition that was Sabina's life. It returned again and again, each time with a different meaning, and all the meanings flowed through the bowler hat like water through a riverbed. I might call it Heraclitus' ("You can't step twice into the same river") riverbed: the bowler hat was a bed through which each time Sabina saw another river flow, another *semantic* river: each time the same object would give rise to a new meaning, though all former meanings would resonate (like an echo, like a parade of echoes) together with the new one. Each new experience would resound, each time enriching the harmony. (88, Kundera's emphasis)

Notes

[1]On Aristotle, Stephen, and history, see Schneider (54-6).

[2]The absurd factual conglomerations of the "Ithaca" chapter illustrate this point most clearly. Lawrence describes this effect: "What the catechism of 'Ithaca' parodies is not the idea of relationship but the idea of a system that purports to halt the play of potential relationships. All sorts of relationships *do* exist in unexpected places--coincidences, repetitions, puns--but these 'facts' cannot be reduced to a schema" (195).

[3]Compare McHale's suggestion that the use of anachronisms and fantastic elements in the representation of history in postmodernist fiction serves to "call into question the reliability of official history" (96).

[4]And of course there is also a level on which Stephen's characterization of history as "a nightmare from which I am trying to awake" can be read simply as the sardonic statement of a frustrated teacher who wishes to escape from *teaching* history. This interpretation, in fact, tells us a great deal about Stephen. If, as Emmanuel Levinas would have it, teaching is one of the primary means through which one can ethically relate to the needs of the Other, then Stephen's distaste for teaching can be seen as another manifestation of his general inability to relate to others.

[5]Note, however, that Kenner's critical insight eventually overcame his religious blindness. When he reworked this essay for *Dublin's Joyce*, he corrected this sentence to read: "*Stephen* never expresses doubt of the existence of God nor of the essential validity of the priestly office" (*Dublin's* 127, my emphasis).

[6]See Restuccia for a discussion of the way in which *Ulysses* is also constructed much like the Bible: "Compelled by his attachment to his patriarchal past, Joyce . . . imitates the Church Fathers by producing a book modeled on biblical typology; but the idiosyncratic, extravagant parodic style of his imitation enables him to shake himself loose from them" (69).

[7]In this same essay, Foucault provides an interesting link between Nietzsche and Bakhtin, emphasizing the importance of parody to the unfolding of history and suggesting that "Genealogy is history in the form of a concerted carnival" (161).

[8]Poe excuses "certain classes of prose composition, such as 'Robinson Crusoe'" from the necessity for unity (1433). However, he does so in a condescending manner, implying that such works are necessarily inferior to works of true "literary art." At the time of this essay (1846), the novel was still highly marginal as a literary form. Poe's comment on Defoe's novel does, however, prefigure Bakhtin's views on the necessary lack of unity in the novel in an interesting way.

[9]Compare here Beckett's criticism that Balzac "can write the end of his book before he has finished the first paragraph because he has turned all his creatures into clockwork cabbages and can rely on their staying put wherever needed or staying going at whatever speed in whatever direction he chooses" (*Dream* 106).

[10]Clockwork models are specifically undermined in the text. After all, Tristram's troubles begin when his father forgets to wind the family grandfather clock at a pivotal time.

[11]This project is inherent in Joyce's eclectic taste in selecting intertextual materials with which to initiate dialogues in his work. Joyce's relationship to major figures such as Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare has long been recognized. However, as Kershner points out, "an important element in Joyce's literary genius is his appreciation of the importance of popular literature in the society of his time" (*Joyce* 301).

[12]A similar argument has been offered by Manganiello, who argues that Joyce's "reluctance to inculcate a rigid political view can be explained, in part, by his hatred of didacticism" (2). However, as I noted in my Introduction, Manganiello goes on to imply that Joyce's avoidance of political alignment was a means of keeping his art separate from politics, a conclusion very different from my own.

[13]One might say that both Joyce and Nietzsche view art as a privileged mode of hermeneutics, but not of epistemology, per the distinction made by Rorty (*Philosophy*).

[14]Representative of these "new" readings of Kant is the work of Derrida in *The Truth in Painting*. For a useful summary of Derrida's rereading of Kant, see David Carroll (*Paraesthetics* 134-44).

[15]Much commentary has been produced on the relationship between Joyce and Vico. Litz presents a good summary of this relationship. The essays collected by Verene are useful as well. Most of this commentary focusses on Joyce's use of Vico's *The New Science*. For a discussion of Joyce and Vico's *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, see Orr.

[16]For a reading of Vico within a Nietzschean framework, See Said (345-81). On the other hand, for an emphasis on Vico's *difference* from Nietzsche, see Megill ("Vico").

[17]Vico's work also resonates with that of Marx in interesting ways. For a brief discussion of this relationship (which notes, among other things, that Vico is well known in Russia), see Kamenka. See also the essays collected by Tagliacozzo.

[18]I discuss this aspect of Joyce's project with regard to the myth of the Fall in more detail elsewhere ("*Finnegans*").

[19]Any given aspect of Joyce's writing tends to be informed by numerous influences. Thus, while Nietzsche and Vico provide useful illumination of Joyce's use of myth and the concomitant cyclic view of history, other analogues can be cited as well. Nadel suggests that Joyce's view of history is strongly influenced by the tradition of Jewish thought (44-7). He notes that, for the Jews, "[h]istory, to the extent that it became universalized, became myth" (45). Moreover, the Jewish model of history is "an amalgam of a cyclical and linear pattern with restoration not repetition its proper direction" (47).

[20]An association of the masturbating Bloom with the bird girl obviously resonates with the discussions in "Oxen of the Sun" of the sexual lures of "Bird-in-the-Hand" (324).

[21]The repetition of the "bird girl" epiphany in "Nausicaa" involves a reversal of gender roles--again, one of Joyce's most frequently employed techniques for injecting difference into his repetitions, as well as for calling into question the validity of traditional gender boundaries. Senn has suggested that Gerty in this scene is actually an autobiographical depiction of Joyce himself filtered though a parodic sex-role reversal ("Nausicaa" 290). That one could also read this episode the opposite way--with Bloom as Stephen and Gerty as the bird girl--only strengthens the effect of the confusion of gender boundaries, showing them to be reversible.

[22]Hart actually employs the spelling "leitmotiv." I have used "leitmotif" throughout as more common n English, except when quoting Hart directly.

[23]On Joyce's appropriation of clichés and other familiar phrases in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* see also the excellent discussion by Levine.

[24]Elsewhere I have compared this process to the release of energy in the fission of the atomic nucleus ("Postmodernism").

[25]*Ulysses* would seem to represent a transition text in this sense, beginning with a relatively "normal" ratio of symbolic to semiotic language, and then gradually moving more and more into the realm of the semiotic (or the openly dialogic) as the text proceeds.

[26]Even the novel language of the *Wake* is constructed from bits and pieces of pre-owned words.

[27]These quotations derive originally from Samuel Butler and from John Howard Payne, respectively, but by Joyce's day they were already clichés of common speech.

[28]As usual in the *Wake*, this motif activates a variety of intertexts, referring not only to *Portrait*, but also to the fairy-tale tradition to which *Portrait* itself refers.

[29]Similarly, note that the titles of most of the stories from *Dubliners* are embedded in warped form in pages 186-7 of the *Wake*. Note again that the appropriation is bi-directional. The mentions of *Dubliners*, *Portrait*, and *Ulysses* in the *Wake* add resonance to those previous texts as well as to the *Wake* itself.

[30]Whether this attribution comes from the narrator or from Haines himself is unclear. In this passage, the voices of characters and narrator are so intertwined that it is often impossible to separate them unequivocally.

[31]This motif, as often happens in Joyce, seems to anticipate developments in our own contemporary world as well, particularly the modern world of television evangelism, in which religiosity, venality, and sexual depravity have become virtually synonymous.

[32]Compare Derrida's contention that the field of anthropology (and by implication all fields) is theoretically, and not just empirically, unknowable in a total sense ("Structure" 260).

[33]Like so many features of quantum mechanical theory, the exact implications of the Uncertainty Principle remain a matter of interpretation. Hooker, for example, notes that "there are almost as many philosophies of quantum theory as there are major quantum theorists" (132). Bohr never accepted Heisenberg's view that uncertainty is the

result of a disturbance produced during the measuring process. Rather he sees the effect in more philosophical terms, arguing that in fact the limitations on simultaneous measurement of conjugate variables are fundamentally related to the nature of language, which inherently forces a distinction between subject and object, a distinction that does not accord with reality on the subatomic level. For a detailed treatment of Bohr's philosophy, see Hooker (132-209). For a discussion of the debates among various interpretations of quantum mechanics, see Putnam.

[34]Spanos derives a similar deconstruction of formalism from the existentialist engagement embodied in Heideggerian phenomenology, arguing for a hermeneutics that "recognizes, with Heidegger, that there can be no presuppositionless understanding of literary texts" ("Postmodern" 224).

[35]Danto claims that eternal recurrence is already precluded by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which suggests that the total amount of entropy in the universe must continually increase, preventing any cyclic model of cosmic history (208). However, Danto assumes that the Second Law itself is invariant, whereas it is perfectly permissible from a scientific perspective to argue that the Second Law only applies in certain phases of the evolution of the universe and not in others, which would make repetition possible after all.

CHAPTER 6
WHAT WE HAVE INSTEAD OF GOD: ALTERNATIVES TO THE THEOLOGICAL SUBJECT IN *ULYSSES* AND *FINNEGANS WAKE*

Virginia Woolf once suggested that the works of both Joyce and Dorothy Richardson are in danger of being ruined by an undue emphasis on "the damned egotistical self" (*Writer's Diary* 22). Yet a little more than half a century later, Hélène Cixous, whose project resonates with that of Woolf in a number of ways, praises Joyce for his deconstruction of the self, noting the important way in which "Joyce's work has contributed to the discrediting of the subject" ("Joyce" 15).[1] Moreover, Woolf's views on the solipsism of Joyce's fiction were typical of early reactions to his work, especially among critics with Marxist orientations, while Cixous' comment is quite representative of more contemporary views, especially among critics with French accents, literal or figurative. Given the palinodic and self-contradictory nature of Joyce's fiction it is not necessarily surprising that such antithetical views of his work could arise. The conclusions of both Woolf and Cixous are quite understandable given the dialogic nature of Joyce's treatment of subjectivity. Joyce does conduct, as Cixous notes, an incessant assault on the traditional notion of the transcendental subject, but in order to do so he must constantly maintain, as Woolf argues, a focus on subjectivity in order to keep that target within his sights. It is for this same reason that Woolf's own work, meant to be antithetical to the "egotistical self," is so vitally concerned with the question of

subjectivity. Thus, observers such as Leon Edel, who characterized both Joyce and Woolf as practitioners of the "novel of subjectivity" or the "psychological novel," are correct in identifying the problem of the subject as perhaps the central concern of in the work of both Joyce and Woolf, even while these writers are conducting subversive campaigns to radically undermine traditional notions of the subject.

The major political impact of Joyce's work is, in fact, embodied in his treatment of the subject. As MacCabe notes, the deconstruction of the stable subject "has profound political implications for a society based on a notion of the individual as an independent and self-sufficient entity" (*Revolution* 152). The subject is the principal underpinning upon which modern bourgeois society is constructed, and any attack on the subject is bound to have serious political ramifications. In the case of Joyce, both the extreme textuality of his writing and his powerful concern with history are directly related to his concern with subjectivity. Moreover, it is in the area of subjectivity that Joyce's work not only performs its most radically destructive subversions of the reigning social order but also produces its most positive statement of a possible alternative vision.

History and Subjectivity: The Self as a Narrative Act

That the questions of history and of subjectivity are intimately related can be seen by a return to Kundera's meditations on the ethical implications of historical recurrence in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being.* The loss of moral responsibility that Kundera associates with a non-recurring history has to do with the difficulty of identifying a

stable subject to whom that responsibility can be assigned. If each moment passes, is gone, and can be forgotten, then there is no continuity of the subject (or anything else) over time. Pynchon explores this same theme in *V.* in the story of Fausto Maijstral, who labels himself as Fausto I, Fausto II, Fausto III, and Fausto IV at various points in his journal to indicate the various phases through which he has passed:

> We can justify any apologia simply by calling life a successive rejection of personalities. No apologia is any more than a romance--half a fiction--in which all the successive identities taken on and rejected by the writer as a function of linear time are treated as separate characters. (*V.* 306)

This kind of denial of responsibility for past actions because they were done by a former self carries powerful echoes of the ideology of conversion espoused by Augustine, who can openly confess his past sins since he is no longer the sinner who committed them. Not surprisingly, given the many parallels between Augustine and Stephen Dedalus, this motif is one with which Stephen is greatly concerned as well. James Maddox notes that in *Ulysses* Stephen "philosophically and existentially . . . seeks some reunion between his sense of himself as a series of so many flickering serial manifestations and his sense of himself as an enduring entity" (34). Indeed, Stephen spends a great deal of time contemplating the enigma of the continuity of the self, as signalled early on by his reflections on his schoolboy days at Clongowes Wood. The young boy that we saw in the early pages of *Portrait* both is and is not the same one that we see fifteen years later in the early pages of *Ulysses.* As Stephen himself puts it: "I am another now and yet the same" (*Ulysses* 10). And later, Stephen specifically links the

question of the continuity of the self to that of individual responsibility. In the library scene of "Scylla and Charybdis" he muses on the pound that he had borrowed five months earlier from the poet George Russell, attempting to produce an argument that he is not responsible for repaying the money, since it was an earlier, different self that received the loan: "Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound" (156).

But then Stephen considers the possibility that there is more to the self than the physical body. After all, even though the actual molecules of the body may be continually exchanged for new ones, the form of the body itself remains identifiably continuous: "And as the mole on my right breast is where it was when I was born, though all my body has been woven of new stuff time after time, so through the ghost of the unquiet father the image of the unliving son looks forth" (159-60). This notion of continuity of form through the process of material flux suggests Aristotle, for whom temporality itself is constituted through the process by which the potentiality of matter becomes the actuality, or entelechy, of form. Stephen himself openly acknowledges his Aristotelian source: "But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms" (156).

But Stephen's emphasis on the role of memory in establishing an identity that is continuous over time also brings us back to Augustine, who argued the inadequacy of Aristotle's definition of time as movement. Augustine, in fact, provides a crucial point in the history of meditations on the mutual involvement of subjectivity and temporality. In his famous exposition on time in Book XI of the *Confessions*, he

proposes a psychological theory of temporality which suggests that the past exists only as an element of human memory, while the future exists only in our anticipation of things to come. In a sense, then, the only time is the present, and

> neither the future nor the past exist . . . Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation. (269)

Augustine's emphasis on the "presentness" of both past and future has a tendency to dechronologize time and may be related to the fact that he constantly contrasts human time to the eternal perspective of God, who sees all times as one. Moreover, temporality becomes a virtual definition of what it means to be human in a fallen world. Only humans experience time. God does not experience time because He exists in eternity, while animals presumably do not experience time because they lack the mental ability to perform the necessary activities of memory and expectation.

Augustine idea here is not unusual, and his distinction between man and animal anticipates the one proposed by Nietzsche in his "Uses and Disadvantages of History" essay. Nietzsche notes that an animal has no sense of time, that "it is contained in the present" (61, 1). And the reason is that animals have no memory, and so cannot connect one minute to the next. One result, again curiously echoing Augustine's emphasis on the temporality of language, is that animals cannot speak. Nietzsche proposes a mini-parable in which a man has asked an animal why it does not speak: "The animal would like to answer, and say: 'The reason is I

always forget what I was going to say'--but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent" (60-1, 1).

In short, Nietzsche suggests, to be human requires a sense of connectedness over time, and the "Uses and Disadvantages" essay is an extended meditation on how one should make productive use of this connectedness without being overwhelmed by it. But this mutual involvement of subjectivity and temporality seems self-evident, and the whole notion of human agency requires a certain amount of temporal continuity of the subject. Clearly, the assignment of responsibility for any action requires that the coherence of character be maintained across temporal boundaries from the past preceding the action, through the present in which the action occurs, and into the future in which the responsibility is assigned. In a study of time in the novel, Hans Meyerhoff notes that questions of self are quite generally linked to questions of time in the narrative. These questions are important and fundamental:

> Time is particularly significant to man because it is inseparable from the concept of the self. . . . What we call the self, person, or individual is experienced and known only against the background of the succession of temporal moments and changes constituting his biography. But how can that which constantly changes be called the same person or an identical self? (1-2)

Or, as Salman Rushdie puts it in *Midnight's Children*, "consciousness, the awareness of oneself as a homogenous entity in time, a blend of past and present, is the glue of personality, holding together our then and our now" (420). Again, the self exists only insofar as it has an experience of connectedness over time. Yet, by Augustine's argument, time exists only as it exists in the human mind. We seem to

have reached a fundamental aporia--temporality is generated by humanity, but humanity is generated by temporality. In an important three-volume study of approaches to the phenomenology of time, Paul Ricoeur compares Augustine's treatment of time to those proposed by thinkers ranging from Aristotle to Heidegger and concludes that such aporias are inevitable. To Ricoeur, the only solution must be a poetic one: "temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect discourse of narration" (III, 241). Elsewhere, Ricoeur states this thesis even more directly: "time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience" (I, 3).[2]

Of course, Ricoeur's own model is circular, which he readily admits--temporality generates narrative even as narrative generates temporality. But he sees it as a productive circle, more of an "endless spiral" than a circle (I, 72). This "spiral" model of circularity is already highly reminiscent of the paradigm of repetition with a difference that proved so prominent in our investigations of the views of history held by Nietzsche, Joyce, and others in the last chapter. But this echo is not surprising. Ricoeur's comments on time and narrative clearly participate in the same movement toward the poeticization of history that I discussed in the last chapter. Moreover, Ricoeur's "poetic" solution to the combined paradox of subjectivity and temporality directly echoes the suggestion by Alexander Nehamas that the implication of Nietzsche's comments on subjectivity is that each of us should live his life as if he were a literary character. According to Nehamas, what

Nietzsche does in his work is simply to produce one example of a commendable life, to fashion one exemplary literary character, i.e. himself. "Nietzsche's texts therefore do not describe but, in exquisite detail, *exemplify* the perfect instance of his ideal character. And this character is none other than the character these very texts constitute: Nietzsche himself" (Nehamas 232-3).

In short, Nietzsche implies that we should conduct our lives in the same way that authors construct narratives. Similarly, Ricoeur's study depicts narrative as the critical link between subjectivity and history. To Ricoeur, we confront history by constructing it in narrative form, but in the process of constituting these narratives we also constitute ourselves. It is the connecting thread of such narratives that binds all the different "Faustos" or "Stephens" into one:

> What justifies our taking the subject of an action, so designated by his, her, or its proper name, as the same throughout a life that stretches from birth to death? The answer has to be narrative. To answer the question "Who?" as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully put it, is to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the "who." And the identity of this "who" therefore itself must be a narrative identity. (III, 246)

It is important to recognize that the "identity" cited by Ricoeur here does not imply a sameness over time, but merely a narrative connectedness. Thus, narrative identity "can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of a lifetime" (III, 246). The narrative subject, then, is constantly in the process of being constituted through the dynamic unfolding of the narrative in which she participates. The resultant interactive nature of the narrative identity so produced has important social consequences. For example, as Ricoeur notes, the

concept of narrative identity can be applied to communities as well as to individuals. Communal identity is involved with history in an obvious way. But it is also clear that "nonhistorical" narratives such as fiction and myth can contribute greatly to a community's sense of its own identity.

Indeed, as I showed in the last chapter, for thinkers like Nietzsche and Vico (and Joyce) "history" is not finally separable from fiction and myth. Ricoeur's work lends support to the notion that individual history is constituted in a fashion similar to that of communal history, implying that my discussions of history in the last chapter are also directly applicable to the question of subjectivity, which, in fact, becomes the same question as history. Furthermore, Ricoeur's work suggests a vital role for fiction in the development of viable narrative structures through which both individual and communal identities can be constituted.

Ricoeur himself produces psychoanalysis as a paradigm of narrative envisionment, arguing that in the process of the interaction of patient and analyst, acceptable narratives are constructed which allow the patient to live more comfortably. Indeed, the intersubjective component of the actual psychoanalytic encounter does work against the traditional notion of the transcendental ego. However, much of traditional psychoanalysis, by placing so much emphasis on anterior infantile experience, would seem to place severe restrictions on the potential for creative production of a narrative identity. One thinks here particularly of the fierce attacks of radical thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari, who suggest that psychoanalysis is restrictive, rather than creative of narrative. To them psychoanalysis is perhaps the ultimate

metanarrative, irresistibly imposing its own Procrustean structure everywhere it looks. Indeed, the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity has proved politically problematic to a number of observers, particularly Marxists and feminists.

The psychoanalytic Oedipal drama seems particularly impoverishing in its strict emphasis on fixed gender roles. In Lacan's reinscription of Freud, gender identity becomes a linguistic construct rather than a biological category, and for this reason Lacan's work has provided inspiration to a number of feminist thinkers, especially in France. But even in Lacan's psychoanalysis the very constitution of the subject depends upon the recognition and acceptance of sexual difference. Linguistic or otherwise, this difference still necessarily depends upon a dualistic opposition between the masculine and the feminine that, like all such dualities, irresistibly becomes a hierarchical one, with "woman" being defined in terms of her deviance from "man" and being cast in the role of Other through which "man" assures himself of his own identity. Teresa de Lauretis notes this effect and suggests that "[t]hat is why psychoanalysis does not address, cannot address, the complex and contradictory relation of women to Woman, which it instead defines as a simple equation: women = Woman = Mother" (*Technologies* 20).

As opposed to psychoanalysis, de Lauretis proposes the model of an ongoing constitution of subjectivity through "experience":

> Through that process one places oneself or is placed in social reality, and so perceives and comprehends as subjective (referring to, even originating in, oneself) those relations--material, economic, and interpersonal--which are in fact social and, in a larger perspective, historical. This process is continuous, its achievement unending or daily renewed. For each person, therefore, subjectivity is an ongoing construction, not a fixed point of

> departure or arrival from which one then interacts with the world. (*Alice* 159)

The model of "experience" espoused by de Lauretis is thus a highly non-teleological one, in which the subject is constituted on an ongoing basis, but never completed. As such, it is very compatible with the thought of Bakhtin on subjectivity: "As long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not yet uttered his ultimate word" (*Problems* 59). The process that de Lauretis articulates is also thoroughly compatible with Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity, with one additional clarification. Her rejection of a "fixed point of departure or arrival" indicates the way in which the narratives used for the generation of subjective identities must not themselves be based on predictable paradigms or metanarratives, but instead must have the flexibility to reflect the contingency of developments in the real world of history. In this case, Joyce's disruption of univocal narratives of history contributes in a powerful way to the establishment of models of subjectivity that can respond to the contingency of history in a positive way. As MacCabe points out, Joyce's denial of history as smooth teleological progression teaches us that

> one can refuse the ready-made identities offered to us in order to investigate the reality of the processes that construct us. By denying an end to history, we can participate in the infinite varieties of the present. ("Introduction" 35)

It is useful to contrast the dynamic kind of subjective constitution posited by de Lauretis with the efforts of Stephen Dedalus to develop a noble vision of himself as subject. The difference is clear: Stephen's

attempts to pattern himself after ideal models partake of exactly the sorts of "fixed points of departure" that de Lauretis rejects. Stephen's idealism and aversion to the contingency of temporality will not allow him to accept a truly historical vision of subjective constitution. He displays the paradigmatic attitude of the Romantic artist, attempting to evade temporality by an escape into a timeless vision of himself as unified transcendental subject.

But if, in fact, the subject has an existence only insofar as it participates in a narrative structure over time, then at its ultimate this Romantic privileging of the self would paradoxically appear to dissolve the self out of existence altogether.[3] By removing herself from time, the Romantic artist would also seem to be removing herself from participation in the narratives that make it possible for her to define herself in the first place. Joyce's texts participate in this same dilemma. Their disruption of traditional narrative modes strikes a blow against predictable narration, thus providing a more viable model for the constitution of the subject in the unpredictable flow of history. At the same time, if this disruption is taken too far, so that the construction of a narrative is made impossible altogether, then Joyce's fiction (and de Lauretis' model) would appear to be in danger of projecting a complete loss of subjective coherence.

Subjectivity and Schizophrenia: Can the Subject Be Too *De-centered?*

Attridge notes the way in which Joyce's decentering of the subject often takes on an explicitly physical character, in which parts of the

body are synecdochically substituted in grammatical constructions that would normally involve the whole person. This move

> challenges momentarily our untroubled belief in the human subject as unitary, unconstrained, and capable of originating action from a single center of consciousness. Here the sharp focus that is the goal of traditional realistic narrative has been narrowed to a point at which it threatens the subjective unity it usually serves to sustain. (*Peculiar* 161)

Attridge sees a positive political statement in Joyce's fragmentation of the body, yet it is also true that such images of bodily dissociation are a typical symptom of schizophrenia. Many aspects of the language of schizophrenics parallel techniques used by Joyce. For example, Rosenbaum and Sonne (whose work is informed by Lacan) note that schizophrenic speech is frequently characterized by a confusion in deixis, or in who is speaking to whom, a common effect in the complex voicing of Joyce's texts: "The unreasonableness of the schizophrenic's ideas is due to the fact that their anchoring to the situation of speaking or writing with its time, space, persons, and so on is unstable and not marked in the text" (24). Further, the perceived experience of bodily fragmentation is directly related to the way in which schizophrenics use language: "The fragmentation of the imaginary body is synonymous with an effective destruction of the deictic dynamics of the text" (77).[4]

This kind of effect has been extensively explored by Fredric Jameson, who sees a loss of subjective coherence as being symptomatic of life under late consumer capitalism. From a Marxist point of view, capitalist society disrupts the normal conception of human agency by separating the worker from the products of his labor, creating the effect described by Marx as "alienation." Jameson argues that this alienation

becomes particularly acute in late consumer capitalism, leading to a fragmented sense of self, and in particular to an inability to maintain a sense of continuity in time that is reminiscent of the symptoms of the schizophrenic patient, particularly as described by Lacan:

> he or she does not have our experience of temporal continuity . . . but is condemned to live a perpetual present with which the various moments of his or her past have little connection and for which there is no conceivable future on the horizon. . . . The schizophrenic thus does not know personal identity in our sense, since our feeling of identity depends on our sense of the persistence of the "I" and the "me" over time. ("Postmodernism" 119)

Jameson suggests that literary texts participate in this loss of temporal continuity, since they themselves are the products of the labor of writers who are alienated from their own texts. Therefore, in the age of late consumer capitalism, texts themselves become schizophrenic, depicting both time and the self as fragmented and discontinuous. Jameson particularly associates this movement toward schizophrenia with postmodernist texts, and indeed the "schizo-text" has become a standard category in the critical discourse surrounding postmodernism.[5] Many postmodernist authors have demonstrated a strong awareness of the way in which their fragmented texts are associated with the modern sense of temporal discontinuity. For example, Italo Calvino's highly fragmented *If on a winter's night a traveler* (whose own fragmentation seems so illustrative of the effect that Jameson describes) explicitly posits a fragmented sense of temporality of exactly the kind described by Jameson. Moreover, Calvino's narrator suggests that such fragmentation is generic to the modern novel and that a sense of time as continuous flow can be

found only in the traditional novel of the progress-oriented nineteenth century:

> the dimension of time has been shattered, we cannot love or think except in fragments of time each of which goes off along its own trajectory and immediately disappears. We can discover the continuity of time only in novels of that period when time no longer seemed stopped and did not yet seem to have exploded, a period that lasted no more than a hundred years. (8)

If on a winter's night a traveler suggests that the modern fragmentation of time leads to a fragmentation in the novel, of which Calvino's text is itself symptomatic. Other postmodernist texts make the link between formal fragmentation in the novel and the modern fragmentation of the human subject more explicit by depicting characters who undergo fragmentation in a variety of ways. Thus in Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* Saleem Sinai begins to feel cracks propagate through his bones as he physically begins to fall apart. Rushdie gives the motif a specifically political twist, relating individual and communal identities by suggesting that Sinai's dissolution arises from the split between India and Pakistan. Rushdie suggests that Sinai falls apart because he is "abandoning consciousness, seceding from history" (420).

Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* provides what may be the best illustration of Jameson's comments on the postmodern, especially in the way that it directly mirrors its own fragmentation in the "scattering" of its central character, Tyrone Slothrop, who simply dissolves into the landscape: "Scattered all over the Zone. It's doubtful if he can ever be 'found' again, in the conventional sense of 'positively identified and detained'" (712). Significantly, Pynchon relates the scattering of Slothrop to precisely the sort of loss of temporal continuity articulated

by Jameson. This connection is made explicit by the fact that Slothrop's loss of identity is governed by "Mondaugen's Law":

> Personal density . . . is directly proportional to temporal bandwidth.
>
> "Temporal bandwidth" is the width of your present, your *now*. It is the familiar "Δt" considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense of Now, the more tenuous you are. (509)

Slothrop's scattering, then, is what happens when personal density reaches zero as a result of temporal bandwidth doing the same, just as Sinai's fragmentation occurs because he has lost "the glue of personality, holding together our then and our now."[6]

The prevalence of the theme of fragmentation as a result of loss in temporal continuity in authors such as Calvino, Rushdie, and Pynchon seems to support Jameson's contention that "schizophrenia" is a central defining characteristic of postmodernist literature. On the other hand, the self-consciousness with which these authors deal with this theme indicates that their texts are not so much participating in the fragmentation of the modern self as commenting upon it, perhaps in ways that might productively combat that fragmentation. None of these authors celebrate fragmentation in the sense, say, of Deleuze and Guattari.

In any case, there is clearly much more at stake in this kind of characterization than mere textual play. The wholeness traditionally attributed to literary characters mirrors the conventional conception of literary texts as unified wholes, which is in turn heavily implicated in the ideology of the unitary human subject. In particular, the notion of a unitary subject is clearly implicated in organicist notions of the

unitary text such as that espoused by the New Criticism. Meyerhoff suggests this relationship in an argument that would be endorsed not only by the New Critics, but by Stephen Dedalus as well:

> Literary works, I submit, have always acknowledged the interdependence of the two unities of time and the self (or the characters and actions depicted in and through time). Ultimately, this is what constitutes the unity of the work of art itself, so that there is a functional correlation in three respects: time, self, and the work of art mutually and reciprocally exhibit the same pattern of continuity, unity, and identity. (37)

Indeed, one could view the entire history of attempts to produce organic models of narrative, from the Aristotelian conception of unity to Hegelian history to the formalism of the New Critics, as a consistent ideologically-motivated project to shore up the notion of the self as an unproblematic whole. I have emphasized throughout this study the ways in which Joyce's texts, through a constant process of palinodic self-contradiction and resistance to closure, as well as through a process of constantly inviting the reader to undertake unpredictable intertextual excursions, radically undermine any formalist notion of the text as a unified organic whole. In so doing, they simultaneously undermine the notion of the self as a static totality, which is based on the same ideology. Joyce's work, and especially his later work, can be seen as a systematic dismantling of the various strategies produced by Western culture in the effort to gain a sense of subjective wholeness. This project, however, is not an entirely negative one. To some extent Joyce's texts participate in the trend toward schizophrenia that Jameson describes, but the result is not a complete loss of the human subject. Rather, Joyce's debunking of the notion of a Kantian transcendental

subject points toward a powerful new social conception of subjectivity and to a mode of subjective involvement in which the idealist notion of intentionality is replaced by the historicized concept of agency.

Joyce's Deconstruction of the Author

Joyce's attack on the discrete, autonomous subject begins, as it were, at the source, with a radical subversion of the traditional bourgeois concept of authorship. Traditionally, one of the most powerful unifying images used to project a sense of unity into literary texts has been the picture of the originating author, standing proud and God-like behind the work that he has produced. Indeed, the whole notion of the author as creator and originator is a highly theological one, as modern thinkers such as Barthes and Foucault have emphasized. Foucault, for example, notes the way in which the traditional definition of the author "is directly derived from the manner in which Christian tradition authenticated (or rejected) the texts at its disposal" ("What" 150). Foucault goes on to suggest that in reality "the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses" (159).

Barthes' notorious "death of the author" is perhaps the best known statement of such new conceptions of authorship:

> We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pécuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing,

> the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. (146)

Clearly, the death of the author is closely connected to the Nietzschean death of God. But the theological view of authorship is also closely connected to the notion of the autonomous transcendental subject--thus Foucault's argument that when Nietzsche announced the death of God he announced the death of "man" as well (*Order* 306).

Joyce's texts stand as especially powerful exemplars of the decentered model of authorship that poststructuralist thinkers such as Barthes and Foucault suggest. In these texts the "author" serves not as a unitary origin of meaning, but as a nodal point where various social, historical, and literary discourses converge and engage in dialogue.[7] Joyce himself once declared that he was "quite content to go down to posterity as a scissors and paste man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description" (*Letters* 297). The whole notion of authorial intention becomes problematic when applied to Joyce's multi-voiced *bricolage* texts, but at the same time Joyce, with scissors and paste in hand, still plays an important role as agent in assembling these texts. Not just anybody can construct *Finnegans Wake*, even if it is composed of bits and pieces of previously-owned discourse.

In his notes "Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book," Bakhtin indicates the way in which his concept of dialogism preserves an active role for the author:

> Our point of view in no way assumes a passivity on the part of the author, who would then merely assemble others' points of view, others' truths, completely denying his own point of view, his own

> truth. . . . The author is profoundly *active*, but his activity is of a special *dialogic* sort. . . . [I]t is dialogic activity no less active than the activity that finalizes, materializes, explains, and kills causally, that drowns out the others' voice with nonsemantic arguments. (*Problems* 285)

In short, Bakhtin replaces intentionality with agency, as Alan Singer notes: "The concept of the dialogic is thus revealed to be an implied critique of intentionality as a totalizing term, but *not* an elision of the subjective agency marked in intentionality" ("Dis-position" 14).

Yet, despite such revisionist notions of authorial agency, Joyce himself also stands as an excellent example of the traditional cult of authorial intention. Despite the clear way in which his texts undermine any notion of authorial origination, Joyce the man himself emerges time and again as a hero (and sometimes villain) of modern literature. Joyce's texts invite the reader to bring additional texts into the reading process, an invitation that moves this process far beyond the realm of authorial intention, since each reader will bring texts with him into this activity. Ironically, though, one of the most frequently cited intertexts in Joyce criticism is the life of Joyce himself.

Propelled by the availability of Ellmann's excellent biography and a variety of other textual evidence, any number of critics have attempted to explain various elements of Joyce's work through recourse to biographical detail. *Ulysses*, for example, becomes much more coherent when many of the episodes, locations, and characters are identified according to the role they played in Joyce's own life in Dublin. Many readers, searching desperately for outposts of realistic decorum in Joyce's dense textual wilderness, gain an odd sort of comfort by being told that Mulligan is Gogarty or by being told that 7 Eccles Street

really did exist. The extent to which readers find this sort of realistic recuperation reassuring can be gauged by the persistence of readings of Stephen Dedalus as a direct avatar of the young Joyce.

Joyce himself seems to invite this sort of identification by filling his texts with people and events from his own life, sometimes thinly disguised and often not disguised at all. But it is the very prominence of Joyce's own presence in his fiction that paradoxically defeats any attempts to recuperate that fiction as the product of a unifying creator. In the final analysis, the effect of all of this intrusion of Joyce's historical Dublin into his fictional texts is a radical ontological instability that calls into question any notion of those texts as somehow arising from events in Joyce's biography that are prior to and that literally author-ize those texts. If, for example, *Ulysses* and Joyce's biography are placed in an intertextual dialogue on the same plane, then who can say whether Mulligan is Gogarty, or whether in fact Gogarty is Mulligan?

The prominence of Joyce in his own work is a clear cause of Woolf's concern over his egotism. After all, to Woolf the goal of the artist should be to "practise anonymity" (*Writer's Diary* 119). Yet Woolf's comments on the anonymous artist often sound suspiciously similar to Stephen's privileging of the invisible God-like author (which seems the opposite of Woolf's intention).[8] Meanwhile, it is precisely by not remaining anonymous that Joyce undercuts any attempt to picture him as God-like creator standing above and separate from his work. This God, after all, is supposed to be invisible, and Joyce is anything but that in his later work. The constant changes in style and the various textual

intrusions such as the headlines in "Aeolus" or the pastiches in "Cyclops" are completely unmotivated by the demands of the narrative itself, thus calling attention to the artificial ministrations of the author. Indeed, Marilyn French argues that "Joyce, in *Ulysses*, is probably the most intrusive author ever to write a piece of fiction" (267).

Actually, Joyce in *Finnegans Wake* is even more intrusive than Joyce in *Ulysses*. In the *Wake* nearly every word has a feel of having been prepared from scratch by the author, even as we are continually reminded that the flour and sugar used to cook up these verbal delicacies were borrowed from a variety of neighbors. McHale notes the constant presence of Joyce in the *Wake*, suggesting that here he "is not merely distributed among the characters but disseminated among the *words* of the text; like Shem the Penman, he is the substance of the text" (209). Joyce injects references to his own life and works (including the *Wake* itself) into the *Wake* in a particularly overt way. In one of these examples of self-reference, Joyce also reminds us of the folly of an overly-simplistic historico-biographical reading in the attempts to identify the author ("who in hallhagal wrote the durn thing anyhow?") of the letter dug up by Biddy the hen:

> To conclude purely negatively from the positive absence of political odia and monetary requests that its page cannot ever have been a penproduct of a man or woman of that period or those parts is only one more unlookedfor conclusion leaped at, being tantamount to inferring from the nonpresence of inverted commas (sometimes called quotation marks) on any page that its author was always constitutionally incapable of misappropriating the spoken words of others. (108.29-36)

Joyce's own refusal to use quotation marks is more than an affectation. This lack of delimiting punctuation reduces the normal distance between narration and spoken discourse, thus signaling not an inability to appropriate the words of others so much as an inability to do anything else. MacCabe suggests that the classic realist text involves the presence of a privileged meta-language, that of the narrator, which dominates the other voices in the text (particularly those of the characters) and guarantees coherence to the text. This narrative voice, clearly related to the concept of the author, provides a discursive position with which the reader can identify: "The classic realist text should not . . . be understood in terms of some homology to the order of things but as a specific hierarchy of discourses which places the reader in a position of dominance with regard to the stories and characters" (*Revolution* 15-6). But "Joyce's texts, without inverted commas, lack any final and privileged discourse within them which dominates the others through its claim of access to the real" (27).

Subjectivity and Narrative Voice

MacCabe's analysis points to the way in which Joyce's refusal to provide a privileged narrative voice is directly related to his refusal of authorial mastery. Both strategies deny the reader any position within the text from which he can generate a fantasy of individual dominance. The voices in Joyce's work are thoroughly dialogic; the voice of the narrator is always merged with a variety of other voices, including those of characters, as well as other texts and discourses. As a result the narrator is never in a position to exert monological

authority in the text, just as the reader is never able to gain complete interpretive mastery. Mahaffey points out the strongly anti-authoritarian implications of Joyce's disavowal of authorial intention, suggesting that Joyce teaches us

> that a reading guided solely by the desire to uncover the author's meaning relies upon the same assumptions about authority--here authorship--that support monotheistic religions and centralized governments, those licensed by representation as well as those established by fiat. (1)

The complexity of narrative voice in Joyce's work has long been recognized, as Kenner's "Uncle Charles Principle" and the Benstock update to that principle indicate. But neither of these models is adequate to account for the radically multiple voicing of Joyce's texts or for the ideological implications of that voicing in undermining any notion of an autonomous transcendental subject as originator of discourse. *Ulysses* presents us with discourse that is not fully recuperable as emanating either from a narrator or from any other identifiable character or object in the text. For example, though the first few chapters are mostly recoverable as either straight third-person narration or *style indirect libre*, in the "Aeolus" chapter we are suddenly presented with a series of newspaper headlines with no identifiable origin:

> In "Aeolus" the book begins to advertise its own artifice, and in doing so it calls attention to the processes of reading and writing. For the headings not only provide a puzzle to the reader, but also are a sign of a new kind of writing in the book--a writing that undermines the norms established in the first six chapters. (Lawrence 58)

Similarly, it is impossible to identify any individual as the originator of the various stylistic pastiches interwoven with the

narrative of the "Nameless One" in "Cyclops." And this effect works in both directions. Not only do the attitudes of characters and various other discursive influences contribute to the narration of *Ulysses*, but a variety of voices also reflect back in the other direction, infecting character speech. Thus, in "Cyclops," various voices ranging from the heroic epic to legalese to medical jargon to modern journalism continually intrude in the narrative. But they also irrupt in the speeches of individual characters, as in the Euphuistic announcement by Bob Doran:

> Let me, said he, so far presume upon our acquaintance which, however slight it may appear if judged by the standard of mere time, is founded, as I hope and believe, on a sentiment of mutual esteem as to request of you this favour. But, should I have overstepped the limits of reserve let the sincerity of my feelings be the excuse for my boldness. (257)

One is reminded here of Tolstoy's comment that Shakespeare's dialogue was flawed because nobody really talks that way. Indeed, though the narrative situation is quite different, the analogy is close, because in both cases the styles of the speeches of characters are being determined not by realistic representation of individual intention but by discursive convention. The rhetorical climate of *Ulysses* is, however, more complex than that of Shakespeare's drama, because so many conventions are being invoked at once--including one point at which characters begin to speak in Shakespearean iambic pentameter (167).

It is very difficult to find a speech by any character in *Ulysses* that is not infected in this way--all of the characters have a tendency to speak--and think--in quotations of one kind or another. Bloom summarizes the citational nature of all of the discourse of *Ulysses* when

he muses on the richness of Shakespeare for supplying quotations: "Music hath charms. Shakespeare said. Quotations every day of the year. To be or not to be. Wisdom while you wait" (230). Even the comments of the Boardman baby seem to participate in this phenomenon. When, in the opening of "Nausicaa" this infant announces, "A jink a jink a jawbo," the effect is quite evocative of infant speech (284). However, such lines are not so much what a baby would really say as a narrator's representation of what a baby might say, relying on the reader to have enough familiarity with conventions of babytalk to properly interpret such comments. Even here, then, there is a dialogic interaction between character and narrator. Mark Twain once expressed admiration for the linguistic facility of the people in France, noting that there even small children are able to speak French. In Joyce, even babies can speak dialogically.[9]

Neither the Uncle Charles nor the Benstock Principles can account for the complexity of this multi-directional mutual infection of narrator, characters, and intertextual voices. It is only with the work of Bakhtin and his circle on the social nature of the utterance that we begin to find a theoretical framework of sufficient sophistication to describe such effects. In *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* V. N. Voloshinov provides a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of reported speech that points toward an understanding of the implications of Joyce's discourse in terms of a social conception of the self (115-23). Voloshinov notes that, in the simplest case (what he calls the "linear style"), an author simply reports the words of others in his own homogeneous style (120). In the case of fiction, this style would mean

that the author's voice dominates and does not engage in dialogue with the voices of characters. But in the more complicated case of what Voloshinov calls the "pictorial style," authorial and character voices begin to interact, to the point that they are often indistinguishable. In such cases, this interaction itself may be more important than the referential action of the narration. Voloshinov cites the example of Gogol, where "characters' speech sometimes loses almost all its referential meaning and becomes decor instead, on a par with clothing, appearance, furnishings, etc." (121).

This mode of discourse clearly has much in common with some of Joyce's more affected representations of character speech, as in the example of Bob Doran cited above. But Voloshinov also posits a third form of indirect discourse, more in line with the Uncle Charles Principle or with Bakhtin's concept of the character zone, in which the reported speech of characters begins to exert an influence on the narrative discourse. In this case the authorial position may disappear almost entirely, and the author's discourse "begins to perceive itself--as subjective, 'other person's' speech" (121). This mode of discourse is the one found most often in Joyce's work, but Joycean narration in fact runs the gamut from one extreme noted by Voloshinov to the other.

This range of discursive strategies is perhaps best represented in Joyce's work by the opposition between the twins Shem and Shaun in *Finnegans Wake*. Shaun's mode of discourse is entirely monologic, corresponding to the "linear style" noted by Voloshinov. Shem, on the other hand, makes no pretense to such authority over his own discourse. He in fact has no discourse separable from the appropriations he makes of

the speech of others. This attitude, so thoroughly antithetical to Shaun's pretensions to authority, understandably brings Shem under considerable criticism from his brother:

> One cannot even begin to post figure out a statuesquo ante as to how slow in reality the excommunicated Drumcondriac, nate Hamis, really was. Who can say how many pseudostylic shamiana, how few or how many of the most venerated public impostures, how very many piously forged palimpsests slipped in the first place by this morbid process from his pelagiarist pen? (181.34-182.3)

The patriarchal authoritarian figure of Shaun the Post illustrates the powerfully political nature of discursive strategies, and Shaun is exemplary of the links in the *Wake* among politics, patriarchy and religion, standing as he does as a figure of both religious and political oppression. For example, his production (in his guise as Jaun) of a list of advice for his sister Issy concerning proper behavior for young girls is a virtual manifesto for male chauvinist pigs everywhere. Jaun, the "killingest ladykiller" (430.32-3), begins this advice as a revision of the Ten Commandments, but the list soon degenerates (in typical Shaun fashion) into a dirty-minded exposition on underwear and urinary functions:

> First thou shalt not smile. Twice thou shalt not love. Lust, thou shalt not commix idolatry. Hip confiners help compunction. Never park your brief stays in the men's convenience. Never clean your buttoncups with your dirty pair of sassers. Never ask his first person where's your quickest cut to our last place. Never let the primising hand usemake free of your oncemaid sacral. . . . Where you truss be circumspicious and look before your leak, dears. (433.22-34)

Then he warns his sister of the danger of disobedience: "if you've got some brainy notion to raise cancan and rouse commotion I'll be apt to

flail that tail for you till it's borning" (436.35-437.1). The conflation of Shaun's authoritarian attitude with religious language and sadistic threat makes a very clear point: much of the apparatus of Christian religion is specifically designed by domineering (and dirty-minded) males for the circumscription and exploitation of women.

Finnegans Wake itself represents the ultimate refutation of Shaun's monological mode of speech. In the *Wake* almost every word seems to embody multiple meanings arising from multiple discursive sources, making the identification of a source for the text as a whole (something corresponding to the concept of a narrator) virtually impossible. Asenjo has noted that many of the sentences in the *Wake* have no grammatical subject. As a result, many statements in the *Wake* "are nobody's utterances; they are like lost waves of thought, created outside any consciousness as pure mental objects without subject" (Asenjo 399).[10] Asenjo relates this phenomenon to the grammar of dreams, and indeed the most common view of the *Wake* for many years (exemplified in the Campbell and Robinson *Skeleton Key*) was to regard the text as representing a dream on the part of HCE. More recently, Atherton has seen the text as a dream on the part of what Yeats called "the Great Memory," similar to Jung's collective unconscious ("Shaun" 149-50). Atherton colorfully suggests that the abrupt entry into the text of various voices can be likened to a "quasi-spiritualistic seance in which various voices compete for hearing in the stream of *Finnegans Wake's* narrative and dialogue" (159). Bekker, meanwhile, argues that "the reader becomes the dreamer of 'Finnegans Wake' creating the real dream-work. We thus become both subject and object: the subject generating the 'event' (the reading), as well as the

object upon whom the event acts" (199). Indeed, the egalitarian way in which the *Wake* seems to share the responsibility for meaning generation with the reader is precisely the sort of gesture that Shaun cannot abide. David White echoes this emphasis on the reader: "Since there is no real difference between narrator and what is narrated, the individual reader narrates the events of the *Wake* as much as do the *Wake*'s mysterious dreamer, HCE, ALP, their various transmogrifications, etc." (147). Finally, Rabaté notes the many self-reflexive passages in the book, and relates them to the performative aspects of its language, which "perhaps stem less from strong, locatable subjects of enunciation than from the constant self-referentiality of the book" ("Lapsus" 92). These performatives are not uttered by specific speaking subjects, but by the book itself, which has the effect of transferring them to the reader himself. Thus, "*Finnegans Wake* would be the 'writable' text par excellence, constituted by the reader in his reading, since the performative is displaced from the subject of the enunciation of the novel to the subject reading/listening to the book" (97).

On the other hand, Michael Begnal goes to great lengths to make the *Wake* seem as traditional as possible, attributing the text to a series of dreams on the part of various characters in a sort of *style indirect libre* of the unconscious. Moreover, Begnal conservatively claims that the *Wake* is organized and controlled by the pervading presence of an omniscient narrator, who may be likened to Tristram Shandy, except that he is trying to get across some serious thematic points despite his bizarre sense of humor (66-7). To Begnal the narrator functions as a guide to the reader and tightly controls the reader's progress through

the text. He is related to Joyce himself, but can be thought of as a sort of universal mind (72). I can see no support for Begnal's position in the *Wake* itself, but his argument does illustrate just how difficult it is to give up certain cherished notions of narrative convention.[11] If, as I am suggesting, traditional notions of authorship and unitary narrative voice are used as props to support the reader's own sense of subjective wholeness, then it is clear that attempts to subvert these conventions can be troubling indeed.

Joyce's Deconstruction of Character

Unable to turn to author or narrator, the reader seeking a sense of unity in a text naturally turns next to the characters appearing in that text. As Derek Attridge points out,

> every time we apprehend a character in a literary text, we are reassured of our *own* self-boundedness, self-consistency, and uniqueness; our own knowability and undividedness; our own existence independent of history, social construction, and ideology. ("Joyce" 153)

But the identification between reader as unified subject and character as representation of that unity is itself related to the same ideology of realism that leads the reader to seek unity in the figure of the author or narrator. Hélène Cixous notes that

> [t]he ideology underlying this fetishization of "character" is that of an "I" who is a *whole* subject (that of the "character" as well as that of the author), conscious, knowable; and the enunciatory "I" *expresses himself* in the text, just as the world is *represented* complementarily in the text in a form equivalent to pictorial representation, as a simulacrum. ("Character" 385, her emphases)

Presumably, any text that challenges traditional notions of characterization will challenge traditional notions of the subject as well-- Cixous specifically mentions Woolf's *The Waves* and Joyce's *Ulysses* as specific examples of such challenges, and emphasizes that these challenges are intensely political ones:

> The machine of repression has always had the same accomplices; homogenizing, reductive, unifying reason has always allied itself to the Master, to the single, stable, socializable subject, represented by its types or characters. (389)

Thus, the characters of postmodernist authors such as Pynchon and Rushdie, whose shrinking "temporal bandwidths" reduce them to a condition of radical fragmentation, potentially present a valuable challenge to totalitarian oppression. In Joyce, the deconstruction of unified characters not only has broad philosophical and theoretical ramifications, but also poses specific critiques of the political situation in his contemporary. As MacCabe points out, the ideology of nationalism is dependent upon a notion of "full unified identity" (*Revolution* 87). In this light, it is significant that some of the most fragmented and interrupted discourse in all of *Ulysses* occurs during "Cyclops," which features a bigoted nameless narrator and a fiercely nationalistic "citizen," both of whose attitudes are thoroughly undercut by the language of the chapter. The chapter demonstrates that it is impossible to establish fixed boundaries between discourses, or even between individuals. That being the case, the entire ideological structure of both nationalism and bigotry (to Joyce approximate synonyms) becomes meaningless. Both are based on exclusion of the Other, and Joyce here shows that the Other is an integral part of the self.

As I noted above, Stephen Dedalus is also centrally concerned with his "temporal bandwidth," and it is clear that the stability of the self (or lack thereof) is a prime concern in *Ulysses*. Meanwhile, Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity helps to illuminate the way in which the problem of the continuity of the individual is paralleled by the problem of the continuity of communities and cultures. For example, Stephen's search for a viable father figure is in part an attempt to establish a sense of temporal continuity across generations that will stabilize his own precarious sense of self. Indeed, the continuity of generations is a central concern throughout *Ulysses*. Leopold Bloom, one of the more prominent father-figures whom Stephen encounters, is himself stranded between generations, as it were--both his father and his only son are dead. Bloom is also stranded between cultures. The Irishmen he encounters consider him Jewish, yet by Jewish law he is not, since his mother was a Catholic and Judaism is considered to be inherited through the mother. The uncircumcised, thrice-baptized Bloom does not generally seem to think of himself as particularly Jewish, yet it is instructive to remember the infamous potato that Bloom carries around with him throughout the events of Bloomsday--a standard symbol of the continuity of existence in both Irish and Jewish tradition (Gifford, *Ulysses* 71).[12] In his own less philosophical way, Bloom even echoes Stephen's meditations on the continuity of individual identity. Remembering the happier days of a decade before, he thinks: "I was happier then. Or was that I? Or am I now?" (137).

Both *Ulysses* itself and the characters who wander through its pages tend to become less and less unified as the book progresses. In

particular, it becomes harder and harder to distinguish Stephen from Bloom. Joyce's characters are typically attracted by the sensuous lure of the exotic East, so it is not surprising to find that Stephen has dreamed the night before of being in the East:

> Street of harlots. Remember. Haroun al Raschid. I am almosting it. That man led me, spoke. I was not afraid. The melon he had he held against my face. Smiled: creamfruit smell. That was the rule, said. In. Come. Red carpet spread. (39)

In light of later events in the book, the man leading Stephen in this dream seems to anticipate Bloom's later invitations, and indeed the melon motif here clearly suggests the "mellow yellow smellow melons" of Molly Bloom's rump (604). We even find that Bloom has similarly dreamed of Molly in a Turkish setting: "She had red slippers on. Turkish. Wore the breeches" (311-2). Even Molly shares in this communal fantasy, musing that if she is going to be dealing with Stephen she might "have to get a nice pair of red slippers like those Turks with the fez used to sell" (641).

It is certainly possible to read these corresponding dreams as mere coincidences. Yet *Ulysses* is filled with odd little instances in which one character's thoughts oddly reproduce those of another (or of the "narrator"), even when there has been direct transmission of the thought from the first character to the other. This effect becomes more and more pronounced as the book moves along, and Lawrence notes the increasing way in which

> the characters' memories and the narrative memory fuse--at a certain level, all the "memories" in the book are fictions created out of other fictions for the purpose of this fiction. All are quotations or citations, iterative events, linguistic and dramatic, including

> the title of the book that prepares us to encounter a retelling of a very old story. (141)

These transgressions of subjective boundaries occur especially frequently between Stephen and Bloom, who eventually are conflated to the point of being referred to as Blephen and Stoom (558). Joyce employs a similar strategy in *Finnegans Wake*, with (for example) Butt and Taff at one point becoming Tuff and Batt (349.8-9) and at another point becoming "*one and the same person*" (354.8, Joyce's italics). Robert Scholes has discussed Joyce's later work in terms of the "structuralist" or "cybernetic" view of character. Scholes suggests that Joyce's early work shows a clear distinction between self and other, but that the later work (*Finnegans Wake* and the latter parts of *Ulysses*) shows a structuralist blurring of sharp ego boundaries:

> As his career developed, he accepted less and less willingly the notion of characters bounded by their own skins, and of actions which take place at one location in space-time, and then are lost forever. (164)

I think Scholes overestimates the boundedness of the characters in Joyce's early work, but the blurring of boundaries between characters does begin to become much more radical in the latter parts of *Ulysses*.[13] This effect continues in the *Wake*, where characters are always problematically defined, and always show a tendency to shift, merge, split apart, dissolve, and so on. It is clear from his working notebooks that Joyce regarded the "characters" in the *Wake* not as autonomous entities, but as generalized textual forces, represented by specific emblems, or "sigla." Thus McHugh notes how the major "personages" in the *Wake* are

> fluid composites, involving an unconfined blur of historical, mythical and fictitious characters, as well as nonhuman elements. Joyce's technique of personality condensation is ultimately inseparable from his linguistic condensation. (10)

All of the characters are dissolved in the text of *Finnegans Wake* much in the way that Tyrone Slothrop is dissolved in the text of *Gravity's Rainbow*. McHale echoes Scholes' association of this phenomenon of dissolved characters with structuralism, noting that structuralist poetics "has taught us to abandon the concept of character as self-identity, as some sort of 'integral creature,' to regard it instead as a textual function" (105). Or, as Joel Weinsheimer has put it in his discussion of *Emma*: "In semiotic criticism, characters dissolve and only text remains" (208). Attridge also emphasizes the textual aspects of the dissolution of character boundaries in the *Wake*, but sees an ideological aspect as well, relating it directly to the dissolution of fixed boundaries between words in the text:

> The disappearance of the word as a self-bounded, consistent, and unique entity marks the disappearance of language as the communicator of clear and distinct meanings; or, rather, it puts in question that model of language, just as the disappearance of character in the other sense puts in question the model of the subject as consistent, undivided, unique, and immediately knowable and self-knowable. ("Joyce" 155)

It is thus through its language that the *Wake* is able to "break down so effectively the notion of character as a way of conceptualizing the subject, and to reveal its multiplicity and uncertainty as a culturally-produced, historically-determined, signifying practice" (156).

Subjectivity and the Book as Object

The reader of Joyce finds no support for his visions of subjective autonomy in the figures of author, narrator, or characters. But potential strategies still remain. Jameson notes the absence of whole images of the author or of characters in *Ulysses*, and suggests that readers then turn to the book itself as an image of wholeness:

> such essentially idealistic (or ideal, or imaginary) categories formerly served as the supports for the unity of the work or the unity of the process. Now that they have been withdrawn, only a form of material unity is left, namely the printed book itself, and its material unity as a bound set of pages. ("*Ulysses*" 136)

Jameson goes on to note that this phenomenon is not limited to Joyce, but that "[o]ne of the classic definitions of modernism is of course the increasing sense of the materiality of the medium itself" (136).[14]

It has long been recognized that Joyce, perhaps more than any other modern author, is intensely aware of the physical nature of the print medium in which he works. Hugh Kenner, in *The Stoic Comedians*, was the first to make this point strongly, noting among other things the way the existence of a book as a self-enclosed volume allows the reader to perform the sort of detailed indexing and cross-referencing that is necessary to make any sense of the book. In short, "the whole conception of *Ulysses* depends on the existence of something former writers took for granted as simply the envelope for their wares: a printed book whose pages are numbered" (*Stoic* 34).

Jameson suggests that all of this emphasis on the material medium is a analogous to the emphasis on medium in a plastic art such as painting ("*Ulysses* 136). As such, this phenomenon brings to mind Spanos'

criticisms of the emphasis on plastic arts in the New Criticism, an emphasis which he sees as being related to the preference for spatial form. Spanos sees a powerful ideological motivation behind this preference, an urge for an escape from historical engagement in "the timeless eternity of the aesthetic moment" ("Modern" 91).[15] Spanos very appropriately cites Stephen Dedalus' preference for stasis in *Portrait* as an example of this effect, though he adds (in a masterpiece of critical understatement) that *Portrait* itself "suggests minimally that Joyce is not completely in accord with Stephen's aesthetics of stasis" (97).

In point of fact, as I have argued repeatedly throughout this study, Joyce's work is diametrically opposed to an aesthetics of stasis. Even the emphasis on the book as material medium undercuts the notion of stasis in Joyce. Jameson himself parallels the emphasis on materiality of the medium in modernism to the classic Marxist concept of reification. It is a standard Marxist argument that the history of the book corresponds to the history of alienation in a direct way, as witnessed by the separation between author and reader of a printed book as opposed to the proximity of speaker and audience in an oral culture.[16] Within this framework, however, it is interesting to note Butor's contention that the reification of the book as consumer object actually runs directly counter to the true properties of the book as physical medium. In short, the main advantage of a book is that it can be studied carefully, read and reread, but the exigencies of a consumer economy require that books be quickly read and then discarded, so that additional books can be manufactured and sold (42). Indeed, when Jameson discusses the recurrence of motifs in *Ulysses* that leads to the sort of cross-

referencing and rereading discussed by Kenner and Butor in connection with the book as object, he finds that this motif in *Ulysses* leads not to stasis and reification, but to instability:

> the analogous recurrence of events and characters throughout *Ulysses* can equally be understood as a process whereby the text itself is unsettled and undermined, a process whereby the universal tendency of its terms, narrative tokens, representations, to solidify into an achieved and codified symbolic order as well as a massive narrative surface, is perpetually suspended. I will call this process dereification. ("*Ulysses*" 132-3)

This movement toward "dereification" indeed leads Jameson to conclude that *Ulysses* has something positive to say about the alienation of modern man. In particular, he suggests that the complex textual mechanics of *Ulysses* can begin to deconstruct the process through which man became so alienated in the first place.

That Joyce's treatment of the book as physical object carries a powerful political message has been emphasized by McCormack. He notes that "the industrialization of communications (of language) is central to *Ulysses*," as seen especially in the scenes in the newspaper office in "Aeolus" (330). According to McCormack, Joyce thus suggests that life itself is becoming more and more mechanical in the industrial age. Thus, Joyce's work "engages with those social and economic modes which led to fascism, especially the mechanization of language and the growth of a passive, depoliticized consumerism" (334).[17]

McCormack's suggestion adds support to Jameson's contention that the complex textual apparatus of *Ulysses* leads not to a static, spatial artifact but to an unstable kinetic structure. It is certainly true that any kind of mastery of *Ulysses* requires multiple readings, but anyone who

has performed such readings can testify that mastery is *still* not gained, no matter how many times one reads, because the text has a remarkable ability to change, becoming an almost entirely different work each time it is read. This kind of mutability is built into Joyce's self-consciousness of his printed medium, as noted by the fact that this awareness very often manifests itself in the depiction of printer's errors. We now know that there are literally thousands of printer's errors in every version of *Ulysses*, and nobody knows how many errors are in *Finnegans Wake*. Joyce acknowledges that such errors will occur by making printer's errors an explicit part of his texts. The most famous example of this effect is the line of "bitched type" in "Eumaeus," where Bloom not only discovers that the newspaper account of Dignam's funeral not only announces his name as "L. Boom," but also includes the memorable phrase "eatondph 1/8 ador dorador douradora" (529). Printed type, Joyce seems to be telling us, is not engraved in stone. As Patrick McCarthy puts it, "Joyce explores the rich possibilities of the print medium only to expose it as one more convention, one more artificial and inexact means of approximating reality" ("*Ulysses*" 60)

In a sense, one might read *Finnegans Wake* as Joyce's ultimate acknowledgement of the fallen condition of the world as it affects printed documents.[18] No doubt the nonstandard discourse of the *Wake* has lead to countless errors of which we are not even aware, but that may be precisely the point. In the *Wake*, where letters tend to run wild anyway, a printer's error makes little difference, and the discourse of the *Wake* seems designed to absorb such errors without being diminished by them. In his recognition of the foibles of printers, Joyce strikes a blow

against the tendency to view the book as an ideal image of totality. And by making it finally impossible to tell the difference between printer's errors and his own fracturing of language, Joyce constructs a book that is capable of comfortably co-existing with the contingency of history.

The ability of *Finnegans Wake* to assimilate error is perhaps best illustrated in the famous anecdote in which a visitor knocked at the door during a session in which the virtually-blind Joyce was dictating to his talented amanuensis, Samuel Beckett. According to the story, Joyce said, "Did I hear a knock? Who is it?" or something to that effect, whereupon Beckett dutiful transcribed the master's words into the manuscript. Later, noticing the error, Joyce decided to let it stand as part of the text. Fred Higginson has declared this wonderful story spurious, stating flatly that in the *Wake* "[t]here is no such sentence" (125). But Higginson's article, while it usefully details some of the textual history of the *Wake*, seems to miss the point by arguing that we ought to strive to get the text "right." Moreover, on page 330 the following passage appears: "Knock knock. War's where!" (330.30). It seems to me that this sentence corresponds to that in the anecdote remarkably well, the slight variance only further reinforcing the motif of error.

Even in *Ulysses*, the intentional inclusion of a number of typographical "errors" in the text makes it extremely difficult to determine which errors are "real." The textual history of *Ulysses* is filled with examples of well-meaning proofreaders and typsesetters who have "corrected" Joyce's own intentional errors, thus inadvertently introducing another kind of error into the text.[19] Even the apparently obvious "errors" in the newspaper report of Paddy Dignam's funeral are

much more difficult to classify than they might first appear. Bloom seems to perceive the misprint in his name as an attack on his very identity, a perception that participates in the same movement in which the fractured language of *Finnegans Wake* unsettles the reader's sense of subjective wholeness. Moreover, who is to say what is and what isn't a misprint, even in *Ulysses*? McCarthy argues that we can gauge the inaccuracy of the newspaper report because we know "what actually happened at the funeral" ("*Ulysses*" 64). But do we? In point of fact the description of the funeral in Hades and the report of that funeral in "Eumaeus" exist in the same fictional text and on the same ontological plane. We do not read the "errors" in the newspaper report as errors because "Hades" somehow has priority over "Eumaeus." Rather, we invoke our own interpretive conventions from outside the text (such as the fact that we know newspapers to often make mistakes) in coming to the conclusion that the report is wrong. In particular, "Hades" is narrated in a relatively realistic style; therefore, we conclude that the events of "Hades" are what "really" happened. The later parts of the book, including "Eumaeus," through techniques such as exaggerated style, expressly call attention to their own artificiality and fictionality. Therefore, we conclude that events narrated in these chapters are not necessarily "real."

One could also argue that we see the newspaper report as erroneous because Bloom sees it as erroneous. But again, Bloom is no more real than is the newspaper. He has priority over the paper only because the reader endows him with that priority as a representative of his own sense of subjectivity. Readers will thus go to remarkable extremes in order to

recuperate a character in a way that conforms to their notions of reality. A classic example of this phenomenon concerns the notorious case of Bloom's chest measurements. Joyce gives us the meticulously "naturalistic" information in "Ithaca" that Bloom is 5 feet 9 1/2 inches tall and that he weighs 158 pounds (546). Then later we are told that Bloom's use of the Sandow-Whiteley exercise puller has expanded his chest measurement from 28 to 29 1/2 inches (593). These figures seem impossible, as they should--Joyce's "naturalism" is almost invariably a parody of naturalism. Thus Hugh Kenner notes that "On nothing is *Ulysses* more insistent than on the fact that there is no Bloom there, no Stephen there, no Molly there, no Dublin there, simply language" ("*Ulysses*" 156). Yet Kenner then promptly produces a detailed explanation of how Joyce might inadvertently have produced Bloom's impossible measurements in an attempt at realistic accuracy (164-5). Indeed, the tendency to recuperate a character as a "person" like ourselves is so strong that many readers still feel that Bloom is perhaps the most realistically represented character in all of fiction, even though at various points in the book he performs such feats as ascending to heaven in a fiery chariot or turning into a woman and having eight metallic babies.

Readers generally conclude that Bloom doesn't "really" ascend to heaven or have eight babies. Yet there is nothing in the text of *Ulysses* that authorizes the reader to assume that Bloom's ascension or gender transformations are less "real" than, say, Molly's infidelity. Those judgments come from conventions that the reader brings with him from outside the text, though it is certainly true that *Ulysses* conforms to those conventions just enough to tempt their invocation.[20] Much of the

power of Joyce's transgression of normal character boundaries in *Ulysses* results precisely from the fact that he gives us such seemingly real and tangible characters with which we can identify, then pulls the rug out from beneath us by flaunting the artificiality of those characters. This process is extremely troubling, largely because of the way in which it suggests that our senses of the reality of our own identities may be similarly illusory. In this light, the numerous transgressions of gender boundaries in Joyce become especially significant, given that (at least according to Lacanian psychoanalysis) a sense of gender identity is prerequisite to any sense of subjectivity whatsoever. Cheryl Herr summarizes the subversive effect of Joyce's challenge to traditional notions of gender roles:

> From the notion that there's no "natural" or "nonalien" gender, *Ulysses* posits that there is no human nature in the ordinary sense of the term and no inner being that one struggles to understand, develop, or fulfill. Rather, *Ulysses* shows us cultural codes mingling in the minds of each character to the effect that the character--whether known through dialogue, thoughts, or action--is properly constructed as a narrative event. (154)

Even Joyce's treatment of the book as object participates in this motif of gender transgression. After all, a common concept in the medieval thought that so thoroughly informs Joyce's work was that texts were female.[21] Carolyn Dinshaw discusses the way in which "medieval writers from Macrobius to Richard of Bury" imaged the fictional text as being "like a woman, extravagantly and seductively arrayed." These writers recommend the reading of such texts via what Dinshaw calls "heterosexual hermeneutics," a mode of reading in which the interpreter evades the seductions of the body of the text while at the same time

stripping it of the garments of its material language and penetrating to the truth or spirit that lies behind the text (27-8).

But Joyce's texts everywhere frustrate and defeat the kind of mastery implied in this "heterosexual hermeneutics." As indicated by Jameson's comments on "dereification," the physical body of Joyce's texts can never be possessed, but continually slips out of one's grip. Joyce's texts seem specifically designed to stimulate the "heterosexual" drive toward textual mastery that Dinshaw indicates. Indeed, no other modern author has provoked more scholarly effort, as ideal readers with ideal insomnia spend hour after hour and write paper after paper in the attempt to plumb the mysteries of Joyce's texts. That this drive for knowledge may be a largely sexual one Joyce indicates in the "Nightlessons" section of the *Wake*, where the scientific theorizing of the boys Dolph and Kevin (a.k.a. Shaun and Shem) quickly turns into a fantasy of lifting the apron of ALP to explore the secret regions of their mother's body:

> Outer serpumstances being ekewilled, we carefully, if she pleats, lift by her seam hem and jabote at the spidsiest of her trickkikant (like thousands done before since fillies calpered. Ocone! Ocone!) the maidsapron of our A.L.P., fearfully! till its nether nadir is vortically where (allow me aright to two cute winkles) its naval's napex will have to beandbe. (297.7-14)[22]

Yet regardless of the amount of scholarly effort, Joyce's texts retain their feminine mysteries. If Joyce's texts are "women," they are elusive peek-a-boo artists, performing elaborate stripteases which tantalize the reader with promises of revelation that are never quite fulfilled. But there are medieval precedents for this kind of textuality as well. Dinshaw opposes to the concept of heterosexual hermeneutics Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale*, in which the physical fragmentation of the

eunuch Pardoner is dramatized in the very language of his text. Dinshaw notes this characteristic of the Pardoner's language and suggests that it calls for an entirely different mode of reading: "The Pardoner enunciates the only possible strategy of using language in a postlapsarian world, cut off from primary wholeness and unity: he acts according to what I call the hermeneutics of the partial, or, for short, eunuch hermeneutics" (28).

Rebuilding the Subject: Feminism, Dialogism, and the Socialization of Subjectivity

Joyce's texts refuse to grant the reader any of the traditional supports with which she can gain a sense of autonomous subjective wholeness. But the blurred boundaries of Joyce's characters (and of his texts) point toward a new conception of socially shared subjectivity that participates in a number of contemporary critical discourses on subjectivity, particularly feminism and Bakhtinian dialogism. Herr notes that Joyce's work highlights "the extent to which what we conceive to be a continuous individual consciousness is composed of materials derived from sources outside the mind" (2). But if each of us is constituted by socially determined discourses, then it is also true that each of us is thus made of common stuff, and the traditional opposition between self and other, subject and object, becomes meaningless.

Joyce's frequent blurring of gender boundaries is one of the most powerful ways in which he effects the deconstruction of such oppositions. Consider the moment in "Circe" when Stephen and Bloom merge to form Shakespeare:

> *Stephen and Bloom gaze into the mirror. The face of William Shakespeare, beardless, appears there, rigid in facial paralysis, crowned by the reflection of the reindeer antlered hatrack in the hall.* (463, Joyce's italics)

This passage is extremely rich. Besides effecting a typical Joycean transgression of character boundaries, it suggests that the great artist, exemplified by Shakespeare, must combine disparate characteristics. Indeed, we have been prepared for such a view of Shakespeare by Best's earlier allusion to Coleridge's characterization of Shakespeare as a "myriadminded man" (168). Here Shakespeare becomes a sort of "everyman." The antlers of the hatrack, evoking Stephen's theory of Shakespeare as cuckold, thus resonate with Bloom's similar condition and suggest that cuckoldry is a universal condition.[23] This suggestion participates in Joyce's general depiction of betrayal as a standard fact of Irish life. But in its particularly sexual connotation it also bespeaks the impossibility of patriarchal mastery, and especially the incompatibility between artistic greatness and the monological attitudes represented by male dominance. As Richard Brown notes, *Ulysses* suggests that "there is always 'another chap in the case' and that no love nor any valid understanding can exist without a recognition of that fact" (21). In other words, Joyce uses the motif of cuckoldry to present a message of constant awareness of the Other, of the fact that there are other points of view than our own.

Perhaps, rather than a "eunuch" hermeneutics, it is more appropriate to suggest that Joyce's texts require a hermeneutics of cuckoldry--they refuse to remain faithful to any one system of interpretation. In this sense, then, Joyce's texts require what has often been identified as a

feminine mode of reading. Caren Greenberg agrees that texts are traditionally seen as female, and that a mode of interpretive mastery--exemplified by the Oedipal metanarrative of psychoanalysis--is correspondingly male. In contrast, Greenberg proposes a feminine mode of reading which grants the text greater freedom to speak for itself:

> By feminine textuality, I mean a non-Oedipal relationship to the text: one in which the relationship of the reader to language is recognized as essential, where the reader perceives the stuff of the text as intrinsically important. (304)

Similarly, from a Bakhtinian perspective, Dale Bauer suggests a dialogic mode of reading in which "the feminist critic becomes double-voiced, engaging in dialogue *with* the text and reaffirming the debate of voices" (xiv).

It is important to recognize that such definitions of modes of reading as "masculine" and "feminine" are entirely arbitrary and socially determined--much like gender roles in general. In this vein it is significant that the Shakespeare in the mirror in "Circe" is beardless, indicating an ambiguity in gender. Here Joyce powerfully anticipates Woolf, who will later argue that the great artist must be able to encompass simultaneously both male and female points of view. To Woolf, we all have both female and male components in our psyches, and it is the mark of the great artist that she can put these components into a productive dialogic relation in the phenomenon that Woolf refers to as "androgyny":

> It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple; one must be woman-manly or man-womanly. . . . Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man before the act of creation

> can be accomplished. Some marriage of opposites has to be consummated. (*Room* 108)[24]

Moreover, Woolf sees Shakespeare as a paragon of the androgynous attitude. Like Joyce's Best, she cites Coleridge to argue for Shakespeare's mental capaciousness. Drawing on Coleridge's suggestion that the truly great mind is an androgynous one, she notes that "one goes back to Shakespeare's mind as the type of the androgynous, of the man-womanly mind" (*Room* 102).

But if Shakespeare is "man-womanly," we also know from Dr. Dixon in "Circe" that Bloom is "a finished example of the new womanly man" (403). Indeed, Maddox has noted the way in which Stephen's Shakespeare actually resembles Bloom more than he does Stephen (109). Bloom's man-womanliness and Shakespeare's sexual ambiguity participate in the general confusion of gender boundaries that so thoroughly informs the climate of "Circe." This is especially true in the encounter between Bloom and the Protean whoremistress Bella Cohen, in which Bloom becomes a woman and Bella becomes the dominating male Bello. Sandra Gilbert has argued that Bloom's transformation into a female and subsequent degradation at the hands of Bella/Bello in this bizarre scene act to reinforce the existing male/female hierarchy of society, as witnessed by the fact that Bloom thereafter regains his male domestic dominance over Molly. To Gilbert, this interpretation implies that Joyce is here reacting to his own anxiety over the growing influence of women writers. She suggests that Joyce's work is made intentionally obscure in order to exclude women readers, and even imagines a sort of debate between Joyce and Woolf, claiming that in *Orlando* Woolf "seems to have deliberately set out to

shatter the 'he-goat' vision of male mastery upon which Joyce based *Ulysses*" (206). In a similar vein, Judy Little argues that the easy transformation of gender undergone by Woolf's Orlando "resists--indeed mocks--the temptation to 'gender' human beings into absolute roles" (188). She then repeats Gilbert's gesture of playing Joyce off against Woolf by attempting to show that, compared to *Orlando*, *Ulysses* is not really subversive at all, and in fact "leaves substantially unquestioned the gender roles that have been assigned to the sexes for millennia" (189).

Such readings of Joyce can be challenged on a number of grounds. For one thing, Bloom's domination at the hands of Bello Cohen in "Circe" is hardly held up as the ideal model for relations between the sexes. For another, suggestions that Joyce's complex, allusive work is too difficult for women readers at best speaks of anti-intellectualism and at worst suggests that women are simply less intelligent than men--leaving out of account Lawrence, Scott, Norris, Herr, and all of the other excellent female scholars of Joyce. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, Gilbert's readings of Joyce are based on a naive notion of authorial intention that is totally inapplicable to Joyce's texts ("Baby"). And I have also noted elsewhere the way in which the encounter between Bloom and Bella/Bello can be read as an ironic re-inscription of Dante's meeting with Beatrice in *Purgatorio*, leading to an interpretation of the episode as an attack on the kind of insidious idealized view of women embodied in Dante's attitude toward Beatrice ("Sublime").[25]

It is important to note that the sexual transformations of Bloom and Bella Cohen in "Circe," spectacular though they may be, are not isolated

incidents. For example, the passage involving the appearance of Shakespeare in the mirror helps to show that Joyce's attitude in "Circe" is much more like Woolf's than different. In fact, as I have pointed out at several points in this study, Joyce's entire body of work is filled with instances of ambiguous sexuality and transgression of gender boundaries.[26] In *Ulysses* this motif is prominent in the treatment of *Hamlet* as intertext. It is no secret that the melancholy, black-clad Stephen is a figure of Hamlet throughout the book. However, there is a change of genders in Joyce's reinscription of Shakespeare's play, since it is Stephen's mother, rather than his father that has died. Hamlet himself is repeatedly associated with sexual ambiguity in *Ulysses*. Bloom, for example, muses on the implications of Hamlet's having been played in Dublin the night before by a woman, Mrs. Bandmann Palmer: "Male impersonator. Perhaps he was a woman." Then he adds a classic touch of Bloomism: "Why Ophelia committed suicide" (62). And later John Eglinton tells us that "Vining held that the prince was a woman" (163).

The effect of all of this questioning of Hamlet's gender is to make Stephen, as well as Bloom, man-womanly in *Ulysses*.[27] Stephen's own androgynous characteristics can perhaps be seen most clearly in "Proteus" as he attempts to compose a poem on the beach. Lacan has suggested that writing is the male activity *par excellence*. Yet in "Proteus," when Stephen attempts to master language, to have it do his bidding in the construction of a poem, he produces nothing more than a reinscription of a poem translated from the Irish by Douglas Hyde. Moreover, in this composition we find a sudden emergence of the feminine that escapes Stephen's grasp:

> His lips lipped and mouthed fleshless lips of air: mouth to her moomb. Oomb, allwombing tomb. His mouth moulding issuing breath, unspeeched. (40)

This passage clearly evokes the emphasis on orality and on the Lacanian Imaginary that thinkers such as Cixous and Kristeva have associated with feminine speech. Indeed, Scott points out that the "soft alliterative sounds and repetitive rhythms suggest semiotic pre-speech associated by Kristeva with the mother" (*James Joyce* 117). Moreover, the speaking persona of the poem clearly assumes a female position. The poem, as we later learn in "Aeolus," reads:

> On swift sail flaming
> From storm and south
> He comes, pale vampire,
> Mouth to my mouth. (109)

Scott then goes on to parallel Stephen's composition of the poem on the beach with Woolf's scene of the battered old woman in *Mrs. Dalloway*, and indeed both moments clearly evoke Kristeva's notion of delirium, of "a discourse which has supposedly strayed from a presumed reality" ("Psychoanalysis" 81). And delirium is precisely a mode in which the semiotic irrupts in the symbolic--here, where feminine discourse irrupts within the masculine. Indeed, the scene in Woolf, incidence of women's language though it may be, occurs in a section of the narration that is filtered directly through the male consciousness of Peter Walsh (122-3).

If clearly-defined gender differences are prototypical of the kinds of oppositions upon which patriarchal is based, then it is clear that the kind of gender-related issues in language use identified by Woolf occupy a special position in the struggle to un-do the domination of patriarchal

discourse. Stephen, as a male, does not experience the special alienation from the language handed down by tradition. On the other hand, Stephen, as shown by his encounter with the dean of studies in *Portrait*, is oppressed by a similar sense that he is working with an inherited language that is foreign to him. This is not to say that Stephen, as an Irish writer in English, occupies the same position as a woman writer, despite the persistence in Joyce and elsewhere of metaphors which link Irishness with the feminine. What it does say, however, is that Stephen experiences some of the same disadvantages of women in patriarchal society, which points up the foolishness of his own misogynistic attitudes. Women are not the enemy or the cause of Stephen's difficulties; they are, in fact, potential comrades in his struggle for liberation if he could but see it.[28]

The mythical prototype of the woman who has difficulty finding speech due to male domination is Philomela, who in Book VI of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is rendered literally speechless when Tereus rips out her tongue to prevent her from reporting his rape of her. Not able to speak, Philomela eventually manages to report the outrage to her sister Procne (the wife of Tereus) by weaving a tapestry depicting the event. In an effort to wreak revenge, Procne kills her own son Itys and serves his flesh to his unsuspecting father for dinner. When this ploy is revealed, a distraught Tereus turns into a bird and flies away, while Philomela and Procne do the same.

The story of Philomela resonates with the text of *Ulysses* in a number of interesting ways. Most obviously, the motif of flight echoes Stephen's association with Icarus and the general symbolic importance of

birds in his thought. Cannibalism is also a persistent presence in Joyce's work, particularly as a parody of the Eucharist. Bloom summarizes the idea with his typical subversive innocence as he muses on the communion in All Hallows Church: "They don't seem to chew it: only swallow it down. Rum idea: eating bits of a corpse. Why the cannibals cotton to it" (66).[29]

As Eliot's use of the myth in *The Waste Land* seems to indicate, the transformation of Philomela into a nightingale can be read as a sort of allegory of the production of poetry. Thus Philomela's inarticulateness resonates in a particularly powerful way with Stephen's difficulty at finding poetic expression on the beach. Indeed, Philomela's tapestry is described by Ovid as "purpureasque nota filis intexuit albis"--"purple marks of thread woven on white" [my translation]. Stephen thus would seem to associate himself (intentionally or not) with Philomela when he describes the poem he is writing as "[s]igns on a white field" (40).

This is not, however, to say that Stephen is the ideal woman writer. His own misogyny, especially in *Portrait*, clearly disqualifies him for such a role. And as Elaine Unkeless points out, Bloom as "womanly-man" in "Circe" is not an ideal expression of Woolfian androgyny, either. The "womanly" traits that he assumes under the domination of Bello include submissiveness, masochism, and willingness to be victimized--all negative aspects of the supposed feminine ideal (Unkeless 36-7). But the production of a positive feminine ideal would be tantamount to supporting a strict distinction between the masculine and feminine, and it is such firm boundaries between individuals or groups of individuals that Joyce seeks to subvert. There are no ideal models of *anything* in Joyce, since

his entire body of work consists largely of a sustained attack on idealism of any kind. The point to Joyce's transgression of traditional gender boundaries is not to apotheosize the feminine at the expense of the masculine, but rather to oppose any hierarchical system of opposition that would privilege one gender over the other. After all, as Luce Irigaray notes of feminists, "if their aim were simply to reverse the order of things, even supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run, would revert to sameness: to phallocratism" (33).

Joyce's texts call for a mode of non-phallic reading, and his entire project can be read as a sustained attack on the kind of phallic mastery implied in Dinshaw's heterosexual hermeneutics or in the Lacanian "Law of the Father." After all, if cuckoldry is a universal condition, then it is clear that the father's rule is a tenuous one indeed, since the very identification of paternity is rendered highly problematic. As Stephen puts it, "Paternity may be a legal fiction. Who is the father of any son that any son should love him or he any son?" (*Ulysses* 170). This note of the difficulty of verification of paternity sounds throughout *Ulysses* in the repeated refrain that it is "a wise child that knows her father."[30]

There are no strong, masterful father figures in Joyce's fiction. In *Dubliners* children tend to live with aunts and uncles rather than parents, and the characters who do specifically act as fathers in the book (such as Farrington and Little Chandler) do so in anything but masterful ways. In *Portrait*, the inadequacy of Stephen's father triggers a series of attempts to find substitutes, all of whom also turn out to be inadequate. Leopold Bloom in *Ulysses* is perhaps the first father figure in Joyce's fiction to display anything like positive characteristics, but

he is positive largely because of his ability to function as a father without mastery. And the humble, flawed, and fallen figure of HCE--much more like a Chaplin character in baggy pants than like an authoritative God-like Father--is Joyce's last and greatest depiction of paternal non-mastery.

HCE's own shifting and uncertain identity in the *Wake* serves as one of Joyce's most powerful counter-statements to paternal mastery, illustrating the close connection between this motif in Joyce and the deconstruction of the stable, autonomous subject. The authority of the traditional father figure serves as a sort of guarantor of the stability of identity, and when that father becomes unstable the whole notion of the self-identical subject begins to crumble. Margot Norris notes the subversion of paternal authority that runs throughout the *Wake*:

> In contrast to that certainty of identity which makes the Symbolic father the figure of the Law, the *Wake's* father figure emerges as indeterminable, dependent, and variable by name. . . . The Wakean vision of a universe ever hurtling toward chaos is based on the theme of the fallen father. He is named rather than namer. He is uncertain of name and identity, unlocatable rather than a center that fixes, defines, and gives meaning to his cosmos. He is lawbreaker rather than lawgiver. As head of the family, he is incestuous rather than the source of order in the relations of his lineage. (61)

In a book-length study of Joyce's assault on the Law of the Father, Frances Restuccia notes the way in which Joyce often employed the feminine as an instrument for subverting the authority of the Church: "It is as if Joyce thought that by aligning himself with the female position he could best free himself from the Church" (17). In this vein, note that the transgressions of gender roles in the *Wake* often have religious connotations. In the very first sentence of the book, the Church of Adam

and Eve (as well as the biblical Adam and Eve) is referred to as "Eve and Adam's" (3.1).[31] Also particularly striking is ALP's reinscription of the Lord's Prayer in female terms that I noted in the last chapter. Joyce's sustained attack on the Law of the Father is related to his incessant assault on theological authority in general, since the figure of God the Father is in fact the prototype of the kind of masterful father figure that Joyce seeks to debunk. In *Ulysses* Stephen draws an explicit connection between the authority of the Church and paternal authority:

> Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical estate, an apostolic succession, from only begetter to only begotten. On that mystery and not on the madonna which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the mob of Europe the church is founded and founded irremovably because founded, like the world, macro and microcosm, upon the void. Upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood. (*Ulysses* 170)

These attacks on paternal authority (especially coming from Stephen) have strong Oedipal reverberations as well, and it is no accident that Joyce's work has attracted a great deal of psychoanalytic interest over the years. Joyce himself showed a great deal of antipathy toward psychoanalysis, as one might expect. After all, Deleuze and Guattari have pointed out the dependence of psychoanalysis on totalizing metanarratives and de Lauretis has pointed out the dependence of psychoanalysis on fixed gender oppositions, both of which are strongly antithetical to Joyce's project. And these two difficulties with psychoanalysis are not independent. For example, the Oedipal metanarrative, with its clearly delineated maternal and paternal roles, clearly restricts the ability of psychoanalysis to respond to the

historical process that de Lauretis sees as central to the ongoing development of human subjectivity. In fact, there is, particularly in the project of Lacan, an air of pre-determination in psychoanalysis that is reminiscent of the "infernal" model of history proposed by Haines in *Ulysses*. Thus, as Michael Ryan points out, Lacan's "sense of tragic inevitability is conducive to the rejection of all progressive action" (105). Meanwhile, though Ryan acknowledges the benefits of the way in which Lacan challenges conventional psychology's privileging of the ego as norm, he suggests that Lacan's theory in this regard "offers little that would enable collective action to transform oppressive social institutions and relations" (107)

Still, Joyce's career was almost exactly contemporaneous with Freud's, and (given Joyce's intense concern with the nature of human subjectivity) it is not surprising that Joyce's interests parallel those of Freud in a number of ways. But the presence of psychoanalytic discourse in Joyce's text does not indicate that Joyce accepted the tenets of Freud. Joyce's attacks on specific targets are typically undertaken through parody, in which a critical discourse interacts dialogically with the discourse being criticized. Freud is not mentioned by name in *Ulysses* and is directly alluded to only in a few vague (and questionable) references in "Scylla and Charybdis"--such as Stephen's mention of "the new Viennese school" (169). Still, the Oedipal resonances that constantly hover in the text seem to invite Freudian interpretations--so much so that, as Jameson has pointed out, psychoanalytical readings of *Ulysses* are just plain boring ("*Ulysses*" 126). The Oedipal theme in *Ulysses* is thoroughly entwined with the

echoes of *Hamlet*, which is especially obvious to us in the light of the links between Hamlet and Oedipus drawn by Freud's student and biographer Ernest Jones. Perhaps Joyce indicates his own attitude toward Jones' reading of *Hamlet* by introducing into *Finnegans Wake* a Shaunish Professor Jones who treats us to a lengthy (and ludicrous) lecture that ridicules not only psychoanalysis but the whole enterprise of the human quest for knowledge (149.11-168.12).[32] Jones' lecture is meant (by him) to be a demonstration of intellectual mastery, but his pompous lucubrations turn out to produce some of the most riotously funny moments in all the *Wake*, especially given the carnivalesque antics of his students, who are constantly sticking their tongues in their inkpots, putting their heads in their satchels, and otherwise disrupting Jones' pretensions to seriousness.

Joyce works in a typical Wakean parody of religious ritual as Jones, attempting to gain the attention of his rambunctious students, cries "*Audi*, Joe Peters! *Exaudi* facts!" (152.14). This exclamation is clearly a parody of the Litany of the Saints: "Christe, audi nos. Christe, exaudi nos." [Christ, hear us. Christ graciously hear us."] I have been unable to identify with any assurance the "Joe Peters" in question, but one of the other students, one "Bruno Nowlan" (152.12) is Giordano Bruno (Bruno of Nola), who surfaces so often in the *Wake*.[33] Here, it is important to recall that Bruno was a fierce opponent of dogmatism in any form and that a major element of his philosophy included the belief that absolute truth and knowledge are impossible. This view is strongly antithetical to that of Jones, not to mention the Church, and Bruno was eventually tried by the Inquisition and burned at the stake.

In the course of the lecture Jones manages to cover everything from politics in ancient Rome to Einsteinian physics, though there is near the end a hint that in all of this he is really only talking about himself:

> I should like to ask that Shedlock Homes person who is out for removing the roofs of our criminal classics by what *deductio ad domunum* he hopes *de tacto* to detect anything unless he happens of himself, *movabile tectu* to have a slade off. (165.32-6)

In other words, human researchers (as epitomized by the detective Sherlock Holmes) ultimately find only themselves (*mirabile dictu*!) at the end of their investigations, and the whole Western intellectual tradition of subjects seeking objective knowledge is shown to be a delusion.[34]

This quandary seems particularly relevant to readings of *Hamlet*, a play in which critics are constantly meeting themselves, as T. S. Eliot indicates: "Goethe . . . made of Hamlet a Werther; and . . . Coleridge made of Hamlet a Coleridge" ("Hamlet" 22). Similarly, Norman Holland has cited this characteristic of Hamlet as a central instance of his theory that readers project their own psychologies onto characters in literature as a means of interpreting them, and Arthur Davis calls Hamlet "the mirror in which each man may see himself" (2).

Apparently Hamlet is reflective in more ways than one. Interestingly, during his own famous disquisition in *Ulysses* on the art of Shakespeare (especially in *Hamlet*) Stephen Dedalus brings up this same topic. Paraphrasing Maeterlinck, he declares: "We walk through ourselves, meeting robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives, widows, brothers-in-love, but always meeting ourselves" (175). Indeed, one of the most important characteristics that Joyce's work shares with Shakespeare's is the way in which readers tend to find themselves in his

texts. It is, for example, a common experience for critics to note the way in which Joyce's texts seem to anticipate anything that might be said about them. Thus, Derrida claims that

> nothing can be invented *on the subject* of Joyce. Everything we can say about *Ulysses*, for example, has already been anticipated . . . to say nothing of *Finnegans Wake*, by a hypermnesis machine capable of storing in an immense epic work, with the Western memory and virtually all languages in the world *including traces of the future*. ("Ulysses" 48, Derrida's emphasis)

This phenomenon, in which readers find themselves in the narratives they read, again evokes the Uncertainty Principle of Heisenberg, in which modern physicists are forced to admit that what they are measuring in their experiments is at least partially the result of their own measurements. It also brings us back to Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity, in which narrative and subjectivity are inextricably intertwined--we find ourselves in narratives because we *are* narratives. But it suggests even more strongly certain contemporary debates over psychoanalysis. In his critique of Lacan's reading of Poe's "The Purloined Letter," Derrida notes that Poe's text seems to have anticipated the kind of impoverishing reading strategies employed by Lacan, and asks:

> what happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text when the latter, the deciphered itself, already explicates itself? When it says more about itself than does the deciphering (a debt acknowledged by Freud more than once)? And especially when the deciphered text inscribes in itself *additionally* the scene of the deciphering? ("Facteur" 414)

There are reasons why this question is particularly vexing in the case of psychoanalysis. Derrida begins his discussion of Lacan by suggesting

that it is a fundamental property of psychoanalysis always to find itself wherever it looks, in *any* text: "Psychoanalysis, supposedly, is found. When one believes one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds itself" ("Facteur" 413). But when a text already includes within its own pages a given reading strategy, is that strategy thereby authorized, or is it disarmed?

This question, Derrida suggests, is ultimately unanswerable. And as a result, there is no critical approach one can use that will allow one to gain a position of mastery over such texts. There can be no metalanguage to apply to such texts, since all languages are already brought down to the level of the language in the text. Any critic approaching the text using a strategy that is already inscribed in the text encounters an unavoidable field of interaction between her own expectations and the expectations of the text. It is impossible to perform a "pure" reading--the text is itself modified by the strategies one employs in trying to read it, much as the objects of measurement in subatomic physics have been found to be modified by the process of measurement.[35]

In the case of Joyce's later works, this ability of the text to anticipate commentary arises partially from the sheer encyclopedism of those works. But it also comes from the profound way in which Joyce's texts invite reader participation--readers find themselves in Joyce's texts because they themselves contribute so fundamentally to the generation of meaning in those texts. In short, the interaction between reader and text is dialogic, involving a shared mutuality that parallels the dialogic interaction between different subjects. Bakhtin hints that

the anticipation of reading strategies is an inherent property of dialogic texts when he notes, referring to Dostoevsky, that "[t]here is literally nothing we can say about the hero of 'Notes from Underground' that he does not already know about himself" (*Problems* 52). Moreover, Bakhtin notes the way in which this kind of interaction defeats any attempt at interpretive mastery: "Any point of view from without is rendered powerless in advance and denied the finalizing word" (*Problems* 52).

It is within such interactions that the difficulty of Joyce's texts becomes highly significant. In Joyce's fiction, especially *Finnegans Wake*, it is often so difficult to extract any meaning at all that the reader who finally does so is possessed by a powerful feeling of accomplishment. As a result, the reader of Joyce often feels an unusual sense of investment in and proprietorship toward Joyce's texts. Perhaps this sense partially explains the passionate dedication of many Joyce scholars. The tendency of readers to find themselves in Joyce's texts--leading to an inextricable entanglement of reader and text--is also a key to the power of those texts to unsettle any preconceived notions we might have about our own subjectivity. Joyce's radical, rule-breaking texts refuse to conform to the kind of behavior that we have come to expect from works of fiction. To read Joyce at all we are forced to revise our notions of what texts are like, and the unusually strong identification that readers experience with Joyce's texts consequently results in a revision of our notions of what *we* are like. By denying us any of the traditional pegs on which to hang a stable notion of the self, Joyce's fictions force us to confront our own subjectivity head on and to ask the

kind of questions with which the traditional transcendental autonomous self simply cannot deal.

All of those characters in Joyce whose blurry boundaries often allow them to share a single subjective space with other characters imply a model of subjectivity in which individual subjects are not entirely separate and autonomous, but in fact depend upon socially inscribed intersubjective relations for their very existence. It is ironic, then, that so many early readers of Joyce viewed his work as participating in the "inward turn" of fiction in which the subject matter of literature became the inner psyche of the individual rather than any external reality. Jeremy Hawthorn reviews some of the early Marxist antagonism to *Ulysses*, which was based on the belief that *Ulysses* embodied an artificial, formal order that rejected the real world of history and that it showed an inward turn toward subjectivity that denied the social dimension of life. Yet Hawthorn argues that, despite certain limitations, "one could counter-claim that few novels show their characters less as free, autonomous beings or more tied to their society and its history" (116).

The apparent contradiction in these views of Joyce arises because Joyce does in fact deal, in *Ulysses*, with the inner thoughts of his characters to an extent that is unprecedented in literature. But a close look at those thoughts shows them to be thoroughly constituted by prior discourse rather than originating in the mind of the thinking subject. It is well known, for example, that the thoughts of Stephen Dedalus consist largely of allusions to literary and other sources. But in fact Stephen is not alone--all of the characters in *Ulysses* seem to think

primarily in allusions. Hawthorn suggests that the work of Lev Vygotsky points toward a way in which the subjective dimension of *Ulysses* can be related to the social:

> Vygotsky's account of the development of conceptual thought through the progressive internalisation of language advances hypotheses about the nature of the 'language of thought' which offer a fascinating way in to the study of Joyce's presentation of inner cerebration in *Ulysses*. (117)

Vygotsky believes that language is first acquired as a thoroughly social phenomenon and that what he calls "inner speech" evolves from the progressive internalization of language. Inner speech evolves from the "egocentric" speech of children, which itself "grows out of its social foundations by means of transferring social, collaborative forms of behavior to the sphere of the individual's psychological functioning" (quoted in Wertsch 112). Thus, Vygotsky's concept of inner speech would predict (correctly) that the interior monologues appearing in *Ulysses* would be socially constituted rather than unique to the individual thinker.[36] For example, André Topia notes the way in which Bloom's monologues include intertextual fragments of popular songs, folk ballads, operatic arias, religious hymns, poems, novels, plays, nursery rhymes, magazine and newspaper articles, proverbial phrases, advertisements, popular maxims, and (especially) Catholicism. Moreover, the intersection of different discourses in Bloom's musings can result in some very Bakhtinian dialogue--a highly subversive example of intertextuality with Catholic discourse occurs when Bloom associates "corpus" with "corpse" (66) implying that "the body of Christ is no more than a cadaver" (Topia 115).

In fact, the models of subjectivity of Vygotsky and of the Bakhtin circle converge at many points. Caryl Emerson outlines some of the similarities between the two thinkers and suggests that Vygotsky's *Thought and Language* "can be read as an important predecessor and perhaps even as clinical underpinning to Bakhtin's philosophy of language" ("Outer" 27). The Bakhtinian model of subjectivity is presented most explicitly by V. N. Voloshinov in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and in *Freudianism*, an extended Marxist polemic against Freudian psychoanalysis. Here, Voloshinov presents a somewhat simplistic view of the Freudian psyche as a sort of formalist self-contained entity, and opposes to that notion a model in which subjectivity is generated through language and language is irreducibly social.[37] Like Vygotsky, Voloshinov deals with the concept of inner speech--and also finds it to be a thoroughly social phenomenon:

> Every utterance is *the product of the interaction between speakers* and the product of the broader context of the whole complex *socials situation* in which the utterance emerges. . . . Nothing changes at all if, instead of outward speech, we are dealing with inner speech. Inner speech, too, assumes a listener and is oriented in its constitution toward that listener. (*Freudianism* 79)

The Bakhtinian dialogic model of selfhood thus posits a model in which speech is irreducibly social and subjectivity is meaningless apart from intersubjectivity: "Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction" (*Marxism* 11). The psyche is thus not a *thing* that exists internally in an individual so much as an *event* that occurs in the process of intersubjective relations: "By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized somewhere

between the organism and the outside world, on the *borderline* separating these two spheres of reality" (*Marxism* 26).

It is clear that these sorts of interactive models of subjectivity provide a much better description of the conception embodied in Joyce's texts than can any notion of an autonomous, self-identical subject. Voloshinov also suggests that this model can be applied to the interaction between reader and text: "Cognition with respect to books and to other people's words and cognition inside one's head belong to the same sphere of reality, and such differences as do exist between the head and book do not affect the content of cognition" (*Marxism* 34). This suggestion applies especially well to the work of Joyce. The reader of Joyce tends to become involved with the text in an extraordinary way, but that involvement will never allow the reader to "master" the text. At best the reader can hope to reach a sort of co-operative state of mutual respect with the text. Text and reader are thus highly interdependent--the reader cannot master the text, but the text can do nothing unless someone reads it. Indeed, the relationship between reader and text in Joyce might almost be described as an intersubjective one, especially given the way that the reader tends to find herself already inscribed in the text even while that text participates in the ongoing formation of that self.

The interactive nature of the Vygotsky/Voloshinov model of the psyche participates in many of the same concerns as the notion of "experience" invoked by de Lauretis. Indeed, the kind of mutual intersubjective relationship suggested by this model is identifiably feminine (or at least what has traditionally been defined as feminine),

and can be related to Gardiner's observation that "[t]hroughout women's lives, the self is defined through social relationships; issues of fusion and merger of the self with others are significant, and ego and body boundaries remain flexible" (182). Drawing on the work of Nancy Chodorow, Gardiner concludes that this different view of feminine subjectivity (relative to the masculine) arises from the fundamentally different nature of the infantile relationship to the mother: "The daughter acquires empathy and the capacity for symbiotic merger through her infantile identification with her mother" (186).

In the same vein, Patricia Waugh has suggested that the work of male modernists embodies relatively traditional notions of the essential self, while postmodernist literature is centrally concerned with deconstructing those traditional notions. But, Waugh argues, for women and other marginal groups those conceptions of subjectivity were never relevant anyway:

> for those marginalized by the dominant culture, a sense of identity as constructed through impersonal and social relations of power (rather than a sense of identity as the reflection of an inner 'essence') has been a major aspect of their self-concept long before post-structuralists and postmodernists began to assemble their cultural manifestos. (3)

Thus, according to Waugh, women writers are not centrally concerned with either the depiction of or the deconstruction of the traditional transcendental self. Instead, women writers are concerned with reconstructing notions of subjectivity along feminine (and especially collective) lines. "Much of women's writing can, in fact, be seen not as an attempt to define an isolated individual ego but to discover a

collective concept of subjectivity which foregrounds the construction of identity *in relationship*" (10).

Waugh sees this project as being more positive than that of postmodernism, since it enables the woman writer to accommodate a notion of the individual as a "strong and coherent agent in the world," as opposed to what she sees as the postmodernist denial of individual agency. Her model of feminine subjectivity is clearly similar to that presented by Gardiner, and indeed she also uses the work of Chodorow as a central resource. Waugh focusses particularly on the work of Woolf to demonstrate this concept of a relational, socially-defined self. Meanwhile, Jean Wyatt has used the work of Woolf elsewhere to illustrate a similar point. Because of the identification between mother and young daughter, Wyatt argues (again echoing Chodorow), "women are more comfortable vaulting over ego boundaries to fuse with what is outside than are men because what Freud calls the 'oceanic feeling' is built into their primary definition of self" (119).

I cite Gardiner, Waugh, and Wyatt to demonstrate the consistency with which such notions of shared subjectivity are perceived to be specifically feminine. None of these authors mention Bakhtin or Vygotsky, and indeed the very male-oriented Bakhtinian notion of the self as intersubjective construct significantly complicates the gender differentiations suggested in their work. For example, when Anne Herrmann approaches the work of Woolf and German writer Christa Wolf from an explicitly Bakhtinian perspective, she concludes that "Woolf deconstructs the centered, unified subject as such, while Wolf rewrites the traditionally male subject as female" (1). Thus, within Waugh's

framework, Herrmann would be suggesting that Woolf is a masculine postmodernist, while Wolf is a typical woman writer.

Still, feminist critics have recently begun to discover a great deal of potential in the work of Bakhtin, and no doubt will continue to do so for some time. For example, in addition to Herrmann's study of Woolf and Wolf, recent books by Bauer and Patricia Yaeger have also approached feminist issues from a Bakhtinian perspective. On the other hand, many feminists are somewhat wary of Bakhtin, because he himself seems to have had very little (if any) consciousness of gender issues. As Herrmann notes, "Bakhtin's dialogic represses gender by assuming two gender-neutral, that is, masculine subjects" (7). Herrmann attempts to "infuse" the dialogic with a notion of gender by introducing Irigaray's concept of "specularity." There is, however, still a great deal to be done in exploring the interface between dialogism and feminism. The work of Joyce, which provides such striking instantiations of so many of Bakhtin's concepts and often does so in a way that explicitly involves gender issues, seems to offer a great deal of promise as a facilitator of this exploration.

Nietzsche and Bakhtin: Two Versions of the Social Self

It seems clear that a radical revision of our fundamental attitudes toward the human subject can have far-reaching implications. Presumably, if everyone accepted Bakhtin's concept of dialogism, then it would become impossible to draw the kind of distinct boundaries between self and other that make political oppression possible. There is, in fact, a strong utopian element in all of Bakhtin's work that points toward blissful

visions of peace, co-operation, and brotherhood among all men. But Joyce, in his persistent refusal to take up a fixed political position in his work and in his construction of works that resist interpretation from any one viewpoint, seems to caution us against being too comfortable with such utopian ideals. As anti-utopian works such as Zamyatin's *We* (which resonates with the work of Bakhtin in a number of interesting ways) have shown, the finalization implied by the achievement of utopia has a way of hardening into monologism--one should be careful what one wishes for in a utopia, because one just might get it. Moreover, the actual practice of oppression has shown itself to be remarkably resistant to the force of utopian theory, and (as real-world experiments in Marxism have shown) blissfully harmonious communal societies are not so simple to achieve.

The mutuality between self and other embodied in a dialogic model of subjectivity implies a do-unto-others attitude that is only effective if the others in question are willing to do likewise. For example, there is much to be gained from the exploration of alternative models of feminine subjectivity, especially since previous models (especially psychoanalytic ones) have tended to define the masculine subject as the norm and the feminine subject as a deviation from that norm. However, it is not at all clear that models of the feminine subject based on her ability to merge and empathize do anything more than reinscribe the traditional male myth of the nurturing female whose role is to make men feel whole but whose own wholeness is of no concern because, well, she's only a woman, after all.[38]

Similarly, Michael André Bernstein has suggested that dialogism, rather than providing an emancipating vision of communal bliss, can in

fact be downright oppressive. Indeed, Bernstein argues that "what Bakhtin understands by the 'dialogical imagination' is uncomfortably similar to Nietzsche's account of the slave's reactive, dependent, and fettered consciousness" ("Poetics" 201). To support his point, Bernstein produces the case of the Underground Man in Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground*. This text, he notes, "is a pastiche of countless prior texts, in part because that is all the Underground Man himself really consists of, except for his additional burden of finding this existence-as-pastiche intolerable" (215). And the intolerability of finding himself always already defined by pre-existing discourses leads the Underground Man to a feeling of Nietzschean *ressentiment*:

> As long as one desires an original, authentic consciousness and voice--as long, that is, as the fact of living a belated and already scripted existence is seen as the ultimate wound, making any claim to personal dignity derisory--*ressentiment* must remain consciousness's dominant emotion, structuring the narratives one lives, the narratives one tells, and ultimately the narratives in which one figures as one more increasingly sorry character. (219)

Bernstein's diagnosis of the Underground Man in terms of Nietzsche's concepts of slave morality and *ressentiment* is, I think, entirely accurate. In fact, Walter Kaufmann makes a similar connection in one of his editor's notes to *The Genealogy of Morals* (564, III.15). Kaufmann also notes Nietzsche's great admiration for Dostoevsky's work, an admiration that (coupled with Bakhtin's emphasis on Dostoevsky) would seem to make *Notes from Underground* an ideal text with which to effect a dialogue between Bakhtin and Nietzsche. Moreover, the *bovarisme* and intense self-consciousness of the Underground Man echo those of Joyce's

Stephen Dedalus in important ways, so that Dostoevsky also provides a means of adding Joyce to the dialogue as well.

Though he does not mention Nietzsche, Bakhtin's own analysis of the Underground Man carries strong suggestions that Dostoevsky's character partakes of slave morality and *ressentiment*. For example, he notes the way in which the self-consciousness of the Underground Man is largely a consciousness of "what others think or might think about him" (*Problems* 52). And indeed, it is precisely characteristic of the Nietzschean slave to allow himself to be defined by others, a form of identification that requires, above all, an ability to distinguish clearly between self and other. Bakhtin sees this ability as being greatly constitutive of the character of the Underground Man:

> The world for him falls into two camps: in one, "I," in the other, "they," that is, all "others" without exception, no matter who they are. Every person exists for him, first and foremost, as "the other person." And this definition of the person directly conditions all the Underground Man's attitudes toward him. He reduces all people to a single common denominator--"the other." (*Problems* 253)

This mode of intersubjective relation is strikingly reminiscent of that of Stephen Dedalus, especially in *Portrait*, where it leads Stephen to a sense of isolation that is accurately summarized by Cranly: "Alone, quite alone. You have no fear of that. And you know what that word means? Not only to be separate from all others but to have not even one friend" (247). But despite this isolation Stephen, like the Underground Man, is literally constituted by the discourse of others, a discourse that is often highly literary. When he goes out to encounter the Otherness of the prostitute, he does so largely within a narrative fantasy derived from *The Count of Monte Cristo*, just as the Underground

Man also appeals to literary models in his dealings with the prostitute Liza.[39]

But as I have emphasized many times in this study, Stephen generally functions as an illustration not of dialogism but of an attempt to suppress dialogism. The same might be said for the Underground Man. Bernstein is correct that Nietzsche's slave is defined by others, and he is also correct that in the dialogic model of intersubjectivity the self is defined by others as well. However, the Bakhtinian subject is defined positively, through a shared experience of mutuality with others, while the Nietzschean slave is defined in an entirely negative way, through the exclusion of others. To Bakhtin, subjectivity is generated through affirmation of the Other, while for the Nietzschean slave "negation is the very premise of the personality" (Strong 243).

Bernstein's analogy between dialogism and *ressentiment* simply does not hold. On the other hand, Bernstein's argument does point toward the extreme difficulty of implementing Bakhtin's program within the ideology of bourgeois individualism. In a society based (however delusionally) on the concept of the unique, free, independent individual, the notion of being constituted by the words of others can clearly be an oppressive one. It is here, in fact, that Nietzsche's work seems to clash most strongly with Bakhtin's, since the noble man whom Nietzsche so praises does seem to be based on a notion of independence from the Other. Thus, Strong notes that the Nietzschean master is defined strictly on his own terms: "There is no comparative element. The master's sense of himself is not dependent on a calculated comparison with the outside" (242).

Yet Nietzsche's comments on subjectivity are highly paradoxical. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that any conclusions that we draw about subjectivity *must* be paradoxical--the question of human subjectivity is inherently self-reflexive, since it can only be asked by human subjects. Writing on the study of the human intellect, Nietzsche notes that "in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and *only* in these. We cannot look around our own corner" (*Gay* 336, 374). Once again we have a sort of "Heisenberg" effect, and the thoroughly paradoxical nature of the very notion of the human subject inquiring into human subjectivity can be held accountable for much of the complex and contradictory attitude taken toward the subject in Nietzsche's own writings.

One can find any number of passages in Nietzsche which glorify the strong individual, and indeed Nietzsche is often viewed strictly in terms of this glorification of individuality. Thus Hayden White suggests that Nietzsche severs all notions of intersubjective links whatsoever, leaving only isolated individuals: "Nietzsche had dissolved the concepts of community and culture, along with those of the past and the future, in the interest of creating the autonomous individual" (370).

Yet how can this picture of Nietzsche be reconciled with his own emphasis on the importance of myth to a society, much in the mode of Ricoeur's notion of communal narrative identity? And how does one deal with the many passages in which Nietzsche explicitly declares the individual to be defined only through his interactions with other individuals? For example, in *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche suggests that civilization arose as a result of economic transactions, that "it

was here that one person first encountered another person, that one person first *measured himself* against another" (506, II.8).[40] And in *The Gay Science* he argues that consciousness exists only in proportion to the ability to communicate to other consciousnesses: "Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop" (298, 354).

In passages such as these, not only does Nietzsche preserve a place for intersubjective relations, but he in fact seems to argue (à la Bakhtin) that intersubjectivity is *prior* to subjectivity, and that the subject exists only insofar as it participates in relations with other subjects. Stanley Corngold notes the paradoxical nature of Nietzsche's view of the self, and suggests that sense can be made of that view only through an appreciation of the importance of Nietzsche's irony. Corngold concludes that Nietzsche's ironic attitude thoroughly "devalues the category of the ego--the so-called personal subject--as the agent or object of reflective cognition." Yet Nietzsche preserves a vision of human agency in which the subject becomes "the organization of ironical practice" (79).

Corngold notes the emphasis in Nietzsche on the importance of "self-constitution," in which the self seems to be conceived in advance of any social situation. At the same time, he notes the way in which the opposition between self and Other is thoroughly deconstructed in Nietzsche. Thus the "resolution" to the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's view of the self:

> In the social field the self has primacy over the other encountered in interpersonal exchange, even as we grant the impossibility of

> maintaining a strict distinction: the Other is "always already" in the self. (84)

Unfortunately, while this "resolution" may explain to some extent how Nietzsche's thoughts on subjectivity came to be so contradictory, it does little to unravel the contradictions. Ofelia Schutte notes the difficulties with which these contradictions confront Nietzsche scholars and the way in which those scholars have often solved the dilemma by simply emphasizing what they like in Nietzsche and ignoring those embarrassing elements that they don't like. To Schutte this kind of selective interpretation is a grave mistake:

> I suggest, as a counterthesis, that the weeding out of the least attractive elements in Nietzsche's work amounts to either self-deceit or censorship, and that, in any case, this practice keeps us from understanding the whole of Nietzsche's vision. (*Beyond* 186)

But in a sense, to Schutte, the very contradictoriness of Nietzsche's thought can be one its most enlightening elements, since Nietzsche's contradictions often act to reveal the contradictions that are at the heart of patriarchal society itself. From the point of view of Bakhtin (and of Joyce), I would suggest that Nietzsche's contradictions (and the reprehensible directions in which they sometimes lead) serve the salutary function of cautioning us against seeing dialogism as a magical panacea of all the world's political ills. I have shown how Joyce depicts both history and subjectivity as processes of ongoing flux without telos, and the fierce resistance to closure in both Bakhtin and Joyce should not be taken lightly. There are no simple or final answers to the problem of oppression, and the battle for emancipation is one that must be fought continually in the same way that

the interpretation of Joyce's texts seems to go on endlessly without ever reaching a comfortable conclusion. If there are no easy answers to the interpretation of Joyce, there are also no easy solutions to the problem of oppression in the real world, and it is with good reason that the narrator-posing-as-author of Rushdie's *Shame* is forced to resort to supernatural means in order to unseat a reigning tyrant:

> Well, well, I mustn't forget I'm only telling a fairy-story. My dictator will be toppled by goblinish, faery means. "Makes it pretty easy for you," is the obvious criticism; and I agree, I agree. But add, even if it does sound a little peevish: "*You* try and get rid of a dictator some time." (284)

Notes

[1]Woolf's call in *A Room of One's Own* for a "woman's sentence" (79-80) is a clear forerunner of Cixous' *l'écriture feminine*. On the other hand, Cixous has suggested that Woolf's work "doesn't speak to me because what I feel like working on is the woman alive and to come. But Virginia Woolf can't stop watching herself die, without ever being able to see herself dead" ("Rethinking" 83).

[2]Compare here Jameson's declaration that the process of narrative is "the central function or *instance* of the human mind" (*Political* 13, his emphasis).

[3]This contradiction at the heart of Romanticism is essentially the same as the one identified by Paul de Man working from a different perspective in his seminal essay "The Rhetoric of Temporality" (187-228).

[4]The topic of schizophrenia has lurked in the margins of the Joycean text for many decades now. Carl Jung, for example, suggested in an early (1932) review that the discourse of *Ulysses* bore certain resemblances to the monologues of schizophrenics. Jung was not arguing that Joyce was schizophrenic; he was merely using schizophrenia as a metaphor for the cubist-like way that Joyce, within language, shatters reality only to recombine it in new ways that yield new perspectives and insights. On the other hand, the subject of schizophrenia in Joyce takes on a new poignancy in the light of the mental illness of Joyce's daughter Lucia, who was in fact diagnosed by Jung as schizophrenic. Joyce long refused to accept Jung's diagnosis, holding to the notion that Lucia was merely exploring new psychic realms in her own way. He thus expressed great admiration for the poems that his daughter composed in the midst of her illness, considering them to be "anticipations of a new literature."

Jung, meanwhile, granted that some of Lucia's portmanteau words and neologisms were remarkable, but claimed they were random and not under any kind of artistic control. Noting certain parallels between the language of Lucia and that of the later Joyce, he commented that Lucia and Joyce "were like two people going to the bottom of a river, one falling and the other diving." Jung concluded that Lucia provided inspiration for some of Joyce's linguistic experiments and that Joyce himself was a latent schizoid who used drinking to control his schizoidal tendencies (Ellmann, *James Joyce* 679-80).

[5]Eugene Holland argues, for example that the *Anti-Oedipus* of Deleuze and Guattari is a paradigmatic postmodernist text. Note that Jameson is not advocating a return to a traditional Cartesian notion of the self. As a Marxist, he argues that an escape from ideological conditioning is possible only through a "collective unity," since "the individual subject is always positioned within the social totality" (*Political* 283). Thus Jameson often has kind words for modernist works which themselves challenge traditional notions of selfhood, and appears to regard Joyce as one of these praiseworthy modernists. However, Jim Collins' characterization of Jameson (along with Lyotard) as fierce enemies of postmodernism and defenders of modernism is an over-simplistic part of Collins' own polemic against modernism and in favor of postmodernism (121-8). Moreover, Collins' suggestion that Jameson advocates a return to Romantic individualism seems to me ill-founded (123).

[6]Within the framework of the Lacanian psychoanalysis cited by Jameson, the scattering of Slothrop can be related to the "fading of the subject" discussed by Lacan (*Four* 207-8). Lacan cites Montaigne as a paradigm of this fading, as "truly the one who has centred himself, not around scepticism but around the living moment of the *aphanisis* of the subject" (*Four* 223). Lacan does not expand here, apparently assuming that his French audience will have sufficient familiarity with the works of Montaigne to know what he means. The reference is, I think, to Montaigne's acceptance of flux and mutability, his pose of constantly having to reconstitute himself as a subject amidst the stream of life. This pose has a number of consequences, including the ability to accept contradiction and paradox. It also results in a reduction of temporal bandwidth that it is strangely similar to that undergone by Slothrop. As Rosalie Colie summarizes, "He admits to no memory whatever, so that what he may have said one day he has forgotten by the next" (380). Or, as Montaigne himself puts it, "I describe not the essence, but the passage; not a passage from age to age, or as people reckon, from seaven yeares to seaven, but from day to day, from minute to minute. My history must be fitted to the present" (III.ii.725-6).

[7]Interestingly, there is an early precedent for this kind of decentered conception of authorship in Vico's discussion of Homer as a sort of generalized social current rather than an individual poet. As Bidney puts it, "Homer is not the author of the book attributed to him; he is himself part of the Greek *mythos*" (267).

[8]Significantly, Stephen's nail-paring artist is specifically a dramatic one, while Woolf singles out Shakespeare as an instance of the anonymous artist: "Shakespeare must have written like that, and the church builders built like that, anonymously, needing no thanking or naming" (*Orlando* 105). But contrast Stephen's later theory in "Scylla and Charybdis that Shakespeare was in fact present in his work in a very direct way, à la Joyce. Apparently both Woolf and Joyce (like Oscar Wilde) are convinced that Shakespeare was "one of us."

[9]One might compare here Attridge's comments on the use of onomatopoeia in *Ulysses*. He suggests that the "sense of appropriateness which an example of nonlexical onomatopoeia may produce is not primarily the result of an unusually close resemblance between the sounds of language and the sounds of the external world" (*Peculiar* 147). Instead, the effect of onomatopoeia derives from linguistic conventions, and Joyce's use of the trope calls attention to those conventions. In short, even Bloom's fart at the end of "Sirens" is dialogic--which may not be surprising given the fundamental importance of Rabelais to Bakhtin.

[10]In *Ulysses* Joyce often achieves a similar effect through the use of pronouns whose reference is unclear, the floating "he's" in Molly's final soliloquy providing the most obvious example.

[11]Even Begnal, without recourse to Bakhtin, admits that the voices of some characters, particularly HCE and ALP, seem to be able to influence the voices of other characters around them, though he does not seem to feel that this phenomenon problematizes the boundaries between characters themselves (39-42).

[12]The one scene in which Bloom does appear to declare himself Jewish occurs in his defiant response to the citizen in "Cyclops": "Your God was a jew. Christ was a jew like me" (280). But later, when Bloom proudly relates this response to Stephen, he says that "I . . . told him his God, I mean Christ, was a jew too and all his family like me though in reality I'm not" (525).

[13]Recall Homer Brown's contention that the same movement toward a breakdown in the distinction between self and other occurs even within *Dubliners*.

[14]Derrida, on the other hand, suggests in *Of Grammatology* that the book serves as an image of wholeness throughout the history of Western thought (18).

[15]In a later essay, Spanos appears to extend his comments on the New Critics to encompass modernism itself ("Postmodernism").

[16]Marshall McLuhan has made a similar point from a different perspective. Indeed, he even echoes Jameson's terminology when he suggests that the separation of the senses of sight and hearing brought about by the combination of print culture and a phonetic alphabet produces a kind of "schizophrenia" (32-3).

[17]One might compare here Swift's warnings against the dire consequences of the invention of the printing press in *A Tale of a Tub*.

[18]On the other hand, textual corruption is not exclusive to print. In fact, it was an even more serious problem in medieval texts, which were copied by hand. The poem "Chaucers Wordes unto Adam, His Owne Scriveyn" indicates the awareness that medieval authors had of the fates that their texts might suffer at the hands of inaccurate transcribers. I would suggest that Joyce's self-consciousness concerning textual corruption arises not only from his appreciation of modern print technology, but also from his knowledge of medieval literature.

[19]These errors, such as the famous "Nother dying" in Stephen's telegram from his father (35), often greatly enrich the text, as I have noted elsewhere ("Joyce").

[20]As opposed to *Finnegans Wake*, which denies the possibility of applying such conventions from the very beginning. Of course, *Finnegans Wake* has one important advantage that *Ulysses* lacked--*Ulysses* as a predecessor.

[21]The "femininity" of Joyce's texts, especially *Finnegans Wake*, has often been remarked. Note that Joyce himself referred to the *Wake* as his "Mistresspiece" (*Letters* 206).

[22]One might compare here Lynch's fascination with the "hypothenuse of the Venus of Praxiteles" in *Portrait* (208).

[23]It may also suggest that men are merely elaborate hatracks, an interpretation that is later enriched by Molly's description of the male genitalia as "two bags full and his other thing hanging down out of him or sticking up at you like a hatrack" (620).

[24]This notion that artistic production requires some sort of fusion of opposing tendencies is a persistent one in the twentieth-century imagination. One might compare Nietzsche's privileging of the creative powers that can be unleashed through a combination of Dionysian and Apollonian elements or Kristeva's suggestion that artistic language involves a combination of semiotic and symbolic elements.

[25]The highly literary and allusive nature of "Circe" is important to keep in mind (as Gilbert does not) when attempting any reading of the episode. For example, the Bloom/Cohen exchange not only partakes of Dante's relationship to Beatrice, but also of the encounter between Encolpius and the goddess Circe in Petronius' *Satyricon*. Here, Encolpius attempts to copulate with the Circe, but (being cursed by the god Priapus) finds himself impotent, whereupon Circe angrily retaliates by having him whipped and spat upon. After this incident, Encolpius becomes so frustrated at the inadequate performance of his phallus that he contemplates chopping it off (148). Note that the *Satyricon* itself is a parody of Homer's *Odyssey*, à la *Ulysses*.

[26]See also Richard Brown for a discussion of Joyce's treatment of gender boundaries, supported by useful information on Joyce's own reading on the matter (96-107).

[27]This transgression of gender boundaries in Stephen is foreshadowed in *Portrait* when Simon Dedalus calls his son a "lazy bitch." Stephen responds: "He has a curious idea of genders if he thinks a bitch is masculine" (175).

[28]One might say that Stephen is oppressed by too *much* tradition, as opposed to the lack of a feminine literary tradition that Woolf bemoans. Compare here the suggestion by Cixous that the lack of a viable tradition in which women writers can work is a positive and liberating advantage, since tradition has a tendency to close off certain avenues of exploration ("Rethinking" 83).

[29]Bloom muses on the mysteries of the Eucharist frequently in *Ulysses*. Compare, for example, his quotation from the sacrament when he views his body in the bath: "This is my body" (71).

[30]The link between mother and child, on the other hand, is more directly physical, as witnessed by the connecting navel cord on which Stephen muses: "The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh" (32). But in *Ulysses* nothing is simple, especially where gender is concerned, and later we find Bloom becoming impossibly confused trying to unravel the question of Corley's *maternity* (504).

[31]The use of "Eve and Adam's" also evokes the meaning "even Adam's," meaning before the time even of Adam. But everything has multiple meanings in the *Wake*.

[32]Professor Jones, like all of the "Shaun" figures in the *Wake*, partakes of several models, including Wyndham Lewis and Irish political leader Eamon de Valera in addition to Ernest Jones.

[33]One could read Joe Peters as a combination of Saints Joseph and Peter. Or one could see him as Jupiter, in which case his subversion of the patriarchal Jones partakes of the mythic tradition in which Jupiter overthrew (and castrated) his father Saturn in order to become ruler of the gods.

[34]This kind of imperialistic reading seems highly patriarchal, but compare Molly's reading of the Tarot cards in "Penelope," wherein she projects her own interests and fantasies so forcefully into the cards that it seems clear she could have done without the cards altogether (637). In Joyce, nothing divides neatly along gender lines.

[35]Note that the tendency of psychoanalysis to find its own expectations wherever it looks is also observed in modern physics, particularly in the complementarity between wave and particle characteristics of matter. Scientists who look for waves find waves; those who look for particles find particles.

[36]In *Finnegans Wake* the discourse is so convoluted that one would be hard-pressed to identify anything as an interior monologue. Interestingly, though, the general language of the *Wake* bears certain resemblances to Vygotsky's description of inner speech. He suggests, for example that inner speech is characterized by a "prevalence of sense over meaning" and that words are often combined together in inner speech so that the "senses of different words flow into one another--literally 'influence' one another--so that the earlier ones are contained in, and modify, the later ones" (Vygotsky 246-7). He also notes that inner speech has the frequent character of "omitting the subject of a sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the predicate" (236), as Asenjo notes of the *Wake* (399).

[37]Interestingly, Alan Singer points to revisionary readings of Freud such as those performed by Samuel Weber and Leo Bersani in arguing for a view of the Freudian subject as dynamically constituted through the conflict of competing drives. To Singer, this view of Freud is quite compatible with Bakhtin, and both Freud and Bakhtin produce a view of the self that is radically opposed to formalist/idealist models ("Dis-position").

[38]One might compare here Nietzsche's vision of the Dionysian in which the overall affirmation of life seems to override any difference between male and female, even as Nietzsche elsewhere consistently espouses a ideology of domination of female by male.

[39]For example, when he speaks to her, he notes his consciousness of how he must sound: "I knew that I was speaking stiffly, artificially, even bookishly; indeed, I was incapable of speaking otherwise than 'like out of a book'" (121).

[40]In passages such as this one, Nietzsche's thought takes on an almost Marxist tone. See Love for an extensive treatment of similarities (and differences) between the thought of Nietzsche and that of Marx.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: JOYCE AMONG THE MODERNISTS

Any reading of Joyce that seeks to reveal the powerful political potential and historical embeddedness of his work must at some point come to grips with the fact that these characteristics run strongly contrary to most received ideas about modernist literature, while Joyce himself is typically regarded as being a principal figure of modernism. Such is the centrality of Joyce's work (especially *Ulysses*) to the modernist canon that when Maurice Beebe set out in 1974 to catalogue the "cardinal points" of modernism, he did so not by examining a broad range of modernist works, but simply by analyzing *Ulysses* ("*Ulysses*"). Beebe cites Leslie Fiedler as one of his authorities for considering *Ulysses* as the most representative modernist work, but it is important to note that Fiedler comes to praise Joyce in this way in order to bury him, declaring in 1970 that "[t]he literary movement which we have agreed to call 'Modernism,' and at the center of which Joyce stands, is a literary movement which is now dead" (21). Beebe himself declares modernism dead in another 1974 essay, delivering a eulogy that again identifies Joyce's corpus as the principal corpse ("What").

But, like that resilient Irish hod-carrier Tim Finnegan, Joyce has shown a stubborn refusal to stay dead. The death certificate that Fiedler hands to modernism is meant to announce the coming of the new age of postmodernism, and in the two decades since Fiedler's announcement

Joyce has gradually worked his way into a position of eminence in the postmodernist canon (oxymoron though such may be) that rivals the one he once held in modernism. According to this revised assessment, modernism is still dead, but Joyce is alive and well because he turns out secretly to have been a postmodernist all along.

Interestingly, my reading of Joyce through the dual optic of Bakhtin and Nietzsche seems to participate in this trend to make Joyce both modernist and postmodernist, since Bakhtin and Nietzsche have themselves been viewed as representative of both the modernist and the postmodernist *Zeitgeist*. For example, William Spanos has suggested that Bakhtin's notion of contemporaneity is perhaps the central impulse behind postmodernism ("Postmodern" 193), while Max Nänny has argued that Bakhtin's concept of carnivalism may be the central informing characteristic of both modernism *and* postmodernism:

> The chief modernist works, Joyce's *Ulysses*, Eliot's *The Waste Land*, and Pound's *Cantos* as well as so much post-modern writing may hence be seen as literary expressions of a pervasive carnivalization of 20th century consciousness and culture, expressions whose strongly ludic character demands an active participation in their carnivalesque games. (535)

Meanwhile, declarations of Nietzsche as a presiding tutelary deity of either modernism or postmodernism are legion. Monroe Spears has emphasized the centrality of Nietzsche's spirit of Dionysianism to modernism, suggesting Nietzsche, Freud, Frazer, and perhaps Marx as the "founders of modernism" (39). Meanwhile, Sanford Schwartz argues that Nietzsche's thoughts on metaphor and language played a "prominent role in Modernist and New Critical Poetics" (44). But the same might be said for postmodernist and poststructuralist poetics. Nietzsche's importance to

poststructuralists like Derrida is well known, and Ihab Hassan has repeatedly emphasized the importance of Nietzsche's views on interpretation and the nature of reality to postmodernism, noting, for example, that "Nietzsche is key to any reflection on postmodern discourse" (*Postmodern* 198).

Clearly Joyce is a crucial figure for any exploration of the interface between modernism and postmodernism (especially when read along with Bakhtin and Nietzsche), and a close examination of his *ex post facto* metempsychosis from modernist to postmodernist promises to yield a great deal of information about the dynamics of modern literary history in general. For one thing, a number of other prominent modernists have experienced similar reincarnations (perhaps riding Joyce's coattails), and erstwhile modernist figures such as Beckett, Woolf, Stevens, Williams, Pound, and even Yeats have recently been "postmodernized" by various observers. In fact, so many modernists have been discovered to have actually been postmodernists that one begins to wonder whether there ever *were* any modernists in the first place. Or, if there were modernists, perhaps modernism was never quite what we once thought it to be.

Questions about the nature of movements such as "modernism" or "postmodernism" are extremely difficult to approach, since it is almost impossible even to ask them without already having postulated an answer. For example, Beebe's attempt to define modernism through careful analysis of *Ulysses* seems empirically sound, even if narrow, but in retrospect it seems fairly clear that he came to *Ulysses* with a previous picture of modernism already in mind, subsequently finding *Ulysses* to illustrate

just that picture. As I pointed out in the last chapter, Joyce's work has a remarkable ability to conform (to a certain extent) to any preconceived notions that one might have about it, even while eventually subverting all such notions. Perhaps, then, the only way to counter such circularity in any exploration of Joyce's place among the movements of modern literary history is to be aware of it, reading both with and against the grain of preconception, openly positing a model of modernism (or postmodernism) and then exploring the ways in which Joyce's work both conforms and refuses to conform to that model.

In this study I have explored Joyce's work primarily in terms of its intertextual relationships to other texts, its approach to history, and its treatment of human subjectivity. Not coincidentally, these same three criteria can be used to map out a model of modernism, so we should already have in hand the material we need to explore the relationship of Joyce to modernism on the basis of such a model. In terms of these criteria, I find first that Joyce's work is so thoroughly intertextual that it constantly reaches out beyond its own bounds, destroying any notion of his texts as autonomous artifacts. Second, the character of Joyce's writing is strongly temporal, while his texts are profoundly embedded in history. And finally, Joyce's work deconstructs any notion of a bounded, transcendental subject, suggesting instead a social model of the self in which intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity. In short, Joyce seems diametrically opposed to most received ideas about modernism on all three counts, a point that seems well worth considering as I move toward the conclusion of my study.

Modernism, Intertextuality, and Difficulty: The Question of Elitism

The novelist-narrator of Flann O'Brien's *At Swim-Two-Birds* offers the following advice to other would-be authors of modern literary works:

> The entire corpus of existing literature should be regarded as a limbo from which discerning authors could draw their characters as required, creating only when they failed to find a suitable existing puppet. The modern novel should be largely a work of reference. Most authors spend their time saying what has been said before--usually said much better. A wealth of references to existing works would acquaint the reader instantaneously with the nature of each character, would obviate tiresome explanations and would effectively preclude mountebanks, upstarts, thimbleriggers and persons of inferior education from an understanding of contemporary literature. (33)

While it is true that the narrator's friend Brinsley (playing Lynch to the narrator's Stephen) immediately ironizes this statement with his response of "That is all my bum," it is also true that this passage stands as a striking commentary on the kind of allusiveness that has been seen as a central tendency of modernist literature. Most obvious among these is O'Brien's text itself, but this method of composition by appropriation brings to mind the works of a number of other authors as well, among whom Joyce looms as the most prominent. Further, O'Brien's passage takes a parodic swipe at such authors (including himself) by suggesting a specific motivation for the dense allusiveness of their texts--to identify an educated "elite" who are somehow "worthy" of access to the products of high culture.

O'Brien's passage thus directly addresses two of the most common political charges that have been leveled against literary modernism in recent years--that it reduces art to a self-contained system that

attempts to avoid engagement with the real world and that it shows an elitist contempt for the masses. As usual Joyce's texts are situated directly at the center of the debate over such issues. It is certainly true that the dense networks of allusions in Joyce's works can give the appearance that they are principally books about other books, and the *bovarisme* of his characters helps to fortify this perception. Moreover, it is also true that Joyce's texts can be extremely difficult and recondite, raising the question of whether they are not in fact constructed specifically to exclude the uninitiated rabblement.

However, any attention to Joyce's texts at all shows that the first of these charges is unfounded. Joyce's texts are quite clearly constructed from other texts and from other pre-existing discourses, but these sources are not exclusively, or even principally of a literary nature. Joyce's allusions to Shakespeare, Dante, Homer, and others are often particularly striking because of their aptness and wit (and because those are the sorts of connections that professional scholars are trained to find), but Joyce's primary *materia poetica* is always derived from the real historical setting of his own Dublin. *Ulysses* garners infinitely more from *Thom's Dublin Directory* than from *Hamlet* or the *Odyssey*, and Joyce's texts in general are packed with references to real people, places, and events to a greater extent than any before or since. And even when Joyce's sources are "literary," they are often derived from decidedly non-elitist forms such as newspapers, magazines, pornography, and the popular stage.

Furthermore, as I have emphasized, Joyce does not divest these materials of their historical embeddedness when he imports them into his

texts. Rather than aestheticizing (or "canonizing," as Bakhtin would call it) the various languages that make up the fabric of his own discourse, Joyce shows a profound recognition of the sources of those languages and of the social and political ramifications of those sources. Joyce's texts are genuinely polyphonic, and the many voices that echo in his work are allowed their positions from which to speak, even when the spirit of his work seems radically antithetical to those positions. The resultant clash of discourses mirrors in a dramatic way the clash of discourses that constitutes the society in which Joyce's texts arise.

But if Joyce's work is not limited to literary concerns, then neither is the work of most other leading modernists. Certainly it helps to be familiar with Dante and Shakespeare and Wagner when reading *The Waste Land*, but it is quite possible to read that poem (especially the notes) as a parody of the kind of intellectual pretentiousness with which it is itself sometimes charged. Moreover, the poem also makes extensive use of materials such as popular songs, and it is as helpful for reading the poem to know the *milieu* of London taverns as to know the plot of *The Tempest*. Similarly, recent readings (especially feminist ones) have uncovered an intense social and political orientation in the work of Virginia Woolf, and Woolf's work is also replete with information and material from non-literary sources.[1]

It is relatively easy, then, to demonstrate that many "modernist" texts are not disengaged from the real world. However, the charge of difficulty is harder to counter. There is no question that writers such as Eliot, Woolf, and (especially) Joyce *are* difficult. In fact, the polyphony of voices that shows the historical embeddedness of Joyce's

work itself contributes significantly to its complexity, as readers are forced to try to weave their ways through a dense network of competing voices in order to recuperate any meaning from them at all. Even so ostensibly simple a text as *Dubliners* turns out to be simple only on the surface, with a vast array of subtleties and nuances dancing just beneath, and the difficulty of *Finnegans Wake* is undeniable. Moreover, this difficulty goes beyond the sheer density of information in the texts, extending to Joyce's innovations with language itself.

Richard Poirier summarizes a traditional view of the motivation behind the extreme difficulty of so many modernist works, noting that with no widely shared common culture in modern society, this difficulty creates a subgroup of dedicated and qualified readers willing to work toward understanding the author and thus sharing his culture (126). Thus, for example, Wayne Booth argues that "Virginia Woolf . . . was haunted by the sense that older writers could depend upon an audience with public norms, while she must construct her private values as she went, then impose them, without seeming to do so, on the reader" (*Rhetoric* 392). But this view of modernist difficulty as the creation of a private cultural system to counter the growing fragmentation of public life clearly has little or no relevance to the work of Joyce. As I have shown, Joyce's works are resoundingly public in nature, and furthermore their range of cultural reference is so broad and all-inclusive that there can be no question of developing a private "in group" of initiated readers who share Joyce's own cultural perspective. There is no secret handshake that gives one access to Joyce, and his references to popular culture can be expected to be as baffling to most college professors as

his allusions to Dante and Aristotle might be to the old Irish milkwoman in "Telemachus."

Sandra Gilbert's criticism of Joyce's work as being intentionally obscure in order to exclude women readers is the latest reinscription of the standard charge of modernist elitism, with the addition of gender as a determining feature. (To Gilbert, when female modernists are difficult they are exploring exciting new uses of language, while male modernists are difficult only as a paranoid reaction against females.) Andreas Huyssen has expressed this same notion of gendered elitism in terms of a general model of modernist art, suggesting that modernism is characterized by the recognition of a "Great Divide" between high culture and low, with the rejected "low" being decidedly connected with the feminine. He thus notes that "mass culture is somehow associated with women while real, authentic culture remains the prerogative of men" (47). But Huyssen does not really support his contention with textual evidence, instead simply citing a list of authors who conform to his model. Oddly, one of the authors on his list is Joyce, yet it is clear that Joyce as much as any of the postmodernist authors Huyssen praises (and certainly more than the female modernists, such as Woolf, whom Gilbert praises) does everything in his power to deconstruct Huyssen's Great Divide by employing a complex amalgam of material from "low" and "high" sources.[2] In fact, Huyssen's egregious lack of understanding of the nature of Joyce's work provides an ideal illustration of the danger of imposing preconceived notions (such as models of modernism) on literary texts. To Huyssen, Joyce is a modernist; modernists reject popular culture; ergo Joyce rejects popular culture.

Hugh Kenner is insightful in relating at least part of Joyce's difficulty to his recognition of the physical nature of the book as object. Thus, Kenner argues, a complex work such as *Ulysses* is only feasible because it is published in book form, allowing the reader to read as slowly as needed, to reread if necessary, to cross-index relevant points, and so on (*Stoic* 32-4). But as critics such as Jameson and McCormack have pointed out from Marxist perspectives, Joyce's manipulation of his physical medium serves the function of highlighting the increasingly mechanical nature of modern existence by forcing the reader to be aware of the work he is reading as a mechanical reproduction. Here Joyce also enters into the discourse of theorists such as Adorno and Benjamin, and it appears that his difficulty, by shocking readers out of complacency, has powerful political potential.

What Kenner is largely indicating in his description of the cross-indexing and re-reading necessary to approach Joyce is simply the way in which modernist works involve the reader in the realization of the work, making rigorous demands upon the reader's time and intelligence in the process of that realization.[3] Joyce, with his "ideal insomniac," is the classic case, and *Finnegans Wake* is perhaps the most spectacular example of this aspect of modernism. Many commentators note the new demands placed on readers by modernist works. Kenner suggests that Joyce "invented" a new kind of patient, diligent reader, which his works required ("Faulkner and Joyce" 30). Leon Edel notes similarly that Faulkner, in works such as *The Sound and the Fury*, requires a new kind of reading. "Faulkner's witchery consists in providing the ground and setting the stage for an unusual act of collaboration with the reader"

("How" 251). Kenner agrees, saying that "the avant-garde created Faulkner's techniques but did not train his reader. We must acquire our training from his books" ("Faulkner and the Avant-Garde" 196).

Eliot's *The Waste Land*, for many *the* modernist poem, also provides an excellent example of the difficulty of modernist literature.[4] The special requirements that the poem has for its readers--the knowledge required to understand its intertextual references and the cleverness required to decipher its portent--are well known. Indeed, the poem even includes a direct challenge for reader involvement: "You! *Hypocrite lecteur!--mon sembable,--mon frère!*" ("Collected" 55). Interestingly, Kenner sees *The Waste Land* as a commentary on the chaotic and fragmentary nature of a modern culture that has absorbed bits and scraps of past cultures (thus the snatches of quotations from past literature) without really absorbing or understanding the true meaning and essence of those cultures (*Invisible* 160). But this is precisely the mode of appropriation that I have associated with Stephen Dedalus (and which Joyce rejects). In Bakhtinian terms, Joyce seems to be saying that modern culture (like Stephen) assimilates bits and pieces of past culture in a non-dialogic--what Voloshinov calls a "linear"--fashion, failing to appreciate the ramifications of the social and political context from which those fragments arose. The parallel between Joyce and Eliot here seems close. Eliot's understanding of this phenomenon may be less ideological, but that does not mean that *The Waste Land* itself cannot have similar ideological implications.[5]

Eliot is a particularly interesting case for the exploration of aspects of modernism, since he was a leading modern theorist as well as

poet.[6] He argues that much of the difficulty of contemporary literature arises because the author simply feels that he is unable to express himself in any other way (*Use* 143). Elsewhere, amidst a sort of capsule manifesto of the modernist style, Eliot states the necessity of difficulty in more direct terms as a symptom of life in the modern world:

> it appears likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at present, must be *difficult*. Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning ("Metaphysical" 248, Eliot's emphasis).

Eliot's attitude here seems quitesimilar to that of Marxist critics of modern culture such as Jameson and Adorno, and indeed Eliot's key concept of the "dissociation of sensibility" partakes of many of the same perceptions of the condition of modern life as does Jameson's notion of schizophrenia.[7] Yet this idea that modernist difficulty is mimetic of modern reality runs directly counter to the fact that much of the difficulty of modernist literature seems to arise from the impact on modernism of the Symbolist aesthetic, with its disdain for representation of the real world.[8] Eliot, himself strongly influenced by French Symbolists such as Laforgue, echoes this disdain in suggesting that meaning in poetry is chiefly useful "to satisfy one habit of the reader, to keep his mind diverted and quiet, while the poem does its work upon him: much as the imaginary burglar is always provided with a bit of nice meat for the house-dog" (*Use* 144). This passage suggests that much of the difficulty of modernist texts is not inherent in the texts themselves, but simply arises from improper reader expectations. In this

vein, Eliot lists the other two sources of modernist difficulty as "novelty" and as "consternation" on the part of a reader intimidated by the anticipation of difficulty (*Use* 143-4).

Joyce's texts seem to be among those that readers fear most. But if Joyce's work makes unprecedented demands on the reader, it also allows the reader to participate in the generation of meaning to an unprecedented extent--and the same might be said for other modernists as well.[9] As I have pointed out, the extraordinary degree of reader involvement allowed (and required) by Joyce's texts creates a situation in which those texts have an enhanced ability to force to reader to challenge received ideas. In fact, Gabriel Josipovici sees a similar function for the difficulty and artificiality of modernist texts in general, arguing (along lines with which Adorno would be highly sympathetic) that the

> modern artist . . . holds that the work of art is meaningful precisely because it reveals to us the 'otherness' of the world--it shocks us out of our natural sloth and the force of habit, and makes us see for the first time what we had looked at a hundred times and never seen. ("Modernism" 192)[10]

Thus, even Symbolism has a potential political power. In the case of Joyce, this is particularly true because the identifiably Symbolist strain in his work never exists in pure form, but is combined with other, ostensibly more realistic modes of writing as well. It is a commonplace of Joyce criticism to note the simultaneous presence of Symbolism and realism in his work, and in fact the multi-layered nature of meaning in Joyce's work is far more complex than this binary model indicates.[11] Moreover, the self-conscious and self-critical nature of Joyce's work is

such that Symbolist aesthetics itself becomes an object of inquiry in the text, and this interrogation helps to highlight the fact that the desire for an escape from history embodied in Symbolism was itself a symptom of a specific sociohistorical moment. Apparently Joyce's work does not conform to traditional notions of the elitism and formalist solipsism of modernist works, but then again neither does Eliot's or Woolf's.

Getting to the Subject: Modernism and the Question of the Self

In his essay "The Lessons of Modernism" Josipovici takes a common position when he sees modernism as deriving from a crisis of authority that infected all of Western society some time around the end of the nineteenth century. In particular (as far as art was concerned), this crisis involved a questioning of "the authority of the author or creator" (109). According to this model, artists became increasingly less confident in their privileged status as interpreters of reality, leading to a reticence of which Eliot's Prufrock is perhaps paradigmatic:

> Then how should I begin
> To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?
> And how should I presume? ("Collected" 5)

Eliot himself, in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," provides perhaps the most important theoretical statement of this new view of the relationship between art and artist. He emphasizes that poetry should be impersonal, viewing (in a famous metaphor) the poet not as creator, but as "catalyst":

> The point of view I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a "personality" to express, but a

> particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. ("Tradition" 56)

This removal of the artist from the work (a foreshadowing of the New Criticism)[12] led Hugh Kenner to entitle his book on Eliot *The Invisible Poet*, and that phrase brings to mind the famous statement on artistic invisibility made by Stephen Dedalus in Joyce's *Portrait*. Stanley Sultan, in fact, suggests that "concealing the authorial voice" is a "general modernist practice" (62), and cites authorial "invisibility" as one of the basic similarities between *The Waste Land* and *Ulysses* (72).[13]

Interestingly, it would appear to be a short step from the modernist emphasis on invisible authors to the more ostensibly postmodern questioning of authorship embodied in the work of thinkers such as Barthes and Foucault. Indeed, Huyssen argues that poststructuralism is not postmodernist, but modernist, and that the poststructuralist "death of the subject" is

> nothing more than a further elaboration of the modernist critique of traditional idealist and romantic notions of authorship and authenticity, originality and intentionality, self-centered subjectivity and personal identity. (213)

The obvious counter to this claim would be to suggest that, while both modernists and postructuralists acknowledge the decentering of authorship and subjectivity, the poststructuralists welcome this decentering while the modernists are nostalgic for the more centered past and show that nostalgia by attempting to create a substitute center in the work of art itself. Joyce clearly participates in the modern trend

toward decentered authorship, but at the same time he curiously subverts both of these positions. He undercuts the autonomy of the work of art by the constant insertion of material from outside the work, and he denies the death of the author by making his authorial presence felt in a way that is anything but invisible. Even Stephen Dedalus, apparently a much more conventional modernist than Joyce, seems to change his position from *Portrait* to *Ulysses*, arguing in the latter that all great art is to some extent autobiographical--though contributing additional confusion by claiming not to believe his own argument.[14]

The modernist emphasis on works of art as well-crafted artifacts clearly implies the presence of a talented artisan who produces the work. And if modernist views of authorship are thus paradoxical, the general modernist attitude toward human subjectivity (of which authorship is a subcategory) is no less complex. Time and again modernist works are concerned with questions of identity, of self and other, to the point that a focus on the interior workings of the human subject is often considered perhaps *the* representative characteristic of modernist works. Some have distinguished between modernism and postmodernism precisely on the basis of the thesis that postmodernism deconstructs the subject while modernism accepts and explores the autonomy of the self. Yet the treatment of subjectivity in modernism, influenced as it was by the then-new theories of Freud, was anything but strictly traditional.

Robert Langbaum has discussed at some length the new concepts of identity and modes of characterization evidenced in *The Waste Land*, seeing these developments as one of the principal organizing features of the poem:

> The point is that Eliot introduces a new method of characterization deriving from the reaction against the nineteenth-century belief in the individual as the one reality you could be sure of. Eliot's nameless, faceless voices derive from the twentieth-century sense that the self, if it exists at all, is changing and discontinuous, and that its unity is as problematical as its freedom from external conditions ("New Modes" 110).

Indeed, the "nameless, faceless voices" in *The Waste Land* are a feature of the poem that almost all commentators have found striking. As in the work of Joyce, some voices appear to be attached to no definable characters at all, while other characters fade and merge as the boundaries between different characters become less and less defined. Eliot describes this phenomenon most clearly in a famous note to the poem:

> Just as the one-eyed merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not wholly distinct from Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias. ("Collected" 72)

It takes very little stretch of the imagination to see Eliot's doubly-gendered Tiresias as participating in some of the same transgressions of gender boundaries that Joyce and Woolf use to challenge traditional notions of the rigidly-bounded self. Indeed, the sort of communal identity indicated in Eliot's note here seems to point toward a social conception of selfhood that I have associated with Joyce through the psychological theories of thinkers such as Voloshinov and Vygotsky--and that has been linked by a number of feminist critics to a feminine mode of subjectivity.

One might argue that the deconstruction of the unified subject is in Eliot associated with a great deal of anxiety and regret, while in Joyce

and Woolf the new visions of subjectivity made possible by this deconstruction have exciting potential. Indeed, Eliot does seem nostalgic when he discusses the modern fragmentation of the self in his idea of the "dissociation of sensibility," a separation between thought and feeling that represents a fundamental change in methods of thought, a fundamental separation of man from experience in the world:

> It is something that happened to the mind of England between the time of Donne or Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the time of Tennyson and Browning; . . . Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose. A thought to Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility. When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. . . . In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; and this dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of the two most powerful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden ("Metaphysical" 247)

Eliot's privileging of the poet's ability to merge different perspectives is highly reminiscent of Woolf's suggestion of the necessary androgyny of the great artist, and it is not entirely clear that either of these attitudes differs that greatly from the kind of Bakhtinian dialogism I have seen to inform the work of Joyce. On the other hand, one could argue that both Eliot and Woolf display a rather un-Joycean nostalgic hope that somehow art might heal the scissions in modern society. Frank Kermode has attacked this view (partly in an undisguised attempt to rehabilitate Milton), seeing Eliot's entire notion as an attempt to justify what he sees as the Symbolist poetics of modernism on an historical basis. Thus dissociation of sensibility is simply

> the most successful version of a Symbolist attempt to explain why the modern world resists works of art that testify to the poet's

> special, anti-intellectual way of knowing truth . . . it is in search of some golden age when the prevalent mode of knowing was not positivist and anti-imaginative; when the Image, the intuited, creative reality, was habitually respected. (*Romantic* 143)

But, as Monroe Spears points out, observations of the fragmentation in the human psyche in the modernist period were too widespread to be easily discounted. It is, for example, a central feature of the thought of agrarian poets and of New Critics such as Ransom, Tate, and Warren (195). Thus Spears notes:

> As to the psychological aspect of dissociation of sensibility, or the theory as a perception about modern life, the evidence of its reality is all too plentiful. The fragmentation of the modern psyche is described not only by the great psychiatrists but by most major writers. (205)

Clearly, then, there are significant and fundamental psychological reasons for the particularly modernist concern with identity and characterization, though these reasons can be associated with specific occurrences in areas outside of psychology itself. In a well-known study, Wylie Sypher sees the modern "loss of the self" as deriving largely from developments in science and mathematics. The "dehumanizing" effect of the growth of technology and of large cities (note that the assembly line was invented by Henry Ford in 1914) was clearly also an important factor, as thinkers such as Heidegger have noted. Langbaum has described this relationship:

> The declining vitality of the self in literature has accompanied a declining confidence in society, in the spiritual power of nature, and in the organic connection of the self with nature. It has accompanied a loss of confidence in the individual and individual effort due to mass production, mass markets, mass media, to increasing urbanization, industrialization, specialization, and to

> the increasing alienation of the self, according to Marx's analysis, from all its specialized functions (*Mysteries* 7).

Indeed, though he himself might have been appalled by the suggestion, there is much in Eliot's diagnosis of the fragmentation of the modern psyche that resembles the Marxist concept of alienation, and his "dissociation of sensibility" is highly reminiscent of the emphasis on modern schizophrenia that appears (for different reasons) in the work of both Jameson and Marshall McLuhan.[15]

My conclusion is that, on the basis of strict textual evidence in their literary works, it is difficult if not impossible to differentiate among the attitudes toward subjectivity taken by authors as ostensibly different as Eliot, Woolf, and Joyce. Now-popular arguments that Eliot is nostalgic for past wholeness, that Woolf is engaged in the adumbration of exciting new feminist modes of subjectivity, and that Joyce produces a politically powerful social conception of the self are largely dependent upon other information that we bring to these texts from the outside. For example, we know from other evidence that Eliot was a conservative Christian, that Woolf recognized the artificiality of gender, and that Joyce sympathized with various left-wing political ideas.

This kind of information is not irrelevant, no matter how wary of the intentional fallacy one might be. As Jameson has argued, a total separation between a writer's artistic production and her own ideological stance "is not possible for any world-view--whether conservative or radical and revolutionary --that takes politics seriously" (*Political* 289). Bakhtin's work in particular emphasizes the importance of considering the position from which the author writes. At the same time,

in Joyce we have to deal with the paradoxical fact that his authorial intention is apparently that we should not yield full interpretative authority to authorial intention, and Bakhtin's work also emphasizes the importance of the position from which the reader reads. It seems clear that the political ramifications of a given work of art arise at least as much from the ideological leanings of the reader as from those of the writer. And the reader's ideology involves not only his "personal" attitudes, but a whole range of contextual and ideological positionings from which the work is read, just as the writer's ideology is itself encompassed by the historical conditions in which the work is produced. But these contexts change with time, and there are aspects of the work of Joyce (or anyone else) that are visible now that simply could not have been visible fifty years ago. In a sense they were not *there* fifty years ago. It is here that literary history becomes particularly critical. If there is an almost irresistible temptation to read works within the framework of "periods" or "movements," it is also clear that the conceptions we have of such schemes of categorization largely determine which elements of a given text will be revealed and which ones will remain hidden in such procedures. History thus becomes doubly-important in any attempt to interpret literary texts within such frameworks, because the general relationship to history that we find within a text is so heavily dependent upon the model of literary history that we impose from without.

> Time present and time past
> Are both perhaps present in time future,
> And time future contained in time past.
> If all time is eternally present
> All time is unredeemable.

With these opening lines from *Burnt Norton* Eliot summarizes what is for many the representative modernist attitude toward time and history. This attitude is essentially an attempt to deny that they even exist, a claim that all times are one--or, at least, a claim that there is a perspective greater and more important than the one we can gain from within time. In the case of Eliot this perspective is God's, and the echo of Augustine in these lines may be no accident. But one need not be a practicing Christian to desire an escape from temporality, and this Augustinian notion of the presentness of both past and future is also echoed in the apostate Stephen Dedalus' vow of "Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past" (*Ulysses* 153).

This kind of denial of history has understandably brought modernists under considerable attack from critics (especially Marxist critics) who see this attitude as politically irresponsible. Thus, for example, Robinson and Vogel charge that modernism

> seeks to intensify isolation. It forces the work of art, the artist, the critic, and the audience outside of history. Modernism denies us the possibility of understanding ourselves as *agents* in the material world, for all has been removed to an abstract world of ideas (198).

Robinson and Vogel also add a feminist orientation to this argument, and in general they appear to regard modernism itself as some sort of

massive, world-wide, white-male-capitalist conspiracy designed to shore up the powers that be and to prevent women and other marginal groups from gaining a slice of the political pie.

Such complaints have a certain validity, though the exact identity of this "modernism" against whom they are being leveled is unclear. Joyce has sometimes been implicated in such charges, and William Spanos identifies Stephen as a paragon of the kind of spatialization of time he sees as characteristic of the desire for an escape from history in the New Criticism, noting that Stephen's stated aesthetic position "constitutes a remarkably accurate *résumé* of New Critical poetic theory" ("Modern" 97). This analysis of both Stephen and the New Critics seems sound. But in a later essay ("Postmodern Literature and Its Occasion") Spanos transfers most of his earlier assault on the New Critics directly to modernism itself, and here the picture becomes more complicated. Against this ethically irresponsible "modernist" denial of history Spanos proposes as paradigm the historical engagement he finds embodied in the existentialism of Heidegger. Heidegger writes: "As authentically futural, *Dasein is* authentically as 'having been' (*gewesen*). Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility (death) is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost 'been'" (*Being* 373, his emphasis).[16] Yet Heidegger's existentialist description of the connectedness of past and future in *Dasein* sounds strangely similar to Eliot's statement of yearning for a timeless eternity. How can we, as Prufrock might say, presume to tell the difference?

The answer is that we must consider the context from which the equally enigmatic statements of Eliot and Heidegger are taken. In the

long run this may come close to saying that we can tell Eliot from Heidegger because we know Eliot is a conservative Christian and Heidegger is an anti-metaphysical existentialist. In other words, we can distinguish between these two passages because we have already decided in advance what they mean based on other information. With Heidegger this kind of interpretation, based on other evidence in his philosophical texts, causes no difficulty. But with Eliot there is no other textual evidence to explain directly his lines and they can be interpreted unequivocally as a rejection of temporality only through access to information external to his poetry itself. After all, the first three lines suggest temporal connectedness as easily as atemporality, and the next two lines are preceded by an "If" that renders their meaning irreducibly ambiguous.[17] Again, there is nothing wrong with introducing such external information, but it should be done carefully, with close attention to ideological implications. There is little to be served by imposing a pre-fabricated model of modernism on Eliot's poem and thus declaring that it shows a contempt for temporality because we know that's what modernist poems are about.

Clearly, analyzing attitudes toward temporality is no simple matter. To Paul Ricoeur, as I noted in the last chapter, it is in fact an impossible matter unless one constructs a narrative model to lend structure to the dilemma. Similarly, I would suggest that one can unequivocally discern the attitude toward time and history in modernist works only by first constructing a narrative of the modernist treatment of temporality in general. And there is nothing necessarily wrong with such constructions. However, they should be used with a great deal of

circumspection, since they will tend to conceal as much as they reveal about a given work of art.

Joyce's work is an excellent example of the potential for impoverishment in such models, since any interpretation of his writing as a statement of typical modernist yearning to awaken from the nightmare of history clearly misses much that is valuable in his work. Spanos himself does not seem to know quite what to do with Joyce, though he does properly note the irony in the fact that the New Critics should seem to cite Stephen's theories of aesthetic stasis as "scriptural authority" even as most readers were already interpreting *Portrait* as a satire of that theory ("Modern" 97). Further, Spanos suggests that Stephen's disgust with temporality mirrors that of Wyndham Lewis, who himself excoriated Joyce for being obsessed with time (103 n24).[18]

Spanos' own narrative of Heideggerian existential engagement is constructed as a counter to Joseph Frank's influential narrative of the spatialization of form in modern literature--which employs Joyce as a central example. Meanwhile, Frank's own narrative takes its shape from Wilhelm Worringer's narrative of the history of art, suggesting that in literary history emphasis fluctuates between temporality, associated with an aesthetics of immanence, and spatiality, associated with an aesthetics of transcendence.[19] Yet if there is a central message in the readings of Joyce I have proposed throughout this study it is that his works embody an aesthetics of immanence and conduct a sustained assault on all notions of transcendence. In short, Stephen's viewpoint, as I have repeatedly emphasized, is not Joyce's, and, as I have also stressed, Joyce's texts are themselves intensely temporal as well as being profoundly embedded in

history. Thus, by my reading, Joyce's texts represent an attitude toward history and temporality that is diametrically opposed to the one that Spanos and Frank (from opposite points of view) both see as being characteristic of modernism.

But the very historical embeddedness of Joyce's work implies that it partakes of much of the same cultural *milieu* as did the contemporary New Criticism. And if Joyce's ironic treatment of Stephen Dedalus shows that Joyce's works potentially take a stance firmly in opposition to the New Critics, it is also true that Joyce's extremely dialogic discourse still allows "New Critical" voices to sound within his texts. A reader who comes to Joyce's work, then, with a prior expectation that it will conform to New Critical aesthetic principles will doubtless find much to confirm those expectations. The same might be said for any number of other modernist writers as well, so that one begins to suspect that much of the difficulty in characterizing modernism arises simply from a confusion between modernism and the New Criticism.

Modernism, Postmodernism, and the New Criticism

By my criteria, Joyce clearly does not conform to conventional ideas about modernist literature. One might argue that my scheme for approaching Joyce's work was developed with the notion of Joyce's refusal to conform to most models of modernism already in mind. However, one can easily reach the same conclusion from a consideration of Beebe's four "cardinal points" of modernism, which were designed to show how *Ulysses* is *the* representative modernist work. Beebe's points include the following: (1) formalism and the importance of structure and design; (2)

an attitude of detachment and non-commitment that can generally be labeled as irony; (3) use of myth not as a discipline for belief or subject of interpretation, but as an arbitrary means of ordering art; (4) reflexivity and the concern of art with its own creation and composition ("*Ulysses*" 175). Yet by my reading Joyce's work engages the outside world in a way so profound that it undermines all formalist approaches to his texts and shows anything but ironic distance;[20] rather than structuring itself by myth, Joyce's work deconstructs myth to reveal the historical contingency that lies behind the development of mythic traditions; and Joyce's reflexivity serves not as a solipsistic exploration of art but as a demonstration of the ways in which discursive conventions are constitutive of social reality.

So maybe Joyce simply isn't a modernist. In his attacks on modernism, Spanos clearly identifies my suggestion of the importance of the interpretive position of the reader as a postmodern stance:

> The objective interpretive methodology of modernism, in other words, is grounded in an ideology sealed off from dialogic encounter. A postmodern hermeneutics, on the other hand, recognizes, with Heidegger, that there can be no presuppositionless understanding of literary texts. ("Postmodern" 224)

Unfortunately, as I have pointed out, Spanos here seems in danger of confusing modernism with the New Criticism, or at least of confusing works of art with certain historically contextualized interpretations of those works, and he is certainly not alone. As Alan Wilde points out, "modernist literature is by now virtually inextricable from the shape modernist criticism has imposed upon it" (20).

As Eliot himself suggests (and exemplifies), in any period "there is a significant relation between the best poetry and the best criticism of the same period" (*Use* 20). However, the relationship between modernism and the New Criticism is probably stronger than similar relationships in any preceding periods. Partly because the difficulty of modernist works made explication necessary, and partly because of educational and social changes that made criticism viable as a profession, modernist works of art exist in a partnership with the criticism of that art to an unprecedented extent.[21]

Curiously enough, this close relationship between modernist works of art and New Critical approaches to those works seems diametrically opposed to the principles upon which the New Criticism was based. The formalist aesthetics of the New Criticism, closely aligned with Eliot's emphasis on a removal of the emotions of the author from the work, dictates a vigilant attention to the interior of a given work without recourse to extratextual details. However, it now seems clear that this approach, far from being an objective, scientific method of reading literature, was itself inscribed within a specific humanist ideology of privileging the interior over the exterior, of esteeming the private experience of the individual more highly than public social concerns. The New Critics, by importing this ideology into the texts they purported to read so objectively, only succeeded in demonstrating the very impossibility of the kind of ideology-free epistemological reading they sought to perform. The hypothetical critic who could perform a reading of a text free of all outside influence would find himself in the position of Wallace Stevens' Snow Man, seeing nothing that is not there,

all right, but also discovering that, with all the ideology removed, nothing *is* there, either.

I have argued here that a principal characteristic of Joyce's texts is that they constantly point beyond themselves and therefore cannot be adequately understood without recourse to extratextual information. Of course, modernist allusiveness is in itself no threat to New Critical principles, as long as the allusions are restricted to the kind of self-enclosed literary universe embodied in Eliot's "Tradition." But the information imported into Joyce's texts (or Eliot's, for that matter) from outside is far from exclusively literary, and a central feature of Joyce's work is the way in which it calls attention to what Jameson has called (in reference to allusive works in general) "the roots such texts send down into the contingent circumstances of their own historical time" (*Political* 34). If Joyce's work can be read within a New Critical framework at all, it is because the New Criticism was itself a part of the contingent historical circumstances in which Joyce's work itself arose.

By my reading, Joyce's texts are much more amenable to interpretation through the hermeneutic mode that Spanos identifies with postmodernism. This result should surprise no one, however, because I am reading from a postmodern perspective which makes it especially easy for me to see the postmodern elements in Joyce. The same can be said to some extent for most other "modernists" as well, and it is no accident that virtually all major modernist writers have gradually become postmodernists after two decades of postmodern criticism. In the case of Joyce, we have a writer whose work apparently was once apolitical, but

now is political, but what has happened is that his work was once read in apolitical ways and now is increasingly being read in political ones. However, I am not suggesting that this apparent transformation in the ideology of Joyce's work is a figment of the critical imagination. Joyce's texts *have* changed over the past fifty years, because the framework within which we read them has changed.

The bottom line is that it makes little sense to categorize individual works of literature as "modernist" or "postmodernist," even if we can figure out what we think those terms mean. It is simply not possible to separate the characteristics of the work from the characteristics of the method of interpretation being used to read that work. Joyce's ability to be both the ultimate modernist and the ultimate postmodernist illustrates this conclusion in a particularly dramatic way. But Joyce's example does not teach us that we should somehow try to rid ourselves of our interpretive prejudices in an attempt to prevent critical contamination and thereby discover the "real" Joyce. Joyce's texts, through their palinodic and self-parodic mode of textuality, clearly demonstrate that there is no single "real" Joyce. His texts are thus constantly in motion, all perpetually remaining works in progress.

By denying us any fixed epistemological object for our critical investigations, Joyce's texts remind us of the way in which interpretation is so often constitutive, rather than merely descriptive, of the object of that interpretation. But just because Joyce's texts espouse no single fixed ideology does not mean that they are ideology-free. On the contrary, they thus suggest a mode of reading in which the reader must remain vigilantly alert to his own ideological prejudices and

to the way in which he often reads those prejudices into the text being read. Moreover, once conscious of his own ideology, the reader is then sensitized to the presence of various conflicting ideological voices in the text itself. The heavily political orientation of Joyce's work suggests that its refusal of closure in interpretation is a figure of the resistance to monologism in the real world of history and politics. Joyce's texts deny the authority of the author, and of the text, and of the reader to declare an unchallenged version of reality. As such, they teach us a mode of radical skepticism that not only prevents the mechanical sorting of literary works into categories such as "modernism" and "postmodernism," but that is also fundamentally antithetical to any authoritarian or totalitarian system of politics. Like Bakhtin, who declared that there is no "last word," and like Nietzsche, who suggested that the world is not nearly so fixed and stable as the tradition of metaphysics would have it, the incessant motion of Joyce's texts leaves us with a vision of a universe in constant flux in which the monological proclamations of tyrants can take no purchase.

Notes

[1]On Woolf's use of various "real-world" materials in her work, see Zwerdling.

[2]Which is why Joyce has been accused of dwelling both in the gutter and in the ivory tower. Both charges are valid to a certain extent, but it is also clear that if both are true then neither is true in the way that they have typically been meant.

[3]Such demands are not, however, unprecedented. Consider the intricate network of allusions and interconnections in a work such as Dante's *Commedia*.

[4]Kenner notes that some wags took to referring to the poem as "the piece that passes understanding" soon after its publication (*Invisible* 182).

[5]It is, of course, possible to argue that the various voices in *The Waste Land* are canonized, and thus stripped of ideological force. This argument is esentially the one made by Bedient. However, it is not clear whether this perception of the sterility of Eliot's voices comes from the poem itself or from other information outside the poem. Moreover, once various social voices are imported into a text, there is always a possibility that readers will activate them, regardless of authorial intention.

[6]Moreover, there are many parallels between *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land*, including some cases of a direct influence of Joyce's novel upon Eliot's poem. See Stanley Sultan for an extensive study of the relationship between these two works.

[7]Such similarities may not be accidental. Eliot was certainly no Marxist, but neo-Marxists such as Jameson and Adorno were powerfully influenced by modernism, as well as by Marxism.

[8]Compare Woolf's suggestion that the new fiction of writers like Joyce is more realistic than the "realism" of writers such as Galsworthy because it is more in tune with the "luminous halo" that is the true character of life ("Modern" 212).

[9]Thus Eliot suggests that he is no more qualified to interpret *The Waste Land* than is anybody else: "But what a poem means is as much what it means to others as what it means to the author" (*Use* 122).

[10]Josipovici's suggestion obviously has much in common with the formulations of "defamiliarization" by the Russian formalists and with the more explicitly political "estrangement" effect in Brecht.

[11]Among other things, the multiple levels of meaning in Joyce's writing are reminiscent of the literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical levels of medieval Biblical exegesis. Joyce may have taken his cue here from Dante, who was the first to employ the technique of fourfold meaning in a secular text, and indeed Sollers has noted that "[l]ike Dante, Joyce uses a dispositif of four superimposed layers of sense" (116). For an extensive discussion of Dante's use of the method of fourfold Biblical allegory, see Hollander. Note, however, that in Joyce the method is significantly complicated by his frequently metaparodic mode--it is generally impossible in his work to definitively distinguish between any of these levels of meaning and a parody of the same level.

[12]Indeed, Ross suggests that Eliot's very "invisibility" as author of *The Waste Land*, combined with the canonical ascendancy of that poem during peak years of the New Criticism, resulted in a situation in which the fortunes of *The Waste Land* and of the New Criticism were "inextricably linked" (39).

[13]Compare Woolf's contention that the goal of the artist should be to "practise anonymity" (*Writer's Diary* 119).

[14]Just how successful Eliot was in avoiding autobiography in his own poetry is open to debate. Recent analyses of *The Waste Land*, based on the evidence of the published manuscript versions of the poem, have emphasized its personal nature. (See, for example, Moody.)

[15]Note also that Eliot's identification of the seventeenth century as the time when the human psyche began to be fragmented roughly corresponds historically with Marxist arguments that this fragmentation began with the rise of the bourgeois self (and of print technology) after the Renaissance. Also note the way in which Woolf sees the era of the Elizabethan playwrights as the last great heyday of authorial anonymity, after which the rise of the printed book results in a cult of authorship and of the individual. Thus, Shakespeare becomes for Woolf the last great figure of "Anon," and she ends her essay on the subject by noting that "[t]he book after Shakespeare takes the place of the play. And Anon is dead for ever" ("Anon" 424).

[16]Even more Eliotic is a statement of Jacques Lacan: "What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming" (*Écrits* 86). Lacan, of course, was significantly influenced by Heidegger, and here he may have even been influenced by Eliot, since later in the same essay he produces a description of the *Damyata*, *Datta*, and *Dayadhyam* of the god of thunder that must surely have *The Waste Land* in mind (106-7).

[17]The fact that Eliot's lines may be a direct allusion to Ecclesiastes 3:15 is of no help, since we are given no indication of the attitude that the poem takes toward this source, and anyway the Biblical verse is just as confusing as Eliot's poem: "That which has been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is past."

[18]For example, Lewis sardonically suggests that the overly time-conscious Joyce instinctively treated time after the manner of Bergson and Einstein, without necessarily realizing what he was doing (106-7).

[19]Worringer's distinction between transcendence and immanence in art is described in an appendix to his *Abstraction and Empathy* (122-35).

[20]For an extensive argument that the kind of Kierkegaardian irony of distance implied by Beebe is in fact representative not of Joyce, but of Stephen Dedalus, see Buttigieg ("*Portrait*" 49-106)

[21]One might also argue that the growing availability of sophisticated explication made the difficulty of modernist works feasible. Ong notes that the New Critics were the first professional literary scholars: "The New Criticism was the product of the first age when thousands of persons became intent on academic, and ultimately scholarly, analysis" (33). Of

course, the New Critics dealt with a variety of literary works, not just modernist ones. However, as Ong points out, their preoccupation with contemporary literary was unprecedented in the history of criticism (30). See also Spears for an extensive discussion of the importance of the New Critics and their successors (such as Kermode and Frye) to the modernist movement (153-228).

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